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1	
Abstract	
	
	 Crises	can	have	significant	effects	on	the	method	of	policy	creation	and	on	the	
content	of	the	resulting	policy	itself.		This	paper	investigates	the	method	of	policy	creation	
employed	in	response	to	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2008.		In	particular,	this	paper	looks	at	
the	creation	and	implementation	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	that	attempted	to	address	the	
causes	of	the	crisis	and	minimize	the	likelihood	and	severity	of	future	crises.		By	using	a	
rational	choice	theory	and	a	transaction	cost	analysis	framework	to	investigate	the	actions	
taken	by	political	actors	as	they	responded	to	the	unfolding	crisis,	this	paper	investigated	
the	method	of	policy	creation	and	the	motivations	that	determined	it.			
A	close	reading	of	the	actions	of	the	legislative	branch	during	the	crisis	and	post-crisis	
period	investigating	whether	the	actions	were	consistent	with	the	results	predicted	by	
delegation	theory	literature	found	considerable	support	for	the	abdication	hypothesis	
during	this	crisis.		It	also	became	apparent	that	a	few	key	constraints	including	time	limits	
and	consultation	requirements	were	used	extensively	by	congress	during	this	period	to	
control	the	actions	of	agents	that	were	delegated	power	whereas	some	other	sorts	of	
constraints.		By	way	of	comparison,	other	constraint	types	were	used	sparingly.	
Congress	also	appeared	to	have	had	specific	motivations	for	the	choice	of	agent	to	
delegate	to	which	were	present	for	most	of	the	acts	of	delegation.		These	included	ensuring	
agency	independence,	ensuring	coordination,	leveraging	agency	expertise,	and	ensuring	
constant	and	long-term	attention	to	an	issue.			
Along	with	congress’	explicit	delegation	of	power	to	the	administration,	there	were	
considerable	amounts	of	implicit	delegation	in	which	executive	branch	actors	asserted	
powers	that	were	not	explicitly	delegated.		The	instances	of	implicit	delegation	decreased	
later	in	the	crisis	as	the	focus	of	policy	creation	shifted	from	mitigating	the	current	crisis	to	
forestalling	future	crises.	
During	the	crisis,	the	president	primarily	relied	on	the	power	to	persuade	and	largely	
avoided	using	executive	actions	to	create	policy.		In	addition,	minimal	power	and	authority	
was	delegated	by	congress	directly	to	the	president	during	this	financial	crisis.	
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1. Introduction	
	
	 The	public	policy	of	the	United	States	directly	affects	the	lives	of	more	than	300	
million	American	citizens	as	well	as	countless	individuals	residing	in	other	nations.		It	thus	is	
of	great	importance	as	to	where	this	policy	comes	from	and	what	it	consists	of.		There	are	
numerous	ways	in	which	public	policy	gets	created	in	the	United	States.		Most	of	these	are	
formal	processes	requiring	actions	of	the	president,	congress,	or	the	bureaucracy	to	enact	
policy	though	in	some	instances	policy	can	be	created	or	enacted	by	habit	or	precedent	or	
through	the	courts.		By	the	term	public	policy,	this	paper	is	referring	to	those	actions	of	
government	that	set	governmental	action	and	priorities.		This	can	include	laws	and	
regulations,	but	also	includes	spending	priorities,	foreign	relations,	military	actions,	and	
other	courses	of	actions	that	affect	the	lives	of	citizens	or	the	actions	of	the	nation.	
	 For	much	of	the	history	of	the	United	States,	enacting	public	policy	was	primarily	
done	by	congress	through	the	issuance	of	laws.		Now	however,	it	is	increasingly	performed	
by	other	political	actors	and	by	other	methods	such	as	delegation1	and	unilateral	executive	
actions.2		By	making	the	assumption	that	the	president,	those	in	congress,	and	the	
bureaucracy	are	rational	political	actors	one	can	investigate	why	specific	avenues	of	policy	
creation	are	used	and	why	this	has	led	to	a	decrease	in	the	percentage	of	policy	enacted	by	
congress.		One	can	also	examine	how	the	process	of	creating	policy	is	altered	by	the	
existence	of	a	crisis	affecting	the	nation.		There	are	numerous	methods	that	can	be	used	to	
create	policy	and	the	decision	to	use	one	avenue	of	policy	creation	rather	than	another	is	a	
conscious	political	decision	by	one	or	more	political	actors.		There	are	different	
requirements,	costs,	and	payoffs	for	each	method	of	enacting	policy	and	some	are	open	to	
only	certain	political	actors	or	are	available	only	at	certain	times.		Some	methods	are	cyclical	
in	nature	and	more	valuable	at	different	times	in	a	political	cycle.		The	existence	of	a	crisis	
influences	the	political	decisions	that	lead	to	actors	selecting	one	method	or	another	with	
																																																						
1	Kiewiet,	D.	Roderick	and	Mathew	D.	McCubbins.		The	Logic	of	Delegation:	Congressional	Parties	and	the	
Appropriations	Process.		University	of	Chicago	Press.		1991.		
2	Howell,	William	G.		Power	without	Persuasion:	The	Politics	of	Direct	Presidential	Action.		Princeton	University	
Press,	2003.	
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which	to	pursue	their	ends.		Furthermore,	this	decision	can	have	profound	effects	
throughout	the	process	affecting	issue	identification,	policy	formulation,	agenda	setting,	
decision-making,	and	policy	implementation.		The	resulting	policy	is	in	turn	greatly	affected	
by	these	factors	and	thus	is	dependent	on	whether	there	is	a	crisis	and	its	characteristics.	
	 The	common	methods	through	which	policy	can	be	created	are	directly	by	congress	
in	the	form	of	legislation,	through	delegation,	or	unilaterally	by	the	president.		Each	of	these	
has	many	different	potential	variations.		For	instance	the	president	can	perform	a	host	of	
different	types	of	unilateral	actions	and	congress	can	structure	delegation	in	a	number	of	
ways	depending	on	the	needs	of	the	situation.	
While	congress,	due	to	its	role	as	the	incarnation	of	legislative	power,	has	typically	
been	viewed	as	the	creator	of	policy	in	the	government,	the	situation	is	far	more	complex	
and	congress	plays	a	much	smaller	role	than	the	constitution	may	imply.		The	president,	
governmental	agencies,	organizations,	local	government,	and	international	organizations	all	
create	policy.		There	are	often	complex	policy	solutions	and	a	large	number	of	potential	
ways	for	public	policy	to	be	created	and	congress	does	not	have	a	monopoly	on	these.		Even	
when	enacting	policy	using	methods	in	which	congress	has	primacy	it	must	make	allowances	
and	adapt	its	policy	preferences	to	those	of	others.	
There	have	been	different	views	on	the	extent	to	which	the	various	bodies	of	
government	have	control	over	the	actions	of	government.		These	range	from	those	that	
believe	that	there	is	congressional	dominance3	to	those	that	see	a	powerful	presidency	that	
over	time	has	continued	to	gain	powers.4		The	central	question	about	dominance	is	to	what	
extent	do	the	various	bodies	have	power	over	the	policy	creation	outcomes	and	the	actions	
of	government.		Similar	to	the	question	of	who	has	power	over	policy,	there	is	the	debate	
over	whose	preferences	are	represented	by	the	actions	of	the	government.	
Often	policy	creation	does	not	have	a	single	source	but	relies	on	political	bodies	that	
have	an	overt	role	in	its	shaping	as	well	as	those	that	have	had	a	more	subtle	role.		
Governmental	bodies	negotiate	amongst	themselves	to	determine	what	actions	are	taken.		
Different	political	entities	often	will	adopt	differing	strategies	to	address	an	issue	even	when	
																																																						
3	Calvert,	Moran	and	Weingast	1987;	McCubbins	and	Schwartz	1984;	Weingast	and	Moran	1983	
4	Golden	2000;	Nathan	1983	
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the	desired	end	result	is	similar.		There	is	an	interplay	between	political	actors	and	
governmental	bodies	that	work	with	and	compete	against	each	other	as	each	tries	to	
achieve	its	political	ends.5		While	each	political	actor	ultimately	seeks	to	advance	his/her	
own	ends,	the	fact	that	national	politics	is	a	repeated	game	leads	political	actors	and	
political	bodies	to	be	strongly	incentivized	to	get	along	and	work	together	and	rules	become	
institutionalized.6		This	cooperation	leads	to	the	best	and	most	predictable	results	for	
individual	political	actors	and	thereby	maximizes	their	returns.		In	part,	governmental	bodies	
take	actions	that	are	in	accordance	with	the	political	actors	that	comprise	them,	but	also	
limit	the	range	of	action	of	the	typical	political	actor.		The	bodies	or	institutions	take	steps	
such	as	punishing	those	that	do	not	act	in	good	faith	that	can	bring	actions	of	the	body	more	
in	line	with	the	median	actor	that	comprises	it.		These	individuals	that	are	aggrieved	will	
sometimes	act	as	strong	reciprocators	and	punish	those	that	they	feel	have	trespassed	
against	them	even	when	the	act	of	punishment	may	lead	to	even	greater	losses	for	the	
aggrieved.7		This	helps	lead	to	more	predictable	political	results.	
The	creation	of	public	policy	is	not	a	discrete	event,	but	typically	consists	of	a	
political	dialog	over	time	between	a	number	of	individuals	and	groups.		Often	a	draft	of	a	
public	policy	is	first	designed	or	created	and	it	is	only	a	later	date	that	it	may	get	enacted.		
At	both	the	initial	creation	stage	of	the	policy	and	at	its	enactment	the	policy	can	be	shaped	
and	individuals	and	entities	can	change	the	policy	that	is	enacted.		In	the	current	political	
system	bills	for	example	may	come	from	a	number	of	sources	such	as	interest	groups	or	
congressional	committees.	Most	bills	that	are	submitted	each	session	do	not	get	passed	in	
that	session.8		Over	time	support	may	grow	for	a	policy	and	it	may	be	reintroduced	and	
eventually	become	a	law.		The	president	also	often	cherry	picks	from	proposals	with	good	
acceptance	from	congress	and	the	nation	and	he	adopts	and	embraces	certain	of	these	
initiatives	which	become	part	of	his	legislative	agenda	or	a	plank	in	his	campaign.		This	can	
lead	to	a	significant	lag	between	the	initial	drafting	of	a	proposal	and	the	point	at	which	
support	for	the	bill	has	increase	to	such	an	extent	that	it	gets	enacted.		During	a	crisis,	this	
																																																						
5	Hall,	Peter	A.	and	Rosemary	C.	R.	Taylor.		Political	Science	and	the	Three	New	Institutionalisms.		1996.	
6	Greif,	and	Christopher	Kingston.		“Institutions:	Rules	or	Equilibria”	in	Political	Economy	of	Institutions,	
Democracy	and	Voting.		2011.	
7	Gintis,	Herbert.		“The	Evolution	of	Strong	Reciprocity:	Cooperation	in	Heterogeneous	Populations.”	
Theoretical	Population	Biology,	65:	17–28.		2004.	
8	Govtrack.		“Statistics	and	Historical	Comparison”		https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics	
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time	period	between	the	initial	policy	proposal	and	policy	implementation	can	be	
significantly	shortened	as	is	the	period	between	the	problem	recognition	and	the	policy	
proposal.		This	is	one	of	the	factors	that	can	lead	to	differences	between	the	policy	formed	
during	a	crisis	and	that	formed	during	the	steady	state.		
	 Certain	policy	areas	lend	themselves	to	different	methods	of	enacting	policy.		
Foreign	affairs	and	military	affairs	are	typically	domains	in	which	the	president	has	primacy.		
While	both	the	president	and	congress	have	some	formal	powers	in	these	areas,	typically	
the	president	largely	guides	the	creation	of	policy	in	these	policy	areas.	However	even	in	
these	areas	congress	has	some	powers	and	though	the	president	typically	is	able	to	move	
first	in	this	arena,	congress	often	has	recourses	available	if	it	were	to	decide	that	it	
disapproved	of	the	agreements	that	the	president	has	signed	or	the	policy	that	he	is	
proposing	that	the	nation	adopt.		Economic	policy	is	an	area	where	the	president	typically	
has	less	ability	to	unilaterally	set	policy,	however	his/her	ability	to	do	so	is	bolstered	in	a	
crisis.	
In	addition	to	the	president’s	role	in	creating	policy,	congress	also	delegates	
considerable	power	to	executive	agencies	and	other	bodies.		While	congress	often	places	
constraints	on	these	entities	to	ensure	that	the	policy	that	is	ultimately	created	is	within	a	
narrow	range	of	alternatives	that	are	acceptable	to	congress,	this	still	allows	pieces	of	public	
policy	to	be	determined	by	those	to	whom	this	power	is	delegated.		In	a	crisis,	the	
bureaucracy	creates	and	implements	policies	based	off	of	power	that	had	been	authorized	
prior	to	the	crisis	and	often	receives	additional	powers	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		In	some	
instances	these	powers	may	be	temporary,	but	often	even	these	can	have	an	effect	on	
altering	allowed	actions	of	the	bureaucracy	and	can	affect	the	shaping	of	future	economic	
policy.	
	 This	paper	will	look	at	the	methods	of	policy	creation	used	during	the	financial	crisis	
and	the	causes	for	those	methods.		It	also	looks	for	general	trends	regarding	the	structure	of	
delegation	during	this	period	and	the	reasons	that	it	was	used.	
	
1.1	Methodology	
	
6	
	 The	analysis	conducted	in	this	paper	makes	several	assumptions.		First	of	all,	
bounded	rationality	is	assumed	in	order	to	investigate	the	way	political	actors	and	bodies	
behave	and	how	it	affects	public	policy	creation.		In	other	words	political	actors	cannot	
know	all	the	relevant	facts	and	often	must	make	decisions	in	a	fast-paced	environment	with	
incomplete	information.		They	are	thus	capable	of	making	mistakes.		This	is	not	to	say	that	
these	actors	are	irrational.		Rather,	this	paper	makes	the	assumption	that	each	actor	has	a	
payoff	function	that	may	be	shaped	by	multiple	motivations	and	that	each	actor	will	
attempt	to	maximize	their	payoff	function.	
This	dissertation	looks	at	the	creation	of	economic	policy	during	a	crisis	over	the	7-
year	period	spanning	the	start	of	the	housing	crisis	and	ending	with	the	4-year	anniversary	
of	the	Dodd–Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act.		In	other	words,	this	
paper	covers	the	period	from	2007	through	July	2014.		This	timeframe	shows	the	current	
status	of	policy	creation	and	also	includes	a	number	of	political	situations	and	corresponding	
power	balances.		It	also	includes	different	economic	crises	including	the	bursting	of	the	
housing	bubble,	the	following	recession,	and	a	number	of	related	issues	and	at	all	segments	
of	a	crisis:	lead	up,	identification,	initial	response,	deepening,	plateau,	improvement,	
resolution,	and	aftermath.		By	bubble	the	paper	refers	to	a	large	and	long-lasting	deviation	
of	the	price	of	some	asset-such	as	a	stock,	bond,	or	a	house-from	its	fundamental	value.9		
	 There	were	several	crises	that	occurred	since	2000.		By	the	term	“crises”	this	paper	
refers	to	external	events	that	combine	immediacy,	severe	downside	risk,	and	public	
salience.		Typically	these	are	exogenous	events	that	are	not	expected.		Using	this	definition,	
there	were	a	number	of	crises	during	this	period.		The	lists	of	crises	during	this	period	
include	the	tech	bust,	a	series	of	corporate	accounting	scandals,	the	Deepwater	Horizon	oil	
spill,	the	oil	crisis	from	the	mid-2000s,	the	California	Electricity	Crisis,	Hurricane	Katrina,	the	
responses	to	the	9/11	terror	attacks	and	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	California	
electricity	crisis,	the	war	in	Afghanistan,	the	war	in	Iraq,	escalating	world	food	prices,	the	
Housing	Crisis,	and	the	Financial	Crisis.				This	paper	focuses	on	the	housing	and	financial	
crisis	because	the	populace	was	severely	adversely	affected	by	this	crisis	and	it	was	viewed	
by	most	of	the	nations	as	being	a	threat	to	them	and	as	having	immediacy.		The	crisis	this	
																																																						
9	Blinder,	Alan	S.		After	the	Music	Stopped:		The	Financial	Crisis,	the	Response,	and	the	Work	Ahead.		Penguin	
Press.		2013.	
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paper	will	investigate	was	selected	because	it	arguably	accounts	for	some	of	the	most	
important	legislation	made	since	the	start	of	the	millennium	and	thus	can	show	how	policy	
is	created	in	this	day	and	age.		Also,	because	of	its	importance,	it	is	comprised	of	much	more	
than	a	single	policy	decision,	but	rather	is	shaped	by	a	host	of	different	actions	and	thus	
gives	us	more	data	and	complexity	to	investigate.			
By	nature	of	their	public	visibility	and	the	threat	they	entail,	crises	will	generally	elicit	
a	response	from	government	to	either	forestall	the	deleterious	effects	of	the	crisis	or	at	
least	to	be	seen	by	the	public	as	taking	action	and	working	for	their	constituents	by	dealing	
with	the	crisis.		Thus	this	is	typically	a	time	when	the	government	will	attempt	to	enact	
significant	public	policy	changes	and	there	generally	is	greater	willingness	on	the	part	of	the	
public	and	governmental	institutions	to	accept	larger	initiatives	than	would	be	the	case	
otherwise.		When	confronted	with	a	crisis,	the	government	must	decide	how	to	respond	to	
the	crisis	and	what	policy	should	get	implemented	as	part	of	this	response.		Crisis	after	all	
comes	from	the	Greek	word	krisis	meaning	'decision'.		This	tendency	to	made	significant	and	
often	drastic	policy	changes	when	confronted	with	cries	makes	this	an	important	area	to	
investigate.			
	 To	investigate	the	questions	posed	by	this	paper,	this	paper	makes	use	of	common	
theories	and	research	on	such	topics	as	political	motivations,	crises,	and	delegation.			This	
dissertation	investigates	where	public	policy	originates	from	and	the	way	it	is	structured	by	
looking	at	actions	during	the	period	studied	and	by	looking	at	a	detailed	case	study.		This	will	
help	this	paper	to	determine	the	validity	of	the	assertion	that	the	legislative	branch	is	but	
one	of	many	actors	enacting	public	policy	and	the	role	of	different	avenues	of	policy	
creation	in	response	to	a	crisis.		Furthermore	this	paper	will	use	those	methods	to	
determine	how	this	public	policy	is	determined	by	institutional	and	environmental	variables	
and	how	in	turn	in	turn	will	determine	the	content	of	the	public	policy.		The	case	study	
included	focuses	on	the	creation	of	a	major	piece	or	pieces	of	economic	public	policy	and	
provides	a	vantage	point	into	the	steps	taken	to	create	the	policy.		It	also	investigates	the	
roles	of	various	political	actors	in	it	the	policy	creation	process.		These	major	pieces	of	policy	
are	particularly	pertinent	and	are	worthy	of	study	because	they	have	had	significant	second	
and	third	order	effects	on	the	actions	of	the	United	States	and	the	lives	of	its	citizens	and	
also	form	the	default	pattern	for	future	government	action	when	faced	with	similar	stimuli.		
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To	investigate	the	effect	of	crisis,	this	paper	will	assume	a	default	case	in	which	
congress	creates	policy	without	a	crisis.		It	then	looks	to	see	what	the	result	would	be	in	this	
default,	status	quo	case	and	from	that	it	will	try	to	ascertain	any	changes	in	the	causes	or	
net	effects	on	policy	that	occur	do	to	the	existence	of	a	crisis	
The	methods	by	which	policy	is	created	change	over	time	and	some	scholars	have	
claimed	that	in	the	current	day	and	age	there	has	been	a	shift	in	who	creates	policy	in	that	
the	executive	branch	is	said	to	have	an	increasing	role	in	this	domain.10		By	looking	in	depth	
at	the	actions	of	political	players,	these	assertions	will	be	tested	with	the	empirical	data	in	
these	examples	to	determine	the	extent	of	the	role	during	a	crisis.		The	paper	also	
investigates	how	various	policy	tools	fit	into	a	politician’s	toolbox	and	how	they	interact	to	
each	other	during	a	crisis.	
While	this	paper	is	focused	on	successful	policy	changes,	it	is	important	to	note	that	
other	major	attempts	to	change	policy	have	been	less	successful.	The	failure	to	enact	new	
policy	can	provide	insight	into	the	policy	making	process	and	the	avenues	for	policy	
creation.	
	 The	period	that	was	selected	to	study	was	2007-2014.		This	span	of	time	is	a	long	
enough	period	that	information	can	be	gained	by	investigating	it,	but	is	focused	enough	to	
allow	the	study	to	determine	the	details	of	the	current	processes	of	public	policy	creation.		
This	paper	intends	to	do	an	empirical	analysis	to	see	if	the	data	during	this	period	are	
consistent	with	hypotheses	put	forward	by	researchers	in	the	field.		This	paper	largely	uses	a	
case	study	to	investigate	these	facts	as	opposed	to	more	of	a	statistical	method	such	as	that	
employed	by	Shull11	or	Epstein	and	O’Halloran12	as	this	seems	to	gloss	over	much	of	the	
details	and	complexity.	
There	is	a	complex	interplay	of	forces	that	shape	the	method	by	which	policy	is	
created	and	the	policy	creation	itself	depends	on	numerous	political	actors.		There	are	
																																																						
10	Golden	2000;	Nathan	1983	
11	Shull,	Steven	A.		Policy	by	Other	Means.		Texas	A	&	M	University	Press,	2006.	
12	Epstein,	David	and	Sharyn	O’Halloran.		Delegating	Powers:	A	Transaction	Cost	Politics	Approach	to	Policy	
Making	under	Separate	Powers.		Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.	
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number	of	variables	that	determine	the	actions	of	economic	actors	and	the	method	they	
choose	to	create	policy.		There	are	also	environmental	issues	such	as	whether	there	is	a	
crisis	or	not	that	can	alter	behaviors	of	political	actors	and	thus	alter	policy	produced	in	
terms	of	scale	as	well	as	content.		In	addition,	there	are	also	institutional	and	structural	
variables	such	as	whether	the	congress	and	presidency	are	both	held	by	the	same	party.		
Finally,	there	are	also	personal	variables	such	as	the	president’s	ADA	score	and	tendency	to	
act	unilaterally.		This	dissertation	does	not	use	either	a	congress-centric	or	president-centric	
framework	to	delve	into	the	nuances,	but	rather	attempts	to	look	at	the	events	and	
causality	that	created	policy.		The	actual	actions	that	led	to	the	formation	of	policy	depend	
on	a	number	of	factors	and	cannot	be	adequate	summarized	with	a	simpler	framework.		
That	being	said,	this	analysis	can	provide	general	information	that	can	be	used	to	investigate	
this	topic	and	can	serve	researchers	who	wish	to	explore	it	further.	
	 As	part	of	this	assessment	process,	this	research	will	attempt	to	ascertain	if	there	is	a	
pattern	that	describes	the	methods	through	which	policy	is	created.		In	particular	in	looking	
at	a	case	study	this	paper	seeks	to	determine	whether	it	was	congress,	the	president,	the	
executive	branch,	or	some	complex	interrelation	amongst	these	that	led	to	the	
establishment	of	public	policy.		Public	policy	is	one	of	the	main	outputs	of	government	and	
so	one	can	gain	a	broad	sense	as	to	government’s	functioning	by	its	handling	of	this	key	
governmental	capability.		The	specifics	of	public	policy	and	its	effects	rely	largely	on	who	
creates	the	policy	and	the	manner	that	was	used	to	create	it.		Thus	one	would	expect	the	
institutional	framework	as	well	as	power	balances	between	the	various	political	actors	to	
have	an	effect	on	the	resultant	policy	they	create.	
	 There	are	differences	in	the	methods	used	to	create	public	policy	between	the	
current	period	and	past	eras	of	government	as	shown	by	recent	studies	stating	for	instance	
that	delegation	is	a	lot	more	common	today	than	it	was	in	the	past.13		In	addition,	there	is	an	
increase	in	partisanship	that	should	both	affect	the	way	that	policy	is	created	as	well	as	the	
way	it	is	structured.		While	partisanship	and	battles	between	the	president	and	the	congress	
																																																						
13	Marshall,	William	P.		“Eleven	Reasons	Why	Presidential	Power	Inevitably	Expands	and	Why	It	Matters”		
Boston	University	Law	Review	Vol	88,	Number	2:	505-522.		2008.	
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have	a	long	history	it	is	generally	acknowledge	to	have	increased	over	the	last	few	decades	
and	this	has	led	to	difficulty	passing	laws.	
There	have	been	major	structural	changes	over	the	years	that	have	altered	the	
institutions	and	the	political	environment	and	thus	the	policy	creation	of	the	current	era	
differs	significantly	from	those	in	say	the	1960s.		Among	these	changes	have	been	changes	
in	power	between	the	president	and	congress,	the	tendency	in	the	House	to	send	a	bill	to	
multiple	committees,	the	ruling	that	legislative	vetoes	are	unconstitutional,	the	Democrats	
losing	their	stranglehold	on	the	House	of	Representatives,	and	the	move	away	from	
centralized	control	of	the	House	of	Representatives.	
	 While	each	of	these	may	seem	like	a	relatively	small	change,	when	combined	they	
have	a	major	effect	which	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	policy	creation	from	the	1960s	was	
significantly	different	from	how	it	is	now.		In	addition,	there	are	countless	other	factors	that	
are	different	about	this	period,	such	as	an	all-time	low	in	vetoes,	which	may	have	as	of	yet	
unknown	effects	on	policy	creation	and	thus	also	make	this	period	unique.		Thus,	since	the	
framework	in	which	policy	is	created	is	so	transitory,	this	paper	focuses	on	a	small	time	
period	to	get	a	snapshot	of	policy	creation	as	it	currently	stands.		While	the	period	is	small	it	
is	relatively	representative	in	terms	of	governmental	control.		It	includes	a	period	with	a	
Democrat	as	president	and	a	period	with	a	Republican	as	president.		Furthermore,	this	
period	includes	periods	in	which	one	party	controls	both	the	presidency	and	the	congress,	
those	in	which	congress	and	the	presidency	are	controlled	by	opposite	parties,	and	those	in	
which	congress	itself	was	split	so	that	one	party	controlled	one	house	while	the	other	party	
controlled	the	other	house.	
The	first	step	to	analyzing	the	creation	of	policy	during	a	crisis	is	to	determine	what	
methods	are	used	in	which	situations	and	why	it	is	they	are	used	in	those	situations.		The	
choice	of	a	method	to	create	policy	is	a	political	act	that	directly	affects	policy	and	so	it	must	
be	analyzed	as	such.		As	such	one	may	look	to	what	determines	this	political	action	taken	by	
various	members	of	government.			
Delegation	is	one	of	the	key	methods	of	creating	policy	and	should	be	investigated	to	
see	in	what	situations	it	is	used	rather	than	direct	legislation.		One	method	one	can	use	to	
analyze	the	act	of	delegation	is	to	use	the	Truth	in	Legislation	Statement	posited	by	
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Schoenbrod.14		While	he	uses	these	hypothetical	statements	as	a	way	to	think	about	curbing	
what	he	sees	as	rampant	delegation,	the	sections	where	he	breaks	out	the	required	
information	that	congress	would	need	to	supply	for	each	bill	under	his	hypothetical	Truth	in	
Legislation	Act	match	the	information	that	we’d	want	to	analyze	the	individual	acts	of	
delegation.		He	lays	out	the	following	article	regarding	each	piece	of	delegation:	each	issue	
that	the	bill	delegates;	the	extent	to	which	the	bill	does	and	does	not	give	guidance	on	how	
the	delegation	should	be	implanted;	why	Congress	decided	not	to	make	the	law	itself;	the	
kinds	of	blame	that	the	delegation	might	shift	from	legislators	to	the	agency;	the	resources	
and	time	needed	to	carry	out	the	delegation	in	comparison	with	the	resources	and	time	
provided	in	the	bill	and	current	appropriations;	the	extent	to	which	legislators	may	
intervene	in	the	implementation	of	the	delegation;	and	the	personal	advantage	that	could	
accrue	to	legislators	from	such	intervention.		A	similar	analysis	can	also	be	done	for	
unilateral	executive	action.	
The	focus	on	resources	was	included	in	Schoenbrod’s	list	as	congress’	lack	of	time	to	
handle	issues	is	a	common	reason	given	for	why	congress	delegates.		Schoenbrod	also	
focused	on	it	due	to	a	concern	about	unfunded	mandates	in	which	congress	can	pass	
political	costs	on	to	others,	but	get	credit	for	doing	a	good	deed.		Among	the	examples	of	
this	he	describes	is	the	mandate	by	the	federal	government	that	schools	and	the	local	
governments	that	fund	them	to	clean	up	asbestos.		The	local	governments	are	not	allowed	
to	decide	at	what	point	it	made	sense	to	require	asbestos	removal	or	to	weigh	the	costs	and	
benefits	of	actions.		Instead	congress	got	credit	for	protecting	the	safety	of	school	children,	
but	the	costs,	both	economic	and	political,	were	borne	by	the	local	governments.		Looking	at	
this	second	point	can	tell	us	about	what	congress	is	trying	to	accomplish	with	this	
delegation.			
The	analysis	of	the	choice	of	policy	creation	method	is	focused	largely	on	the	factors	
listed	by	Schoenbrod.		This	paper	does	this	by	looking	at	the	characteristics	of	the	policy	
creation	method	and	making	suppositions	about	the	motivations	of	political	actors	based	off	
their	votes,	words,	political	power,	etc.		
																																																						
14	Schoenbrod,	David.		Power	Without	Responsibility:	How	Congress	Abuses	the	People	Through	Delegation.		
Yale	University	Press,	2008.		Page	172.	
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When	delegation	is	used	to	create	policy	one	can	look	at	related	factors	as	well	such	
as	who	is	delegated	too,	the	constraints	used	in	the	delegation,	and	the	scope	of	the	
delegation.		These	can	get	to	the	heart	of	some	of	the	questions	above,	but	can	also	give	a	
view	as	to	what	the	result	of	the	delegation	will	be	and	how	the	delegation	changed	the	
ultimate	resulting	policy	instead	of	if	congress	had	directly	created	a	law.		Similar	analysis	
will	prove	helpful	when	evaluating	the	use	of	unilateral	executive	action	in	policy	creation	
which	in	many	instances	can	be	viewed	as	a	type	of	delegation	and	often	comes	about	due	
to	a	broad	delegation	of	power	to	the	executive	branch.	
There	are	other	types	of	crises	such	as	military	conflict,	terrorism,	environmental,	
political,	and	law	and	order.		However,	this	paper	investigates	economic	crises	because	they	
are	a	relatively	common	type	of	crisis	and	one	in	which	congress	has	the	ability	to	address	
directly	or	delegate.		Furthermore	it	is	an	area	in	which	congress	has	primacy	over	the	
president	as	opposed	to	military	and	international	affairs	in	which	case	in	practice	if	not	in	
theory.		During	a	crisis,	power	tends	to	shift	from	the	congress	to	the	president,	but	as	this	
is	a	case	in	which	congress	would	typically	start	with	significant	power,	this	allows	for	
congress	to	continue	to	play	a	role.		The	president	is	viewed	by	most	citizens	as	the	proper	
initiator	of	major	actions	and	he	acts	in	accordance	with	this	perception.	
	
1.2	Theoretical	Framework	
	
Rational	choice	institutionalism	lays	out	one	of	the	frameworks	that	this	paper	uses	
to	evaluate	the	actions	of	congress	and	other	political	actors	such	as	the	president	and	
executive	agencies.		This	framework	investigates	the	interrelation	between	the	institutions	
of	the	federal	government.		It	views	political	actors	as	being	rational	and	being	utility-
maximizers	however	it	presupposes	constraints	and	boundaries	upon	actions	based	off	of	
factors	such	as	the	structure	of	the	institutional	framework.	
Rational	choice	institutionalism	contains	concepts	of	principal-agent	theory.		It	also	
makes	the	assumption	that	political	actors	look	at	each	problem	rationally.		The	strict	
interpretation	of	this	assumption	can	be	questioned	in	the	real	world,	but	in	general	can	be	
13	
taken	as	a	rule	that	can	simplify	the	analysis	while	still	explaining	much	of	the	behaviors	of	
those	making	political	decisions.	
The	policy	choices	that	the	nation	can	make	at	any	given	time	are	not	infinite.		The	
possibilities	are	circumscribed	by	a	number	of	factors	such	as	the	public	sentiment	about	a	
topic,	the	opinions	of	those	in	office,	the	limits	of	action	afforded	to	institutions	that	craft	
the	legislation,	social	and	legal	norms.		Thus	not	all	policies	preferred	by	those	involved	in	
creating	policy	can	be	achieved	under	circumstances.		Among	those	policies	that	are	
unattainable	are	some	beneficial	policies	that	provide	higher	utility	to	the	nation	and	the	
politicians	than	the	policies	that	are	ultimately	enacted.		In	addition	institutions,	such	as	
congress,	are	influenced	by	other	institutions	and	entities.		The	institutions	are	bound	by	
limits	of	their	power,	the	procedures	they	use,	their	constituent	member	makeup,	and	the	
institutional	history.	
Besides	these	limitations,	policy	creation	faces	a	number	of	real	world	circumstances	
such	as	uncertainty	about	the	current	economic	and	political	state	that	shape	the	policy.		
There	will	also	be	uncertainly	about	economic	theory	as	well	as	human	actions.		Those	
creating	policy	cannot	know	the	results	of	their	policy	or	how	the	policy	will	ultimately	be	
viewed	by	voters.		The	full	range	of	effects	will	not	be	known	going	in	and	unintended	
consequences	are	almost	assured.		For	instance,	during	the	economic	crisis	from	2008	to	
2009	there	was	a	21%	increase	in	the	number	of	applications	for	disability	as	there	was	
more	economic	incentive	to	go	on	disability.15		Typically	50%	of	those	that	apply	for	
disability	are	granted	disability	and	99%	of	those	approved	for	disability	payments	never	go	
back	to	work	despite	the	fact	that	the	average	age	of	new	recipients	is	only	49.16		Thus	there	
can	be	second	order	effects	that	can	affect	the	nation	for	decades.	
Furthermore	as	in	all	political	processes	a	number	of	individuals	often	with	different	
goals	and	working	at	cross-purposes	have	a	hand	in	shaping	the	resulting	policy.		This	can	
lead	to	inefficient	or	poorly	designed	legislation	or	even	legislation	that	has	within	it	
provisions	that	undermine	itself.		The	conflicting	goals	of	the	individuals	that	shape	policy	
																																																						
15	Hargreaves,	Steve.		“Disability	Claims	Skyrocket:	Here’s	Why”		CNN.		4/11/2013.	
16Fletcher,	Michael	A.		“Disability	claims	rising	sharply	at	Social	Security.”		Washington	Post.		September	14,	
2010.	
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can	also	limit	the	size	and	scope	of	the	action	that	can	be	taken.		In	such	an	environment,	
political	actors	do	their	best	to	maximize	their	utility	by	making	approximations	of	the	
resulting	effects	of	legislation	and	trying	to	change	the	political	landscape	and	the	policy	
decisions	in	question	to	achieve	a	result	that	best	matches	their	desired	ends	while	
minimizing	risk.		The	creation	of	policy	is	greatly	complicated	by	this	fact	that	parties	have	
incomplete	knowledge	and	they	have	to	make	estimates	as	to	likely	outcomes	and	the	risks.		
The	strategic	interaction	of	these	actors	through	a	complex	process	shapes	and	creates	the	
policy	that	is	produced.	
Policy	is	created	at	many	levels	of	government	and	by	many	institutions.		Congress	is	
typically	seen	as	the	preeminent	policy	making	entity	in	America	due	to	the	legislative	
powers	that	are	uniquely	given	to	it	by	the	U.S.	Constitution.		However,	there	are	a	vast	
number	of	entities	that	actually	create	public	policy	in	the	United	States	with	congress	being	
but	one	of	these.		This	ability	of	other	institutions	to	create	policy	is	in	large	part	due	to	the	
vast	quantity	of	policymaking	power	that	congress	has	delegated.		Much	of	this	power	was	
delegated	to	executive	agencies	that	comprise	much	of	the	governmental	bureaucracy.		
Similarly,	the	heads	of	these	agencies	are	delegated	a	great	deal	of	power	as	well.		Members	
of	the	cabinet	and	other	agency	heads	often	can	generate	policy	and	law	without	the	direct	
action	of	congress	or	the	president	and	thus	have	the	power	to	unilaterally	make	policy	
decisions	that	can	affect	the	nation	and	those	that	live	in	it.		The	president	also	has	been	
delegated	significant	powers	and	due	to	his	unique	role	as	the	head	of	the	executive	branch	
he	is	able	to	have	a	major	effect	on	policy.17		His	ability	to	affect	policy	is	even	greater	in	a	
crisis	in	which	his/her	uniqueness	causes	people	to	look	to	him	to	provide	leadership	and	
guidance.		Thus	he	gets	first	mover	advantage	in	crafting	solutions	to	the	policy	and	has	
significant	political	backing	and	public	support	to	enact	changes.		He	also	is	often	given	
emergency	powers	far	in	excess	of	the	tools	he	typically	employs	to	create	policy.	
The	public	can	most	readily	be	swayed	by	the	president	as	he	has	a	unique	role	and	
he	is	far	better	known	than	other	members	of	the	government.		Most	individuals	do	not	
even	know	the	members	of	congress	that	represent	them	and	do	not	attentively	listen	for	
																																																						
17	Marshall.		2008.	
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messages	emanating	from	congress.18		People	have	higher	expectations	for	the	president	
and	expect	him	to	perform	actions	and	fix	problems	that	the	country	faces	even	in	areas	in	
which	the	president’s	formal	powers	are	slight.		A	message	from	the	president	increases	
salience	and	improves	the	likelihood	that	things	will	go	the	way	the	president	wants.			
People’s	expectations	of	the	president	often	require	that	he	needs	to	take	actions	to	
address	these	expectations	whether	the	actions	taken	have	much	value	or	not.		High	gas	
prices	affect	the	president’s	ratings	though	he	has	little	control	over	them	and	moves	that	
would	be	taken	would	be	short-sited	and	politically	motivated.		Gas	prices	rise	annually	in	
the	summer	due	to	increase	usage	however	the	president	is	still	considered	responsible	by	
many	for	it.	
Issues	that	affect	people’s	lives	directly	such	as	the	price	of	gas	or	the	
unemployment	rate	have	an	outsized	effect	on	the	opinions	of	voters	and	are	typically	a	
greater	impetus	for	change	than	issues	that	do	not	directly	affect	them.		Economic	crises	
have	a	major	effect	on	voters	and	thus	lead	to	a	call	to	action.		However,	it	is	not	only	these	
personal	effects	that	can	affect	voters.		People	change	their	opinions	and	voting	preferences	
and	thus	the	pressure	they	put	on	congress	based	off	of	both	their	personal	economic	
interests	as	well	as	sociotropic	reasons.		An	economic	crisis	has	both	personal	and	
sociotropic	salience	and	so	the	message	of	the	president	was	likely	to	be	heard.		The	same	is	
true	of	the	threat	of	terrorism.	
Arnold	argued	that	the	politics	of	explicit	economic	policy,	policy	proposed	in	an	
effort	to	improve	the	economy,	differed	from	the	policy	of	derivative	economic	theory,	
policy	with	macroeconomic	effects	that	is	proposed	for	other	reasons.19		For	derivative	
economic	theory,	he	states	that	policy	makers	focus	more	on	the	noneconomic	components	
of	the	policy	than	for	explicit	economic	policy.		This	is	in	large	part	due	to	considerations	of	
how	their	constituencies	will	judge	the	policy	and	the	factors	that	will	determine	if	a	policy	
is	broadly	supported	
		
																																																						
18	2000	Social	Capital	Community	Benchmark	Survey.		
http://thearda.com/Archive/Files/Downloads/SCCBS_DL2.asp	
19	Arnold,	R.	Douglas.		The	Logic	of	Congressional	Action.		Yale	University	Press,	1992.		151.	
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1.3	Theories	about	Delegation	
	
	 This	paper	looks	at	the	governmental	responses	to	the	fiscal	crisis	and	attempts	to	
see	how	well	theories	of	delegation	match	with	the	governmental	action	that	was	taken	
during	this	period	to	deal	with	the	financial	crisis.		This	paper	investigates	below	some	of	the	
more	common	theories	of	delegation.	There	have	been	a	number	of	investigations	into	the	
tendency	of	congress	to	delegate.		These	range	from	Kiewiet	and	McCubbins20	theoretical	
framework	to	Epstein	and	O’	Halloran’s	statistical	approach.21		Many	of	these	analyses	rely	
on	a	principal-agent	theory	framework	to	make	conclusions	about	motivations	and	effects	
of	delegations.		Most	frameworks	sought	to	use	theory	to	determine	the	motivations	of	
congress	in	delegating	to	the	executive	branch.		These	have	typically	viewed	delegation	in	
one	of	two	ways.		Either	they	see	delegation	as	a	positive	development	in	which	congress	
uses	an	innovative	political	tool	to	enact	better	policy	that	benefits	from	the	expertise,	time	
and	attention,	and	a	depoliticized	environment	that	congress	would	struggle	to	supply.		
Those	such	as	Kiewiet	and	McCubbins	are	in	this	positive	camp.		There	are	however	those	
that	view	congress’	actions	in	delegating	as	fundamentally	negative	and	stemming	from	an	
aversion	to	make	tough	policy	decisions.		This	avoidance	hypothesis	says	that	delegation	by	
congress	is	fundamentally	just	a	crass	political	way	to	get	reelected	and	that	it	stems	from	
an	unwillingness	on	the	part	of	politicians	to	make	unpopular	political	positions	or	those	
that	may	eventually	cause	political	harm	even	when	in	the	interests	of	the	nation.	
One	theory	of	delegation	is	that	lawmakers	delegate	because	it	is	politically	useful	to	
them.		From	this	theory	it	follows	that	looking	as	the	personal	advantage	that	would	accrue	
to	lawmakers	can	help	determine	actions	that	political	actors	will	take	since	these	may	be	
major	motivators	for	the	delegation	and	can	also	shape	how	the	delegation	is	structured.22		
Similarly,	by	investigating	the	blame	shifting	or	credit-taking	enabled	by	the	delegation	one	
can	learn	about	the	act	of	delegation	itself.	
																																																						
20	Kiewiet,	D.	Roderick	and	Mathew	D.	McCubbins.		1991.	
21	Epstein,	David	and	Sharyn	O’Halloran.		1999.	
	
22	Campbell,	Colton	C.		“Creating	an	Angel:	Congressional	Delegation	to	Ad	Hoc	Commissions”.		Congress	&	the	
Presidency.		Vol.	25,	Iss.	2.		1998.	
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This	tendency	to	delegation	does	not	need	to	be	a	linear	or	one	directional	
movement	and	some	individuals	argue	that	delegation	may	occur	in	response	to	a	short-
term	impetus,	but	that	subsequently	congress	will	regress	the	delegation	and	will	try	to	
“nibble	back”	some	of	the	authority	that	it	delegated.23		
	
1.3.1 Abdication Hypothesis 
	
The	abdication	hypothesis	of	delegation	argues	that	the	trend	towards	increasing	
amounts	of	delegation	has	come	about	primarily	due	to	members	of	congress	wishing	to	
avoid	having	to	make	unpopular	decisions.		This	hypothesis	also	states	that	delegation	leads	
to	excessive	centralization	of	power	in	the	executive	branch	and	to	a	too	intrusive	
government.	
The	constitution’s	framers	envisioned	a	legislature	composed	of	numerous	
individuals	as	posing	less	of	threat	of	tyranny	than	the	accumulation	of	power	by	the	
president	who	could	gain	a	kinglike	role	if	his	authority	was	unchecked.		A	similar	view	on	
the	risks	of	power	accumulation	tends	to	lead	to	question	the	extensive	use	of	delegation	
that	currently	occurs.		The	vast	transfer	of	power	to	the	executive	branch	has	already	in	
some	eyes,	such	as	David	Schoenbrod,	begun	to	pose	a	threat	to	liberty.		The	decrease	in	
the	public	opinion	of	the	congress	relative	to	the	president	in	recent	decades	however	does	
little	to	fortify	congress	as	a	policy	creating	body	when	juxtaposed	against	a	more	popular	
president.		Part	of	this	perception	comes	from	the	belief	that	congress	is	not	doing	the	job	it	
was	sent	to	Washington	to	do.		This	view	is	also	represented	among	some	academics	that	
study	delegation	and	feel	that	it	displays	this.		Lowi	argued	that	congress	abdicated	it	
responsibility	for	creating	public	policy	by	essentially	giving	that	responsibility	to	unelected	
bureaucrats.24	
While	there	have	been	differing	views	on	delegation,	one	widely	accepted	fact	is	that	
delegation	has	led	directly	to	the	increase	in	the	bureaucracy.		Some,	such	as	Schoenbrod,	
																																																						
23	Farrier,	Jasmine.		Congressional	Ambivalence:	The	Political	Burdens	of	Constitutional	Authority.		University	
Press	of	Kentucky,	2010.	
24	Lowi,	Theodore	J.		The	End	of	Liberalism:	The	Second	Republic	of	the	United	States.	New	York,	NY:	W.	W.	
Norton	and	Co.		1979.	
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argue	that	this	increase	in	the	size	of	the	government	in	turn	has	led	to	people	feeling	to	a	
greater	extent	that	their	lives	are	being	run	by	nameless	bureaucrats	who	are	unelected	and	
unanswerable	to	the	people.		The	logical	conclusion	is	that	this	has	helped	feed	
dissatisfaction	in	the	United	States	with	the	quality	of	the	government	and	in	particular	the	
role	played	by	the	congress.	
Those	who	see	delegation	primarily	as	a	ploy	to	help	get	members	of	congress	
elected,	such	as	David	Schoenbrod,	tend	to	have	a	negative	view	of	both	the	causes	and	
effects	of	delegation.		This	camp	believes	that	by	delegating	away	the	tough	decisions	that	
congress	is	abdicating	their	responsibility	and	is	merely	participating	in	issue	avoidance	out	
of	cowardice	and	self-concern.		Fiorina	argues	that	Delegation	can	shift	blame	from	
legislator	onto	the	agent.25		He	then	went	on	to	argue	that	the	decision	to	delegate	is	a	
function	of	the	political	costs	and	benefits	for	which	they	have	been	held	accountable.		This	
matches	up	with	studies	that	show	that	due	to	the	use	of	political	heuristics	that	voters	use	
in	selecting	politicians,	it	is	far	more	damaging	for	a	politician	to	be	blamed	than	it	is	for	
them	not	to	get	credit.		Despite	the	potential	benefits	of	delegation,	works	have	tried	to	
show	that	the	actual	motivation	to	delegate	does	not	appear	to	be	for	the	sake	of	efficiency	
gains.26		Thus	it	is	often	politically	a	good	move	to	disassociate	or	obscure	the	
congressperson	from	the	politically	risky	goal	that	the	congress	wishes	to	achieve.		By	
delegating,	a	commission	can	enable	this	and	it	can	be	especially	valuable	if	the	
congressperson	can	in	good	faith	deny	they	were	aware	of	the	commission’s	actions	and	
decisions.		Congleton	and	Sweester	refer	to	this	as,	“Policy	making	under	the	veil	of	
ignorance”.27		This	enables	a	congressman	to	take	credit	for	a	much	desired	good,	but	they	
do	not	get	blamed	for	the	inevitable	costs	as	they	can	set	up	an	agent	to	figure	out	how	to	
pay	for	it	and	delegate	that	responsibility.		Fiorina	and	others	have	surmised	that	delegation	
to	the	executive	branch	is	largely	an	attempt	to	shift	political	and	other	costs.	
																																																						
25	Fiorina,	Morris	P.		“Legislative	Choice	of	Regulatory	Forms:	Legal	Process	or	Administrative	Process?”		Public	
Choice	39(1):33.	
26	Aranson,	Peter	H.	,	Ernest	Gellhorn,	and	Glen	O.	Robinson.		“Theory	of	Legislative	Delegation”	Cornell	Law	
Review	68:1.		1982.	
27	Congleton,	Roger	D.	and	Wendell	Sweester.		“Political	Deadlocks	and	Distributional	Information:	The	Value	
of	the	Veil”		Public	Choice.		1992.		73:1.		
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It	is	argued	by	this	camp	that	delegation	leads	to	a	lack	of	legitimacy	and	
representativeness	on	the	part	of	the	policy	makers.		Congress	was	elected	to	represent	the	
people	and	the	ceding	of	power	by	the	electorate	entails	a	contract	with	those	they	elect	for	
those	to	act	on	their	behalf.		By	congress	delegating	power	to	unelected	bureaucrats	who	
are	typically	unknown	to	voters	and	are	not	charged	with	representing	them	or	the	districts	
that	they	comprise,	this	contract	is	voided.		In	other	words	the	recipients	of	the	delegated	
power	do	not	have	a	mandate	and	this	delegation	would	negate	Rousseau’s	Social	
Contract.28		Seymour	Martin	Lipset	discussed	the	idea	of	legitimacy	by	saying	that	it,	
“involves	the	capacity	of	a	political	system	to	engender	and	maintain	the	belief	that	existing	
political	institutions	are	the	most	appropriate	and	proper	ones	for	the	society.”29		The	public	
perception	of	the	institutions	of	democracy	is	eroded	by	delegation.		This	decreases	the	
legitimacy	of	these	institutions	and	the	government	in	general.		This	can	be	seen	in	those	
that	want	small	government	and	are	opposed	to	the	increase	in	bureaucracy.		The	Tea	Party	
movement	in	particular	argued	for	a	smaller	government	and	questioned	its	legitimacy	and	
representativeness.	
Despite	the	occasional	push	back	against	increasing	executive	power,	congress	
continues	to	delegate	new	powers	to	the	executive	branch.		According	to	the	abdication	
hypothesis,	the	reason	for	this	increase	in	delegation	by	the	congress	is	that	individual	
lawmakers	believe	it	is	in	their	interest	to	delegate.		This	is	primarily	for	two	reasons:	they	
feel	it	will	help	them	get	reelected	and	they	feel	it	will	allow	for	better	public	policy.		Of	
these	two	motivations,	researchers	have	tended	to	conclude	that	the	former	of	these	is	the	
one	that	has	the	most	influence	upon	the	minds	of	lawmakers.		David	Mayhew	for	instance	
argues	that	reelection	is	the	principle	goal	of	congress.30	
Using	delegation	Congress	can	appear	to	be	acting	on	the	behalf	of	their	voters.		
Acting	on	constituents’	behalf	and	intervening	for	them	with	executive	agencies	can	be	one	
of	the	most	politically	beneficial	actions	a	congressperson	can	take	and	along	with	garnering	
votes	is	a	major	source	of	campaign	funding.		It	can	also	allow	a	lawmaker	to	take	credit	for	
																																																						
28	Rousseau,	Jean-Jacques.		The	Social	Contract:	&	Discourses.	No.	660.		JM	Dent	&	Sons,	Limited,	1920.	
29	Lipset,	Seymore	Martin.		Political	Man:	The	Social	Bases	of	Politics.		Doubleday.		1960.	P.	64.	
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programs	while	disavowing	responsibility	for	spending	or	any	burdens	of	the	program.		In	
the	words	of	John	Quarles,	former	Environmental	Protection	Agency	deputy	administrator,	
delegating	to	the	executive	branch	is,	"a	handy	set	of	mirrors--so	useful	in	Washington--by	
which	politicians	can	appear	to	kiss	both	sides	of	the	apple.''31	
The	trope	of	fat	cat	bureaucrats	and	insiders	in	Washington	juxtaposed	against	the	
narrative	of	disaffected,	unrepresented	outsider	in	true	America	has	long	been	common.		In	
America	there	has	also	long	been	anxiety	about	the	power	of	the	state.		In	the	words	of	
Kenneth	Dyson,	“The	American	liberal	tradition	is	profoundly	individualistic	and	anti-
bureaucratic;	it	begins	with	autonomous	individual	and	with	a	populist	belief	that	all	
authority	emanates	from	the	people.		A	dispersal	of	public	power	was	seen	as	necessary	in	
order	to	maintain	the	supremacy	of	the	popular	will	and	to	protect	the	individual.”32		Its	
central	premise	that	decision	makers	can	create	laws	that	impinge	on	personal	freedom	
while	not	knowing	or	caring	about	those	they	govern	resonates	especially	strongly	in	the	
case	of	delegation	to	executive	agencies	and	those	that	work	for	them.	
The	proliferation	of	delegation	has	allowed	for	more	rules	and	regulations		David	
Schoenbrod,	states	this	and	further	argues	that	despite	the	emergence	of	the	bureaucratic	
state,	that	delegation	is	not	inevitable	and	that	without	delegation	from	the	legislative	to	
the	executive	branch	that	government	would	be	more	legitimate	and	less	intrusive	and	he	
states	that	without	the	delegation,	“more	would	be	done	through	private	ordering,	common	
law,	and	state	and	local	rules."33			Others	such	as	Richard	Pierce	argue	the	opposite	and	go	
so	far	as	to	say	that	the	nondelegation	doctrine	never	truly	existed	and	that	it	was	not	
necessary.34		Likewise,	Justice	Blackmun	who	delivered	the	majority	opinion	in	Mistretta	v.	
United	States35,	wrote	that,	“As	society	increases	in	complexity,	Congress	must	delegate	its	
job,	“under	broad	general	directives”.	The	broad	delegation,	“is	sufficiently	specific	and	
detailed	to	meet	constitutional	requirements.”		He	further	stated	that,	“in	our	increasingly	
																																																						
31	Boaz,	David.		Cato	Handbook	for	Policy	Makers:	7th	Edition.		Cato	Institute.		2009.	Pg.	86.	
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complex	society,	replete	with	ever	changing	and	more	technical	problems,	Congress	simply	
cannot	do	its	job	absent	an	ability	to	delegate	power	under	broad	general	directives.”	
John	Locke	argued	that	a	legislature,	"cannot	transfer	the	power	of	making	laws	to	
any	other	hands,	for	it	being	but	a	delegated	power	from	the	people,	they	who	have	it	
cannot	pass	it	over	to	others	.	.	.	.	And	when	the	people	have	said,	We	will	submit	to	rules,	
and	be	govern'd	by	Laws	made	by	such	Men,	and	in	such	Forms,	no	Body	else	can	say	other	
Men	shall	make	Laws	for	them;	nor	can	the	people	be	bound	by	any	Laws	but	such	as	are	
Enacted	by	those,	whom	they	have	Chosen,	and	Authorized	to	make	Laws	for	them.	The	
power	of	the	Legislative	being	derived	from	the	People	by	a	positive	voluntary	Grant	and	
Institution,	can	be	no	other,	than	what	the	positive	Grant	conveyed,	which	being	only	to	
make	Laws,	and	not	to	make	Legislators,	the	Legislative	can	have	no	power	to	transfer	their	
Authority	of	making	laws,	and	place	it	in	other	hands	''.36	
In	the	1989	Federal	district	case	United	States	v.	Mills,	Judge	Roger	Vinson	wrote,	"A	
delegation	doctrine	which	essentially	allows	Congress	to	abdicate	its	power	to	define	the	
elements	of	a	criminal	offense,	in	favor	of	an	un-elected	administrative	agency	such	as	the	
[Army]	Corps	of	Engineers,	does	violence	to	this	time-honored	principle.	.	.	.	Deferent	and	
minimal	judicial	review	of	Congress'	transfer	of	its	criminal	lawmaking	function	to	other	
bodies,	in	other	branches,	calls	into	question	the	vitality	of	the	tripartite	system	established	
by	our	Constitution.	It	also	calls	into	question	the	nexus	that	must	exist	between	the	law	so	
applied	and	simple	logic	and	common	sense.	Yet	that	seems	to	be	the	state	of	the	law.''		The	
concept	that	delegated	or	transferred	powers	cannot	be	further	delegated	or	transferred	is	
the	legal	concept	of	delegata	potestas	non	potest	delegari	which	is	a	standard	legal	concept	
in	the	United	States	as	well	as	in	the	United	Kingdom	upon	which	much	of	the	U.S.	legal	
system,	tradition,	and	historic	examples	were	based.		It	was	explicitly	stated	in	such	cases	as	
United	States	v.	Sav.	Bank.37	
In	addition,	prior	to	the	New	Deal	there	was	less	centralization	of	power	in	the	
federal	government.			John	R.	Bolton	largely	ascribes	this	tendency	to	the	Commerce	Clause	
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of	the	U.S.	Constitution38	and	the	Tenth	Amendment	of	the	constitution	which	states,	“The	
powers	not	delegated	to	the	United	States	by	the	Constitution,	nor	prohibited	by	it	to	the	
States,	are	reserved	to	the	States	respectively,	or	to	the	people.”		Together	these	sections	of	
the	constitution	preserve	powers	for	the	states	that	are	not	specifically	given	to	the	federal	
government.		This	lack	of	power	in	the	federal	government	limited	its	ability	to	delegate	
power	as	it	had	less	control	and	needed	less	of	a	bureaucracy	to	control	things.		However	
over	time	both	the	commerce	clause	and	the	Tenth	Amendment	have	continued	to	be	
reinterpreted	and	the	federal	government	has	gained	more	power	at	the	expense	of	the	
states.		This	shift	of	power	to	the	federal	government	consist	of	a	number	of	other	small	
transfers	of	power	to	the	federal	government	such	as	the	Seventeenth	amendment	which	
allowed	for	direct	election	of	senators	by	citizens	as	opposed	to	having	senators	selected	by	
state	legislators.39		In	addition,	it	also	coincided	with	the	weakening	of	ties	between	
individuals	and	the	state	they	live	in.		This	centralization	of	power	can	be	seen	in	various	
new	provisions	such	as	the	federal	income	tax	that	was	permanently	ushered	in	with	the	
Sixteenth	Amendment	to	the	U.S.	Constitution.	
The	change	in	the	interpretation	of	the	commerce	clause	can	be	seen	in	Wickard	v.	
Filburn40,	in	which	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	used	the	Commerce	Clause	to	sustain	the	
Agricultural	Adjustment	Act	of	193841	and	they	ruled	that	the	constitution	gave	the	
government	the	ability	to	regulate	agriculture	even	in	this	case	where	the	crops	grown	were	
not	for	sale,	but	rather	for	internal	consumption.		In	the	words	of	Justice	Robert	H.	Jackson,	
“even	if	appellee's	activity	be	local	and	though	it	may	not	be	regarded	as	commerce,	it	may	
still,	whatever	its	nature,	be	reached	by	Congress	if	it	exerts	a	substantial	economic	effect	
on	interstate	commerce	and	this	irrespective	of	whether	such	effect	is	what	might	at	some	
earlier	time	have	been	defined	as	'direct'	or	'indirect.'”		It	wasn’t	until	United	States	v.	
Alfonso	Lopez,	Jr.42,	that	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	there	was	a	limit	to	congress’	power	
to	regulate	activity	under	the	Commerce	Clause.	
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	 Delegation	tends	to	increase	laws	produced	and	some	view	this	as	impinging	on	
liberties.		The	constitution	was	designed	so	that	law	would	be	made	by	the	two	houses	of	
congress	with	the	president’s	involvement	and	this	thereby	would	limit	the	number	of	laws	
that	get	passed.		This	would	limit	the	number	of	laws	enacted	because	it	requires	more	
steps	to	be	completed	and	more	obstacles	overcome	in	order	for	a	law	to	get	passed.		In	
addition	with	bills	needing	to	pass	both	houses	of	congress	it	makes	legislation,	especially	
excessively	partisan	legislation,	much	more	difficult	to	get	enacted.	As	James	Madison	said	
in	arguing	for	Bicameralism,	“Another	advantage	accruing	from	this	ingredient	in	the	
constitution	of	the	senate,	is	the	additional	impediment	it	must	prove	against	improper	acts	
of	legislation.”43	
Among	those	who	think	that	delegation	helps	lead	to	too	many	restrictions	and	
regulations	are	the	CATO	Institute,	a	libertarian	think	tank	that	advocates	small	government,	
and	the	American	Civil	Liberties	Union,	an	advocacy	group	focused	on	protecting	individual	
rights.		In	its	Handbook	for	Congress,	the	CATO	Institute	refers	to	the	separation	of	powers	
as	a	Bulwark	of	Freedom.		While	this	alludes	to	the	protection	from	tyranny	that	a	
separation	of	powers	ensures	by	limiting	the	ability	of	any	one	political	actor	to	consolidate	
all	power,	it	also	refers	to	the	personal	freedoms	safeguarded	by	having	a	weaker	national	
government	since	it	is	less	capable	of	action	due	to	competing	interests	and	gridlock.		As	it	
says	in	the	handbook,	“The	upshot	was	that	the	separation	of	powers	effectively	restrained	
federal	power”.44		This	concern	about	excess	laws	is	not	new	and	has	been	around	
throughout	the	history	of	America.		James	Madison	wrote,	“The	facility	and	excess	of	law-
making	seem	to	be	the	diseases	to	which	our	governments	are	most	liable.”45		Besides	
personal	liberties,	those	that	hold	this	view	also	see	delegation	as	a	means	to	shift	power	to	
the	federal	government	that	should	be	left	to	the	states.		Thus	even	with	the	increase	in	
delegation,	there	are	lingering	questions	about	both	the	legality	and	constitutionality	of	
delegation	as	to	about	the	lack	of	legitimacy	and	representativeness	engendered	by	
delegation.		Delegation	has	certainly	become	commonplace	and	the	number	of	regulations	
created	each	year	is	quite	large.		According	to	the	U.S.	Government	Accountability	Office,	in	
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the	four	fiscal	years	from	1996	to	1999,	15,286	regulations	were	created.		This	far	exceeds	
the	number	of	laws	enacted	during	that	period.	
However,	delegation	does	not	always	provide	solutions.		There	is	still	a	political	
dimension	in	all	administrative	processes	and	poorly	designed	commissions	can	suffer	from	
some	of	the	same	issues.		Fisher	has	shown	that	delegating	can	be	risky	due	to	the	fact	that	
voluntary	cooperation	from	legislators	is	typically	given	for	political	not	legal	or	moral	
reasons.	
	 Delegation	lowers	the	accountability	for	legislators.		Theorists	have	suggested	that	
delegation	does	not	destroy	the	principal	of	democracy	because	voters	can	always	vote	out	
members	of	congress	if	they	are	unhappy	with	the	actions	done	by	an	agency	that	was	
delegated	power.		However	in	practice	this	is	a	very	tenuous	link.		Most	voters	have	only	a	
basic	awareness	of	the	votes	and	positions	of	their	congressional	representatives	and	they	
do	not	know	if	their	representative	voted	to	delegate	the	power	and	tend	not	to	know	
about	the	process	of	the	creation	of	administrative	law	or	even	the	rules	that	have	recently	
been	promulgated	by	agencies.		Congress	is	able	to	use	this	to	avoid	tough	decisions	and	if	a	
new	law	gets	bad	publicity,	the	congress	person	can	pretend	to	be	against	it	and	fighting	on	
the	side	of	the	people	against	the	agency	that	created	the	rules	regardless	of	their	actual	
viewpoints	and	role	in	the	agency	action.		This	delegation	also	goes	contrary	to	the	ideal	of	
congress	taking	responsibility	for	legislation	and	policy.	
Furthermore,	as	Schoenbrod	argues,	congress	finds	it	in	their	own	interests	to	create	
laws	if	they	can	delegate	since	it	allows	for	them	to	do	case	work	or	perform	credit	taking	
whereas	if	the	market	or	states	settled	the	issue	then	congress	would	be	unable	to	perform	
these	functions.46		This	leads	to	more	federal	rules.	
He	also	suggests	that	delegation	helps	exacerbate	other	issues	plaguing	the	U.S.	
democratic	process.		For	instance	he	has	have	suggested	that	high	rates	of	voter	apathy	are	
tied	to	congress’	use	of	delegation.		He	also	suggests	that	the	tendency	to	delegate	
decreases	congress’	willingness	to	compromise.	
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Delegating	can	help	a	legislator’s	electability	by	allowing	the	legislator	to	avoid	
taking	political	decisions	which	would	be	unpopular	with	the	constituency	in	their	district.		It	
can	also	allow	the	legislator	to	selectively	take	positions	that	would	help	them	politically	
while	avoiding	those	which	would	be	detrimental	to	their	reelection	chances.		Selective	
position	taking	can	help	frame	and	create	a	politician’s	narrative	in	an	election	and	thereby	
help	them	position	themselves	politically	to	be	most	likely	to	be	approved	of	by	the	
constituency	in	their	district.		It	also	allows	for	the	legislator	to	do	casework	on	behalf	of	
those	they	represent.	
	 Schoenbrod	following	the	work	of	Fiorina	lays	out	a	hypothesis	of	how	responsibility	
shifting	affects	legislation	in	which	he	hypothesizes	that	legislators	will	delegate	instead	of	
directly	legislate,	“if	the	public	would	perceive	the	net	benefits	from	the	bill	that	delegates	
as	greater	than	those	from	the	bill	that	does	not	delegate.”47		He	builds	this	from	an	axiom	
that	lawmakers	will	vote	for	a	bill	when	it	will	appear	good	to	constituents	as	opposed	to	
any	sort	of	merit	of	the	bill	in	and	of	itself.		This	pessimistic	view	is	not	fully	borne	out	by	
empirical	evidence	as	there	have	been	numerous	occasions	where	legislators	have	voted	for	
a	bill	that	it	is	well	known	will	not	be	popular	and	will	hurt	them	politically.		An	example	of	
this	is	the	TARP	Act	which	was	uniformly	unpopular	with	voters,	but	which	never	the	less	
ended	up	passing	due	to	the	nation’s	need	for	the	legislation.	
	 Schoenbrod	explicates	further	by	stating	than	a	member	of	congress	will	be	more	
likely	to	use	delegation	if	it	will	shift	blame	away	from	them	or	would	still	allow	credit	to	
accrue	to	them.48		He	uses	this	result	to	say	that	members	of	congress	will	act	differently	
than	if	the	option	of	delegation	had	not	been	there.49	
	 Delegation	also	allows	congress	to	claim	the	benefits	of	the	action	while	the	blame	
often	is	placed	on	the	agency	that	must	formulate	the	details	of	the	rules.		An	example	of	
this	is	congress	which	in	2001	in	response	to	terror	threats	passed	the	Aviation	and	
Transportation	Security	Act	and	was	able	to	claim	that	they	were	making	flying	safer	and	
protecting	people.		The	agency	created	by	this	act	to	create	and	enforce	rules,	The	
Transportations	Safety	Administration	(TSA)	by	comparison	was	given	the	unpopular	job	of	
taking	the	invasive	steps	to	ensure	this	safety	and	they	have	been	vilified	for	their	actions.		
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The	split	between	blame	and	praise	for	agencies	and	congress	is	particularly	true	for	
concentrated	interests.			
	 The	question	arises	of	whether	the	delegation	of	power	goes	against	the	notion	of	
living	in	a	democracy,	if	those	who	are	delegated	to	can	so	often	go	against	the	wishes	of	
our	elected	representatives	who	entrusted	them	to	make	decisions.		If	instead	of	our	
representatives	making	decisions,	self-interested	bureaucrats	make	decisions	then	the	link	
to	the	people	is	lost.		The	same	criticism	hold	true	of	special	interests,	which	tend	to	be	
more	partisan	in	their	views,	effectively	making	these	decisions	through	their	capture	of	an	
agency.			
According	to	Arnold,	Congress	tends	to	prefer	concentrated	benefits	and	diffuse	
costs	while	citizens	typically	prefer	diffuse	benefits.50		This	provides	another	impetus	to	
delegate	power.		As	legislators’	policy	preferences	are	misaligned	with	those	of	voters,	
delegation	can	help	them	achieve	their	ends	without	this	being	visible	to	voters	who	would	
often	not	approve.		Delegation	can	also	allow	members	of	congress	to	get	credit	for	benefits	
of	a	program	and	blame	the	agency	for	the	costs.		It	can	also	help	with	credit	claiming	as	
well	as	blame	avoidance.		Trying	to	insulate	congresses’	decisions	and	policy	from	political	
considerations	can	at	times	lead	to	better	policy	and	in	these	situations	delegation	can	be	
viewed	as	a	tool	that	can	improve	policy	outcomes.		
	
1.3.2 Political Tool Hypothesis	
	
The	political	tool	hypothesis	views	delegation	more	positively.		Rather	than	
delegation	being	caused	by	congress’	unwillingness	to	make	unpopular	decisions,	this	
hypothesis	views	delegation	as	being	the	result	of	congress	choosing	a	tool	to	create	better	
policy	and	results	than	it	could	not	achieve	by	acting	directly.	
By	delegating,	congress	can	lead	to	a	less	political	and	politicized	decision.		Congress	
is	fearful	of	alarms	or	public	outcry	being	raised	and	thus	will	try	to	minimize	the	risk	of	this.		
However,	there	are	times	when	congress’	ends	or	analysis	of	a	situation	is	likely	to	vary	from	
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those	of	news	outlets	or	the	public	and	which	thus	may	give	rise	to	just	such	alarms	or	
outcry.		By	delegating,	congress	can	avoid	the	pressure	to	deviate	from	a	policy	course.	
Delegation	can	lead	to	commitment	to	a	goal	or	course	of	action,	such	as	budget	
reduction,	without	requiring	discussion	of	the	problematic	and	controversial	details	that	can	
lead	to	gridlock.		This	can	allow	for	problem	resolution	to	be	broken	down	into	two	discrete	
steps.		The	decision	to	address	the	issue	and	the	means	by	with	the	issue	is	addressed.		This	
can	bind	congress	to	a	solution	created	by	the	agent.		This	precommittment	is	very	
important	and	is	more	commonplace	than	is	expected.		One	can	think	of	the	constitution	as	
a	form	of	precommittment	that	limits	the	potential	courses	of	action	for	future	congresses	
since	they	have	less	freedom	of	action	than	if	the	constitution	was	in	place.		However,	this	
was	done	for	a	purpose	to	ensure	that	future	leaders	of	government	would	follow	course	of	
action	that	were	deemed	acceptable	actions	when	the	constitution	was	written	in	order	to	
ensure	the	actions	of	congress	do	not	focus	only	on	the	short	term	exigencies	of	the	day,	
but	keep	with	these	more	important	goals	that	are	enshrined	in	law	–	in	this	case	in	the	
form	of	the	constitution.		Precommitment	can	be	seen	in	the	deficit	reduction	debates	in	
which	each	side	agreed	that	a	certain	amount	of	spending	cuts	needed	to	be	enacted	
though	they	could	not	decide	on	the	specifics	of	the	cuts	and	agreed	to	have	a	committee	
iron	out	those	details.		It	thus	separated	out	the	decision	of	cutting	spending	from	the	
difficult	and	deeply	politicized	question	of	what	spending	to	cut.			
	 Precommitment	is	used	in	many	forms.		Even	the	Constitution	can	be	viewed	as	a	
form	of	precommitment	in	that	it	limits	the	ability	of	congress	to	pass	laws	that	it	would	be	
able	to	otherwise.		It	gives	primacy	to	predetermined,	key	principals	rather	than	current	day	
expediency	and	needs	or	even	the	will	of	the	majority.		It	was	essentially	a	bequest	from	
one	body	in	power	to	a	future	group	of	law	makers	much	as	it	is	a	straitjacket.		The	future	
congress	is	effectively	an	agent	of	the	current	congress.		Precommittment	can	encourage	
public	discussion	to	avoid	heedlessly	rushing	into	reactionary	action.		Precommittment	
limits	the	actions	of	congress	and	thus	is	effectively	self-incapacitation.		It	can	be	used	as	a	
signaling	mechanism	in	which	the	effectively	limit	the	payoff	table	and	thus	if	the	
announcement	is	credible	it	can	alter	the	actions	of	the	other	side.		Likewise	if	they	
announce	that	they	will	punish	the	other	side	and	pay	a	tit-for-tat	response	if	the	other	side	
does	not	coordinate.		This	can	help	lead	to	a	Nash	equilibrium	and	coordination.		
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Precommitment	is	often	used	to	affect	the	actions	of	others,	but	can	also	be	used	to	ensure	
an	entity’s	actions	are	consistent	with	their	current	intentions	much	as	a	man	that	is	sober	
may	ensure	that	when	he	is	drunk	that	he	does	not	drive	home	though	when	he	is	drunk	he	
may	be	tempted	to	drive.		A	political	actor	can	strategically	burn	bridges	to	enforce	their	
course	of	action.		Institutions	and	contracts	can	also	commit	an	actor	or	both	actors	to	
ensure	a	better	end	result.		Another	factor	in	this	solution	is	credibility	that	can	be	built	
based	off	of	the	options	an	actor	has	and	their	credibility	which	is	based	on	their	past	
actions	and	whether	they	accord	with	their	words.	
Those	who	view	delegation	in	a	more	positive	light	such	as	Kiewiet	and	McCubbins	
view	delegation	as	a	useful	political	tool	that	can	allow	policy	to	be	enacted	that	otherwise	
would	not	be	viable	if	created	directly	by	congress.		Congress	can	suffer	from	gridlock,	
excessive	politicization,	a	lack	of	expertise	on	relevant	issues	areas,	a	lack	of	timeliness,	an	
excessive	workload,	and	inconsistent	policy.		Aberbach	and	Rockman	have	stated	that	
delegation	allows	for	offloading	of	excessive	amounts	of	congressional	work	to	a	
commission	that	has	time	to	thoroughly	investigate	issues	and	which	unlike	congress	has	
the	necessary	skills	to	handle	technical	policy	issues	that	are	not	available	in	congress	at	
large.51		By	delegating,	congress	can	mitigate	some	of	these	structural	problems.		Executive	
agencies	and	ad	hoc	committees	can	be	set	up	to	be	non-partisan	and	less	politicized.	
An	example	of	this	is	the	Defense	Base	Closure	and	Realignment	(BRAC)	Commission	
which	was	set	up	in	1988	to	deal	with	the	over-politicized	topic	of	defense	base	closures.		
For	decades	before	the	BRAC	Commission	few	bases	were	closed,	but	the	five	BRAC	rounds	
were	able	to	close	hundreds	of	bases	over	the	last	25	years.		Prior	to	BRAC,	law	makers	for	
political	reasons	would	jealously	guard	bases	in	their	district	as	a	source	of	jobs	and	as	a	key	
economic	benefit	to	the	district.		While	there	were	more	bases	than	needed,	the	extra	
money	saved	by	closing	a	base	would	be	shared	by	all	tax	payers	while	the	political	cost	of	a	
base	staying	open	would	only	accrue	to	the	congressman	in	that	district.		This	describes	the	
classic	situation	in	which	there	was	a	public	good,	in	this	case	the	prudent	policy	of	closing	
an	unneeded	base,	was	undersupplied.		Social	choice	theory	also	predicts	this	result.		By	
setting	up	the	BRAC	commission,	an	ad	hoc	committee,	congress	could	remove	this	block	to	
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base	closures	and	provide	a	better	solution.		Analyses	by	researchers	have	shown	that	
delegating	to	BRAC	obscures	the	causal	chain	of	Congressional	actions	in	the	base	closure	
process	thereby	making	it	so	that	no	member	could	be	directly	blamed	for	the	negative	
effects	in	the	community.		The	process	even	allows	the	affected	congressional	districts’	
representatives	to	essentially	appear	as	“champions”	for	their	region	fighting	a	losing	fight	
to	keep	a	base	open.52		While	lawmakers	and	those	they	represent	want	efficient	
government	that	does	not	waste	resource	this	result	cannot	be	achieved	by	the	congress.		
This	was	one	example	of	how	delegation	can	help	solve	collective	action	problems	that	the	
congress	is	unable	to	handle	as	well	as	general	political	issues.		If	there	was	a	policy	
production	frontier	of	potential	policy	that	can	be	achieved	by	congress	and	another	
showing	potential	policies	produced	by	a	commission,	you	could	see	the	policy	production	
frontier	has	been	shifted	and	is	closer	to	the	combined	utility	function	of	the	populace.	
Others	such	as	Max	Weber	also	saw	positives	in	Bureaucracy.53		They	argue	that	
government	by	bureaucracy	fixes	defects	inherent	in	other	types	of	government	and	is	a	
more	efficient	type	of	administration	that	other	options	as	it	allows	for	specialization	and	
has	a	tendency	towards	meritocracy.		This	would	argue	for	more	delegation.	
In	addition,	outsourcing	their	workload	to	the	large	bureaucracy	allows	for	a	timelier	
and	responsive	policy	and	can	allow	for	subject	matter	experts	to	play	a	larger	role	in	
shaping	policy	about	complex	or	technical	subjects.		Also	by	removing	the	decision	making	
from	congress’s	hands	it	helps	assure	that	policy	is	consistent	over	time	and	allows	credible	
commitments	to	be	made	to	those	affected	by	policy.		Supreme	Court	Justice	Blackmun	
wrote	about	Mistretta	v.	U.S.54,	"Our	jurisprudence	has	been	driven	by	a	practical	
understanding	that	in	our	increasingly	complex	society,	replete	with	ever	changing	and	
more	technical	problems,	Congress	simply	cannot	do	its	job	absent	an	ability	to	delegate	
power	under	broad	general	directives.''	
Delegation	not	only	allows	for	expertise,	but	also	encourages	it.		Those	in	agencies	
tend	to	be	more	interested	and	know	more	about	an	area	than	those	in	other	agencies.		In	
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addition,	repeated	exposure	and	familiarity	with	the	key	subject	matter	gives	them	practical	
real	world	experience	that	would	be	difficult	for	congress	to	gain	and	which	enables	agency	
staffs	to	provide	better	judgment	with	regard	to	areas	in	the	subject	matter.		There	is	also	
the	important	fact	that	agencies	do	their	hiring	knowing	the	areas	they	will	be	responsible	
for	and	the	functions	that	they	will	need	to	fulfill.		This	enables	them	to	specifically	hire	
those	who	can	fill	areas	in	which	they	need	specialized	knowledge.		Furthermore	as	the	
requirements	of	the	agency	change	or	the	field	of	knowledge	changes,	the	agency	can	adapt	
their	hiring	to	account	for	these	changes	and	thereby	continue	to	have	the	necessary	
skillsets	to	address	the	policy	areas	delegated	to	them.	
Delegation	can	have	a	significant	impact	with	regard	to	producing	effective	public	
policy	and	the	efficient	allocation	of	scarce	resources.		The	parameters	used	to	determine	
the	method	of	delegation	have	a	big	effect	on	the	resulting	policy	created	and	thus	
determining	which	method	of	delegation	to	use	when	has	a	major	effect.		Therefore	analysis	
of	these	can	help	answer	questions	such	as	whether	it	is	beneficial	to	require	commissions	
to	justify	their	decision	using	recognizable	standards	of	utility	or	whether	strict	membership	
controls	should	be	devised	to	minimize	political	influence.	
Delegation	to	agencies	also	can	simplify	the	process	of	performing	some	tasks.		
Agencies	can	perform	simple,	informal	actions	with	less	overhead	than	can	congress	and	
thus	may	be	able	to	accomplish	goals	more	efficiently.		In	some	cases	these	informal	
methods	may	serve	in	lieu	of	general	policy	or	regulation.		Agencies	are	also	able	to	
interpret	the	law	and	can	do	this	in	such	a	way	as	to	simplify	the	creation	of	policy	and	its	
promulgation	in	society.		Bureaucrats	also	can	differ	from	congress	in	personality.		For	
instance,	bureaucrats	tend	to	be	risk	adverse.		Also	they	may	have	different	values	such	as	a	
focus	on	equity	as	opposed	to	just	efficiency.		In	some	situations	this	can	help	improve	the	
resulting	policies	that	they	make.	
The	political	tool	hypothesis	states	that	there	are	reasons	for	the	use	of	delegation	
and	reasons	to	view	it	as	a	beneficial	development.		In	the	words	of	Lowi,	“It	is	of	course	
impossible	to	imagine	a	modern	state	in	which	central	authorities	do	not	delegate	functions,	
responsibilities,	and	powers	to	administrators.		Thus	the	practice	of	delegation	itself	can	
hardly	be	criticized.		The	practice	becomes	pathological,	and	criticizable,	at	the	point	where	
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it	comes	to	be	considered	a	good	thing	in	itself,	flowing	to	administrators	without	guides,	
checks,	and	safeguards.”55		Delegation	has	many	facets	and	may	be	interpreted	as	a	positive	
or	a	negative	phenomenon	based	on	the	user’s	view	point.	
Delegation	can	also	be	leveraged	as	a	strategic	gesture	in	order	to	gain	political	
support	from	rival	members	of	congress.		For	example,	members	of	congress	on	powerful	
steering	committees	may	use	delegation	to	gain	acceptance	from	other	members	of	
congress	by	agreeing	to	delegate	to	a	notionally	nonpartisan	agency	or	board.		This	may	
occur	if	they	believe	that	the	issue	will	be	handled	fairly	or	in	other	words	favorably,	by	a	
nonpartisan	body	or	if	this	will	cause	their	homologues	in	congress	to	be	more	willing	to	
compromise	on	controversial	issues.		Successful	reconciliation	via	delegation	can	lead	to	
logrolls	in	which	many	members	of	congress	agree	to	an	approach	to	an	issue	to	remove	it	
from	their	plate.		This	process	creates	a	win-win	situation	for	members	of	congress	as	they	
are	able	to	convince	others	who	have	less	at	stake	to	compromise	and	forge	strong	
coalitions	that	can	withstand	the	rigors	of	the	legislative	drafting	and	approval	process.	
Delegation	allows	for	the	offloading	of	congress’	excessive	workload	to	agencies	so	
that	issues	can	get	the	time	and	attention	that	they	deserve.		Members	of	congress	spend	
more	time	soliciting	contributions	and	taking	other	actions	in	order	to	get	reelected	than	in	
actual	legislating	and	so	the	time	they	have	to	analyze	and	pass	legislation	is	even	more	
limited	and	thus	offloading	workload	makes	more	sense.56	
Theories	of	delegation	often	suppose	delegation	is	used	to	move	policy	making	to	
those	with	expertise,	however	even	agencies	that	are	considered	experts	in	a	field	are	still	
often	lacking	key	knowledge	that	would	help	determine	a	policy	response.			
Institutional	factors	such	as	the	shape	and	size	of	voting	districts	can	affect	the	
resulting	election	and	thus	the	policies	created.		Delegation	moves	away	from	a	reliance	on	
electoral	majorities	and	can	remove	factors	such	as	district	makeup	from	the	decision	of	
what	policy	to	enact.	
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	 As	Arneson	argues,	Democracy	is	not	in	and	of	itself	a	good	thing.		Rather	it	produces	
good	outcomes.57		Following	upon	this	the	way	to	judge	the	normative	effect	of	mass	
delegation	of	legislative	power	to	the	executive	branch	is	to	judge	the	resulting	structure	by	
its	fruits.		There	is	nothing	intrinsically	wrong	with	bureaucracy	and	the	results	that	it	
produces	relies	heavily	on	the	structure	of	the	delegation	and	the	manning	in	which	it	is	
carried	out	and	performed.		Thus	the	legitimacy	or	value	of	delegation	depends	on	these	
factors	as	well.	
	 Delegation	can	solve	some	of	the	structural	problems	that	congress	has	in	
addressing	issues	and	in	creating	policy.		For	instance	congress	tends	to	have	a	short-term	
temporal	focus	as	their	time	horizon	is	typically	focused	squarely	on	the	next	election	and	in	
the	case	of	the	House	of	Representatives	this	is	at	most	two	years	in	the	future	and	not	a	
decent	goalpost	with	which	to	craft	policy.		By	delegating	decisions	to	an	impartial	and	
theoretically	non-partisan	body	such	as	a	commission,	congress	is	able	to	give	the	decision	
to	a	body	that	is	more	deliberative	and	has	less	inherent	need	to	focus	on	the	short	term	
political	implications,	but	which	can	rather	find	a	policy	solution	that	is	better	for	the	nation	
over	the	long	term.	
	 Delegation	can	be	used	to	convince	people	to	sign	on	to	a	specific	goal	without	going	
into	the	particulars	or	the	means.		This	is	a	useful	method	for	getting	things	done.		Examples	
of	cases	where	this	method	is	used	are	the	Defense	Base	Closure	and	Realignment	
Commission	and	the	Joint	Select	Committee	on	Deficit	Reduction	(Supercommittee)	charged	
with	cutting	long-term	spending.		Congressman	James	Florio	explained	this	technique,	“with	
all	the	contentiousness,	with	all	the	outside	forces	…	one	consciously	strives	for	ambiguity	in	
order	to	get	people	to	sign	on	to	things.”58		Delegating	to	commissions	such	as	this	also	
allows	negotiation	to	be	conducted	secretly	in	an	unpoliticized	environment.		In	the	words	
of	Campbell,	“When	deliberations	are	private,	parties	can	make	offers	without	being	
denounced	either	by	their	opponents	or	by	affected	groups.		Removing	external	contact	
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reduces	the	opportunity	to	use	an	offer	from	the	other	side	to	curry	favor	with	
constituents.”59	
	 Delegaion	can	also	be	used	to	minimize	risk.		Congress	does	not	merely	want	to	
maximize	credit	and	minimize	blame,	but	also	has	an	incentive	to	minimize	the	risk	of	a	
“catastrophic”	career-ending	piece	of	legislation.		Delegation,	even	when	not	strictly	profit-
maximizing	in	terms	of	expected	blame-credit	value,	can	protect	a	systematic	advantage	
held	by	incumbents	and	thus	still	increase	their	chance	of	being	reelected.	
The	amount	of	constraint	and	delegation	thus	vary	in	part	based	on	the	relationship	
between	the	congress	and	the	executive	branch.		As	Allen	Schick	writes,	“Where	members	
are	willing	to	entrust	the	fate	of	their	policies	to	administrators,	they	are	apt	to	legislate	in	
broad	terms.		The	laws	can	be	brief,	with	little	bickering	among	members	over	the	details.		
Not	so,	however,	when	members	are	skeptical	about	whether	executive	agencies	will	
perform	according	to	their	expectations.”60		Thus	in	politically	contentious	periods	such	as	
when	there	is	split	control	of	government	there	tends	to	be	more	constrain	on	delegated	
power.		However	the	amount	of	delegation	will	not	necessarily	decrease	as	there	are	
competing	forces	at	work.		The	lack	of	trust	between	the	branches	will	tend	toward	less	
authority	being	delegated,	but	the	gridlock	that	may	occur	in	the	traditional	legislative	
process	may	lead	to	legislators	being	more	willing	delegate	because	they	are	not	able	to	
pass	legislation	themselves	and	they	want	to	use	delegation	as	a	political	tool	to	accomplish	
their	political	goals.		During	much	of	the	period	this	paper	covers,	the	relationship	between	
the	president	and	the	congress	was	largely	adversarial.	
Kiewiet	and	McCubbins	investigate	delegation	from	a	principal-agent	framework.61		
The	treat	the	congress	as	the	principal	and	the	bureaucracy	as	the	agent	and	investigate	
what	occurs.		They	argue	that	bureaucrats	have	gained	significant	power	through	delegation	
and	that	this	has	been	increasing.		They	also	argue	that	limited	oversight	allows	the	
bureaucracy	to	largely	use	this	delegated	power	as	it	sees	fit.		Furthermore	they	argue	that	
the	bureaucrats	have	significant	control	over	congress.		They	however	list	ways	that	the	
delegation	can	be	structured	or	actions	that	congress	can	take	to	better	control	its	agents.	
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The	increase	in	delegation	of	power	was	not	inevitable.		There	have	been	trends	that	
have	contributed	to	the	increase	and	acceptance	of	delegation.		Among	these	trends	are	the	
growth	of	the	nation	and	the	growth	of	the	executive	branch.		The	dominance	of	the	
executive	branch	is	by	no	means	enshrined	in	law	nor	is	it	inevitable.		In	previous	periods	
the	legislative	branch	had	been	dominant.		A	quarter	century	before	he	was	elected	to	
public	office,	political	scholar	and	future	president	Woodrow	Wilson	asserted	that	Congress,	
”has	entered	more	and	more	into	the	details	of	administration	until	it	has	virtually	taken	
into	its	own	hands	all	the	substantial	powers	of	government.”62		Wilson	and	other	liberal	
politicians	at	of	the	turn	of	the	20th	century	helped	to	reverse	this	trend.		Their	focus	on	
efficiency	and	their	belief	that	governance	could	be	more	scientific	led	to	power	shifting	to	
the	executive	branch.		This	trend	towards	more	executive	power	has	been	exacerbated	by	
actions	taken	by	the	government	during	crisis.		During	those	periods	power	often	gets	
centralized	or	increased,	but	these	changes	can	persist	even	beyond	the	scope	of	the	crisis.	
Congress	has	taken	steps	to	counter	the	increasing	power	of	the	executive	branch.		
Among	these	actions	were	a	series	of	changes	designed	to	strengthen	and	increase	its	own	
capabilities.		By	increasing	the	proficiency	of	congress,	its	committees,	and	legislative	
agencies	it	gives	itself	the	ability	to	perform	oversight	of	executive	agencies	and	create	
policy.		The	legislative	branch	in	the	United	States	is	considerably	larger	than	in	most	
nations.		By	funding	and	staffing	the	Congressional	Budget	Office,	the	Congressional	
Research	Service,	and	the	Government	Accountability	Office,	congress	greatly	increases	its	
capabilities	and	it	can	thus	counterbalance	the	abilities	of	the	executive	branch.	
	
1.3.3 The Capacity of Politicians Affects the Amount of Delegation 
	 	
	 Huber	and	Shipan	hypothesize	that	capacity	of	politicians	to	write	detailed	statues	
affects	whether	they	delegate.63		This	can	be	broken	into	two	pieces.		One	is	that	if	the	
institutional	capacity	and	resources	are	less,	that	delegation	will	increase.		The	other	is	that	
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if	the	requisite	expertise	is	to	be	found	in	congress	to	deal	with	the	issue	area	efficiently,	it	is	
less	likely	to	delegate	than	if	the	experience	is	lacking.		The	United	States	Congress	has	
significant	institutional	resources	compared	to	other	legislative	bodies	around	the	world.		
However	congress	does	not	have	deep	knowledge	of	financial	matters	and	needed	expertise	
to	deal	appropriately	with	the	crisis.		Congress	was	having	difficulty	passing	bills	and	the	
majority	of	its	time	and	energy	was	directed	to	health	care	reform	and	that	meant	that	the	
throughput	and	attention	that	could	be	dedicated	to	dealing	with	the	crisis	was	limited.	
	
1.3.4 More Authority will be Delegated to the Executive Branch in Informationally Intense 
Issue Areas 
	
Epstein	and	O’Halloran	investigated	whether	intense	issue	areas,	which	have	more	
political	uncertainty	for	politicians,	lead	to	more	delegation	to	the	executive.64		The	thought	
behind	this	hypothesis	is	that	politicians	would	not	want	to	risk	making	an	action	that	would	
later	turn	out	to	be	a	political	liability	and	this	is	more	likely	in	these	issue	areas.		Politicians	
tend	to	be	risk	adverse	and	are	more	concerned	with	avoiding	blame	than	taking	credit	as	
the	former	can	hurt	more	than	the	latter	can	help.		Moe	also	argued	that	political	
uncertainty	affected	policy	formation.65	
	
1.3.5 Complex policy areas lead to more delegation 
	
Epstein	and	O’Halloran	also	looked	into	whether	more	discretion	will	be	delegated	to	
the	executive	in	complex	when	reported	by	committees	in	informationally	intense	policy	
jurisdictions.66		This	would	seem	intuitive	since	more	complex	issue	areas	require	specialized	
knowledge	beyond	that	which	congress	has.		Finance	and	the	economic	decisions	involved	
in	dealing	with	a	crisis	are	complex	policy	areas.	
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1.3.6 Where this Paper Fits in to the Literature 
	
	 This	paper	seeks	to	investigate	the	use	of	delegation	in	response	to	a	financial	crisis.		
This	paper	is	the	first	in	depth	investigation	of	the	use	of	delegation	in	creating	public	policy	
in	response	to	the	2008	financial	crisis.		It	is	one	of	the	few	empirical	studies	to	investigate	
the	common	theories	of	delegation	such	as	the	abdication	hypothesis	and	the	only	one	to	
investigate	the	creation	of	policy	in	crisis	situations.		The	understanding	of	the	creation	of	
policy	during	and	in	response	to	crises	is	important	because	significant	policy	changes	are	
more	possible	during	these	periods	than	they	are	in	periods	without	crises.		It	also	is	worth	
investigated	actual	policy	creation	to	see	if	it	matched	up	with	the	results	that	would	be	
expected	by	various	theories.	
The	paper	also	seeks	to	investigate	the	different	constraints	used	and	the	way	that	
delegation	is	structured	in	response	to	the	crisis.		The	specifics	of	delegation	are	important	
for	understanding	the	reason	for	the	delegation,	the	probable	effects	of	the	delegation,	and	
whether	policy	could	be	created	to	be	more	effective	and	efficient	and	lead	to	better	
results.	
	
1.4	Existing	Framework	
	
While	much	of	this	paper	focused	on	specific	laws	and	the	delegation	they	
contained,	these	acts	do	not	take	place	in	a	vacuum.		There	were	in	place	some	laws	that	
were	far	ranging	and	affected	the	amount	or	details	of	delegation	and	which	set	the	political	
climate	and	structural	framework	for	future	delegation.		One	of	the	most	important	and	far	
reaching	of	these	bills	is	The	Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA).67		The	APA	sets	out	a	
number	of	rules	for	executive	agencies	and	thus	effectively	limits	the	power	of	these	
agencies	and	the	executive	branch.		It	constrains	the	president	and	the	agencies’	freedom	of	
action	and	ensures	that	actions	are	in	the	desired	direction	that	congress	would	like	them	to	
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take.		The	APA	came	about	during	the	period	of	increased	delegation	and	power	to	the	
executive	branch	that	came	to	pass	with	Franklin	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal	efforts.		This	led	to	
congress	putting	in	place	the	APA	as	a	framework	for	the	use	of	this	power	that	congress	
had	started	to	delegate	to	the	executive	branch.		This	view	that	this	new	concentration	of	
powers	needs	to	be	limited	was	even	supported	by	the	president.		Roosevelt	felt	that	
creating	these	agencies	and	vesting	in	them	powers	of	different	branches	of	government,	
“threatens	to	develop	a	fourth	branch	of	government	for	which	there	is	no	sanction	in	the	
Constitution."68		He	thus	proposed	a	study	to	determine	the	best	set	of	administrative	rules	
and	procedures	to	deal	with	that	risk	as	well	as	to	ensure	good	and	efficient	governance	on	
the	part	of	these	agencies.		
Though	the	APA	was	an	act	of	congress,	the	president	too	can	change	the	dynamics	
and	framework	in	which	power	is	delegated	by	congress.		In	1939,	the	president	issued	
Executive	Order	8248,	which	created	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President.		It	also	greatly	
empowered	the	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	(OMB)	and	changed	its	functions	which	
in	effect	gave	the	president	greater	political	power	over	executive	agencies.		In	establishing	
the	OMB,	this	executive	order	calls	on	the	OMB,	“To	conduct	research	in	the	development	
of	improved	plans	of	administrative	management,	and	to	advise	the	executive	departments	
and	agencies	of	the	Government	with	respect	to	improved	administrative	organization	and	
practice	…To	aid	the	President	to	bring	about	more	efficient	and	economical	conduct	of	
Government	service	…To	assist	the	President	by	clearing	and	coordinating	departmental	
advice	on	proposed	legislation	and	by	making	recommendations	as	to	Presidential	action	on	
legislative	enactments,	in	accordance	with	past	practice…To	keep	the	President	informed	of	
the	progress	of	activities	by	agencies	of	the	Government	with	respect	to	work	proposed,	
work	actually	initiated,	and	work	completed,	together	with	the	relative	timing	of	work	
between	the	several	agencies	of	the	Government;	all	to	the	end	that	the	work	programs	of	
the	several	agencies	of	the	Executive	branch	of	the	Government	may	be	coordinated	and	
that	the	monies	appropriated	by	the	Congress	may	be	expended	in	the	most	economical	
manner	possible	with	the	least	possible	overlapping	and	duplication	of	effort.”	69		This	
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clearly	enables	the	president	to	determine	the	course	of	actions	being	pursued	by	the	
agencies	and	to	better	guide	and	control	these	organizations.	
	 The	Executive	Office	of	the	President	is	sometimes	viewed	as	working	for	the	current	
president	rather	than	the	presidency	in	general.		It	is	a	politicized	and	partisan	body	that	has	
accumulated	powers	that	used	to	belong	to	congress.		It	was	given	thee	powers	despite	the	
fact	that	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President	is	not	as	readily	answerable	to	congress	or	as	
controllable	by	it	as	other	agencies	are.		This	body	has	grown	substantially	since	its	founding	
with	the	Reorganization	Act	of	1939.70		Very	few	members	of	the	Executive	Office	of	the	
President	have	to	be	confirmed	by	the	Senate	and	even	the	head	of	the	organization,	the	
president’s	Chief	of	Staff	does	not	need	to	be	confirmed.		This	allows	the	Executive	Office	of	
the	President	significant	freedom	from	congress	and	gives	the	president	considerable	sway	
over	the	office.	
	 The	APA	helped	solve	potential	problems	that	could	occur	due	to	information	
asymmetry	and	hidden	actions	or	actors.		The	APA	requires	the	agency	and	other	political	
actors	post	to	their	intentions	and	give	congress	notice	of	their	intended	actions.		This	gives	
congress	first	mover	advantage	and	allows	them	to	gain	information	and	evaluate	the	
political	landscape	to	better	control	the	agency	and	determine	the	potential	positives	and	
negatives	of	taking	an	action	on	an	issue.		
	 Another	act	that	changed	the	underlying	framework	of	delegation	is	The	Budget	&	
Accounting	Procedures	Act	of	1950	which	President	Harry	S.	Truman	described	in	his	signing	
statement	as,	"the	most	important	legislation	enacted	by	the	Congress	in	the	budget	and	
accounting	field	since	the	Budget	and	Accounting	Act,	1921.”		While	this	act	primarily	
created	rules	and	standards	as	to	how	organizations	did	their	budgeting	and	accounting,	it	
by	extension	increased	financial	control	of	these	organizations.		This	helped	the	president’s	
ability	to	control	these	organizations	and	helped	increase	transparency	and	changed	the	
operating	procedures	of	these	agencies.		Later	in	President	Truman’s	signing	statement	it	
states	this	when	it	says,	“The	budget	provisions	will	enable	the	President	to	present	the	
financial	program	of	the	Government	in	simpler	and	more	meaningful	terms.	It	will	provide	
the	basis	for	a	better	evaluation	of	Government	programs	and	activities	in	terms	of	where	
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the	funds	come	from,	the	purposes	to	which	they	are	to	be	applied,	and	the	costs	
involved.”71		
Temporal	binding	of	congress	can	be	useful	for	congress	as	it	can	ensure	that	current	
preferences	are	enshrined	in	future	policy	preferences	and	congress	can	ensure	that	policies	
are	enacted	that	allow	for	better	public	policy.		This	can	best	be	accomplished	by	delegating	
the	power	to	make	and	alter	policy	to	the	executive	branch.		It	has	been	shown	that	internal	
delegation	to	congressional	committees	and	the	establishment	of	rules	is	not	able	to	bind	
future	congresses	since	if	the	wishes	of	congress	change,	the	new	congress	can	simply	undo	
or	ignore	the	steps	taken	by	prior	congresses	to	constrain	their	actions.		Examples	of	this	
can	be	seen	in	the	repeal	of	Gramm–Rudman–Hollings	Balanced	Budget	Act,72	which	had	
been	created	to	stop	future	congresses	from	excessive	deficit	spending.		Ultimately	a	future	
congress	decided	that	it	did	not	like	the	restrictions	on	spending	nor	did	it	approve	of	the	
sequesters,	or	automatic	spending	cuts,	that	were	implemented	when	the	deficit	spending	
exceeded	predefined	levels.		Likewise	the	empowerment	of	the	house	appropriations	
committee	to	defend	the	treasury	from	claims	coming	from	other	congressional	committees	
was	a	significant	force	in	trimming	spending,	but	eventually	congress	overturned	this	trend	
and	disempowered	the	committee	and	spending	increased	as	the	new	congress	wanted.	
Most	U.S.	States	have	the	concept	of	separation	of	powers	and	have	distinct	
branches	of	state	government	with	separate	powers	vested	in	each	branch.		Most	also	have	
a	concept	of	delegation	and	allow	the	delegation	of	at	least	some	power	and	authority	from	
the	legislative	branch	to	the	executive	branch.		States	enforce	the	delegation	doctrine	more	
strictly	and	state	courts	are	far	more	likely	to	strike	down	delegations	of	power	from	the	
legislative	branch	to	the	executive	branch.	
	 At	the	federal	level,	delegation	has	effectively	become	the	law	of	the	land,	however	
some	Supreme	Court	justices,	lawmakers,	and	law	scholars	have	seen	continued	value	and	
importance	in	the	non-delegation	doctrine.		This	ranges	from	Justice	Rehnquist’s	opinion	
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offered	in	the	case	of	AFL-CIO	v.	American	Petroleum	Institute	to	statements	made	by	
Justices	Thomas	and	Scalia.73	
	 The	prevalence	of	delegation	has	not	been	due	to	a	change	in	the	legal	view	of	the	
constitution	so	much	as	it	has	been	due	to	the	necessities	of	a	larger	government	that	needs	
to	perform	more	functions,	the	results	of	a	larger	nation,	and	the	complexities	of	new	policy	
areas	and	a	rapidly	changing	world.		The	pragmatic	needs	of	government	have	led	to	a	vast	
increase	in	the	amount	of	power	delegated	to	the	executive	branch.		Despite	the	separation	
of	powers,	this	sort	of	delegation	from	one	branch	to	another	is	not	totally	in	opposition	to	
the	intentions	and	views	of	the	framers	of	the	constitution.		This	can	be	seen	in	#48	of	The	
Federalist	Papers	where	James	Madison	argued	that	the	branches	of	government	should	not	
be	completely	separated,	but	should	be	interconnected.		The	underlying	purpose	of	the	
separation	of	powers	was	to	avoid	excessive	centralization,	which	could	lead	to	tyranny.		If	
delegation	is	not	a	threat	of	excessive	concentrations	of	power	and	the	appropriate	checks	
and	balances	are	maintained	to	assure	a	representative	government	that	works	for	the	
people	then	this	threat	of	delegation	is	minor.		This	explains	the	focus	on	delegation	having	
at	intelligibility	principle.		
	 Besides	the	legislative	framework,	there	is	also	an	existing	framework	of	political	
actors	and	institutions.		Congressional	delegation	is	not	a	unilateral	action.		Even	setting	
aside	the	two	houses,	competing	political	parties,	and	differing	constituencies	and	law	
makers,	one	must	take	the	president’s	wishes	into	effect.		The	president	holds	veto	power	
over	all	bills	and	joint	resolutions	and	thus	can	wield	considerable	power	over	how	congress	
approaches	a	problem.		He	need	not	directly	veto	a	law,	but	can	use	this	power	along	with	
his	other	powers	including	his	being	the	face	of	the	government	to	bargain	for	his	preferred	
solution	or	try	to	get	traction	for	a	view	that	he	approves	of.		Furthermore	when	executive	
orders,	signing	statements,	impoundment,	and	the	president’s	control	over	the	
administration	come	in	to	play	congress	typically	makes	some	effort	to	accommodate	the	
wishes	of	the	president.		The	president’s	interests	diverge	from	those	of	congress	when	it	
comes	to	the	issue	of	delegation.		The	president	also	has	different	motivating	factors	and	is	
concerned	about	issues	beyond	just	re-election,	particularly	if	the	president	is	in	his	they	are	
in	their	second	term	and	thus	cannot	run	again	due	to	the	limit	on	presidential	terms	that	is	
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imposed	by	the	22nd	Constitutional	Amendment.		Thus	with	different	motivations	and	
payoffs	the	president	will	have	a	different	set	of	preferences	with	regard	to	delegation	
which	he	will	try	to	impose	on	the	process	by	using	the	tolls	in	his	power.		A	president	may	
want	the	additional	power	and	authority	granted	to	the	administration	through	delegation	
to	an	executive	agency,	however	there	is	the	potential	for	an	unpopular	law	being	created	
by	one	of	these	agencies	and	the	president,	fairly	or	not,	taking	blame	for	it.		Thus	the	
president	too	will	be	concerned	with	mitigating	these	risks.		A	clear	example	of	this	was	
President	George	H.	W.	Bush	who	prohibited	executive	agencies	from	creating	new	laws	
during	the	90-day	period	preceding	the	1992	elections.	
	 While	both	Congress	and	the	President	have	some	general	preferences	on	the	topic	
of	delegation,	much	is	determined	by	the	situation	and	by	examining	in	what	issues	they	
tend	to	delegate	and	which	they	don’t	one	can	learn	more	about	this	tendency.		For	
instance,	the	minimal	amount	of	tax	authority	that	has	been	delegated	hints	that	congress	
likes	to	control	the	ability	to	create	the	laws	that	govern	taxes	as	these	enable	members	of	
congress	to	add	tax	breaks	for	powerful	constituents	that	may	prove	grateful	and	
reciprocate	in	some	manner	that	will	help	in	a	congressional	reelection.		Likewise	the	
structure	and	manner	of	the	delegation	can	vary	terrifically	and	with	competing	interests,	
differing	groups	will	prefer	differing	methods	and	structures	of	delegation.		By	structures	of	
delegation	this	paper	refers	to	the	constraints	used	and	the	parties	to	whom	power	is	
delegated	and	how	it	is	overseen	as	well	as	how	much	power	is	delegated	and	for	what	
purposes.	
	 Along	with	the	differing	views	of	delegation	held	by	those	in	the	legislative	branch	
and	those	in	the	executive,	there	is	also	a	disparity	of	views	between	the	political	parties.		
The	parties	have	differing	views	of	key	issues	such	as	the	role	of	government	and	its	proper	
size.		These	have	been	rather	consistent	though	the	years	and	this	too	will	likely	affect	the	
act	of	delegation.		Republicans	have	typically	been	more	disposed	towards	smaller	
government	and	fewer	regulations	than	have	the	Democrats.		This	may	make	the	
Republicans	less	likely	to	create	new	agencies	to	deal	with	policy	issues.	
	 Some	have	viewed	delegation	as	an	action	in	which	the	main	questions	of	policy	that	
rely	on	judgments	regarding	broad	policy	decisions,	morals,	or	the	goals	of	the	government	
are	being	done	by	congress	while	the	power	delegated	are	to	specialized	experts	or	
technocrats	that	act	on	these	broad	policy	guidance	with	targeted	actions	that	enact	these	
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main	goals.		However,	in	practice	this	does	not	appear	to	be	the	case.		Laws	that	rely	on	
delegation	are	not	self-implementing	but	rather	require	significant	discretion	of	agencies	to	
make	determinations	to	the	best	course	of	actions	and	not	merely	determinations	of	facts.	
	 Delegation	can	be	set	forth	with	goals	that	give	guidance	on	how	to	balance	
priorities	such	as	when	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	was	given	responsibility	to,	“promote	
effectively	the	goals	of	maximum	employment	and	stable	prices”.74		Congress	could	have	
given	the	Federal	Reserve	a	single	focus	such	as	keeping	inflation	in	check,	but	it	chose	to	
set	forth	two	contrasting	goals	that	the	Fed	could	then	balance	against	each	other.		Often	
though,	a	specific	end	goal	is	given	to	an	agency	which	is	in	some	cases	not	achievable	with	
the	power	and	resources	assigned	to	the	agency.		This	can	lead	to	members	of	congress	
implying	to	their	constituents	that	there	is	an	effective	method	of	dealing	with	an	issue	that	
is	not	being	properly	dealt	with	and	allows	the	agency	to	take	the	blame	for	not	meeting	
goals	that	were	set	forth	for	them.		This	has	the	effect	of	breaking	the	link	between	cause	
and	effect	in	people’s	minds	so	that	they	lose	sight	of	the	tradeoffs	in	legislation	and	believe	
there	are	quick	fixes	to	be	has	just	by	assigning	the	problem	to	some	agency.		Meanwhile	
lawmakers	gain	by	casting	blame	as	this	appears	to	the	public	as	the	lawmakers	
championing	the	people	against	the	bureaucracy	and	combatting	government	waste	and	
inefficiency.		This	can	lead	to	a	deception	of	voters	that	makes	making	tough	decisions	and	
facing	the	nation’s	problems	even	more	of	a	challenge.		This	can	also	lead	to	self-deception	
where	lawmakers	underestimate	the	costs	of	dealing	with	a	problem	and	do	not	take	into	
account	the	aspects	of	laws	that	they	do	not	see.		Schoenbrod	suggests	that	this	helped	
exacerbate	the	Savings	and	Loan	Crisis.75	
	 Delegation	can	have	contrasting	effects	on	the	public’s	view	of	government.		It	can	
both	increase	and	decrease	the	public’s	perception	of	the	effectiveness	and	responsiveness	
of	government.		While	perception	is	not	paramount	and	can	differ	widely	from	the	actual	
facts,	it	is	an	important	criterion	in	determining	the	validity	of	government.		Peoples’	views	
of	the	democratically	elected	congress	reflect	their	sense	of	the	government.	
	 An	increase	in	the	number	of	laws	can	lead	to	a	so	called	“nanny	state”	and	one	in	
which	government	oversteps	what	it	does	well	and	impinges	on	other	areas.		Government	
can	be	viewed	as	providing	benefit	by	providing	public	goods	and	keeping	individuals	from	
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hurting	each	other.		Other	areas	are	perhaps	not	handled	well	by	government	and	often	can	
consist	of	congress	doling	out	rewards	to	politically	connected	individuals	from	those	with	
less	power.		This	becomes	rent	seeking	behavior	and	often	includes	transfers	that	are	
inefficient	or	which	would	generally	be	considered	to	be	not	fair.	
	 The	negotiations	take	place	within	a	certain	political	framework	and	respond	to	the	
structure	of	power	between	various	political	players.	The	structure	of	the	House’s	rules	is	an	
important	factor	in	that	it	gives	the	majority	party	in	the	House	additional	capability	to	
control	the	body	and	changes	the	capabilities	and	policy	preferences	of	the	House	as	a	
whole.		The	party	in	power	changes	these	rules	to	meet	their	short-term	interests	rather	
than	long-term	partisan	interest	or	the	needs	of	the	house.76		Besides	rules,	the	majority	
party	has	control	over	areas	such	as	committee	assignments	and	discharge	petitions	and	
these	too	alter	the	political	playing	field	in	which	negotiations	take	place.	
	 Divided	government,	such	as	was	the	case	in	these	during	the	crisis,	leads	to	lower	
discretion	for	both	the	executive	and	congressional	branch.		Delegation	from	the	legislative	
branch	under	divided	government	leads	to	the	delegation	to	actors	that	are	farther	from	
executive	power	and	are	freer	and	with	greater	discretion.77	
Delegating	power	to	those	more	distance	from	executive	power	allows	the	power	to	
be	wielded	to	a	greater	extent	by	the	bureaucracy.		The	goals	of	senior	members	at	the	
agency	differ	from	those	of	members	of	congress.		They	are	happier	with	the	status	quo	in	
terms	of	culture	and	political	continuity	whereas	congress	wants	to	ensure	responsiveness	
and	control,	which	would	help	them	get	votes.		The	heads	of	the	agencies	have	their	own	
agenda	that	can	be	to	increase	or	safeguard	the	power	of	their	fiefdom	and	thus	can	come	
into	conflict	with	career	bureaucrats	at	agencies	as	well	as	with	congress.		Agency	heads	
also	have	a	much	different	time	horizon	than	career	employees	since	political	appointees	
are	not	around	for	very	long	and	have	goals	they	want	to	accomplish	in	a	short	time.	
Agents	for	their	part	may	want	to	gain	more	power	to	better	accomplish	their	own	
goals.		There	are	a	number	of	methods	by	which	an	agent	may	accomplish	this.		Agents	can	
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seek	to	hide	both	their	intentions	and	their	actions	from	members	of	congress,	the	
president,	and	others	that	seek	to	control	them.		This	can	improve	the	agent’s	freedom	of	
action.		In	addition,	those	agents	that	are	supposed	to	work	independently	can	form	a	cartel	
with	other	executive	agencies	and	the	president	which	can	help	each	other	and	keep	power	
away	from	congress	so	that	they	are	able	to	have	freedom	of	action.	
Many	researchers	have	claimed	that	over	the	last	100	years	there	has	been	by	in	
large	an	increase	in	the	power	of	the	president.		While	there	may	be	periods	of	reversion	
such	as	when	congress	asserted	its	powers	in	the	1970s	and	attempted	to	place	checks	on	
presidential	unilateralism,	these	individuals	would	argue	that,	“taken	by	and	large,	the	
history	of	the	Presidency	is	a	history	of	aggrandizement.”78		Or	in	Thomas	Cronin’s	more	
recent	assessment,	“for	almost	150	years	the	executive	power	of	the	presidency	has	steadily	
expanded”.79	
	 The	tendency	to	delegate	is	related	to	a	convergence	of	interests	and	beliefs	on	the	
part	of	the	delegator	of	the	power	and	the	person	or	body	who	is	delegated	to.		Ogul	found	
that,	“A	congressman	of	the	president’s	political	party	is	less	likely	to	be	concerned	with	
oversight	than	a	member	of	the	opposition	party.”80	This	is	not	to	say	that	delegation	
removes	congress	from	having	any	role	in	policy	creation,	but	it	tends	to	relegate	congress	
to	the	role	of	periodic	overseer,	which	gives	congress	less	power	and	is	an	area	in	which	
congress	can	struggle	to	make	a	mark.	
Governments	typically	deal	with	crises	in	two	phases.		One	deals	with	the	immediate	
issue	and	tries	to	put	a	Band-Aid	on	the	situation	and	try	to	staunch	the	bleeding.		It	works	
to	stop	the	crisis	from	getting	worse	and	tries	to	begin	to	improve	the	situation.		The	second	
phase	tries	to	take	steps	to	stop	a	similar	crisis	from	happening	in	the	future	and	solving	any	
systematic	weaknesses	and	giving	the	government	the	ability	to	deal	with	similar	crises	in	
the	future.		These	two	phases	are	not	necessarily	sequential	in	time.		There	is	often	a	later	
phase	that	tries	to	undo	the	temporary	extreme	actions	that	were	taken	to	deal	with	the	
crisis.		Crisis,	though	they	may	be	seen	far	off,	are	typically	acute	in	that	problems	build	fast	
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and	thus	the	crisis	must	be	dealt	with	quickly	and	often	with	little	planning	in	place	already	
on	how	best	to	approach	the	problem.	
Crises	necessitate	an	increase	in	the	amount	of	action	needed	in	order	to	deal	with	
the	crisis	as	well	as	an	increase	in	operational	tempo	and	speed	at	which	public	policy	must	
be	created	and	government	actions	must	be	taken	in	order	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		The	very	
nature	of	a	crisis	and	its	effects,	which	are	out	of	the	normal	stream	of	events,	open	up	the	
government	to	take	extraordinary	actions	in	response	to	rare	and	major	events.		The	
government	thus	increases	the	scope	and	breadth	of	actions	that	it	takes	and	will	take	steps	
that	it	would	not	take	in	less	dire	circumstances.		This	readiness	of	the	government	to	
increase	the	uses	of	policy	and	the	areas	in	which	it	pertains	are	conjoined	with	a	willingness	
and	even	an	eagerness	of	the	populace	at	large	to	increase	the	intensity	and	scope	of	its	
actions.		People	typically	clamor	for	more	government	intervention	and	action	in	the	midst	
of	the	crisis	and	see	the	government	as	the	body	responsible	to	resolve	the	crisis	whereas	at	
other	times,	the	populace	may	look	more	to	private	citizens,	nonprofits,	and	the	market	to	
address	issues	of	everyday	concern.		Individuals	are	also	more	understanding	of	actions	
which	impinge	on	their	individual	rights	or	which	adversely	affect	them	during	a	crisis.		They	
will	give	the	government	additional	authorities,	as	people	are	willing	to	make	short-term	
sacrifices	for	long-term	stability.		There	is	a	rally	round	the	flag	effect	in	many	crises	that	can	
silence	the	voice	of	dissent	and	allow	for	easier	policy	creation.81		There	is	also	more	
incentive	for	those	in	the	government	to	take	action	as	it	is	expected	of	them	and	they	will	
be	electorally	rewarded	for	taking	action	and	appearing	to	be	actively	engaged	in	addressing	
the	crisis.		
Delegation	can	be	an	effective	method	of	dealing	with	crises,	but	can	also	have	some	
adverse	or	unintended	effects.		One	of	these	effects	is	that	agencies	created	to	deal	with	a	
crisis	or	concern	may	continue	past	the	point	where	they	are	needed	and	become	encrusted	
as	part	of	the	bureaucracy.		Alternatively	the	actions	of	the	agent	may	overshoot	the	target	
and	be	excessively	reactionary	so	that	it	ends	up	being	poor	long	term	policy	and	may	even	
lead	to	other	further	crises.		The	exigencies	of	the	day	may	not	have	much	in	common	with	
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the	sustained	needs	of	the	nation.		This	risk	is	increased	due	to	the	fact	that	delegation	
allows	for	more	vigorous	governmental	action.			
To	allow	delegation	to	provide	benefits	while	decreasing	the	potential	negative	
effects	of	broad	delegation,	congress	must	structure	the	delegation	intelligently	and	make	
sure	to	use	constraints	such	as	sunset	provisions	or	limitations	on	power	to	best	ensure	a	
desired	result.		The	form	and	manner	of	the	delegation	can	tell	us	a	great	deal	about	
congress’	goals	and	implicit	assumptions.		Likewise	the	political	process	that	is	used	to	
produce	the	delegation	can	also	let	us	know	how	the	delegation	is	viewed	and	whether	it	
meets	political	ends,	ideological	ends,	or	is	designed	to	improve	the	state	of	the	nation	and	
its	ability	to	meet	the	crisis.		The	political	process	thus	also	enables	us	to	test	theories	of	
delegation	such	as	the	abdication	hypothesis,	which	states	that	the	primary	reason	to	
delegate	is	to	help	individual	members	of	congress	achieve	their	goals,	of	which	by	far	the	
most	important	for	members	of	congress	is	reelection.		
Economic	crises	have	a	particular	dynamic	that	other	crises	such	as	political	crises	
may	not.		Citizens	may	view	the	administration	as	responsible	for	economic	problems	and	as	
such	the	opposition	party	may	not	find	it	in	their	political	interest	to	help	take	actions	to	
stimulate	the	economy	or	help	the	short-term	economic	picture,	particularly	if	an	election	is	
approaching.		The	opposition	would	tend	to	justify	their	inaction	and	opposition	for	other	
reasons	such	as	ideological	reasons	or	by	questioning	the	efficacy	of	the	proposed	action.		
An	example	of	this	is	the	Republican	push	for	actions	that	they	argued	were	necessary	for	
long	term	fiscal	responsibility,	but	which	would	pose	a	risk	to	the	short	term	economic	
turnaround.		The	party	in	control	of	the	White	House	by	comparison	would	benefit	from	
short-term	moves	that	would	improve	the	economy	in	the	short	term	despite	their	long-
term	costs.		They	the	president	and	to	a	lesser	extent	the	administration	will	lobby	for	these	
short-term	goals.		
Economic	crises	do	not	completely	stop	other	policy	issues	coming	up,	but	the	mere	
fact	of	there	being	a	crisis	can	largely	set	the	agenda.		Nobody	wants	to	be	seen	as	
sidetracking	a	potential	solution	or	not	responding	to	the	needs	of	the	nation	and	thus	the	
space	for	policy	creation	in	other	areas	is	small.		It	never	fully	vanishes	though	as	the	nation	
always	has	multiple	competing	priorities	even	when	faced	with	massive	crises.		During	the	
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Great	Depression,	items	such	as	the	Indian	Reorganization	Act	and	the	21st	Constitutional	
Amendment	repealing	prohibition	were	passed	despite	the	fact	that	they	were	not	directly	
related	to	the	economic	crisis	affecting	the	nation.		Likewise,	during	the	2007	financial	crisis	
other	priorities	such	as	dealing	with	terrorism	competed	with	the	economy	for	space	on	the	
legislative	and	executive	agendas.		Delegation	can	help	the	government	address	many	
priorities	simultaneously.			
The	agent	that	congress	chooses	to	implement	its	plans	points	to	congress’	
intensions	and	its	goals.		The	amount	of	freedom	of	action	granted	to	an	agent	is	
symptomatic	of	whether	congress	feels	comfortable	with	the	agent	and	how	they	want	to	
balance	the	tradeoff	between	control	of	the	agent	and	the	ability	of	the	agent	to	enact	
quick,	efficient	change	in	a	manner	that	can	best	handle	specifics	and	changing	situations.	
Crises	change	the	actions	of	political	actors.		The	decisions	made	during	crises	are	
more	critical	and	time	sensitive.		They	are	also	typically	higher	profile	and	have	more	of	a	
spotlight	and	a	different	mix	of	constituents	concerned	with	the	actions	of	lawmakers.		
Rather	than	the	typical	political	environment	when	those	who	follow	the	actions	of	congress	
are	a	select	few	political	enthusiast	and	those	such	as	lobbyists	and	pressure	groups	
intimately	intertwined	in	the	political	process,	crises	often	raise	the	awareness	of	the	issue	
in	large	swaths	of	the	populace.		This	leads	to	additional	pressure	on	members	of	congress	
to	be	seen	acting	on	the	issue.		This	can	lead	to	law	makers	needing	to	be	seen	taking	some	
action	and	often	lead	to	the	political	need	to	embrace	populism	rather	that	rational	decision	
making	or	embracing	elite	opinions	and	with	the	shortened	timeframe	it	limits	rational	
decision	making	as	all	the	information.		It	also	muddies	calculations	of	political	expediency,	
as	new	stakeholder’s	opinions	need	to	be	taken	into	account.		These	new	pressures	on	
decision-making	can	lead	to	delegation	being	a	good	option	to	ensure	sensible	policy	
making	under	these	conditions	that	are	not	necessarily	conducive	to	good	public	policy.	
Delegation	can	help	in	this	regard	by	allowing	members	of	congress	and	the	
president	to	publicly	speak	and	support	populist	points	of	view	and	pass	laws	that	seem	to	
enact	the	popular	measures	quickly	during	the	crisis,	but	to	craft	the	form	of	the	bill	to	allow	
checks	to	be	put	into	place	to	ensure	that	the	proper	amount	of	information	is	collected	
before	action	is	made,	and	that	the	decision	is	made	by	those	with	expertise	in	the	areas,	to	
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ensure	that	rash,	short	term	measures	are	not	taken	that	will	cause	other	problems	or	lead	
to	poor	long	term	effects.		Often	delegations	are	designed	to	look	a	certain	way	that	is	
politically	useful	while	being	designed	to	give	minimal	real	power.		Procedural	methods	
taken	by	the	congress	and	the	president	to	further	weaken	these	acts	often	secretly.		
Examples	such	as	the	Clean	Air	Act	allowed	politicians	to	take	a	position	that	would	help	
them	politically	while	not	requiring	them	to	actually	to	take	the	actions	they	espouse	and	
often	to	forestall	these	by	their	pretense	of	action.82		As	stated,	there	is	even	more	cause	for	
politicians	to	do	so	during	a	crisis.	
A	fiscal	crisis	is	distinct	from	other	crises	in	so	far	as	there	are	unique	pressures	at	
play	and	the	views	of	individuals	are	quite	strong	and	polarized	on	financial	issues	as	their	
lives	are	typically	quite	impacted	by	the	government’s	fiscal	decisions	and	the	economic	
state	of	the	country.		Furthermore	there	are	significant	differences	of	beliefs	on	what	are	
appropriate	goals	for	the	country	with	regard	to	financial	policy.		Republicans	and	
Democrats	have	different	party	planks	and	different	populations	from	which	they	get	their	
support.		They	thus	have	different	political	aims	with	regard	to	finances	and	this	means	that	
though	they	both	will	work	together	to	avert	and	mitigate	financial	crises,	the	preferred	
manner	and	method	of	actions	as	well	as	the	end	state	they	endeavor	to	achieve.		This	can	
make	coming	up	with	policy	to	avert	the	crises	a	two	player	Battle	of	the	Sexes	game	in	
which	both	sides	want	action	taken	to	minimize	the	crisis	and	thus	have	reason	to	work	
together	but	also	have	opposing	pay	offs	that	lead	them	to	bargain	hard	for	their	own	goals.		
While	this	is	true	in	other	crises,	those	such	as	wars	can	lead	to	less	division	between	the	
factions	in	congress	and	more	agreement	on	how	to	handle	the	crisis.	
Another	factor	affecting	economic	policy	making	is	that	the	common	citizen	does	not	
have	a	strong	grasp	of	economic	theory	or	competing	school	of	economic	thought.		The	
actions	taken	by	the	government	thus	can	often	not	be	judged	on	their	merits,	but	opinions	
are	largely	formed	based	on	the	postures	taken	by	politicians	and	the	cases	that	they	make	
to	the	public	through	the	media	and	other	methods.		This	makes	calculations	of	the	political	
benefit	of	potential	congressional	action	more	difficult	for	lawmakers	to	judge	and	increases	
the	risk	involved	with	being	seen	either	pushing	for	an	action	or	forestalling	action.		In	
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addition,	their	actions	will	likely	be	viewed	in	two	time	frames:	the	current	and	the	future.		
In	the	moment,	congress	might	need	to	be	seem	taking	decisive	action,	however	they	want	
to	insure	that	it	will	not	be	a	political	liability	later	in	their	career	and	they	realize	that	often	
individuals	will	judge	actions	very	differently	when	under	the	stress	and	immediacy	of	crisis	
than	they	will	once	the	crisis	is	abated	and	can	be	judged	calmly	and	rationally.		In	addition,	
often	the	steps	taken	by	congress	can	forestall	a	crisis	if	taken	early	enough	and	this	can	
lead	to	the	problem	of	the	full	brunt	of	the	crisis	never	come	to	being.		In	these	cases	the	
fast,	efficient,	and	prescient	congress	can	be	thought	less	well	of	since	the	crisis	was	not	
apparent	to	all	and	thus	there	are	timing	issues	related	to	dealing	with	a	crisis.		An	example	
of	this	was	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program,	which	was	viewed	by	many	economists	at	the	
time	as	being	critical	to	forestall	what	could	be	a	catastrophic	collapse	of	the	entire	financial	
system.		Congress	took	extraordinary	steps	to	address	this	risk	and	by	many	accounts	staved	
off	a	far	more	dire	and	protracted	situation,	but	by	doing	so	the	need	for	this	and	other	
stimulus	measure	was	not	seen	by	voters	who	instead	focused	on	the	unpopular	provisions	
in	these	congressional	actions	such	as	the	apparent	bailout	of	rich	bankers	and	privileged	
others	in	the	financial	industry.		Furthermore	these	actions,	which	were	unpopular	even	
when	they	were	first	being	made,	appeared	to	imply	that	congress	was	helping	politically	
connected	individuals	at	the	expense	of	the	so	called	everyman	and	that	profits	unfairly	
accrued	to	the	individuals	while	losses	were	borne	by	society	as	a	whole	
	 There	are	a	few	common	repeating	patterns	for	economic	crises.		These	often	
contain	common	characteristics	such	as	a	weakening	of	confidence	in	the	economic	system,	
a	decrease	in	the	consumer	sentiment,	and	inefficiently	utilized	resources.		They	also	fall	
into	a	few	common	categories	such	as	periods	of	high	unemployment	or	recessions.		
However,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	difference	between	each	crisis	and	the	causes,	responses,	
and	effects	of	the	crisis.		Since	the	Great	Depression	since,	when	delegation	really	began	to	
be	commonly	used	as	a	policy	making	tool,	there	have	been	a	series	of	economic	crises	that	
have	precipitated	actions	by	congress	and	its	agents	to	deal	with	the	crises	and	take	actions	
they	believe	will	strengthen	the	nation.		Along	with	the	Great	Depression	and	the	severe	
recession	of	the	1930s	that	followed	it,	examples	of	crises	include	the	so	called	Nixon	Shock,	
the	severe	inflation	during	the	1970s,	the	recession	between	1973-1975,	the	Savings	and	
loan	crisis,	Social	Security	depletion,	and	the	financial	crisis	beginning	in	2007.		
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	 These	crises	can	be	caused	by	previous	actions	of	congress	and	can	be	exacerbated	
by	congressional	inaction	or	poorly	thought	out	responses.		This	is	one	of	the	reasons	that	
investigating	delegation	is	such	an	important	area.		If	short	sighted	action	of	congress	lead	
to	long	term	problems	and	sows	the	seeds	of	future	crises	this	might	be	one	argument	for	
delegation	to	an	agency	or	an	independent	body	as	these	would	be	better	able	to	adjust	
course	over	time,	give	it	the	appropriate	lasting	focus	and	attention,	would	have	a	longer	
period	in	view,	and	less	pressure	to	act	quickly	even	if	the	proper	course	of	action	is	not	
clear	and	the	actions	that	are	being	called	for	are	not	beneficial.		Delegation	can	also	be	
useful	because	it	allows	congress	to	deflect	certain	calls	for	immediate	action	and	allows	
congress	to	come	to	a	decision	when	factions	within	congress	can	agree	on	a	general	goal,	
but	not	on	the	specifics	or	how	to	proceed.		This	can	help	solve	politically	intractable	
situations.	
	 There	are	a	limited	number	of	viable	political	possibilities	that	can	be	achieved	with	
the	political	factions	in	play.		Within	those	that	are	achievable,	actors	will	try	to	achieve	a	
result	that	is	most	congruent	with	their	goals	or	the	goals	that	can	be	achieved	by	working	
along	with	others	in	a	party	or	other	grouping.		The	president	is	a	powerful	component	in	
the	system	and	in	a	crisis	he	often	uses	his	role	and	speaks	to	the	public	in	order	to	initiate	
proposals.		In	these	moments,	people	are	more	likely	to	look	to	the	president	than	to	
congress	or	to	their	members	of	congress.		The	president	is	able	to	use	this	power	along	
with	his	control	over	the	bureaucracy	to	set	the	agenda.		This	can	consist	of	working	to	shift	
popular	opinion	and	prepare	the	way	for	certain	desired	political	actions,	bringing	
prewritten	proposals	to	congress	and	having	allied	congress	members	submit	it,	or	making	
proposals	with	certain	provisions	and	thereby	trying	to	convince	or	maneuver	congress	into	
doing	as	the	president	proposes.		He	also	has	first-mover	advantage	in	so	far	as	the	cabinet	
and	agencies	that	the	president	controls	can	quickly	take	steps	to	address	issues	as	they	
arrive	whereas	congressional	processes	can	take	a	considerable	amount	of	time	as	a	bill	has	
to	pass	both	houses,	go	through	committee,	have	both	houses	pass	the	reconciled	version	
and	have	the	president	sign	it	and	this	can	even	be	slowed	down	if	the	president	vetoes	a	
bill	or	if	congress	is	not	in	session.	
	 As	part	of	the	law	making	process	the	two	houses	have	to	pass	identical	versions	of	
the	bill.		This	ensures	that	the	two	houses	have	to	agree	on	what	steps	to	take.		This	can	
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lead	to	bargaining	between	the	two	houses	as	there	are	differences	between	the	average	
voter	in	the	House	of	Representatives	and	in	the	Senate	due	in	large	part	to	the	differences	
between	the	structures	of	the	two	houses,	such	as	the	size,	the	area	represented,	the	length	
of	the	votes.		The	Senate	for	is	typically	viewed	as	being	more	civil	and	centrists	compared	
to	the	more	partisan	House.		The	typically	explanation	for	this	trait	is	that	because	the	
Senate	is	smaller	and	has	larger	districts	it	avoids	excessive	partisanship	due	to	
gerrymandering	and	people’s	self-selection	of	where	to	live	based	on	factors	related	to	
world	view	or	politics.		The	houses	also	may	be	under	control	of	different	parties	or	factions	
with	vastly	different	goals.		This	can	lead	to	a	stalemate	where	the	houses	have	trouble	
passing	legislation	though	both	would	prefer	some	law	is	passed	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		
Congress	will	try	to	select	an	agency	with	an	area	of	expertise	and	general	authority	
over	the	area	on	question.		This	limits	the	number	of	choices	that	congress	can	use	for	the	
delegation,	however	there	is	often	a	bit	of	overlap	between	agencies	as	well	as	offices	and	
departments.		Congress,	however,	has	multiple	choices	of	who	to	delegate	to.		In	addition,	
congress	always	has	the	prerogative	of	making	a	new	agency,	office,	or	bureau.		This	option	
can	be	used	to	further	isolate	the	agency	from	outside	interference	and	help	ensure	its	
independence.		It	can	also	be	used	to	focus	the	organization.		If	an	office	is	created	inside	an	
existing	agency	or	the	new	task	is	given	to	an	existing	entity	this	can	lead	to	them	having	
contrasting	goals.		If	congress	wants	emphasis	placed	on	an	issue	it	will	set	the	agency	that	
oversees	the	issue	area	apart	so	that	it	would	remain	a	priority	over	time.		The	separation	of	
these	goals	from	other	larger	goals	of	a	bigger	organization	is	important	for	the	issue	or	goal	
to	remain	relevant	and	to	continue	to	be	given	priority	put	on	over	time.		Common	group	
dynamics	theories	such	as	Tuckman's	Group	Development	Model	discuss	the	amount	of	
time	before	a	group	such	as	a	board	work	well	together.83		They	suggest	that	it	takes	a	while	
for	a	board	to	be	prepared	to	address	an	issue	and	thus	that	creating	a	new	agency	is	a	good	
method	for	addressing	issues	that	are	not	pressing	and	can	be	handled	in	the	future	while	
immediate	whereas	near-term	solutions	are	best	handled	by	agencies	already	in	place.	
Delegations	to	the	president	are	also	very	common.		These	can	take	the	form	of	
explicit	delegations	in	which	congress	passes	a	bill	that	vests	responsibility	for	a	decision	
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with	the	president.		Alternatively	there	can	be	an	implicit	delegation	in	which	congress	
allows	the	president	to	make	a	decision	and	handle	a	situation	which	congress	has	formal	
authority	over.			
Congress	has	tried	to	change	the	framework	on	multiple	occasions,	meeting	with	
mixed	success.		In	the	1970s	congress	passed	a	number	of	constraints	trying	to	limit	the	
power	of	the	president.		An	example	is	the	Case-Zablocki	Act,	which	was	passed	in	1972,	and	
aimed	at	limiting	the	power	of	the	president	use	of	his	ability	to	agree	to	executive	
agreements.		The	act	required	that	all	executive	agreements	must	be	submitted	to	the	
Senate.		This	would	allow	congress	to	take	appropriate	action	with	regard	to	executive	
agreements	if	they	did	not	feel	these	agreements	were	beneficial,	but	in	practice	congress	
does	not	follow	up	on	these	and	the	president	has	pretty	much	free	reign	over	such	
agreements.		In	addition	the	executive	agreements,	which	this	law	requires	are	submitted	to	
the	Senate	Foreign	Relations	Committee	within	sixty	days	of	being	executed,	are	quite	often	
slow	to	be	submitted	to	the	senate.		In	practice	only	half	of	all	executive	agreements	were	
submitted	to	the	Senate	at	all.84	
	 Similarly	the	War	Powers	Act,	which	was	passed	in	1973,	was	a	reaction	to	the	power	
of	the	president	to	effectively	enter	or	exit	a	war	and	commit	American	troops	without	
congressional	involvement.		However,	once	again	presidents	have	not	felt	constrained	by	
this	act	and	have	largely	continue	to	assert	the	right	to	unilateral	action	due	to	national	
need	and	due	to	the	president’s	role	as	Commander-In-Chief.		Presidents	seem	to	have	
sought	congress’	blessings	for	actions	when	they	knew	they	would	receive	it,	but	were	
prepared	to	work	without	congress	otherwise,	much	as	the	U.S.	will	use	the	United	Nations	
to	add	validity	to	its	actions,	but	does	not	feel	itself	constrained	to	inaction	if	it	is	unable	to	
convince	the	United	Nations	to	take	action.	
	 Likewise,	the	1974	Budget	and	Impoundment	Control	Act,	sought	to	block	the	
impoundments	that	Nixon	had	done	to	shape	policy	and	undercut	congressional	actions.		It	
had	some	success	in	this	core	goal,	but	presidents	have	continued	to	have	significant	
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discretion	in	this	arena	and	often	use	tools	such	as	rescissions	to	much	the	same	purpose.85		
Thus	the	actual	constraints	on	presidential	power	were	only	slight.	
	 Another	law	passed	by	the	congress	during	this	period	was	the	National	Emergencies	
Act	86	that	was	passed	in	1976.		It	was	designed	to	stop	the	president	from	abusing	the	
presidential	power	to	declare	a	state	of	national	emergency	and	thereby	granting	
himself/herself	and	the	executive	branch	extraordinary	powers	such	as	the	right	to	suspend	
habeas	corpus.		The	act	sought	to	give	congress	a	voice	in	the	process,	to	define	what	
constitutes	a	national	emergency,	and	to	preclude	the	president	from	calling	an	extended	
state	of	emergency	when	this	action	was	not	actually	needed.		The	law	placed	some	limits	
on	the	president’s	ability	to	issue	emergencies,	but	once	again	in	practice	the	president	has	
considerable	leeway	in	this	area	and	has	had	few	actual	limitations	on	his	power.		The	most	
obvious	indication	of	this	being	the	fact	that	from	September	14th	2001	through	the	time	of	
this	writing	in	2014	there	has	existed	a	state	of	emergency.		During	this	period	that	has	
lasted	more	than	a	decade,	the	president	has	held	and	exercised	significantly	increased	
powers	over	what	would	be	available	to	the	president	if	a	state	of	emergency	does	not	exist.	
	
2. Policy	Can	Be	Created	At	Many	Levels	
	 	
2.1 Direct Congressional Action 
	
While	there	is	more	variety	of	action	and	procedural	options	open	to	the	president	
and	the	bureaucracy	than	there	had	been	previously,	much	policy	is	still	enacted	through	
the	traditional	means	of	congress	passing	a	bill	and	it	becoming	a	law.		However,	even	with	
direct	congressional	action	there	is	variety	as	a	bill	can	take	various	routes	on	its	way	to	
becoming	a	law.		The	process	a	bill	goes	through	to	become	a	law	affects	the	content	of	the	
resulting	law.		For	instance	if	a	bill	goes	through	multiple	committees	in	the	House	of	
Representatives,	it	will	potentially	be	different	than	if	the	policy	only	went	through	one	or	
than	if	it	had	been	if	it	was	not	sent	to	a	committee.		These	changes	are	not	solely	due	to	
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the	preferences	and	suggestions	that	the	committee	has,	but	due	to	factors	such	as	changes	
in	the	coalitions	that	will	be	required	to	pass	the	law.		During	a	crisis,	direct	congressional	
action	becomes	less	ideal	for	dealing	with	the	immediate	consequences	of	the	crisis,	but	
because	of	congress’	unique	ability	to	issue	public	laws	it	continues	to	play	a	part	even	if	it	
works	more	closely	with	the	executive	branch	to	determine	necessary	policy	changes.			It	
also	plays	a	big	role	in	dealing	with	less	immediate	consequences	to	crises	and	making	sure	
that	laws	are	in	place	to	avoid	or	deal	with	similar	crises	in	the	future.		
	 The	main	pieces	of	legislation	during	this	period	dealing	with	this	crisis	were	the	
Economic	Stimulus	Act	of	2008,	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008,	Emergency	
Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008,	American	Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009,	Helping	
Families	Save	Their	Homes	Act	of	2009,	Fraud	Enforcement	and	Recovery	Act	of	2009,	Dodd-
Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	and	the	Budget	Control	Act	of	2011.		
While	these	seem	like	sizable	legislative	accomplishments,	many	of	these	acts	did	little	to	
set	policy	and	mostly	delegated	policy	creation	and	in	instances	where	policy	was	set	it	was	
largely	just	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	something.	
	
2.1.1	Drafting	of	Bills	
	
Public	support	can	lead	to	acceptance	of	a	policy.		Occasionally	a	call	for	a	policy	can	
come	from	the	grassroots	and	then	it	is	often	promoted	by	an	interest	group	and	
championed	and	submitted	by	sympathetic	members	of	congress.		In	a	crisis	there	will	often	
be	calls	for	populist	actions.		The	time	is	often	too	short	and	the	pain	too	acute	for	a	deep	
investigation	of	causes	and	effects	so	the	electorate	exerts	pressure	for	short-term	
solutions.		Likewise	the	electorate	is	easier	to	lead	as	they	are	looking	for	a	course	of	action	
that	will	ameliorate	the	situation	and	if	a	politician	puts	forth	a	proposal	that	they	say	will	
improve	the	situation,	the	public	will	more	readily	go	along	with	his	proposal.	
Bills	can	be	drafted	by	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President,	by	congress,	by	agencies	
or	others.		The	entity	initially	creating	the	bill	has	considerable	ability	to	shape	the	bill	and	
decide	what	options	will	be	available	to	policy	makers	or	discussed	in	the	public	discourse.		
This	power	is	greater	if	the	entity	has	the	potential	to	go	public	and	frame	the	policy,	
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increase	the	salience	of	the	issue,	or	to	gain	acceptance	from	the	public.		In	a	crisis	the	
period	for	public	discourse	is	shortened	and	so	the	first	proposal	that	gains	the	public’s	
attention	has	a	major	leg	up	in	getting	passed.		This	usually	will	give	the	president	an	
advantage	and	thus	increase	his	ability	to	implement	changes	as	he	sees	fit.	
The	Speaker	of	the	House	and	other	congressional	power	brokers	make	decisions	as	
to	how	the	bill	becomes	a	law.		Issues	such	as	which	house	of	congress	the	bill	starts	in,	
when	in	the	session	the	bill	goes	to	the	floor,	the	rules	that	the	bill	is	evaluated	under,	and	
which	committees	review	the	bill	affect	the	likelihood	the	bills	will	pass,	what	actions	will	be	
taken	by	political	actors,	the	provisions	of	the	bill,	and	the	blame	or	credit	for	its	passage.	
There	are	many	options	that	political	actors	can	use	to	meet	their	goals.		Parties	are	
one	such	tool	that	can	be	used	for	achieving	political	goals	or	societal	ends.		These	are	used	
because	they	are	an	easier	and	more	effective	tool	to	wield	than	other	tools	and	because	
there	is	a	long	precedent	of	their	use.		The	party	can	be	a	brand	that	a	politician	can	use.	
	
2.1.2	Reasons	for	Direct	Congressional	Action	
	
	 Direct	congressional	action	is	perhaps	still	the	default,	status	quo	option	available	to	
members	of	congress.		It	gives	members	of	congress	the	most	control	over	policy	and	thus	
lets	them	enact	their	policy	preferences.		This	can	also	include	pork	barrel	politics	in	which	
the	bill	can	be	crafted	in	such	a	way	as	to	provide	benefits	for	key	constituencies.		This	can	
increase	the	popularity	and	likelihood	of	election	of	members	of	congress	that	get	the	bill	
passed.		Passing	legislation	also	allows	for	credit	claiming	by	members	of	congress	so	that	
they	can	turn	popular	actions	into	electoral	goodwill.	
	 For	members	of	congress,	the	main	alternative	to	direct	congressional	action	that	is	
available	to	them	is	delegation,	which	typically	includes	delegating	to	either	the	president	or	
to	executive	agencies	that	the	president	is	nominally	in	charge	of.		When	the	president	and	
congress	are	of	different	parties	this	means	ceding	significant	power	to	the	president	or	an	
agent	that	he	largely	can	control.		While	congress	can	design	the	delegation	so	that	congress	
continues	to	have	power	over	an	agency,	the	president	by	virtue	of	his	position	and	
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resources	that	he	can	call	to	bear	can	readily	compete	with	congress	to	control	agencies	
that	are	given	power.		When	power	is	directly	delegated	to	the	president,	congress	has	even	
less	control	over	the	delegated	power.		In	a	crisis	congress	delegates	more	power,	but	they	
will	tend	to	structure	the	delegation	in	ways	that	meet	the	political	needs	of	congress.	
	 Congress	is	often	lobbied	by	other	political	actors	to	pass	laws.		This	is	particularly	
true	in	a	crisis	or	when	the	president	is	trying	to	get	a	major	initiative	enacted.		The	
president	can	use	tactics	such	as	going	public	to	convince	lawmakers	that	it	makes	sense	to	
support	a	bill.		The	president	frames	an	argument	and	makes	a	public	case	to	the	nation	in	
hopes	that	their	acceptance	of	the	idea	will	convince	the	law	makers	to	see	the	change	is	
supported	by	their	constituents	and	it	is	in	the	best	interests	of	the	law	makers	to	go	along	
with	the	president’s	proposed	legislative	agenda	or	public	policy	preferences.		During	a	crisis	
when	changes	in	policy	can	be	more	extreme	there	is	more	at	stake	and	thus	more	reason	
for	political	actors	to	lobby	for	their	position.	
	
2.1.3	Types	of	Congressional	Action	
	
	 Congress’	main	method	of	creating	public	policy	is	by	passing	a	bill	that	gets	enacted	
and	becomes	a	law.		This	method	of	policy	creation	makes	the	policy	decisions	of	congress	
legally	binding	and	this	accounts	for	most	of	the	official	actions	of	congress,	however	it	is	
not	the	only	option	available	to	congress	and	in	some	situations	may	not	be	the	best.		Bills	
may	be	private	bills	or	public	bills,	the	former	of	which	affects	a	specified	individual	or	entity	
while	the	latter	is	broadly	applicable	and	create	generalizable	public	policy.	
Besides	bills,	congress	has	the	option	of	issuing	joint	resolutions,	concurrent	
resolutions,	and	simple	resolutions	as	well	as	taking	other	actions	such	as	holding	
conferences,	ratifying	treaties,	or	going	public.		Of	the	three	types	of	resolutions	listed	
above,	the	most	powerful	policy	creation	tool	is	the	joint	resolution,	which	unlike	the	other	
two	types	of	resolutions	is	able	to	create	legally	binding	public	law	that	has	as	much	force	as	
the	passage	of	a	bill.		In	their	form	and	in	their	process	of	implementation,	joint	resolutions	
are	almost	identical	to	bills.		Both	houses	of	congress	must	pass	them,	though	not	
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necessarily	at	the	same	time,	and	generally	both	require	the	president’s	signature	or	a	
2/3rds	majority	of	a	presidential	veto.	
	 Congress	also	has	the	option	of	taking	no	action	and	allowing	another	governmental	
body	to	take	action	and	relegating	the	decision	to	later	congresses	or	to	another	body	
effectively	delegating	the	decision.		Taking	no	action	is	effectively	a	policy	decision.		This	is	
true	both	during	crisis	and	at	other	times,	but	during	crises	there	is	an	even	greater	
inclination	for	congress	to	allow	the	president	or	an	agency	head	to	see	policy.	
	
2.2 Delegation 
	
Contrary	to	the	view	that	the	American	public	has	long	had	of	U.S.	Congresspersons	
as	being	power	hungry	individuals	that	always	try	to	gain	more	power	and	authority,	since	
the	1930s,	the	U.S.	congress	has	consistently	delegated	much	of	their	lawmaking	power	to	
others.		This	phenomenon	is	still	in	accordance	with	the	belief	that	legislators	will	refuse	to	
cede	power	to	delegate	unless	convinced	that	the	benefits	outweigh	adverse	agency	
action.87	
The	framers	of	the	constitution	believed	that	the	branches	would	jealously	guard	
their	powers	and	would	actively	strive	for	self-aggrandizement.		As	James	Madison	said	in	
the	Federalist	Papers,	“Ambition	must	be	made	to	counteract	ambition.”88		He	felt	that	the	
natural	desire	of	those	in	power	to	try	to	increase	their	power	was	the	best	check	on	
governmental	abuse,	stronger	even	than	trusting	to	the	morals	of	leaders	and	stating,	“This	
policy	of	supplying,	by	opposite	and	rival	interests,	the	defect	of	better	motives”.89			The	
founders	thus	would	be	surprised	by	the	tendency	that	congress	has	displayed	to	voluntarily	
transfer	their	power	to	another	branch	of	government.	
The	ubiquity	of	delegation	today	contrasts	sharply	with	the	use	of	delegation	in	
earlier	eras.		Prior	to	the	1930s	there	was	very	little	delegation	by	the	congress.		When	the	
Constitutional	Convention	adopted	the	U.S.	Constitution	in	1787,	it	separated	the	United	
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States	government	into	three	branches:	the	executive,	the	legislative,	and	the	judicial.		
Further	it	clearly	enumerated	and	delineated	the	powers	assigned	to	each	of	these	branches	
as	well	as	those	reserved	for	the	states.		In	article	1	section	8	of	the	constitution,	the	powers	
of	congress	are	listed	and	in	article	1	section	9,	the	constitution	lists	the	limits	of	congress’	
power.		While	over	time	there	were	some	shifts	in	which	branch	exercised	certain	powers,	
there	was	almost	no	delegation	of	authority	from	one	branch	to	another.		What	is	more,	
such	delegation	was	generally	believed	to	be	unconstitutional	as	any	such	delegation	would	
contradict	the	powers	as	laid	out	in	the	Enumerated	Powers	clause	of	the	constitution.		This	
apparent	contradiction	when	coupled	with	the	reverence	that	Americans	held	for	their	
constitution	limited	the	attempts	to	delegate	power.	
Congress	has	delegated	its	power	to	a	number	of	different	entities.		Among	those	
that	are	delegated	to	are	the	president,	agencies	in	the	executive	branch,	ad	hoc	
commissions,	states	and	local	jurisdictions,	as	well	as	delegation	internally	to	congressional	
committees.		Most	common	of	these	is	the	delegation	to	the	executive	branch.		In	addition,	
congress	often	willingly	ties	its	own	hands	and	limits	its	power	using	methods	such	as	
indexing	to	remove	unfavorable	decisions	that	it	does	not	wish	to	be	on	record	as	having	
made	such	as	voting	to	increase	their	own	salary.		This	is	similar	to	delegation	as	it	removes	
a	decision	from	future	congresses.	
While	it	may	seem	to	some	almost	natural	that	as	the	nation	grew	and	became	more	
complex	that	congress	would	transfer	its	authority	in	many	areas	to	the	bureaucracy	and	
that	the	bureaucracy	would	perform	many	of	the	administrative	functions	that	it	now	
performs,	this	course	of	events	was	not	inevitable.		Many	of	the	functions	currently	
performed	by	various	executive	agencies	such	as	United	States	Department	of	Health	and	
Human	Services,	Department	of	Labor,	and	the	Department	of	the	Interior	had	previously	
been	performed	by	congress.		An	example	of	this	is	that	in	Section	8	of	Article	I	of	the	U.S.	
Constitution,	where	the	specific	powers	of	Congress	are	enumerated.		Among	these	is	that	
congress	is	given	the	power	and	authority	to	fix	the	Standard	of	Weights	and	Measures.	
Congress	initially	performed	this	role,	but	later	delegated	this	power	to	the	National	
Institute	of	Standards	and	Technology,	an	executive	agency	under	the	U.S.	Department	of	
Commerce,	who	currently	perform	this	function.		Likewise,	the	congress	had	numerous	
military,	fiscal,	and	trade-related	powers	that	are	now	routinely	performed	by	the	executive	
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branch.		Congress	still	maintains	the	capabilities	to	perform	many	of	these	roles,	but	has	
voluntarily	given	up	direct	responsibility	for	them.	
Bureaucracy	can	be	a	good	thing	and	an	efficient	way	to	administer	and	govern.		
Max	Weber	sets	out	an	ideal	bureaucracy	in	which	there	are	formalized,	systematic	rules	
that	impersonally	implied	by	professional	public	servants	who	perform	a	function	and	feel	
that	it	is	the	most	efficient	form	of	government.		He	argues	that	having	this	professional	
class	of	administrators	that	have	spent	their	careers	working	in	a	field	enables	better	
decisions	and	leads	to	an	efficient	government.		Of	course	this	focus	on	efficiency	is	not	the	
only	goal	of	government,	it	also	has	a	responsibility	to	ensure	that	its	ends	are	just.		There	is	
a	difference	in	efficiently	achieving	a	goal	and	whether	that	goal	is	moral	or	not.		In	the	U.S.	
system,	congress	first	and	foremost	wants	bureaucrats	to	do	what	is	laid	out	in	laws	and	to	
essentially	do	as	they	are	told	to	do	while	politicians	have	a	responsibility	to	decide	the	
moral	decisions,	determine	tradeoffs,	and	decide	on	the	major	policy.		This	viewing	of	
bureaucracy	keeps	the	role	of	congress	as	central	to	the	proper	functioning	of	government.		
To	make	an	analogy	to	steering	a	boat,	congress	feels	that	it	should	act	as	a	navigator	
setting	a	course	while	the	bureaucracy	should	act	as	helmsman	and	make	the	maneuvers	
and	small	course	corrections	required	to	follow	the	course	or	destination	that	was	laid	out.	
This	paper	will	largely	ignore	the	moral	issues	related	to	the	content	of	the	policy	as	
well	as	effectiveness	issues	except	where	these	relate	to	the	scope	or	means	of	policy	
creation.		This	paper	investigates	the	provisions	of	specific	laws	passed	and	policies	created	
only	in	so	far	as	these	are	affected	by	the	manner	that	the	policy	is	created	or	as	they	vary	
due	to	the	environmental	factor	of	a	crisis	being	present.		This	paper	tries	to	trace	the	cause	
of	policy,	but	it	is	difficult	to	fully	attribute	results	and	responsibilities	to	individuals	or	even	
to	bodies	because	of	the	complex	political	process	has	too	many	variables	and	there	is	
always	information	that	is	not	available	or	too	subjective	to	analyze.	
	 Delegation	is	often	efficient	and	useful	at	least	for	lawmakers	and	thus	has	become	
increasingly	common.		Today	it	is	a	practical	reality	despite	the	apparent	constitutional	
prohibitions	against	its	use.		Garry	Lawson	states	it	well	when	he	says,	“No	one	seriously	
doubts	the	outcome	of	a	showdown,	in	any	authoritative	forum,	between	the	Constitution	
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and	the	modern	state.	Quite	simply,	the	nation	has	chosen	administrative	governance	over	
a	Constitution	that	was	designed	precisely	to	prevent	any	such	outcome.”90	
While	significant	power	is	delegated	to	the	executive	branch	this	does	not	mean	that	
the	president,	the	head	of	the	executive	branch	is	able	to	wield	this	power.		Statistical	
analysis	has	found	that	executive	branch	preferences	vary	from	the	presidents’.		
Furthermore	the	agency	that	receives	power	will	often	seek	to	keep	this	power	for	itself	and	
for	their	own	needs.		As	Lowi	states,	“parceling	out	policymaking	power	to	the	most	
interested	parties	tends	strongly	to	destroy	political	responsibility.	A	program	split	off	with	a	
special	imperium	to	govern	itself	is	not	merely	an	administrative	unit;	it	is	a	structure	of	
power	with	impressive	capacities	to	resist	central	political	control.”91	
While	there	may	be	those	that	view	the	source	of	rules	and	regulations	as	
unimportant	and	a	mundane	issue	with	little	effect	on	the	nation,	the	source	of	these	rules	
and	how	they	are	made	has	significant	effects	on	the	content	of	the	rules.		Different	policy	
outcomes	are	likely	to	be	achieved	through	delegation	than	would	be	if	congress	decided	
the	issues.		These	rules	and	regulations	routinely	affect	the	lives	of	those	that	live	and	work	
in	the	United	States	and	frequently	even	those	abroad.		In	addition,	the	root	of	the	
legitimacy	of	the	government	that	is	in	place	is	wrapped	up	in	the	method	of	determining	
policy	as	well.		As	John	Adams	said,	“As	a	good	government	is	an	empire	of	laws,	the	first	
question	is,	how	shall	the	laws	be	made?”92	
While	congress	has	long	established	agencies	that	perform	specific	functions,	there	
is	a	vast	scope	of	difference	between	an	agency	performing	a	function	prescribed	for	it	by	
congress	and	one	on	its	own	initiative	creating	far	reaching	public	policy	and	law.		Examples	
of	the	former	of	these	are	the	United	States	Postal	Service	delivering	mail	or	the	Internal	
Revenue	Service	collecting	taxes.		While	they	do	have	some	discretion	such	as	on	what	
mode	of	transportation	to	use	to	best	deliver	the	mail,	they	do	not	have	the	ability	to	
impinge	on	personal	liberties	or	change	the	central	policies	of	the	nation.		Many	of	agencies	
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and	departments	have	significant	discretion	that	allowed	them	to	play	a	big	part	during	the	
recent	financial	crisis	and	during	other	past	crises.	
While	much	of	the	literature	investigating	political	delegation	focuses	largely	on	the	
motivation	of	those	who	are	delegating	power,	those	that	are	delegated	to	often	benefit	
from	the	power	that	is	delegated	to	them.		It	gives	them	greater	authority	and	importance	
which	are	much	sought	after	in	political	circles.		The	president	in	particular	is	often	viewed	
as	seeking	additional	powers	as	this	can	allow	him	to	accomplish	more.		Senator	Byrd	
expressed	this	view	thusly,	“For	decades,	Presidential	Administrations	have	sought	to	wrap	
their	fingers	around	the	purse	strings,	push	away	the	Congress,	and	ignore	the	
Constitution.		It	does	not	matter	which	Administration.		It	does	not	matter	the	political	party	
of	the	President.		What	matters	is	nothing	more	than	raw	power.		Congress	has	it.		The	
Executive	Branch	wants	it	--	and	will	use	any	excuse	to	get	it.”93	
Power	can	be	explicitly	delegated	to	the	president	or	claimed	by	the	president	in	
what	is	essentially	an	implicit	delegation.		Considerable	deference	is	generally	given	by	
congress	to	the	president	and	this	is	even	more	the	case	during	a	crisis.		Thus	the	actions	
that	the	president	takes	are	generally	not	overturned	by	congress.		The	judiciary	likewise	
rarely	overturns	the	president	or	the	bureaucracy’s	actions.	
Often	the	shaping	of	policy	consists	of	multiple	actions	by	multiple	political	actors.		
An	example	of	this	is	that	executive	branch	action	can	also	serve	to	blaze	a	trail	by	using	
executive	orders	to	lead	the	way	for	future	congressional	action.		Shull	gives	an	example	of	
this	with	Executive	Orders	such	as	#11063	serving	as	a	precursor	to	the	Fair	Housing	Act	of	
1963.94		Kerwin	states	that	the	bureaucracy	also	often	takes	action	and	makes	policy	choices	
that	are	then	followed	up	by	an	executive	order	issued	by	the	president.95	
	The	formation	of	policy	becomes	more	complex	in	that	it	is	not	conducted	in	a	
vacuum,	but	is	dependent	on	the	prevailing	political	environment	and	these	actors	will	thus	
seek	to	change	the	political	environment	for	their	own	ends.		For	instance,	the	framing	of	a	
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political	issue	has	significant	effect	on	the	policy	that	is	adopted	and	the	president	often	is	
the	one	that	has	the	most	power	over	the	framing	of	an	argument	and	the	shaping	of	a	
response.		This	is	especially	true	in	a	crisis	where	the	public	looks	to	the	president	to	set	
national	policy	and	take	action.		Crises	also	make	the	public	pay	more	attention	to	the	issue	
and	thus	make	it	easier	for	the	president	to	shape	opinion.		The	president	also	has	a	wider	
array	of	policy	options	available	to	him	at	such	times,	because	the	public	feels	that	
extraordinary	measures	may	need	to	be	taken	to	deal	with	the	extraordinary	circumstances	
threatening	the	nation.		The	president	is	accorded	far	more	media	coverage	than	any	other	
political	actor	and	if	he	wishes	to	focus	that	attention	on	an	issue	or	a	proposal	of	his	it	
enables	him	to	shift	many	opinions	often	before	they	hear	the	opposing	side	on	the	issue	
and	have	started	to	make	opinions.		This	ability	is	even	greater	in	light	of	diminishing	public	
trust	in	members	of	congress	since	it	is	tougher	for	an	opposing	political	actor	to	lay	out	an	
alternative	that	has	broad	national	support.		
There	are	other	factors	though	such	as	structural	factors	which	affect	the	amount	of	
delegation	between	the	branches	and	the	use	of	constraints.		Among	these	is	the	change	in	
power	of	committee	chairmen.		Norman	Ornstein	states	that,	“Any	description	of	
congressional	change	in	the	1970s	begins	with	decentralization.”96		This	decentralization	
leads	to	individual	law	makers	having	more	ability	to	take	actions	to	represent	their	
individual	preferences	and	thus	their	votes	should	better	reflect	their	views	on	delegation.		
Among	other	changes	the	power	and	autonomy	of	the	subcommittees	and	their	
chairpersons	greatly	increased	in	the	1970s.		This	increased	the	number	of	political	actors	
with	control	over	legislation	and	helped	lead	to	increase	in	oversight	committees	and	
oversight	in	general.		This	function	being	in	place	greatly	affects	the	willingness	of	congress	
to	delegate	power.		Thus	the	1970s	ushered	in	a	period	in	which	there	was	a	new	normal	
with	regard	to	delegation.	
Most	delegation	performed	by	congress	comes	in	the	form	of	bills	that	have	
delegation	provisions	that	pass	both	chambers	of	congress	and	become	law.		There	are	a	
wide	variety	of	areas	in	which	congress	chooses	to	use	delegation	and	there	are	few	if	any	
areas	still	untouched	by	the	trend	towards	delegation	that	emerged	in	the	last	75	years.		
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There	are,	however,	some	general	trends	in	where	delegation	is	more	commonly	found.		
Amongst	these	is	legislation	in	certain	complex	issue	areas	such	as	science	and	technology.		
Delegation	has	become	a	commonplace	method	used	by	congress	to	address	an	issue.		
Congress	delegates	its	legislative	powers	most	typically	to	the	executive	branch.		This	can	
take	the	form	of	giving	authority	to	the	president	or	to	an	executive	agency.		More	often	
than	not	the	power	ends	up	in	the	hands	of	the	bureaucracy,	which	has	some	checks	on	its	
authority	from	congress	and	the	president.		The	laws	often	give	the	authority	to	act	and	
effectively	legislate	or	regulate,	but	include	constraints	upon	the	actions	of	the	agencies.	
	 Delegation	can	allow	for	congress	to	deal	with	short-term	crises	through	delegation.		
Congress	is	a	deliberative	body,	but	often	its	structure	tends	to	make	it	slow	to	adapt	to	
change	and	during	a	crisis	this	can	be	a	liability.	
	
	
2.2.1	History	of	Delegation	
	
	 Delegation	has	increased	over	the	years	as	has	the	federal	government.		In	1835,	
Alexis	de	Tocqueville	wrote,	“The	nation	participates	in	the	making	of	its	laws	by	the	choice	
of	its	legislators,	and	in	the	execution	of	them	by	the	choice	of	the	agents	of	the	executive	
government;	it	may	almost	be	said	to	govern	itself,	so	feeble	and	so	restricted	is	the	share	
left	to	the	administration,	so	little	do	the	authorities	forget	their	popular	origin	and	the	
power	from	which	they	emanate.”97		This	shows	how	small	the	government	and	
bureaucracy	were	at	the	time.		Most	would	find	this	statement	to	no	longer	be	the	case	in	
contemporary	America.	
	 The	size	of	the	bureaucracy	has	grown	over	time.		This	was	not	solely	due	to	the	
increase	in	the	amount	of	delegation	or	its	acceptance	by	the	Supreme	Court.		Around	the	
turn	of	the	20th	century	there	was	an	ascendancy	of	the	Republican	reformers	who	
advocated	a	scientific	method	of	governance	and	public	administration	that	would	lead	to	
better	results.		This	was	in	part	a	reaction	to	the	abuse	of	power	and	threats	to	individual	
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liberties	that	had	been	perpetrated	by	some	politicians.98		This	also	led	to	changes	to	the	
bureaucracy	such	as	the	replacement	of	the	spoils	system	with	a	more	with	a	more	
meritocratic	system.		In	the	spoils	system	the	winner	of	an	election	places	key	political	
supporters	in	political	jobs	as	a	reward	for	their	support.		Some,	such	as	the	Mugwumps	and	
much	of	the	population,	viewed	this	in	general,	as	a	corrupt	and	inefficient	system	who	in	
response	wanted	civil	service	reform.		Those	advocating	this	change	saw	it	as	a	change	that	
would	allow	disinterested	experts	to	advance	and	make	decisions	and	there	by	improve	
governance	and	its	approval	was	in	part	due	to	President	Garfield’s	assassination	by	a	
scorned	spoils	job	seeker.	
As	part	of	this	same	trend	was	the	Pendleton	Civil	Service	Reform	Act	that	enshrined	
the	changes	that	merit	should	be	the	determinate	of	who	receives	jobs	and	disallowed	
other	personnel	moves	based	off	of	political	reasons.		At	the	time	of	the	Pendleton	Civil	
Service	Reform	Act	only	10%	percent	of	federal	government	workers	were	civil	servants	and	
thus	would	be	covered	under	the	act.		However	by	the	turn	of	the	century	the	vast	majority	
of	federal	jobs	were	civil	service	jobs	where	civil	service	jobs	are	defined	as,	"all	appointive	
positions	in	the	executive,	judicial,	and	legislative	branches	of	the	Government	of	the	United	
States,	except	positions	in	the	uniformed	services."99	
An	important	part	of	the	Pendleton	Civil	Service	Reform	Act	was	the	creation	of	the	
United	States	Civil	Service	Commission,	which	was	a	three-member	commission	that	from	
1883	to	1977	administered	the	federal	civil	service.		This	board	in	part	ensured	the	changes	
in	the	act	that	depoliticize	the	bureaucracy	as	well	as	creating	certain	rules	to	ensure	better	
governance	such	as	exams	to	qualify	for	certain	civil	service	positions.		This	board	was	
designed	to	be	an	independent	entity	that	could	oversee	the	bureaucracy	and	would	be	
apart	from	the	president	and	his	goals	to	help	ensure	political	neutrality.			
A	number	of	cases	questioned	the	use	of	delegation	of	legislative	power.		The	1921	
Supreme	Court	case	of	United	States	v.	L.	Cohen	Grocery	Co.,100	the	court	struck	down	a	
statute	that	criminalized	price	gouging	on	necessities.		The	opinion	of	the	court	justified	this	
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by	stating	that,	"Congress	alone	has	power	to	define	crimes	against	the	United	States.	This	
power	cannot	be	delegated	either	to	the	courts	or	to	the	juries	of	this	country."	
The	1920	case	of	Knickerbocker	Ice	Co.	v.	Stewart101	and	the	1924	case	Washington	
v.	W.	C.	Dawson102	struck	down	statutes	on	the	basis	that	they	had	delegated	federal	
legislative	power	to	state	legislatures.		As	the	court	found	in	the	Knickerbocker	case,	“The	
subject	was	entrusted	to	it	to	be	dealt	with	according	to	its	[congress’]	discretion	—	not	for	
delegation	to	others.		To	say	that	because	Congress	could	have	enacted	a	compensation	act	
applicable	to	maritime	injuries,	it	could	authorize	the	States	to	do	so	as	they	might	desire,	is	
false	reasoning.	Moreover,	such	an	authorization	would	inevitably	destroy	the	harmony	and	
uniformity	which	the	Constitution	not	only	contemplated	by	actually	established	—	it	would	
defeat	the	very	purpose	of	the	grant…	Congress	cannot	transfer	its	legislative	power	to	the	
States	—	by	nature	this	is	non-delegable.”	
	 Once	the	question	of	whether	congress	could	delegate	power	was	settled,	the	
question	of	whether	the	congress	should	delegate	power	arose.		For	the	president	and	
much	of	congress,	they	viewed	the	answer	in	the	affirmative	and	saw	many	benefits	to	
delegation.	
	
2.2.2	Legal	Framework	
	
Article	1	of	the	United	States	Constitution	explicitly	states	that	all	legislative	powers	
of	the	government	reside	with	the	congress.		The	non-delegation	doctrine,	prohibiting	the	
delegating	of	one	branches’	powers	as	laid	out	by	the	constitution	to	another	branch	was	
viewed	as	an	iron	clad	prohibition.			Montesquieu	who	helped	shape	the	views	of	many	of	
the	framers	of	the	constitution	proclaimed	that,	"There	can	be	no	liberty	where	the	
legislative	and	executive	powers	are	united	in	the	same	person,	or	body	of	magistrates".103		
By	separating	the	powers	of	government	into	three	branches,	the	government	can	help	
ensure	that	this	tyranny	or	abuse	of	power	does	not	come	to	fruition.		Eventually	over	time	
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the	Supreme	Court	decided	that	limited	delegation	was	allowable	so	long	as	Congress	used	
a	clear	intelligible	principle	to	guide	the	executive	branch	agency.		The	concept	is	that	basic	
delegation	was	an	implied	power	of	congress	which	though	not	explicitly	stated	in	the	
constitution	was	implied	as	a	means	to	allow	for	congress	to	act	upon	its	explicitly	laid	out	
powers.		Thus	congress,	in	keeping	with	the	Necessary	and	Proper	clause	in	the	U.S.	
Constitution,	could	delegate	so	long	as	it	was	merely	charging	an	agency	to	work	on	its	
behalf	and	it	gives	clear	rules	and	guidance	that	limit	the	authority	of	the	agency	performing	
the	work.		This	was	a	major	constraint	that	initially	eliminated	almost	all	decision	making	
authority	from	the	agent	that	was	delegated	to.		Thus	there	was	so	little	discretion	left	in	
the	hands	of	the	agent	that	it	effectively	had	no	power	delegated	to	it,	but	merely	carried	
out	orders.		The	U.S.	Supreme	Court	upheld	this	division	between	the	branches	and	ruled	
that	delegating	any	power	that	included	discretion	of	the	agent	to	act	on	their	own	rather	
than	merely	interpreting	laws	was	not	acceptable.		This	can	be	seen	in	Cargo	of	the	Brig	
Aurora	v.	United	States.104		Over	time	the	Supreme	Court	began	allowing	delegation	with	
continually	less	specific	and	more	open-ended	guidance.			
Even	in	the	early	case	of	Wayman	v.	Southard	from	1825,105	Chief	Justice	Marshall	
said,	“that	there	is	some	difficulty	in	discerning	the	exact	limits,”	and	further	stated	the	
opinion	that,	“the	precise	boundary	of	this	power	is	a	subject	of	delicate	and	difficult	
inquiry,	into	which	a	court	will	not	enter	unnecessarily.”		The	specific	place	where	the	line	is	
drawn	has	shifted	over	the	years	with	the	general	trend	being	towards	fewer	restrictions	on	
delegation.		In	the	current	legal	environment	almost	any	case	of	delegation	will	be	accepted	
if	there	is	even	a	small	piece	of	guidance	included	in	the	accompanying	legislation.	
This	prohibition	however	began	to	soften	with	the	progressive	movement	during	the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century.		An	example	of	this	is	United	States	v.	Grimaud,106	in	which	
the	Supreme	Court	in	a	split	decision	upheld	an	instance	of	delegation	from	the	congress	to	
the	Secretary	of	Agriculture	disagreeing	with	the	defendant’s	claims	that,	“that	the	Acts	of	
Congress	making	it	an	offense	to	violate	rules	and	regulations	made	and	promulgated	by	the	
Secretary	of	Agriculture	are	unconstitutional,	in	that	they	are	an	attempt	by	Congress	to	
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delegate	its	legislative	power	to	an	administrative	officer."	and	instead		finding	that	the	
delegation	was	constitutional.	
Delegation	had	been	allowed	if	the	power	delegated	was	minor	and	the	agency	
merely	“filled	up	the	details”.		An	example	of	this	is	In	re	Kollock107,	where	congress	
approved	of	the	delegation	of	setting	certain	specifics	of	regulation	of	oleomargarine	
manufacturers	since	the	major	decisions	about	the	delegation	had	already	been	decided	by	
the	congress.	
Another	key	case	in	the	history	of	the	delegation	doctrine	is	Buttfield	v.	Stranahan.108		
In	this	case,	the	Supreme	Court	allowed	Secretary	of	Treasury	to	use	powers	delegated	to	
him	by	the	congress.		This	precedent	of	this	case	expanded	the	situations	in	which	power	
can	be	delegated.		This	increased	the	scope	that	was	allowed	by	Field	vs.	Clark,	which	
allowed	the	executive	branch	to	determine	a	fact	that	in	turn	affected	the	legislative	
consequences.		In	Buttfield	v.	Stranahan,	the	Supreme	Court	went	so	far	as	to	allow	the	
executive	branch	to	carry	out	a	policy	that	had	been	previously	determined	by	an	act	of	
congress.	
The	increase	in	the	types	of	delegations	found	allowable	by	the	Supreme	Court	can	
be	seen	in	1928	case	of	J.	W.	Hampton,	Jr.	&	Co.	v.	United	States,109	in	which	the	court	
allowed	the	delegation	despite	it	being	outside	the	typical	restrictions	on	delegation.		In	this	
case,	the	court	gave	its	approval	in	a	unanimous	decision,	and	ruled	that	the	Tariff	Act	of	
1922	which	gave	the	president	considerable	leeway	in	setting	tariff	rates.		The	court	ruled	
that	delegation	was	allowable	and	limited	only	by,	“common	sense	and	the	inherent	
necessities”.		Chief	Justice,	and	former	president,	Taft	goes	onto	say	that,	“The	field	of	
Congress	involves	all	and	many	varieties	of	legislative	action,	and	Congress	has	found	it	
frequently	necessary	to	use	officers	of	the	Executive	Branch,	within	defined	limits,	to	secure	
the	exact	effect	intended	by	its	acts	of	legislation,	by	vesting	discretion	in	such	officers	to	
make	public	regulations	interpreting	a	statute	and	directing	the	details	of	its	execution,	even	
to	the	extent	of	providing	for	penalizing	a	breach	of	such	regulations.”	
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In	the	case	of	J.	W.	Hampton	Jr.	&	Co	v.	United	States,	Chief	Justice	Taft	lays	out	the	
separation	of	powers	and	the	idea	of	non-delegation	thusly,	“The	Federal	Constitution	.	.	.	
divide[s]	the	governmental	power	into	three	branches....	[I]n	carrying	out	that	constitutional	
division	.	.	.	it	is	a	breach	of	the	National	fundamental	law	if	Congress	gives	up	its	legislative	
power	and	transfers	it	to	the	President,	or	to	the	Judicial	branch,	or	if	by	law	it	attempts	to	
invest	itself	or	its	members	with	either	executive	power	or	judicial	power.	This	is	not	to	say	
that	the	three	branches	are	not	co-ordinate	parts	of	one	government	and	that	each	in	the	
field	of	its	duties	may	not	invoke	the	action	of	the	two	other	branches	in	so	far	as	the	action	
invoked	shall	not	be	an	assumption	of	the	constitutional	field	of	action	of	another	branch.	In	
determining	what	it	may	do	in	seeking	assistance	from	another	branch,	the	extent	and	
character	of	that	assistance	must	be	fixed	according	to	common	sense	and	the	inherent	
necessities	of	the	governmental	co-ordination.”		In	addition,	the	court	stated	that,	“There	is	
only	one	commission	to	which	delegation	of	that	authority	can	be	made.	That	is	the	great	
commission	of	their	own	choosing,	the	Congress	of	the	United	States	and	the	President.	It	is	
the	only	commission	which	can	be	held	responsible	to	the	electorate.”		This	is	consistent	
with	long	standing	views	of	the	idea	of	checks	and	balances.	
This	differed	a	great	deal	from	the	few	early	instances	in	which	the	congress	tried	to	
delegate	power	were	generally	brought	before	the	United	State	Supreme	Court.		The	
Supreme	Court	overturned	many	of	these	attempts	at	delegation	though	they	generally	did	
so	without	actually	referring	back	to	the	issue	of	delegation	when	deciding	the	cases.		
Rather	they	preferred	to	use	more	technical	questions	with	a	narrower	scope	to	base	their	
determinations	upon.			This	continued	to	be	the	law	of	the	land	until	the	1930s	when	the	
Great	Depression	caused	Franklin	Roosevelt	to	be	in	opposition	to	the	Supreme	Court	over	
this	issue.		During	the	Great	Depression,	Franklin	Roosevelt	wanted	congress	to	grant	him	
and	the	executive	branch	additional	powers	with	which	to	deal	with	the	severe	crisis	the	
nation	was	facing.		While	both	houses	of	Congress	were	roughly	split	between	the	
Democratic	and	Republican	parties	by	the	end	of	President	Herbert	Hoover’s	term,	
Roosevelt	came	to	power	with	large	majorities	in	both	houses	with	over	61%	of	the	Senate	
and	71%	of	the	House	of	Representatives.		Thus	congress	was	inclined	to	yield	some	of	their	
power	to	the	president	so	that	he	could	undertake	his	new	deal	agenda	and	deal	with	the	
severe	financial	problems	that	the	nation	was	facing.	
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The	Supreme	Court	initially	was	opposed	to	this	delegation	of	power	and	followed	in	
the	tradition	of	previous	Supreme	Court	rulings	such	as	United	States	v.	Shreveport	Grain	&	
Elevator	Co.110	and	Field	v.	Clark111,	in	which	the	court	ruled	that	the	constitution	prohibited	
congress	from	delegating	its	authority.		At	stake	in	the	Field	v.	Clark	case,	was	whether	the	
president	was	given	authority	to	temporarily	reinstitute	a	duty	on	the	import	of	sugar	and	
other	commodities,	“for	such	time	as	he	shall	deem	just”	in	response	to	other	nations	
imposing	duties	on	U.S.	products.		This	was	viewed	as	a	delegation	of	power	from	congress	
to	the	president.		As	was	stated	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	that	case,	“That	Congress	cannot	
delegate	legislative	power	to	the	President	is	a	principle	universally	recognized	as	vital	to	
the	integrity	and	maintenance	of	the	system	of	government	ordained	by	the	Constitution.”	
And	the	delegation	was	ruled	unconstitutional.	
Delegation	became	a	key	topic	during	the	Great	Depression.		During	this	period,	
President	Roosevelt	argued	for	more	delegation	to	the	executive	branch	to	deal	with	the	
financial	challenges	facing	the	country.		However,	the	Supreme	Court	was	initially	unwilling	
to	approve	of	Roosevelt’s	desire	to	change	the	status	quo	and	allow	for	more	delegation.		In	
1935,	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	took	at	a	case	regarding	the	regulation	of	the	poultry	
legislation.		Schechter	Poultry	Corp.	v.	United	States,112	the	Supreme	Court	unanimously	
ruled	that	the	delegation	involved	violated	the	non-delegation	clause.		The	issue	at	question	
was	not	solely	the	poultry	industry	or	even	the	use	of	the	Commerce	Clause	that	was	ruled	
to	have	been	violated.		Rather	the	Supreme	Court	was	targeting	Roosevelt’s	National	
Industrial	Recovery	Act	and	effectively	overturned	this	key	part	of	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal	
agenda.		Despite	the	unanimous	ruling,	there	was	a	political	factor	in	play	as	2/3rds	of	the	
justices	were	appointed	by	Republican	presidents113	that	disapproved	of	the	aims	of	the	
Democrat,	Roosevelt.		In	addition	the	view	of	jurisprudence	was	shifting	at	this	period	and	
many	of	the	old	guard	serving	on	the	court	at	the	time	were	more	hostile	to	Roosevelt’s	
proposal	than	later	judges	would	be.			
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This	ruling	followed	similar	legal	setbacks	for	New	Deal	legislation	such	as	Panama	
Refining	Co.	v.	Ryan,114	in	which	in	a	narrow	decision,	sections	of	the	National	Industrial	
Recovery	Act	were	struck	down	due	to	improper	delegation.			The	Schechter	decision	also	
led	to	a	number	of	other	legal	defeats	for	new	deal	legislation.		An	example	of	this	is	the	
Carter	v.	Carter	Coal	Co.115,	in	which	the	Schechter	case	was	cited	as	a	precedent.		In	
response	to	the	acts	of	delegations	that	made	up	much	of	the	New	Deal	legislation,	the	
Supreme	Court	Justice	Brandeis	told	the	Assistant	General	Counsel	to	the	president	and	
close	presidential	advisor,	Thomas	Corcoran,	"This	is	the	end	of	the	business	of	
centralization,	and	I	want	you	to	go	back	and	tell	the	President	we're	not	going	to	let	this	
government	centralize	everything.	It's	come	to	an	end."	
While	much	of	the	Hughes	court	was	predisposed	to	oppose	these	cases,	even	
justices	that	would	typically	be	more	supportive	towards	Roosevelt’s	agenda	questioned	the	
amount	of	delegation	in	National	Industrial	Recovery	Act	(NIRA).		For	instance	Supreme	
Court	Justice	Cardozo	while	reviewing	these	cases,	opposed	NIRA	down	as,	“delegation	
running	riot.”116		NIRA	allowed	the	president	the	power	to	regulate	numerous	aspects	of	
industry	and	these	powers	were	used	in	practice	by	President	Roosevelt.		Similarly	the	use	
of	the	Agricultural	Adjustment	Act	gave	the	president	considerable	powers	to	regulate	
agriculture	which	at	the	time	accounted	for	a	large	part	of	the	economy.	
After	continued	battles	with	the	Supreme	Court,	Roosevelt	attempted	to	
outmaneuver	his	critics	in	the	Supreme	Court	by	increasing	the	number	of	judges	on	the	
Supreme	Court	and	thereby	packing	it	with	judges	that	would	be	more	sympathetic	to	his	
viewpoint.		The	number	of	Supreme	Court	justices	is	not	explicitly	laid	out	in	the	
constitution	but	rather	was	determined	by	congressional	statutes	that	have	changed	the	
number	of	justices	over	time.		He	was	unable	to	accomplish	this	aim	due	to	a	coalition	
consisting	primarily	of	congressional	Republicans	and	Southern	Democrats	who	successfully	
thwarted	the	Judicial	Procedures	Reform	Bill	of	1937	that	contained	Roosevelt’s	proposal.		
However	the	attempt	chastened	the	Supreme	Court	and	after	Roosevelt’s	appointment	of	
Hugo	Lafayette	Black	followed	short	upon	by	his	appointments	of	Stanley	Forman	Reed,	
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116	Concurring	with	the	ruling	on	A.L.A.	Schechter	Poultry	Corp.	v.	United	States,	295	U.S.	495,	553	(1935).	
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William	Orville	Douglas,	and	Felix	Frankfurter	by	early	1939,	the	Supreme	Court	began	to	
better	align	with	Roosevelt’s	goals.	
With	Roosevelt	eventually	able	to	prevail,	significant	authority	passed	to	the	
executive	branch,	which	can	be	seen	in	the	proliferation	of	the	large	number	of	New	Deal	
agencies	that	came	into	being	at	that	time.		Most	of	these	had	very	limited	congressional	
guidance	and	largely	lacked	a	driving	intelligibility	principle.		Since	the	1930s,	there	has	been	
a	continuous	increase	in	the	amount	of	delegation	and	most	of	these	instances	have	very	
limited	intelligibility	principles	and	make	little	pretense	to	needing	this.		Delegation	was	first	
allowed	to	deal	with	crises.		The	long	duration	of	the	Great	Depression,	World	War	II,	and	
the	Korean	War	which	followed	shortly	after,	has	led	to	delegation	from	the	legislative	
branch	to	the	executive	branch	and	the	growth	in	executive	agencies	that	went	hand	and	
hand	with	to	become	firmly	entrenched	as	a	way	of	running	the	country	by	the	time	these	
crises	has	all	subsided.	
The	floodgates	of	New	Deal	legislation	and	its	accompanying	delegation	opened	with	
the	National	Labor	Relations	Board	v.	Jones	&	Laughlin	Steel	Corporation,117	in	which	the	
Supreme	Court	in	a	5-4	split	decision	upheld	the	National	Labor	Relations	Act	as	
constitutional.		This	allowed	for	more	delegation.		It	also	allowed	for	additional	powers	of	
the	federal	government	under	the	Commerce	Clause,	in	which	in	the	words	of	Chief	Justice	
Charles	Evans	Hughes,	“Although	activities	may	be	intrastate	in	character	when	separately	
considered,	if	they	have	such	a	close	and	substantial	relation	to	interstate	commerce	that	
their	control	is	essential	or	appropriate	to	protect	that	commerce	from	burdens	and	
obstructions,	Congress	cannot	be	denied	the	power	to	exercise	that	control."		This	increase	
in	the	power	of	the	federal	government,	while	initially	vested	in	the	legislative	branch	has	
over	time	led	to	significant	new	powers	being	delegated	to	federal	agencies.	
Thus	one	can	see	that	in	response	to	crises,	the	method	by	which	policy	is	created	
was	permanently	shifted	in	the	1930s	and	the	effect	of	those	crises	still	shapes	our	political	
system	today.		As	Schick	states,	“The	New	Deal	and	World	War	II	changed	the	relationship	
between	the	executive	and	legislative	branches	and	made	the	president	chief	executive	in	
his	own	right,	not	merely	as	the	agent	of	Congress.		These	critical	events	fueled	an	
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enormous	expansion	of	the	federal	government	and	a	redistribution	of	power	between	the	
two	branches.”118	
The	increase	in	delegation	had	a	revolutionary	effect	on	the	separation	of	powers	
between	the	branches	of	government.	Even	Franklin	Roosevelt,	a	major	proponent	and	
impetus	for	this	increase	in	delegation	to	the	executive	branch,	asserted	that	growth	of	the	
bureaucratic	state,	"threatens	to	develop	a	fourth	branch	of	government	for	which	there	is	
no	sanction	in	the	Constitution."119	
While	the	initial	transfers	of	power	were	at	the	behest	of	the	president,	this	increase	
of	power	to	the	executive	branch	was	not	a	power	grab	by	the	executive	branch,	but	
fundamentally	relied	on	the	willingness	of	congress	to	cede	this	power	to	the	executive	
branch.		As	John	Bolton	points	out,	“More	ambitious	attempts	of	the	executive	to	act	
without	congressional	support	have	been	uniformly	and	emphatically	rejected	by	the	
Supreme	Court,	as	in	the	cases	concerning	President	Harry	S	Truman’s	seizure	of	the	
nation’s	steel	mills	and	President	Richard	M.	Nixon’s	secret	White	House	tape	
recordings.”120		In	the	case	of	Youngstown	Sheet	&	Tube	Co.	v.	Sawyer,121	which	John	Bolton	
was	referring	to,	Supreme	Court	Justice	Black	stated	that,	“The	President's	power,	if	any,	to	
issue	the	order	must	stem	either	from	an	act	of	Congress	or	from	the	Constitution	itself.	
There	is	no	statute	that	expressly	authorizes	the	President	to	take	possession	of	property	as	
he	did	here.	Nor	is	there	any	act	of	Congress	to	which	our	attention	has	been	directed	from	
which	such	a	power	can	fairly	be	implied.”		Since	this	case	the	Supreme	Court	has	continued	
to	be	a	bulwark	against	unilateral	encroachment	by	the	executive	branch	into	the	powers	of	
the	legislative	branch	and	in	recent	cases	such	as	Youngstown	in	Medellín	v.	Texas,122	Chief	
Justice	Roberts	in	delivering	the	opinion	of	the	court	referenced	the	Youngstown	Sheet	&	
Tube	Co.	v.	Sawyer	case	when	he	wrote,	“Such	considerations,	however,	do	not	allow	us	to	
set	aside	first	principles.	The	President's	authority	to	act,	as	with	the	exercise	of	any	
governmental	power,	‘must	stem	either	from	an	act	of	Congress	or	from	the	Constitution	
itself.’”	
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There	have	been	occasional	challenges	to	the	decrease	in	specificity	of	the	
intelligibility	principles	allowed	in	delegation.		The	D.C.	Circuit	ruled	that	the	EPA’s	
implementation	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	violated	the	intelligibility	principle.		The	Supreme	Court	
later	overturned	this	ruling,	but	it	shows	the	legality	issue	is	still	an	active	question.		In	
addition,	in	AFL-CIO	v.	American	Petroleum	Institute,123	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	
regulation	by	OSHA	which	was	in	question	in	the	case	was	not	allowable	in	that	congress	did	
not	provide	an	adequate	intelligibility	principal.		More	recently,	in	Clinton	v.	City	of	New	
York,124	the	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	Line	Item	Veto	Act	of	1996	which	delegated	to	the	
president	the	power	to	unilaterally	amend	laws,	was	unconstitutional	as	it	violated	the	
Presentiment	Clause.		However	the	trend	towards	progressively	more	delegation	has	
continued.	
The	net	effect	of	all	this	delegation	is	that	agencies	are	now	creating	law	and	setting	
policy.		There	are	three	types	of	laws:	the	legislative	law	created	by	congress,	the	
administrative	laws	created	by	an	organization,	and	common	law	created	through	the	
congress.		There	is	no	difference	in	the	validity	of	these	three	types	of	laws	as	far	as	the	law	
is	concerned.		What	is	more,	both	legislative	law	and	administrative	law	are	tools	that	can	
and	do	get	used	to	create	public	policy	on	behalf	of	the	nation.	
	 Delegation	itself	appears	to	run	contrary	to	Article	1	Section	1	of	the	Unites	States	
Constitution.	That	section	contains	the	so	called	Vesting	Clause	that	states	that,	“All	
legislative	Powers	herein	granted	shall	be	vested	in	a	Congress	of	the	United	States,	which	
shall	consist	of	a	Senate	and	House	of	Representatives.”		This	clearly	lays	out	that	all	
legislative	powers	reside	in	congress	and	was	initially	interpreted	as	disallowing	legislative	
powers	to	be	exercised	by	executive	agencies	that	have	been	delegated	such	powers	by	
congress.		It	was	felt	that	in	many	cases	of	delegation,	the	fundamental	powers	delegated	
were	legislative	rather	than	executive	and	thus	were	expressly	forbidden	by	the	text	of	the	
constitution.		This	interpretation	was	often	supported	by	the	Supreme	Court	who	in	the	case	
of	Shreveport	Grain	&	Elevator	Co.,125	said,	“the	legislative	power	of	Congress	cannot	be	
delegated”.			
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	 In	the	case	of	Wayman	v.	Southard,126	Chief	Justice	Marshall	argued	that	rule-making	
power	was	a	legislative	function.		Thus	delegation	could	not	be	justified	by	merely	
proclaiming	that	the	regulations	and	rules	propounded	by	agencies	are	merely	the	executive	
branch	performing	executive	functions.		While	the	executive	branch	is	vested	with	the	
power	to	carry	out	and	enforce	the	law,	the	creation	of	law,	even	administrative	law	
remains	a	legislative	power.	
	 A	subset	of	delegation	in	which	congress	gives	away	some	of	its	power	is	contingent	
legislation.		In	this	sort	of	delegation,	congress	determines	actions	to	be	taken,	but	gives	the	
executive	branch	a	role	in	which	it	often	triggers	these	actions	to	take	effect	through	the	
actions	or	determinations	of	the	executive	branch	actor.		An	example	of	this	is	The	Brig	
Aurora	case.127		In	this	1813	Supreme	Court	case,	congress	legislated	that	after	the	
expiration	of	restrictions	on	British	trade,	that	they	would	be	reinstated	unless	the	president	
made	the	determination	that	Brittan	had	ceased	to	violate	the	United	States	neutrality.		In	
this	situation,	whether	these	restrictions	went	into	place	or	not	were	contingent	upon	
presidential	action.		There	have	also	cases	been	cases	in	which	contingent	delegation	was	
upheld	where	the	contingency	rested	upon	the	action	of	private	individuals	or	groups.		Thus	
those	affected	by	congress’	legislation	are	able	to	change	the	effects	of	the	legislation	and	
have	authority	essentially	delegated	to	them	due	to	this	privileged	position	as	a	political	
actor.		
	 Delegation	is	more	common	and	viewed	more	favorably	in	the	courts	in	certain	
policy	areas	such	as	those	that	are	viewed	as	being	shared	areas	of	policy	creation	for	the	
executive	and	legislative	branches	or	ones	in	which	the	president	is	viewed	to	have	primacy.		
An	example	of	this	is	foreign	affairs	in	which	the	president	is	typically	viewed	as	having	
primacy.		This	can	be	seen	in	United	States	v.	Curtiss-Wright	Export	Corp.,128	in	which	the	
opinion	of	the	court	states,	“In	international	relations,	the	President	is	the	sole	organ	of	the	
Federal	Government.		In	view	of	the	delicacy	of	foreign	relations	and	of	the	power	peculiar	
to	the	President	in	this	regard,	Congressional	legislation	which	is	to	be	made	effective	in	the	
international	field	must	often	accord	to	him	a	degree	of	discretion	and	freedom	which	
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would	not	be	admissible	were	domestic	affairs	alone	involved.	The	marked	difference	
between	foreign	and	domestic	affairs	in	this	respect	is	recognized	in	the	dealings	of	the	
houses	of	Congress	with	executive	departments.”		Thus	while	the	rules	that	govern	what	
kind	and	amount	of	delegation	are	acceptable	are	for	the	most	part	not	dependent	on	the	
specific	issue	to	be	decided,	there	are	certain	privileged	areas	in	which	courts	have	
determined	that	more	leeway	is	needed	and	can	be	given	be	congress	to	the	president	or	
other	parts	of	the	executive	branch.	
	 Another	area	in	which	the	president	and	the	congress	share	responsibility	is	
oversight	of	the	military.		The	Uniform	Code	of	Military	Justice	(UCMJ)	gives	the	president	
considerable	power	over	the	administration	and	running	of	the	military.		This	was	upheld	in	
a	court	decision	in	Loving	v.	United	States,129	which	allowed	this	delegation	of	the	power	to	
determine	the	standards	for	the	military	to	impose	capital	punishment	from	the	congress	to	
the	president.		As	the	court	concluded	in	this	case,	“The	President's	duties	as	Commander	in	
Chief,	however,	require	him	to	take	responsible	and	continuing	action	to	superintend	the	
military,	including	the	courts	martial.	The	delegated	duty,	then,	is	interlinked	with	duties	
already	assigned	to	the	President	by	express	terms	of	the	Constitution,	and	the	same	
limitations	on	delegation	do	not	apply,	"where	the	entity	exercising	the	delegated	authority	
itself	possesses	independent	authority	over	the	subject	matter.”		Thus	the	conjoining	of	
presidential	and	congressional	power	change	the	acceptability	of	delegation.	
	 Conversely	it	has	been	found	that	some	areas	require	a	higher	standard	for	
delegation	such	as	when	there	is	direct	impact	on	the	rights	of	the	people.		An	example	of	
this	is	Kent	v.	Dulles,130	in	which	the	State	Department’s	restriction	of	the	right	to	travel	in	
this	case	was	found	to	be	an	infringement	upon	personal	liberty	and	ruled	that	the	Secretary	
of	State	had	exceeded	the	authority	delegated	to	him	by	the	congress.	
	 Besides	Article	1	of	the	U.S.	Constitution,	delegation	must	be	in	accordance	with	all	
other	sections	of	the	constitution	as	well	for	it	to	be	constitutional.		One	area	in	which	
delegation	may	not	be	in	strict	accordance	with	the	constitution	is	with	regards	to	due	
process	of	law.		The	Fifth	Amendment	lays	out	that	the	government	may	not	do	harm	to	the	
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life,	liberty,	and	property	of	a	citizen	without	due	process	and	this	is	once	again	reaffirmed	
in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment.		Thus	if	delegation	does	not	provide	for	due	process	or	is	not	
in	keeping	with	this	tenant	it	would	not	be	constitutional	for	it	to	impinge	on	life	liberty	or	
property.		By	mere	dint	of	being	a	regulation	upon	action	many	agency	regulations	and	
pieces	of	administrative	law	are	by	their	nature	impingements	upon	liberty.		Thus	to	assure	
ourselves	of	the	constitutionality	of	these	cases	of	delegation	this	paper	investigates	
whether	delegation	complies	with	substantive	and	procedural	provisions	due	process.		This	
procedural	due	process	can	take	the	form	of	informing	those	whose	rights	will	be	limited	or	
who	otherwise	will	be	adversely	affected	by	an	administrative	law	to	be	informed	prior	to	
the	law	taking	affect	and	allowing	the	affected	party	or	parties	to	have	legal	recourse	to	
challenge	the	law.		Substantive	due	process	stops	the	government	and	in	this	case	the	
agency	or	entity	that	has	been	delegated	power	from	impinging	upon	any	fundamental	
rights	granted	in	the	constitution	such	as	those	granted	in	the	Bill	of	Rights	as	well	as	
unenumerated	rights	that	are	viewed	as	fundamental	such	as	privacy	or	self-dignity.		
	
	
2.2.3	Types	of	Delegation	
	
There	are	many	types	of	delegation	each	with	their	own	characteristics.		Many	of	
these	types	of	delegation	are	forms	of	explicit	delegation	to	other	governmental	entities	
such	as	when	congress	passes	a	bill	that	cedes	its	power	to	the	executive	branch.		However,	
there	is	also	implicit	delegation	when	the	executive	branch	asserts	a	power	that	was	
specifically	reserved	for	congress	and	which	congress	does	not	question.		This	is	delegation	
of	power	because	one	entity,	the	congress,	has	its	power	transferred	to	another	entity,	the	
executive	branch,	and	neither	body	perceives	a	compelling	need	to	stop	this	transfer	of	
power.	
In	the	delegation	process,	there	are	also	multiple	types	of	agents	that	can	be	the	
recipients	of	delegated	authorities.		Among	these	potential	agents	are	the	president,	ad	hoc	
commissions,	cabinet	members,	and	executive	agencies.		The	latter	categories	includes	such	
organizations	as	departments,	independent	regulatory	commissions	(e.g.	Security	and	
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Exchange	Commission),	agencies	in	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President	(e.g.	Office	of	
Management	and	Budget),	and	independent	agencies	each	with	differing	levels	of	authority	
and	freedom	from	congress	and	the	president.	
Departments	such	as	the	Department	of	Defense	(DOD)	are	typically	large	
organizations	run	by	members	of	the	president’s	cabinet.		Due	to	the	fact	that	executive	
agencies	are	headed	by	cabinet	members	who	serve	at	the	pleasure	of	the	president,	they	
tend	to	be	more	committed	to	the	goals	of	the	sitting	president.		They	would	thus	be	more	
likely	to	be	whom	the	president	favors	having	power	delegated	to	in	the	event	of	a	crisis.	
Independent	agencies,	such	as	the	Office	of	Personnel	Management,	are	those	
organizations	that	are	separated	from	the	day-to-day	oversight	of	the	executive	
departments.		Thus,	they	are	not	headed	by	members	of	the	president’s	cabinet,	but	rather	
are	run	by	agency	heads	who	are	harder	for	the	president	to	dismiss.		Therefore,	these	
agencies	have	more	freedom	of	action	from	the	congress	and	are	less	tied	to	the	president’s	
agenda.		Furthermore,	these	agencies	are	often	led	by	a	board	or	commission	rather	than	a	
single	leader.		The	board	members	or	commissioners	serve	longer	terms	that	are	often	
staggered	so	that	a	president	cannot	stack	the	agency	with	his	own	partisans.		In	addition,	
many	of	these	agencies	are	structured	so	that	their	board	must	be	bipartisan.		Congress	also	
is	limited	with	regard	to	what	action	it	can	take	to	influence	independent	agencies.		For	
example,	it	cannot	appoint	commissioners.		In	addition,	members	of	congress	cannot	serve	
as	commissioners,	or	take	part	in	the	removal	of	commissioners	except	through	the	
impeachment	process.		This	isolates	and	protects	these	organizations	from	congress	and	
thus	congress	has	less	ability	to	oversee	these	organizations.		This	can	affect	congress’	
willingness	to	delegate	to	agencies.		Overall	significant	power	has	shifted	to	agencies.		
Agencies	do	not	just	hold	hearings	in	which	they	make	judicial	decisions	and	potentially	dole	
out	punitive	penalties;	they	also	decide	which	cases	to	have	hearings	on.		This	prosecutorial	
power	strengthens	the	judicial	power	that	the	agents	hold.	
These	types	of	agencies	have	differing	capabilities,	inclinations,	and	political	
relations	and	therefore	some	are	better	suited	for	particular	sorts	of	delegation	than	others.		
Due	to	their	natures,	some	are	innately	more	likely	to	be	trusted	by	congress	with	greater	
delegated	authority	and	fewer	constraints.		Likewise,	the	reasons	for	delegation	will	differ	
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between	different	agencies	and	consequently	delegations	to	different	actors	will	lead	to	
varying	results	by	the	very	nature	of	the	agency	delegated	to	regardless	of	their	policy	
specialties.		This	is	also	true	when	the	delegation	is	to	actors	other	than	agencies.	
Delegation	need	not	be	to	other	national-level	political	actors.		It	can	also	be	to	
individual	states,	local	governments	or	even	to	privately	owned	entities.		For	instance,	the	
Energy	Policy	Act	of	2005	granted	authority	to	a	non-governmental	nonprofit	organization,	
the	North	American	Electric	Reliability	Corporation,	to	create	mandatory	standards	
governing	the	operation	and	accreditation	of	electric	power	systems.		There	have	been	
cases	in	which	delegation	to	trade	groups	and	other	private	entities	have	been	overturned	
by	the	U.S.	judicial	system	such	as	Carter	v.	Carter	Coal	Co.,131	which	found	the	Bituminous	
Coal	Conservation	Act	as	being	unconstitutional	in	nature.		Typically	though,	the	cases	that	
have	not	upheld	delegation	have	been	overturned	on	other	grounds	than	the	specific	
delegation	itself.	
One	type	of	implicit	delegation	is	giving	the	president	advisory	or	first	mover	role	in	
the	creation	of	legislation	and	other	congressional	powers.		This	has	been	done	in	areas	
such	as	devising	the	budget,	war	declarations,	and	treaty	creation.		Though	the	president’s	
actions	can	be	countermanded	or	ignored	by	congress,	this	power	to	act	first	often	allows	
the	president	to	effectively	control	the	policy	being	made	and	is	thereby	delegation.		In	the	
words	of	Sundquist,	“any	delegation	to	the	executive	of	authority	to	act	on	matters	on	
which	the	Congress	has	customarily	acted	is	a	shift	in	power	from	the	legislative	to	the	
executive	branch.		Even	if	Congress	delegates	to	the	president	no	more	than	the	
responsibility	to	recommend,	to	the	extent	that	the	recommendations	are	not	seriously	
reviewed	and	therefore	become	controlling,	the	exercise	of	governmental	power	has	moved	
between	the	branches.”132	The	sum	total	of	all	this	delegation	is	a	strengthening	of	the	
executive	branch	and	an	increasing	of	presidential	power.		As	Huntington	states,	“the	
initiative	in	formulating	legislation,	in	assigning	legislative	priorities,	in	arousing	support	for	
legislation,	and	in	determining	the	final	content	of	the	legislation	has	clearly	shifted	to	the	
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executive	branch.”133		This	first	mover	power	is	used	to	the	fullest	by	presidents	when	faced	
with	a	crisis	and	magnifies	their	other	powers.	
	
2.2.4	Principal	Agent	Theory	
	
	 In	principal	agent	theory,	a	principal	delegates	authority	to	act	on	their	behalf	to	an	
agent.		In	the	case	of	congressional	delegation,	the	principal	is	the	congress	and	the	agent	is	
the	agency	entrusted	with	the	authority	that	congress	is	delegating.		Congress	itself	is	an	
agent	acting	on	behalf	of	its	constituents,	the	people.		Even	this	picture	is	a	major	
simplification	as	congress	is	made	up	of	two	houses	each	comprised	of	numerous	
individuals,	who	in	the	U.S.	political	system	with	relatively	weak	parties,	are	effectively	free	
agents	with	their	own	goals.		Further	as	congress’	membership	and	agency	heads	change	
over	time	the	agents	and	principals	are	continually	evolving	and	changing.		In	addition,	
complicating	this	picture	is	the	role	of	the	president.		The	president	has	a	privileged	position	
in	this	system.	
	 Many	scholarly	works	attempting	to	describe	the	actions	of	congress	in	delegating	
away	its	power	have	relied	on	principal-agent	theory.134		These	works	often	come	to	
differing	conclusions.		Typically	they	simplify	the	situation	and	presume	a	single	principal	
and	agent	to	accord	with	the	research	of	the	consequences	of	a	principal	agent	situation.		
This	gives	a	general	framework	to	investigate	the	phenomena	of	congress’	willingness	to	
delegate	actions	and	the	constraints	it	places	on	its	agent,	but	it	ignores	much	of	the	
interlocking	system	of	actors	and	thus	its	conclusions	must	be	brought	in	to	question.	
	 There	is	a	tradeoff	between	better	agency	leadership	by	the	agent	and	increased	
responsiveness	for	the	principals.		A	strong	agency	head	will	be	able	to	lead	the	agency	
better	than	a	weak	one	and	a	more	encompassing	delegation	of	authority	to	the	agency	is	
also	likely	to	attract	stronger	candidates	to	the	position,	however	a	strong	agency	head	will	
tend	to	be	less	responsive	to	both	the	congress	and	the	president.		Responsiveness	is	
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important	for	congress	as	it	enables	congress	to	do	casework	and	helps	ensure	the	agency	
does	not	deviate	from	congress’	wishes.		The	president	also	benefits	from	agency	
responsiveness	as	it	can	improve	the	perception	of	his	ability	to	lead	the	government	and	
can	help	him	or	her	implement	new	policy.	
The	principal	has	the	objective	of	controlling	those	to	whom	they	delegate	power.		
They	thus	will	often	need	to	create	a	reward	and	punishment	system	to	ensure	that	those	
with	the	delegated	powers	are	incentivized	to	act	in	ways	that	the	agent	would	want	and	
have	their	interests	aligned	with	those	of	the	agent.	
Institutions	and	methods	of	creating	policy	are	used	to	provide	benefit	to	politicians	
that	built	them.		This	can	be	by	minimizing	political	risk	to	risk	adverse	politicians,	
channeling	benefits	to	key	constituencies,	or	improving	perceptions	of	politicians.		The	goal	
of	the	agent	is	not	always	to	create	the	best	policy	for	the	nation	or	their	electorate	and	
thus	what	oversight	that	congress	provides	might	be	geared	towards	keeping	the	agent	on	
their	own	agenda	and	goals	rather	than	on	the	agents	or	the	electorate’s.	
Principal-agent	theory	has	often	used	been	used	to	analyze	congress’	delegation	of	
authority	to	the	bureaucracy.		This	theory	however	is	overly	simplistic	as	there	are	at	least	
two	principals	in	this	case:	the	congress	and	the	president.		The	bureaucracy	acts	at	the	
behest	of	both	the	congress	that	initially	grants	the	authority	to	the	agency	as	well	as	the	
president	that	heads	the	executive	branch	to	which	executive	agencies	belong.		Both	the	
congress	and	president	are	interested	in	controlling	the	actions	of	the	agency	so	that	it	
corresponds	to	their	preferred	courses	of	action.		The	agency	and	its	leaders	however	have	
their	own	goals	and	wish	to	maintain	their	freedom	of	action.		Thus	there	is	an	interplay	
between	these	three	actors	who	wish	to	each	get	their	way	and	which	thus	consequently	
may	have	incentives	to	play	the	other	organizations	against	each	other.		Likewise	they	must	
take	into	account	the	desired	outcomes	of	the	other	entities.		Thus	the	willingness	of	the	
congress	to	delegate	authority	to	an	agency	and	the	constraints	that	it	uses	are	dependent	
on	the	president’s	party	and	priorities.		Likewise,	conflict	between	the	president	and	the	
legislative	branch	will	lead	to	less	delegation.	
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This	leads	to	a	multifaceted	political	situation	in	which	actors	must	estimate	the	
policy	preferences	and	ability	to	enact	changes	of	other	political	actors.		Likewise	even	
within	congress	there	are	different	factions	and	furthermore	congress	and	the	president	will	
change	over	time.		The	current	congress	is	aware	that	it	may	have	different	preferences	
than	a	future	congress	and	thus	may	wish	to	handcuff	future	congresses	to	follow	the	
existing	congress’	preferences.		Often	a	switch	in	the	party	in	control	of	congress	changes	
the	actions	of	congress	and	its	relation	to	the	agency	it	delegated	to.		They	also	are	aware	of	
the	fact	that	presidents	change	over	time	and	thus	they	must	factor	this	into	their	collective	
decision	making.		Thus	congress	sometime	finds	it	in	its	best	interest	to	lock	in	the	status	
quo.		This	can	be	achieved	many	ways.		One	of	these	is	relying	on	the	bureaucracy.		Typically	
bureaucracy	likes	to	defend	the	status	quo	and	resists	change	from	the	head	of	the	agency,	
the	president,	or	congress.		Because	agencies	do	not	turn	on	a	dime,	congress	can	count	on	
delegations	to	an	agency	to	cement	its	wishes.	
Gauging	intentions	can	be	difficult.		Often	what	is	stated	publicly	is	not	the	whole	
picture	or	an	actor’s	true	intensions.		Even	congress	may	have	differing	goals	during	the	
policy	formulation	and	legislation	phases	as	it	does	during	policy	implementation.		It	can	use	
legislation	as	a	signaling	method	though	it	may	wish	to	signal	different	policy	preferences	
and	actions	than	it	in	fact	has.		Congress	can	thus	under	the	cover	of	bureaucratic	action	and	
the	obscurity	and	disinterest	in	the	process	that	this	engenders,	ensure	their	true	policy	
preferences	are	followed	despite	their	stated	intensions.	
The	principals	will	vary	in	relative	power	and	in	other	attributes	that	will	affect	their	
ability	to	shape	agency	actions.		One	way	to	think	of	this	is	Neustadt’s	description	of	
presidential	power	coming	not	just	innately	from	his	position	but	also	from	the	perception	
of	the	president	both	by	congress	and	agents	and	by	how	they	judge	the	populace	at	large	
to	view	the	president.		As	he	states	it,	“Effective	influence	for	the	man	in	the	White	House	
stems	from	three	related	sources:	first	are	the	bargaining	advantages	inherent	in	his	job	
with	which	to	persuade	other	men	that	what	he	wants	of	them	is	what	their	own	
responsibilities	require	them	to	do.	Second	are	the	expectations	of	those	other	men	
regarding	his	ability	and	will	to	use	the	various	advantages	they	think	he	has.	Third	are	those	
men's	estimates	of	how	his	public	views	him	and	of	how	their	publics	may	view	them	if	they	
do	what	he	wants.	In	short,	his	power	is	the	product	of	his	vantage	points	in	government,	
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together	with	his	reputation	in	the	Washington	community	and	his	prestige	outside.”135		
Thus	different	presidents	will	be	at	varying	power	differentials	with	regard	to	congress	and	
will	thus	have	greater	or	less	influence	on	agency	heads.		Similarly	over	time	as	the	political	
fortunes	of	a	president	wax	and	wane	and	perceptions	of	the	job	he	or	she	is	doing	shift,	the	
president	will	find	a	relative	strengthening	or	weakening	in	his	power	to	influence	agency	
staff	when	compared	to	these	abilities	of	congress.			
Even	accepting	Kernell’s	hypothesis	that	president	have	shifted	to	more	of	a	
confrontational	rather	than	a	bargaining	approach	to	achieve	their	ends	and	influence	other	
political	players,136	one	can	still	see	that	the	president’s	political	strength	and	consequent	
ability	to	prevail	in	his	appeal	will	be	heavily	dependent	on	perceptions	of	him,	his	potential	
strength,	and	perceptions	of	how	others	view	him.		And	even	under	this	newer	hypothesis,	
the	assumption	is	kept	that	the	president	does	not	have	coercive	power	to	force	his	
prescribed	course	of	action,	but	rather	must	work	with	and	influence	others	to	achieve	his	
ends.		It	can	be	seen	from	this	that	even	though	the	president	may	technically	lead	the	
executive	branch	that	in	some	instances	the	president	may	not	have	significant	control	over	
agency	heads	and	may	need	to	enlist	others	such	as	congress	when	attempting	to	assert	
authority	over	agencies.	
Interest	groups	also	battle	to	guide	agency	actions	and	shape	policy.		They	lobby	the	
agency,	congress,	and	the	president.		Often	they	target	their	lobbying	to	where	they	feel	
they	will	get	the	most	benefit	for	their	expenditures.		This	will	often	lead	them	to	lobby	the	
agency	head	or	congress	members	on	the	committee	that	oversees	the	agency.		Thus	they	
can	affect	the	system	as	well.		In	some	cases	they	may	want	to	weaken	agencies	and	
decrease	its	ability	to	enact	change	or	perform	its	duties.		Terry	Moe	lays	this	out	saying,	
“Opponents	want	structures	that	work	against	effective	performance.		They	fear	strong,	
coherent,	centralized	organization.		They	like	fragmented	authority,	decentralization,	
federalism,	checks	and	balance,	and	other	structural	means	of	promoting	weakness,	
confusion,	and	delay.”		He	later	goes	on	to	sum	up	by	stating	that,	“opposition	groups	are	
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dedicated	to	crippling	the	bureaucracy.”		Clearly	this	conjecture	implies	that	factions	do	not	
always	strive	for	efficiency	and	thus	that	agencies	are	not	perfectly	rational.		In	addition,	
members	of	Congress	and	agencies	care	about	specific	parts	of	the	bureaucracy	whereas	
the	president	would	want	the	entire	government	to	run	better	and	to	be	more	rational.		
Furthermore,	“the	president	will	try	to	ensure	that	agency	behavior	is	consistent	with	
broader	presidential	priorities.”137	
The	president	and	congress	both	try	to	shape	institutions	to	give	themselves	a	lasting	
political	advantage.		The	president	for	his	part	benefits	from	a	centralization	of	power	and	
the	tendency	of	congress	to	delegate	its	authority	to	the	executive	agency.		The	president	
thus	will	try	to	reinforce	these	trends	and	further	centralize	power	if	possible.		Starting	with	
Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	there	was	a	shift	in	the	president’s	actions	as	the	position	became	
more	politicized	and	in	reaction	as	the	president	attempted	to	strengthen	his	position	by	
shaping	and	stamping	institutions	to	allow	greater	leverage	over	policy	making	through	
actions	such	as	centralizing	policy	creation	and	politicizing	the	appointments	of	agency	staff	
to	ensure	his	preferences.		The	natural	response	of	congress	towards	the	president’s	
consolidation	of	power	would	be	to	strengthen	its	own	position	and	to	take	steps	to	weaken	
the	president’s	new	power	base.		The	structure	of	the	political	environment	can	shape	the	
interplay	of	the	political	actors	in	domestic	politics	such	as	these	just	as	sharply	as	a	
multination	power	dynamics	guides	the	actions	of	nation-states.		The	president	does	not	
solely	seek	to	gain	power	to	enact	personal	policy	preferences,	but	has	other	goals	such	as	
reelection	and	carving	out	an	impressive	historical	legacy	and	these	goals	also	give	president	
cause	to	try	to	increase	his	influence	over	the	bureaucracy	and	his	leverage	over	other	
political	players.		For	one	thing	this	strength	is	viewed	as	“presidential”	and	also	it	can	be	
used	to	further	these	goals	by	enabling	the	president	to	achieve	or	appear	to	achieve	
popular	initiatives.		The	president	is	judged	by	many	factors	and	among	these	his	ability	to	
function	as	a	legislator	and	get	proposed	laws	passed	and	as	an	administrator	in	his	role	
overseeing	and	leading	the	bureaucracy.	
With	multiple	principals,	it	is	often	in	congress’	interest	to	protect	their	agents	from	
executive	control	by	limiting	action,	by	strengthening	them,	and	giving	them	structural	
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advantages	such	that	the	agency	head	or	the	organization	will	have	the	ability	to	resist	the	
president.		There	can	also	be	attempts	to	change	the	climate	or	culture	of	an	organization	to	
resist	executive	interference.		This	goes	hand	in	hand	with	Moe’s	argument	that	by	instilling	
a	culture	of	professionalism	in	an	agency	that	this	will	buttress	the	agency	and	enable	it	and	
encourage	it	to	better	resist	outside	interference.138	
In	addition,	other	agencies	such	as	the	appropriations	committee,	the	so	called	
guardian	of	the	treasury,	can	have	a	big	effect	on	actions	of	the	agency.		Though	it	typically	
does	not	have	a	large	effect	on	the	initial	delegation	of	power,	through	its	control	of	funds	it	
can	greatly	affect	the	ability	of	an	agency	to	perform	the	tasks	assigned	to	it	and	its	ability	to	
overreach	or	to	perform	actions	not	approved	of	by	congress.		Likewise	the	budget	
committee	and	a	number	of	subcommittees	can	affect	the	course	of	delegation	and	the	
actions	of	the	agent.	
The	president	has	multiple	ways	to	control	agencies.		He	has	the	power	to	appoint	
and	remove	the	head	and	senior	members	of	the	agency,	he	has	the	ability	to	restructure	
the	executive	agency	and	this	can	exert	considerable	pressure	on	agencies	and	also	
decrease	the	importance	of	an	organization.	
Congress	for	its	part	can	threaten	to	eliminate	an	agency	or	program.		This	nuclear	
option	can	help	keep	the	agency	doing	congress’	will.		Likewise	the	president	under	the	
Executive	Reorganization	Act	can	reorganize	the	executive	branch	and	collapse	or	move	
functions	to	either	mitigate	unwanted	behavior	or	as	a	punitive	action.		While	this	needs	the	
approval	of	congress,	it	is	a	powerful	tool	that	the	president	has	at	his	disposal.	
The	president	and	the	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	also	evaluate	the	budgets	
of	agencies	and	he	can	take	informal	action	or	formal	actions	to	curtail	agency	behavior.		
Beyond	his	or	her	ability	to	persuade	and	exact	political	leverage	to	sway	an	agency’s	
actions,	he	or	she	can	also	issue	an	executive	order	that	directly	directs	an	agency	or	its	
staff.	
The	president	can	influence	things	through	bargaining	and	trading	favors.		He	is	
needed	by	many	and	is	able	to	trade	this	need	for	the	ability	to	influence	others.		Neustadt	
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argues	that	there	are	many	things	expected	of	the	president	that	are	not	strictly	within	his	
control	or	legal	powers.		However,	he	must	take	steps	to	fulfill	these	roles	that	the	public	
expects	of	him.		These	areas	include	the	economics	in	which	the	president	traditionally	has	
little	power	to	affect	results.		There	are	competing	factions	that	each	try	to	get	their	ideas	
enacted.		Also	the	public	looks	to	the	president	to	be	a	leader	and	so	he	must	come	up	with	
plans,	try	to	set	an	agenda,	and	get	his	proposed	solution	enacted.		Power	is	the	ability	to	
enact	changes	and	get	people	to	do	what	is	wanted.		Commanding	can	be	used	in	some	
situations	and	persuading	can	be	used	in	other	situations,	but	each	has	its	place	and	certain	
situations	in	which	it	is	most	appropriate.		His	power	to	persuade	is	bolstered	by	success,	
popularity,	and	strength.		The	president’s	reputation	shapes	how	he	is	perceived	and	how	
others	deal	with	him.		This	is	affected	both	by	the	opinions	of	him	in	Washington	as	well	as	
those	in	the	country	as	a	whole.		Strong	popularity	can	help	stop	resistance	and	build	
consensus	for	the	president’s	plans.		The	president	must	use	his	power	efficiently	and	
ensure	that	his	opinion	stays	strong	so	he	will	continue	to	be	able	to	influence	policy.		The	
president	can	persuade	the	congress,	interest	groups,	the	public,	and	agencies.	
The	president	can	also	take	steps	to	shape	the	institutions	and	political	climate	
around	him.		These	are	neither	static	nor	stable	and	his	actions	are	capable	of	affecting	it	in	
a	number	of	ways	both	intentionally	and	unintentionally.		The	existing	institutional	structure	
affects	its	actions	and	so	the	president	has	to	take	those	into	account	and	tries	to	modify	
those	to	allow	for	better	results.		This	can	be	brought	about	through	the	creation,	closure,	
and	modification	of	agencies	and	other	entities.		It	can	also	be	done	through	changing	the	
relations	between	entities	so	that	one	influences	another	in	ways	positive	to	the	president’s	
goals.		The	president	also	benefits	by	centralizing	decision	making	as	well	as	power	so	that	
he	has	more	levers	he	can	press	to	get	his	policy	enacted.		Implementation	of	a	specific	
policy	is	not	the	only	goal	of	the	president.		He	typically	also	wants	an	efficient	government	
as	well	as	one	that	is	responsive	and	that	he	can	control	in	a	timely	fashion.		He	thus	also	
will	attempt	to	achieve	these	goals	as	well	since	they	reflect	positively	on	him	and	lead	to	a	
better	government.		The	president	by	himself	is	unable	to	completely	reshape	these	
institutions,	and	even	with	his	attempting	to	persuade	congress	there	are	limitations	to	the	
scope	of	the	change	that	is	possible.		Such	divided	government	can	encourage	inter-branch	
governing,	when	the	role	of	creating	policy	becomes	a	multiple	entity	affair.	
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Congress	however	does	not	always	care	that	deeply	about	the	details	since	these	are	
typically	not	in	the	spotlight	of	the	public	eye.		Making	the	common	assumption	that	
congress	members	are	rational	actors	and	that	their	main	goal	is	reelection,	they	often	have	
little	reason	to	focus	too	intently	or	spend	too	much	political	capital	on	curbing	future	
actions.	
The	head	of	an	agency	has	many	goals	that	they	wish	to	achieve.		Among	these	are	
increasing	their	discretionary	budget,	protecting	the	size	of	their	fiefdom,	and	increasing	
their	power.		Thus	the	agent	will	seek	to	maximize	these	before	working	on	the	priorities	of	
the	president	and	congress.		However,	realizing	this,	congress	and	the	president	try	to	align	
these	goals	with	their	goals	and	can	give	a	bigger	budget	as	a	reward	for	approved	of	
behavior	or	threaten	cuts	for	an	intractable	agency	head.		In	addition	those	who	work	for	an	
agency	have	more	knowledge	about	their	actions	as	well	as	about	causes	and	effects	of	
policy.		This	can	lead	to	an	agent	feeling	that	they	know	better	than	the	principal	about	
what	is	the	correct	course	of	action	to	take.	
An	agency	can	go	beyond	congress’	intentions	that	were	implicit	in	the	bill	that	
delegated	power.		As	Niskanen	argues,	the	agency	is	overseen	by	a	committee	whose	
members	care	more	about	the	issue	than	congress	in	general,	are	happier	with	increased	
agency	action,	and	are	more	willing	to	pursue	an	increased	budget	for	agencies	they	
oversee	than	the	median	floor	voter.139		Also	due	to	the	costs	of	oversight,	members	of	
congress	will	tend	to	freeride	and	under	produce	the	common	good	of	oversight	and	good	
governance.		This	only	adds	to	the	already	difficult	task	of	oversight	in	which	there	is	an	
asymmetry	of	data	that	gives	the	agency	being	overseen	several	key	advantages	over	those	
overseeing	them.		This	lack	of	oversight	contrasts	with	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	of	the	
pool	of	federal	resources	available	to	fund	organizations.		Deficit	spending	is	a	natural	
consequence	of	members	of	congress	receiving	little	benefit	from	decreasing	spending.	
Time	is	another	factor	in	analysis	of	the	relation	between	the	principals	involved.		It	
changes	the	relations	between	the	political	actors,	the	goals	of	the	political	actors,	and	the	
actors	that	are	involved	in	the	system.		It	is	another	type	of	uncertainty	of	which	there	are	
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numerous	distinct	causes	particularly	in	a	system	composed	of	the	counterbalancing	of	
numerous	competing	interests.		Many	actors	such	as	agency	heads,	whether	career	
professionals	or	politically	appointed,	seek	to	minimize	their	political	uncertainty.		House	
rules	change	as	a	result	of	short	term	political	gain	not	to	improve	efficiency	and	this	
tendency	of	the	political	framework	to	change	is	a	risk	of	keeping	policy	decisions	with	
congress.140		Many	initiatives	take	many	years	to	implement	and	the	results	of	the	policy	
may	not	be	clear	for	a	significant	period	while	costs	of	the	policy	may.		This	can	make	it	
difficult	for	congress	to	create	good	policy,	as	it	is	liable	to	change	a	policy	before	it	bears	
fruits.		Examples	of	this	sort	of	long	term	policy	decision,	is	the	adoption	and	fostering	of	a	
technology	such	as	green	technologies,	a	change	in	methodology	of	education,	a	
transportation	policy,	or	a	border	policy.	
There	are	a	number	of	ways	that	congress	or	the	president	can	attempt	to	guide	an	
agency.		Among	these	are	constraints,	empathy,	threat,	reward,	structural	means,	and	
cultural	means.		The	agency	for	its	part	can	resist	these	and	push	back	in	a	number	of	ways.		
The	can	include	bringing	their	views	to	the	public	by	harnessing	the	media,	by	working	with	
interests,	or	by	playing	one	principal	against	another.		They	also	sometimes	employ	a	
strategy	of	strategic	avoidance	in	which	the	agent	ignores	what	the	principal	says.	
While	delegation	can	improve	efficiency	and	efficacy	such	as	when	a	man	hires	a	
lawyer	to	defend	him	rather	than	defending	himself,	there	are	two	types	of	losses	that	are	
intrinsic	to	delegation.		The	first	of	these	is	agency	loss,	which	occurs	due	to	a	misalignment	
of	the	goals	of	the	agent	and	the	principal.		In	order	to	rectify	agency	loss,	the	principal	has	
to	take	actions	such	as	oversight	and	this	too	can	lead	to	the	second	type	of	loss,	which	is	
inefficiency	of	having	to	perform	these	actions	and	oversight.		This	is	known	as	agency	cost.	
An	example	of	agency	loss	was	the	early	history	of	the	Office	of	Information	and	
Regulatory	Affairs	(OIRA),	which	was	established	by	the	Paperwork	Reduction	Act	of	1980	as	
an	office	within	the	OMB.141		OIRA	was	designed	to	manage	and	oversee	how	the	
government	handled	information.		However	through	the	use	of	Executive	orders	OIRA	was	
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directed	to	conduct	cost-benefit	analyses	of	regulations	proposed	by	government	agencies	
and	became	a	central	overseer	of	other	agencies	with	the	powers	to	conduct	hearings	and	
other	data	collection	and	analysis	in	order	to	gauge	the	desirability	of	the	proposed	
regulation.	142		In	practice,	OIRA	used	its	privileged	position	as	a	central	overseer	of	
proposed	rules	and	regulations	to	forestall	proposed	pieces	of	administrative	law	that	
though	popular	with	the	democratically	controlled	congress	and	its	supporters,	run	contrary	
to	the	policy	goals	of	the	Republican	administration.		Thus	congress	created	an	agency	to	
improve	the	effectiveness	of	government	and	a	year	later	the	new	agency	subverted	its	
mission	and	began	to	run	contrary	to	the	wishes	of	congress.		It	effectively	allowed	for	a	
backdoor	veto	of	regulations	and	rules	proposed	by	agencies.	
It	was	not	merely	OIRA	that	had	gained	this	power,	but	also	in	large	part	the	
president.		The	president	is	able	to	exert	considerable	influence	on	the	Executive	Office	of	
the	President	and	by	extension	OIRA	that	is	part	of	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President.	
This	allowed	him	to	pursue	his	own	agenda	and	curtail	government	actions	with	which	he	
disagreed.	Ultimately	the	congress	was	able	to	reel	in	the	rogue	agency	by	cutting	off	
agency	funding	and	later	by	passing	legislation	that	made	the	head	of	OIRA	subject	to	
Senate	confirmation	and	by	restricting	the	use	of	funds	to	behavior	that	congress	found	
unobjectionable,	but	it	has	become	a	useful	presidential	asset.	
This	shows	how	oversight	and	constraints	can	be	used	by	congress	to	keep	agencies	
better	aligned	and	in	tune	to	the	goals	of	congress	and	thereby	to	decrease	the	agency	costs	
that	can	occur	due	to	delegation.		OIRA	showed	how	a	governmental	entity	can	be	used	to	
decrease	the	effectiveness	of	another	governmental	entity	and	thereby	lead	to	political	
gains	for	some	set	of	political	actors.		While	the	blatentness	of	OIRAs	actions	decreased	
subsequent	to	congresses	passing	legislation	to	curb	OIRA,	there	have	continued	to	be	
executive	orders	that	have	led	to	trends	in	which	during	Republican	presidencies	the	
caseload	of	OIRA	is	increased	and	this	adds	additional	workload	and	constraints	to	the	
agencies	overseen,	whereas	during	Democratic	presidencies	the	number	of	regulations	
reviewed	has	decreased.		This	seems	in	keeping	with	the	general	trend	of	Republicans	being	
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more	opposed	to	regulation	than	democrats	and	thus	helping	limit	the	amount	of	new	rules	
and	regulations	by	using	OIRA	as	a	tool	to	limit	this	amount	of	regulation.	
	 The	president	can	try	to	control	the	agency	actions	by	using	Office	of	
Information	and	Regulatory	Affairs	(OIRA)	and	other	tools	to	guide	agencies.		OIRA	is	
designed	to	be	a	clearing	house	for	new	proposed	regulation	and	thus	can	track	agency	
actions	and	bring	the	information	to	the	president	and	his	surrogates.		In	2001,	OIRA	began	
sending	out	“Prompt	Letters”	which	do	not	have	the	force	of	law,	but	are	a	tool	design	by	
the	OIRA	administrator	John	D.	Graham	in	order	to	direct	agencies	to	focus	on	a	specific	
area.	
Agencies	have	many	other	influences	such	as	recommendations	from	congressional	
committees,	any	of	the	roughly	one	thousand	Federal	Advisory	Committees,	and	the	vast	
number	of	interest	groups.		Corporations,	individuals,	nonprofits,	trade	and	labor	groups,	
and	countless	others	have	an	interest	in	agency	actions	and	thus	have	a	reason	to	try	to	
influence	its	actions.		
In	addition	to	the	direct	principals,	agencies	are	also	greatly	affected	by	those	that	
can	affect	those	principals.		Examples	of	these	can	be	other	countries,	powerful	individuals,	
or	special	interest	groups.		Moe	argues	that	interest	groups	are	pivotal	to	how	agencies	are	
shaped	due	to	the	power	that	they	exert	on	congress.143	
The	nature	of	delegation	is	determined	by	whether	the	relations	between	the	
Principal	and	the	agent	are	clearly	established	and	defined.		Often	laws	are	passed	that	give	
agencies	considerable	latitude	or	in	which	the	agency	asserts	that	they	have	powers	under	
the	act.		Laws	can	be	read	literally,	can	be	interpreted	as	to	the	intensions	of	the	creators	of	
the	law,	or	interpreted	how	the	agency	believes	is	now	best	for	the	country.		This	can	give	
an	agency	considerable	freedom	of	action	in	some	cases.			
	 The	dynamic	between	agent	and	principal	changes	if	there	is	a	repeating,	continuous	
relationship	between	the	two.		In	the	case	of	agencies	and	the	lawmakers	this	is	typically	a	
weak	relationship.		Within	its	sphere	of	expertise	and	authority,	the	agency	typically	takes	
the	lead	and	sets	priorities,	taking	initiatives	and	deciding	on	required	action	as	it	sees	fit.	
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2.2.5	Other	Methods	of	Analysis	
	
	 There	have	been	many	other	methods	of	modeling	and	analyzing	delegation.		There	
is	a	narrative	approach	that	looks	its	specific	forces	and	factors	and	tries	to	determine	
causes	and	effects	based	on	looking	at	the	specifics	and	then	generalizing	these	results	
based	off	of	their	universality	or	the	fact	that	they	appear	to	have	been	repeated.	
Delegation	has	also	been	viewed	through	the	lens	of	game	theory.		The	interaction	
among	actors	is	reoccurring	and	thus	cannot	be	modeled	accurately	by	a	single	game	theory	
game.		Instead	it	must	be	viewed	as	a	multiplayer	repeated	game.		For	simplicity’s	sake	a	
three	dimensional	matrix	can	be	created	in	which	the	agency	has	one	play	and	set	of	
payouts,	the	congress	has	one	set	and	the	president	has	one.		The	resulting	payout	for	each	
of	these	comes	out	of	the	interplay	amongst	these.		
	
2.3 Unilateral Executive Action 
	
The	president	was	long	viewed	as	relying	primarily	on	the	power	to	persuade,144	but	
in	recent	years	there	has	been	a	shift	in	investigating	the	power	of	the	president.		Those	
such	as	Moe	and	Howell	have	looked	into	the	unilateral	powers	that	the	president	has.145		
These	powers	are	used	considerably	more	than	they	were	even	100	years	ago	and	are	a	key	
characteristic	of	the	modern	presidency.		These	powers	are	generally	not	laid	out	in	the	
constitution,	but	presidents	have	argued	these	powers	are	implied	by	it	and	by	now	have	
become	traditional	powers	of	the	president.		Many	presidents,	such	as	Roosevelt	and	Nixon,	
tried	to	take	steps	to	strengthen	the	role	of	the	president	as	this	allowed	them	to	achieve	
more	of	their	policy	goals.		The	unilateral	actions	of	the	president	come	in	a	large	number	of	
forms	such	as	presidential	directives,	executive	orders,	executive	agreements,	presidential	
memoranda,	presidential	proclamations,	signing	statements,	and	impoundment.		The	types	
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of	presidential	unilateral	action	listed	above	all	have	the	power	to	affect	policy	decisions.		
There	are	some	other	unilateral	powers	that	the	president	has	that	are	not	able	to	affect	
policy	such	as	the	power	of	the	president	to	pardon.		This	paper	focuses	on	only	those	types	
of	actions	that	were	specified	above	which	the	president	can	use	to	affect	or	set	policy.		
While	these	are	unilateral	actions	that	reflect	the	prerogatives	of	the	president,	the	
congress	has	mechanisms	to	stop	or	counter	these	actions	of	the	president.		The	interaction	
between	the	congress	and	the	president	in	these	instances	is	a	repeated	game	in	which	the	
two	institutions,	congress	and	the	president,	must	work	together	over	a	time	and	thus	in	
this	tandem	juxtaposition	these	two	institutions	have	considerable	ability	to	affect	the	
actions	of	each	other.		Besides	shaping	policy,	these	actions	of	the	president	can	also	be	
used	to	allow	for	bargaining	with	the	congress,	to	control	the	bureaucracy,	and	to	help	the	
president	and	their	party	politically.		These	combined	abilities	can	change	the	political	
landscape	allowing	the	president	to	better	set	the	agenda,	control	political	sentiment,	and	
shape	institutions.		
	 The	president	can	use	these	powers	not	only	to	accomplish	specific	goals,	but	can	
use	them	strategically	for	a	wide	range	of	ends	and	as	a	utility-maximizer,	the	president	will	
use	these	powers	when	they	are	most	beneficial	to	him	and	will	most	help	him	accomplish	
the	goals	that	he	is	trying	to	accomplish.		This	of	course	would	include	when	the	president	
has	less	opportunity	through	other	means	to	accomplish	his	aims	be	they	political,	policy,	or	
otherwise.		He	will	also	choose	his	timing	and	scoping	of	these	executive	actions	to	best	
achieve	these	goals	with	the	understood	caveat	that	these	actions	are	taken	in	a	politically	
uncertain	environment	that	continues	to	change,	there	are	institutional	constraints	that	
limit	the	courses	of	action	that	the	president	can	take,	and	the	president	has	incomplete	
information.		
	 Given	those	constraints,	the	president	is	able	to	take	unilateral	executive	actions	
with	considerable	freedom	of	action.146		These	actions	are	also	flexible	in	that	they	can	be	
tailored	to	certain	needs	and	can	be	easily	modified	or	rescinded	as	needs	change.		
Importantly,	as	these	tools	enable	him	to	set	policy	in	such	a	way	as	to	deflect	media	
attention,	the	public	backlash	and	negative	opinion	are	not	that	large	a	factor	or	constraint	
																																																						
146	Warber,	Adam	L.		Executive	Orders	and	the	Modern	Presidency:	Legislating	from	the	Oval	Office.		Boulder,	
CO:	Lynne	Rienner,	2006.		38.	
92	
on	most	executive	actions.		The	president	can	take	steps	such	as	timing	the	action	so	that	it	
does	not	get	covered	by	major	media	outlet,	he	can	make	it	so	that	the	actions	coincide	and	
are	thus	are	overshadowed	by	other	major	governmental	actions	or	world	events,	and	he	
can	make	the	actions	vague	or	indeterminate	so	that	the	focus	on	the	actions	of	the	
president	is	minimal	as	is	the	political	opposition	and	the	negative	repercussions.		In	
addition,	media	outlets	are	less	likely	to	cover	such	actions	as	they	are	to	legislative	
accomplishments	or	political	fights.		However	congress	is	typically	acutely	aware	of	the	
actions	of	the	president	and	so	the	president	will	sometimes	make	allowances	for	the	
opinions	of	key	members	of	congress’	to	keep	his	relationship	with	congress	on	a	positive	
note	even	when	he	does	not	need	their	acceptance	of	his	current	action.	
	 Not	all	of	these	unilateral	presidential	actions	are	unpopular	with	congress	though.		
Occasionally	congress	will	even	state	when	passing	a	bill,	that	they	would	like	an	executive	
action	executed	in	conjunction	with	the	law	in	order	to	help	it	get	implemented.		In	this	case	
the	president	and	congress	would	be	working	together,	but	in	many	cases	the	president	and	
congress	do	not	have	the	same	goals.		In	these	cases	the	president	must	make	a	cost	benefit	
analysis	of	the	tradeoffs	between	taking	action	himself,	working	to	get	congress	to	pass	the	
bill,	or	taking	no	action.		Even	in	cases	in	which	congress	can	be	lobbied	by	the	president	
and	convinced	to	pass	a	law	itself	rather	than	the	president	issuing	an	executive	order	or	
taking	similar	action.		However,	it	can	be	far	costlier	politically	for	the	president	if	the	bill	is	
enacted	by	congress	because	the	president	often	has	to	use	a	significant	amount	of	political	
capital	to	get	a	bill	through	congress	whereas	if	he	in	essence	enacts	it	himself/herself,	the	
president	can	save	that	political	capital	and	use	it	later	for	other	purposes.	On	the	other	
hand	there	can	be	significant	political	losses	if	the	president,	using	an	executive	action,	tries	
to	push	through	policy	that	congress	opposes.	
	 Unilateral	executive	actions	can	also	be	a	communication	device	to	signal	policy	
changes	to	congress	and	the	bureaucracy.		It	can	signal	policy	directives,	the	
administration’s	resolve	and	intensions,	and	agenda	as	well	as	the	action	it	expects	from	
Federal	agencies	to	support	this	aim.		This	can	also	boost	the	visibility	of	the	president’s	
policy	proposals.		Presidents	want	their	place	to	be	central	in	the	policy	making	process	
rather	than	simply	trying	to	convince	congress	of	the	rightness	his	proposals	and	using	
executive	actions	can	help	do	this.		
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	 Different	types	of	executive	actions	are	useful	in	different	policy	domains	and	thus	
the	president	uses	different	types	of	executive	actions	for	different	needs.		Executive	
agreements	are	useful	for	foreign	policy	and	defense,	while	other	tools	such	as	signing	
statements	and	executive	orders	are	useful	for	manipulating	domestic	policy.	
	 The	president	has	a	very	short	period	in	which	to	affect	policy.		This	window	means	
that	the	president	must	prioritize	his	goals	and	work	on	those	that	matter	most	to	him.		
Obama	decided	to	focus	on	healthcare	reform	as	his	signature	legislative	achievement	as	
opposed	to	addressing	the	chronic	weakness	in	the	economic	market.		He	likely	believed	
that	action	on	healthcare	would	be	fast	and	then	he	would	be	able	to	focus	on	other	
priorities	like	the	economy,	but	due	to	solid	opposition	and	strong	party	cohesion	of	the	
minority	party,	Republicans,	the	healthcare	proposal	ended	up	taking	14	months	to	get	his	
enacted.		By	that	point	in	his	term	the	honeymoon	period	was	over	and	the	president	faced	
a	unified	opposition	in	almost	all	his	proposals	and	this	would	only	intensify	eight	months	
later	when	the	Republicans	took	control	of	the	House	of	Representatives	in	the	2010	
elections.		The	economy	had	worsened	by	that	point	making	the	challenge	of	resolving	the	
crisis	more	difficult.		The	president	had	also	used	up	a	lot	of	political	capital	and	his	
popularity	had	fallen	during	this	period	decreasing	his	power	to	enact	change.		It	also	
allowed	the	president	to	be	attacked	with	the	accusation	of	having	done	nothing	about	the	
economy.		The	depth	of	the	crisis	made	it	unpopular	for	the	president	to	be	seen	as	ignoring	
the	economic	crisis.		He	began	to	use	rhetoric	to	make	his	proposals	more	acceptable	
whereas	the	Republicans	began	to	see	how	they	could	use	the	weak	economy	as	a	major	
issue	with	which	to	assail	Obama	and	weaken	his	administration	and	his	reelection	
potential.	
	 Presidents	are	constrained	by	the	law,	but	they	also	shape	the	law.		One	cannot	
judge	a	president’s	ability	to	act	by	the	formal	powers	of	the	office	alone.		In	the	current	era	
Presidents	do	not	typically	list	the	specific	sources	of	power	that	enable	their	unilateral	
action	as	this	allows	their	opponents	to	question	the	basis	for	presidential	action	more	
easily.		Rather	they	assert	a	power	and	when	they	do	list	the	source	of	their	authority,	the	
only	list	vague	sources.	
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	 As	Mayer	points	out,	there	is	an,	“expectation	that	presidents	would	prepare	a	
comprehensive	legislative	agenda,	which	became	common	only	in	the	twentieth	century”.	
147	This	expectation	is	a	major	pressure	upon	the	president’s	actions	and	fits	into	the	
president’s	wishes	to	have	an	open	field	of	action	so	they	can	press	their	agenda	in	all	areas	
of	potential	political	action.		This	desire	to	move	in	numerous	areas	leads	the	president	to	
need	a	number	of	different	political	and	legislative	tools	because	passing	laws	in	the	normal	
manner	is	so	slow	and	the	bar	for	action	is	so	high.	
	 The	president	is	able	to	use	unilateral	actions	and	his	power	to	control	and	
restructure	the	executive	branch.		This	gave	him	significant	control	over	the	government	
actions	and	allowed	him	to	lead	them	and	guide	their	actions.		They	can	shape	the	
institution	in	one	action	rather	than	fight	a	series	of	little	battles.		There	is	still	confrontation	
over	control	of	the	bureaucracy,	but	the	president	had	advantages	that	enabled	him	to	win	
most	of	these	battles.	
It	has	been	argued	that	presidential	powers	are	not	fixed,	but	fluctuate	according	to	
whether	the	actions	of	the	president	are	in	accordance	with	congress’	stated	or	implied	
authorization	or	are	in	opposition	to	congress’	wishes	and	the	actions	that	congress	has	
taken.148	
	 As	head	of	the	executive	branch,	the	president	nominally	has	control	over	those	in	
the	branch	who	are	his	subordinates.		The	president	has	a	number	of	tools	that	he	can	use	
to	control	the	executive	branch	such	as	removing	agency	heads	and	other	key	senior	leaders	
of	the	executive	branch.		The	case	of	Myers	v.	United	States,149	solidified	this	power	with	
Chief	Justice	of	the	United	Stated	and	former	president,	William	Howard	Taft,	delivered	the	
opinion	of	the	court	which	included	key	phrases	such	as,	“in	so	far	as	it	attempted	to	
prevent	the	President	from	removing	executive	officers	who	had	been	appointed	by	him	by	
and	with	the	advice	and	consent	of	the	Senate,	was	invalid,	and	that	subsequent	legislation	
of	the	same	effect	was	equally	so.”	
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	 Executive	action	is	given	considerable	leeway	by	the	courts.		When	the	issue	of	
Executive	Order	12092,	which	gave	significant	power	over	the	management	of	government	
property,	was	brought	before	the	court,	the	appeals	court	ruled	that	the	president’s	use	of	
this	authority	was	allowable	because,	“when	that	view	has	been	acted	upon	over	a	
substantial	period	of	time	without	eliciting	congressional	reversal,	it	is	entitled	to	great	
respect.	.	.	construction	of	a	statute	by	those	charged	with	its	execution	should	be	followed	
unless	there	are	compelling	indications	that	it	is	wrong.”150	
	 Presidents	argue	for	expanded	executive	powers,	particularly	during	a	crisis.		While	
many	do	not	approve	of	these	powers	before	they	get	into	office,	they	tend	to	view	such	
power	better	after	they	come	to	power.151		Presidents	such	as	Lincoln	and	Franklin	Delano	
Roosevelt	used	considerable	executive	powers	to	deal	with	crises.		President	George	W	
Bush	behaved	similarly	in	response	to	9/11	crisis	and	asserted	considerable	new	executive	
powers	to	deal	with	it.	
	 There	is	some	justification	to	feel	that	executive	powers	are	expanded	during	a	crisis.		
Congress	has	passed	many	laws	giving	powers	in	such	instances	and	even	the	U.S.	
Constitution	makes	allowances	for	an	expanding	of	powers	during	times	of	crisis.		An	
example	is	the	Suspension	Clause	that	states,	"The	privilege	of	the	writ	of	habeas	corpus	
shall	not	be	suspended,	unless	when	in	cases	of	rebellion	or	invasion,	the	public	safety	may	
require	it."152		While	the	Constitution	does	not	state	that	it	is	the	president	that	has	the	
ability	to	suspend	habeas	corpus	in	such	instances	that	was	clearly	the	assertion	made	by	
President	Lincoln	during	the	Civil	War.		Likewise,	presidents	Grant	and	George	W.	Bush	also	
used	the	constitution	as	a	basis	for	action	when	they	too	suspended	the	writ	of	habeas	
corpus.	
	 Besides	taking	direct	executive	action,	the	executive	powers	that	the	president	has	
and	even	those	that	he	just	asserts	that	he	has	can	be	a	powerful	tool	in	negotiating	with	
the	congress	and	getting	them	to	do	what	he	wants.		Franklin	Delano	Roosevelt	said,	“I	ask	
the	Congress	to	take	this	action	by	the	first	of	October.	Inaction	on	your	part	by	that	date	
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will	leave	me	with	an	inescapable	responsibility	to	the	people	of	this	country	to	see	to	it	that	
the	war	effort	is	no	longer	imperiled	by	threat	of	economic	chaos.	In	the	event	that	the	
Congress	should	fail	to	act,	and	act	adequately,	I	shall	accept	the	responsibility,	and	I	will	
act.		At	the	same	time	that	farm	prices	are	stabilized,	wages	can	and	will	be	stabilized	also.	
This	I	will	do.		The	President	has	the	powers,	under	the	Constitution	and	under	
Congressional	Acts,	to	take	measures	necessary	to	avert	a	disaster	which	would	interfere	
with	the	winning	of	the	war.	I	have	given	the	most	thoughtful	consideration	to	meeting	this	
issue	without	further	reference	to	the	Congress.	I	have	determined,	however,	on	this	vital	
matter	to	consult	with	the	Congress.”153	
He	essentially	gives	congress	an	ultimatum	and	said	that	if	it	did	not	meet	his	
demands	that	he	would	claim	this	power	and	on	his	own	he	would	perform	the	same	action	
he	is	requesting	of	congress.		Congress	had	little	choice	then	but	to	acquiesce	to	his	
demands.		While	the	policy	result	may	not	have	been	in	the	interests	of	congress	it	did	allow	
congress	to	keep	the	prestige	and	power	of	itself	as	an	institution	intact.	
The	power	division	between	the	branches	of	government	is	always	in	flux	and	it	is	up	
to	congress	to	check	power	grabs	from	the	president	lest	they	become	a	permanent	transfer	
of	power	from	the	legislative	branch	to	the	executive	branch.		Presidents	have	continually	
tried	to	increase	their	powers	as	this	better	enables	them	to	accomplish	their	political	and	
personal	goals,	but	congress	is	often	passive	in	stopping	that	practice	and	protecting	their	
political	turf.		The	continued	usage	of	a	power,	even	one	that	perhaps	does	not	rightfully	
belong	to	the	executive	branch,	gives	more	validity	to	future	uses	of	such	powers.		Louis	
Fisher	describes	this	phenomena	thusly,	“The	boundaries	between	the	three	branches	of	
government	are	strongly	affected	by	the	role	of	custom	or	acquiescence.		When	one	branch	
engages	in	a	certain	practice	and	the	other	branches	acquiesce,	the	practice	gains	legitimacy	
and	can	fix	the	meaning	of	the	Constitution.”154		Kenneth	Mayer	traced	the	foundation	of	
this	acquiescence	doctrine	to	the	1915	Supreme	Court	case	of	United	States	v.	Midwest	Oil	
Co.155		Edward	S.	Corwin	voiced	the	view	thusly,	"What	the	Constitution	does,	and	all	that	it	
does,	is	to	confer	on	the	President	certain	powers	capable	of	affecting	our	foreign	relations,	
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and	certain	other	powers	of	the	same	general	kind	on	the	Senate,	and	still	other	such	
powers	on	Congress;	but	which	of	these	organs	shall	have	the	decisive	and	final	voice	in	
determining	the	course	of	the	American	nation	is	left	for	events	to	resolve."156	
The	president	is	not	the	only	one	who	can	use	presidential	power.		The	president	
had	long	had	others	in	the	administration	act	on	his	behalf	using	his	powers	and	Congress	
formalized	this	ability	of	the	president	when	it	passed	it	passed	the	Presidential	
Subdelegation	Act	of	1950.157		Furthermore	the	presidency	as	an	institution	includes	more	
than	just	the	president,	but	also	includes	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President,	which	the	
president	and	the	congress	have	vested	with	power.	
Congress	has	taken	actions	to	limit	the	president’s	control	over	the	bureaucracy.		
This	included	an	amendment	to	a	1944	appropriations	bill	that	any	agency	created	by	
executive	order	could	be	funded	for	more	than	a	year	without	the	congress	specifically	
appropriating	funding	for	the	agency.158		This	action	makes	it	difficult	for	the	president	to	
restructure	or	grow	the	executive	branch	without	the	acceptance	of	congress.	
	 The	president	has	the	ability	both	to	set	the	legislative	agenda	and	enact	changes	in	
one	fell	swoop.		As	Baron	and	others	have	argued	there	is	strategic	advantage	to	moving	
first	in	agenda	setting.159		Among	other	advantages	it	allows	the	president	to	gauge	the	
popularity	of	the	action	and	perform	credit	taking	if	it	was	well	received	and	mitigation	if	it	
would	be	unpopular	generally	or	across	certain	segments	of	the	population.		The	president	
is	often	given	credit	or	blame	for	the	actions	of	government	regardless	who	initiates	them,	
how	they	are	passed,	or	the	methods	used	to	get	the	policy	enacted.		Thus	the	president	
gains	by	getting	more	pieces	of	policy	or	more	comprehensive	enacted	particularly	when	it	
is	popular	policy.	
	 Individual	legislators	have	few	if	any	unilateral	powers	and	must	convince	their	
colleagues	and	other	political	actors	in	order	to	get	their	desired	policies	enacted	whereas	
the	president	has	the	ability	to	enact	legislation	without	rallying	a	coalition	and	working	
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with	others	or	even	the	ability	to	persuade.		Howell	argues	that	these	unilateral	powers	are	
not	formal	powers	since	they	are	not	delineated	in	the	constitution,	but	neither	are	these	
powers	coming	solely	from	the	president’s	personality	or	personal	qualities	as	these	powers	
have	been	exercised	for	decades	and	have	been	exercised	by	numerous	presidents.		They	
are	more	similar	to	institutional	powers	which	have	increased	or	decreased	over	time	and	
are	affected	by	the	relative	powers	and	disposition	of	the	various	branches.	
	 Howell	sums	up	the	use	of	unilateral	executive	action	by	saying,	“When	congress	is	
weak	and	the	judiciary	lenient,	presidents’	powers	of	unilateral	action	flourish;	when	
Congress	is	unified	and	strong	and	the	judiciary	takes	a	restricted	view	of	presidential	
power,	presidents	can	accomplish	relatively	little.”160		The	president	can	sometimes	take	
steps	that	exceed	the	powers	that	the	constitution	or	congress	have	specifically	given	to	
him.		Locke	describes	this	as	saying,	“There	is	a	latitude	left	to	the	Executive	power,	to	do	
many	things	of	choice,	which	the	Laws	do	not	prescribe.”161	
	
2.4 Interrelations between the Branches 
	
Proposals	put	forward	by	the	president	are	often	proposals	that	had	previously	been	
submitted	to	congress,	but	which	have	not	become	law.		Often	the	president	will	not	form	a	
whole	legislative	agenda	from	scratch	on	his	own,	but	will	take	ideas	or	even	entire	bills	
from	the	vast	array	of	legislative	items	that	are	submitted	to	congress	each	year,	but	are	not	
addressed	or	otherwise	fail	to	become	law.		This	can	also	lead	to	there	already	being	a	
contingent	of	supporters	to	the	bill	even	before	the	president	tries	to	lobby	congress	to	pass	
the	bill.		As	Mark	Petersen	describes	it,	Congress	and	the	Presidency	are	tandem	
institutions.162		They	are	intertwined	and	the	actions	of	one	affects	the	actions	of	the	other	
and	both	affect	the	shape	of	legislation.		The	president-centric	view	of	legislation	views	the	
president	as	waging	a	battle	to	get	key	pieces	of	his	agenda	passed	and	he	is	to	be	judged	a	
success	if	for	the	most	part	he	succeeds	in	this	endeavor.		However,	this	neglects	the	role	of	
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congress	and	merely	repurposes	it	as	a	field	of	play	rather	than	the	principal	governmental	
body	empowered	to	create	legislation.		While	the	president	can	find	surrogates	in	congress	
to	raise	bills	that	he	wants	passed,	congress	has	even	more	ability	to	set	the	legislative	
agenda	and	see	through	major	new	laws.		The	president	and	congress	have	a	complex	
relationship	that	can	shift	from	being	cooperative	to	adversarial	based	on	a	number	of	
factors.		This	is	the	situation	Richard	Neustadt	refers	to	which	he	describes	the	idea	of	two	
separate	institutions	sharing	power.163		This	becomes	more	complex	when	one	looks	at	the	
number	of	factions	or	even	individuals	in	congress	that	cannot	just	be	aggregated	as	a	mass,	
but	each	have	their	own	opinions	of	legislation	proposed.		The	president	can	take	a	number	
of	tacks	with	regard	to	pushing	an	agenda.	
One	extreme	is	that	a	president	can	try	to	force	an	agenda	through	congress	and	not	
work	with	congress	to	vet	ideas	for	what	they	find	acceptable.		An	example	of	this	can	be	
seen	in	the	first	two	years	of	the	Carter	presidency	where	his	view	of	the	essential	
correctness	of	his	proposals	and	his	newness	to	Washington,	D.C.	caused	him	and	his	
administration	at	first	to	try	to	unilaterally	set	the	legislative	agenda	without	input	from	
congress.		This	led	to	a	number	of	failed	efforts.	
Lyndon	Baines	Johnson	on	the	other	hand	was	very	focused	on	congress	and	tried	to	
take	their	opinion	into	account.		He	had	some	successes,	however	there	is	the	risk	that	the	
bills	will	be	so	watered	down	that	little	of	the	president’s	agenda	remains	and	that	congress	
essentially	dictates	its	wishes.		There	are	limits	to	what	they	can	do	alone	and	this	ties	the	
president	and	together	and	this	generally	precludes	a	scorched	earth	policy	of	negotiating.		
Besides	actively	opposing	the	president,	congress	also	has	the	strategic	option	of	ignoring	
the	president’s	proposal.		Time	sensitivity	causes	most	bills	to	fail.		Congress	need	only	
ensure	that	the	president’s	proposal	does	not	pass	both	houses	by	the	end	of	the	year	and	
they	can	sidetrack	his	legislative	proposals.		Bills	can	be	killed	in	committee,	in	conference,	
by	a	floor	vote,	or	by	the	end	of	the	legislative	session.		The	opposition	has	significant	power	
to	stop	votes	it	disapproves	of.		The	president	however	has	significant	bargaining	power	on	
certain	key	issues	and	has	spoils	to	dole	out	and	can	also	trade	off	unrelated	bills	so	as	to	
achieve	his	desired	ends.	
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The	relationship	between	congress	and	the	president	is	determined	by	a	large	
number	of	factors	such	as	the	personalities,	parties,	and	length	of	time	in	office	of	the	
political	actors.		Another	factor	that	can	have	a	considerable	effect	is	whether	the	president	
is	perceived	to	have	a	mandate.		If	a	president	was	elected	by	a	large	margin	or	with	a	set	
agenda	that	is	popular	he	has	more	ability	to	get	legislation	passed.		When	the	president	has	
a	mandate	or	is	popular,	congress	is	more	inclined	to	allow	the	president’s	prerogative	of	
suggesting	legislation	and	is	more	willing	to	take	up	his	proposal	and	support.		The	same	is	
true	early	in	the	president’s	term.		In	this	honeymoon	period	the	president’s	popularity	is	
high	and	he	has	not	expended	much	political	capital	or	made	enemies.	
Another	major	factor	that	affects	the	relationship	between	the	executive	and	
legislative	branches	is	the	structure	of	the	institutions	themselves.		For	instance,	a	congress	
with	much	more	centralized	power	allows	for	the	president	to	deal	with	just	a	few	key	
leaders	and	push	through	legislation	by	negotiating	with	just	a	few	members.		The	more	
decentralized	congress	of	today	allows	more	players	to	be	involved	in	the	crafting	of	
legislation.		This	challenge	for	the	president	is	bolstered	by	the	fact	that	congress	has	more	
resources	such	as	bigger	staffs	and	supporting	agencies	and	thus	can	better	put	forth	
competing	proposals.		The	institution	of	congress	has	been	strengthened	by	acts	such	as	the	
Budget	and	Accounting	Act	of	1921164	and	by	the	increase	in	staffs	of	committees	and	
members.		This	makes	members	of	congress	more	competitive	in	the	legislative	arena	and	
thus	less	willing	to	adopt	the	president’s	proposals.		Some	of	the	changes	that	have	
decentralized	power	are	restrictions	that	a	member	of	the	House	of	Representatives	cannot	
chair	more	than	one	committee	and	the	shift	to	strengthen	subcommittees	at	the	detriment	
to	the	power	of	committee	chairs.		There	have	been	some	tendencies	toward	centralization	
of	power	such	as	a	renewed	ability	of	House	leadership	to	use	the	Rules	committee	to	
support	their	initiatives,	however	over	all	congress	and	in	particular	the	House	of	
Representatives	have	a	far	more	decentralized	power	structure	than	they	did	back	in	the	
early	1970s	before	many	of	these	changes	came	about.	
Presidents	can	also	lobby	or	pressure	congress	into	implementing	their	preferred	
policies.		Presidents	use	“going	public”	as	a	technique	to	push	their	policy	by	utilizing	public	
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pressure	which	he	attempts	to	focus	on	congress	in	anticipation	that	it	will	help	achieve	his	
desired	actions	from	congress	and	will	shape	public	opinion	about	the	policy.		“Going	
public”	can	affect	public	opinion	in	the	current	context	and	allow	for	changes,	but	can	also	
lay	the	foundation	long	term	for	the	adoption	of	the	technology	and	the	incorporation	of	
their	viewpoints	into	the	public	view	of	the	issue	even	after	their	term	is	over.165		This	can	
lead	to	these	policies	becoming	entrenched,	which	is	ideal	for	the	president.		Kernell	
however	argues	that	going	public	is	not	costless.		He	also	views	going	public	as	being	in	
opposition	to	the	use	of	inter-branch	bargaining	and	argues	that	it	is	mostly	of	a	threat	for	
noncompliance.		That	assertion	is	likely	not	totally	true	as	“going	public”	is	not	solely	
punishment	for	noncompliance,	but	serves	other	purposes	as	well.		He	also	argues	that	it	
can	make	those	involved	less	flexible	because	they	effectively	must	posture	and	make	a	case	
in	public	and	thus	have	less	room	to	give	when	negotiating	and	thus	going	public	makes	it	
harder	for	the	two	sides	to	negotiate.		Going	public	is	particularly	effective	if	it	can	be	done	
as	an	outsider	or	man	of	the	people	railing	against	congressional	and	governmental	inaction.		
President	Obama	was	well	placed	to	do	this	at	the	start	of	his	term	and	had	some	successes	
with	this	tactic.	
As	power	has	devolved	from	party	bosses	and	chairmen	down	to	even	freshman	
congresspersons166	and	with	the	decrease	in	party	loyalty	or	cohesion,	congress	has	moved	
towards	pluralism	in	which	each	individual	is	a	political	power	than	must	be	deal	with	and	
who	has	their	own	goals	that	must	be	taken	into	effect.		This	situation	makes	negotiation	
too	complex,	as	it	is	hard	to	negotiate	with	many	individuals	with	their	own	ends	and	keep	
them	on	the	ranch.		However	one	cannot	go	public	too	often	and	become	overexposed	so	
that	their	future	messages	do	not	have	much	power.		Also	the	president	does	not	want	to	
risk	losing	these	public	battles.		In	addition,	going	public	can	look	desperate	since	if	the	
president	could	accomplish	their	means	without	this	extraordinary	step	they	usually	would.		
In	the	words	of	Neustadt,	"Effective	influence	for	the	man	in	the	White	House	stems	
from	three	related	sources:	first	are	the	bargaining	advantages	inherent	in	his	job	with	
which	to	persuade	other	men	that	what	he	wants	of	them	is	what	their	own	responsibilities	
require	them	to	do.		Second	are	the	expectations	of	those	other	men	regarding	his	ability	
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and	will	to	use	the	various	advantages	they	think	he	has.	Third	are	those	men's	estimates	of	
how	his	public	views	him	and	of	how	their	publics	may	view	them	if	they	do	what	he	wants.	
In	short,	his	power	is	the	product	of	his	vantage	points	in	government,	together	with	his	
reputation	in	the	Washington	community	and	his	prestige	outside.		A	President,	himself,	
affects	the	flow	of	power	from	these	sources,	though	whether	they	flow	freely	or	run	dry	he	
never	will	decide	alone.		He	makes	his	personal	impact	by	the	things	he	says	and	does.	
Accordingly,	his	choices	of	what	he	should	say	and	do,	and	how	and	when,	are	his	means	to	
conserve	and	tap	the	sources	of	his	power.		Alternatively,	choices	are	the	means	by	which	
he	dissipates	his	power.		The	outcome,	case	by	case,	will	often	turn	on	whether	he	perceives	
his	risk	in	power	terms	and	takes	account	of	what	he	sees	before	he	makes	his	choice.	A	
President	is	so	uniquely	situated	and	his	power	so	bound	up	with	the	uniqueness	of	his	
place,	that	he	can	count	on	no	one	else	to	be	perceptive	for	him."167	
Public	policy	is	generally	the	creation	of	multiple	political	actors	and	typically	
involves	actors	both	from	the	executive	branch	and	from	the	legislative	branch.		The	
interaction	between	those	two	branches	greatly	shapes	the	policy	that	is	ultimately	created.		
This	interaction	can	rely	on	personal	factors,	but	typically	also	has	many	structural	factors	
that	lead	under	certain	circumstances	to	specific	types	of	interaction	and	thus	which	shape	
policy	in	certain	systematic	ways.		Over	time	the	branches	have	developed	strategies	for	
dealing	with	the	other	branch	that	help	them	maximize	their	utility.		
Among	these	strategies	available	are	publicly	committing	to	a	policy.		This	
commitment	would	entail	staking	out	a	position	on	an	issue	and	publicly	committing	to	it	as	
a	way	of	eliminating	future	alternative	courses	of	actions.		Ingberman	and	Yao	argue	that	
the	president	can	better	achieve	his	desired	results	by	committing	to	a	specific	policy.168		
This	can	help	the	president	ensure	that	congress	will	accommodate	his/her	preferences	
since	he	has	veto	power	over	the	policy	and	if	congress	does	not	make	the	requisite	
allowances	for	his	preferences,	the	president	will	veto	the	bill	and	congress	will	likely	not	
get	any	of	what	they	wanted.		Often	congress	will	not	even	attempt	to	pass	a	bill	that	the	
president	does	not	want	since	he	will	be	able	to	block	it	and	it	is	difficult	for	congress	to	
override	the	veto	in	today’s	partisan	climate.		The	president	can	commit	to	a	policy	and	
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make	it	known	that	he	has	fixed	views	on	an	issue	by	going	public	and	stating	his	position	
on-the-record.		He	can	go	even	further	by	stating	an	unwillingness	to	waver	from	that	
position.		This	ability	to	go	public	and	use	a	commitment	strategy	is	greater	in	the	current	
era	in	which	press	conference	and	other	direct	communication	techniques	are	available	to	
the	president.		This	public	commitment	binds	the	hands	of	the	president	since	he	will	in	
effect	lose	politically	if	he	then	backtracks	and	ultimately	goes	against	the	position	he	earlier	
went	on	record	as	supporting.			
The	use	of	going	public	as	a	method	of	policy	commitment	is	not	necessarily	at	odds	
with	Kernell’s	view	of	going	public	where	the	act	of	going	public	is	undertaken	largely	to	
affect	public	sentiment	with	the	intent	of	altering	congress’	utility	function	and	ultimately	
their	votes.169		Going	public	can	and	does	serve	both	these	purposes	and	can	have	major	
effects.		Canes-Wrone	argues	that	going	public	can	change	the	policy	that	otherwise	would	
be	implemented.170		The	president	must	have	a	viewpoint	that	will	be	popular	with	people	
when	it	is	framed	a	certain	way	if	he	hopes	to	gain	politically	from	going	public.	
Ingberman	and	Yao	view	the	use	of	commitment	through	the	tools	of	game	theory	
as	a	game	played	between	congress	and	the	president.171		In	this	game,	congress	takes	the	
role	of	agenda	setter	whereas	the	president	must	decide	whether	to	accept	the	agenda	or	
whether	to	veto	the	proposal.		Congress	thus	tries	to	make	a	bill	more	acceptable	to	the	
president	so	that	he	will	not	veto	it	even	though	this	may	entail	congress	parting	with	some	
favored	provisions	or	adding	some	that	the	president	favors	that	are	less	popular	with	
congress.		Congress	can	be	forced	by	the	political	landscape	to	adapt	to	the	president’s	
position	if	the	president	has	committed	to	a	position	and	remains	inflexible	about	it.		There	
is	a	point	at	which	the	president	will	not	veto	the	bill	and	he	considers	the	policy	acceptable.		
The	president	may	know	that	point,	but	generally	congress	must	guess	and	take	that	
estimate	into	account	when	they	craft	the	bill	and	potentially	err	on	the	side	of	being	too	
generous	due	to	the	uncertainty	about	the	exact	location	of	this	pivot	point.	
Presidents	have	multiple	goals	including	reelection,	getting	their	desired	policy	
outcomes,	making	sure	they	maintain	a	good	relationship	with	congress,	raising	funds,	and	
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ensuring	their	legacy.		Members	of	congress	also	have	similar	goals	that	often	are	at	odds	
with	those	of	the	president.		The	president	has	a	utility	function	that	takes	all	these	goals	
into	account.		By	going	public	this	raises	the	importance	and	salience	of	an	issue	and	makes	
it	more	of	a	focus.		In	some	cases	this	is	what	the	president	would	prefer,	such	as	if	the	issue	
is	likely	to	be	popular	or	if	a	spotlight	is	needed	to	pass	a	bill.		However,	there	are	instances	
where	the	president’s	agenda	would	be	better	served	by	sweeping	things	under	the	rug	and	
negotiating	in	secret	without	the	scrutiny	of	public	opinion	and	the	media	spotlight.		The	
president	also	can	frame	an	issue	and	lead	the	option	of	the	public.		He	must	look	at	the	
likelihood	that	the	proposal	will	pass	without	his	going	public	and	without	his	cajoling.		
Going	public	can	be	done	a	number	of	ways.		There	are	steps	such	as	making	the	president’s	
weekly	address,	the	state	of	the	union,	and	the	regular	attention	they	command	as	they	try	
to	push	their	policies.		By	virtue	of	their	unitary	and	symbolic	nature	of	the	office,	the	
president	gets	attention	regarding	many	of	their	actions.		Going	public	is	the	case	when	the	
president	takes	extraordinary	actions	such	as	going	on	television	and	making	a	plea	for	his	
viewpoint.	
Divided	government	can	make	governance	more	challenging,	but	not	impossible.		It	
requires	more	inter-branch	and	interparty	bargaining.		The	tools	used	and	process	are	
different.		For	instance,	vetoes	are	unlikely	when	the	same	party	controls	both	the	
presidency	and	the	congress.		There	is	a	pivot	point	at	the	majority	and	the	veto	override	
points	at	which	a	certain	number	of	floor	voters	in	each	house	will	override	a	president’s	
veto.		Thus	there	is	not	often	just	a	take	it	or	leave	it	situation.		If	congress	can	pass	a	bill,	
but	cannot	override	the	veto,	then	a	presidential	veto	would	lead	to	an	inefficient	outcome	
and	lost	utility	for	them	and	so	they	can	trade	away	some	of	that	utility	to	the	president	to	
convince	him	not	to	veto	a	bill.		They	try	to	either	find	a	bill	that	the	president	does	not	
dislike	enough	to	veto	or	one	in	which	he	has	uncertainty	whether	his	veto	can	be	
overridden	and	he	wishes	to	limit	his	losses	by	compromising.		Vetoes	occur	more	
frequently	under	divided	government	and	during	election	years.	
The	congress	for	its	part	often	finds	it	beneficial	to	be	inclusive	and	get	the	president	
involved	in	the	decision	at	an	early	time	before	the	bill	was	crafted	or	else	it	might	harden	
positions	and	have	less	ability	to	negotiate	with	the	president.		If	the	president	would	veto	a	
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bill,	congress	has	the	option	of	passing	the	initial	bill	that	was	proposed	or	else	it	makes	
amendments	to	accommodate	the	president’s	preferences.		Compromise	is	not	always	
possible.		In	a	single-issue	decision	space,	an	issue	can	often	be	approximated	on	a	left-right	
political	spectrum	and	when	the	president’s	preference	for	change	in	policy	is	in	the	
opposite	direction	of	the	status	quo	point	than	congress’	then	there	is	not	much	ground	on	
which	to	compromise	other	than	agreeing	to	avoid	that	policy	dimension	and	keep	the	
status	quo.		If	a	proposal	is	put	forward	under	these	situations,	the	hope	of	this	proposal	is	
that	the	proposal	gets	enacted	by	dominance	rather	than	through	concurrence	or	
bargaining.		There	is	uncertainty	of	course	in	most	decisions	and	if	the	president	has	not	
publicized	his	views	then	they	might	not	be	known.		In	addition,	while	counts	in	congress	are	
taken	and	can	generally	be	assumed	to	be	correct,	the	veto	override	pivot	point	may	change	
over	time	as	opinions	and	political	calculations	shift.		Those	involved	must	manage	
assumptions	and	may	gain	by	hiding	or	misrepresenting	their	preferences.		The	president	
can	use	a	veto	to	encourage	congress	to	give	him	a	better	offer	that	better	meets	his	needs.		
He	can	hide	his	true	feelings	about	the	status	quo.		Over	time	the	president	can	create	a	
reputation	for	himself	for	how	he	approaches	these	situations.		He	can	appear	to	be	a	tough	
bargainer	that	will	not	compromise	much	and	thus	cause	congress	to	be	more	willing	to	
meet	him	more	than	halfway	since	they	do	not	think	they	will	be	able	to	get	a	better	deal	
from	him.		Cameron	claims	that	veto	bargaining	tends	to	lead	to	policy	that	is	more	in	the	
middle	of	the	political	spectrum	and	less	extreme.172		Due	to	the	election	process,	on	most	
issues	the	citizenry	are	in	the	middle	politically	compared	to	the	politicians	that	were	
elected.			
Members	of	congress	want	to	be	re-elected.		In	fact,	many	theorists	and	
practitioners	consider	this	to	be	one	of	their	main	goals.173		To	this	end	politicians	focus	on	
credit	claiming	and	position	taking	as	these	will	typically	help	get	them	elected.		They	also	
engage	in	other	actions	such	as	casework	and	advertising	with	the	goal	of	improving	their	
electoral	prospects.		Creating	public	policy	is	not	in	itself	necessarily	a	goal	of	the	politicians,	
but	rather	a	means	to	an	end.		Creating	public	policy	is	an	ancillary	goal	and	thus	policy	
makers	will	negotiate	on	the	substance	of	policy	in	order	to	secure	their	main	goals.	
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This	can	sometimes	lead	to	playacting	or	cheap	talk	in	which	political	actors	try	to	
send	signals	to	donors	or	the	electorate	by	their	political	actions.		An	example	of	this	is	that	
Congress	and	the	President	bargain	in	the	spotlight	and	want	to	be	seen	taking	certain	
actions	even	if	they	do	not	correspond	with	their	preferences	without	this	spotlight.		Several	
of	the	programs	set	up	to	deal	with	the	crisis	had	minimal	effect	but	seemed	designed	
instead	to	be	broadly	popular.		An	example	of	this	is	the	home	mortgage	restructuring	
provisions	that	were	enacted.		These	seem	to	be	designed	to	appear	that	government	was	
working	on	behalf	of	Main	Street	and	the	nation’s	troubled	borrowers,	though	the	design	of	
these	programs	was	such	that	the	number	of	people	that	were	able	to	benefit	from	them	
was	continually	far	smaller	than	politicians	state	and	certainly	far	smaller	than	the	potential	
need.		These	did	however	allow	for	political	cover	for	bailouts	and	other	programs	that	were	
unpopular	and	seemed	by	the	general	public	to	be	primarily	directed	towards	helping	Wall	
Street.	
Signaling	can	not	only	be	used	to	convey	messages	to	the	public,	but	can	also	be	
used	to	convey	information	to	other	political	actors.		The	parties	in	politics	negotiate	
without	full	knowledge	of	what	is	going	on.		This	leads	in	many	situations	to	a	conflict	in	
which	all	sides	will	tend	to	be	hard	bargainers.		Tougher	bargaining	is	more	likely	to	prevail	
in	negotiations	and	those	that	do	so	are	more	likely	to	get	their	way	or	to	a	point	closer	to	
their	ideal	point.		Neither	side	knows	how	hard	the	other	is	willing	to	negotiate.		The	
willingness	to	bargain	hard	and	the	power	this	conveys	ostensibly	comes	from	positioning	
and	from	their	having	less	to	lose.		The	amount	each	side	has	to	lose	is	tied	up	with	how	
willing	they	are	to	accept	the	default	or	status	quo	as	opposed	to	cooperating	on	a	deal.		If	
one	side	will	only	realize	a	small	improvement	by	compromising,	this	will	make	them	less	
interested	in	working	together	with	the	other	side	and	thus	better	able	to	extract	more	
from	them.		The	sides	will	thus	try	to	signal	that	they	are	comfortable	with	noncooperation	
and	that	the	other	side	will	need	to	give	more	ground.		While	this	is	done,	the	sides	perform	
acts	such	as	screening	to	determine	the	true	utility	functions	of	the	other	side,	as	well	as	
their	negotiating	strategies	and	what	they	are	willing	to	accept.		One	of	the	signs	that	a	side	
can	send	to	show	that	they	do	not	need	a	deal	is	to	hold	out	longer	and	not	bend	or	
compromise.		This	can	help	them	extract	more	in	negotiations,	but	it	can	also	lead	to	a	deal	
falling	through	even	if	both	sides	would	prefer	that	there	be	a	deal	and	would	be	better	off	
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if	there	was	one.		In	addition,	when	the	public	eye	is	on	them,	each	is	less	willing	to	give	in	
and	appear	weak.	
An	example	of	this	was	the	first	debt	limit	negotiation	in	which	the	Republicans	stuck	
to	their	preferred	policy	and	said	that	any	increase	in	the	debt	ceiling	needed	to	be	paired	
with	deep	cuts	in	spending.		They	signaled	their	intransigence	and	unwillingness	to	
compromise.		Several	went	so	far	as	to	state	that	they	did	not	think	raising	the	debt	ceiling	
was	important	or	should	be	done	at	all	though	this	would	have	meant	the	first	ever	U.S.	
default	on	sovereign	debt	and	potentially	vast	negative	repercussions.		By	taking	such	a	
hardline,	they	were	able	to	get	an	agreement	for	deeper	cuts	out	of	the	president	and	the	
Democrats	in	congress	than	they	would	have	otherwise.		However,	by	taking	such	a	hardline	
they	risked	not	coming	to	a	debt	ceiling	agreement	also	led	to	a	downgrading	of	the	U.S.	
credit	rating.	
In	negotiations	there	can	be	mutual	intransigence	if	both	sides	play	hardball	and	are	
unwilling	to	work	together.		This	can	occur	as	they	feel	that	they	are	benefitting	from	tough	
bargaining	and	public	posturing.		Their	constituents	often	judge	them	less	highly	if	the	give	
in	and	try	to	work	with	the	other	side	than	if	they	stick	to	their	position	and	don’t	
compromise.		By	not	compromising	a	politician	or	group	of	politicians	can	come	across	both	
as	not	having	principals	and	as	not	being	effective.		The	Republicans	have	stuck	to	a	key	
platform	of	not	raising	taxes	while	Democrats	strongly	resist	cuts	in	entitlements.		This	leads	
to	conflicts	in	which	little	gets	done	to	solve	long	term	problems,	but	each	side	appears	to	
be	doing	what	is	right	to	their	political	base.	
The	interpretation	of	political	actions	and	consequently	the	actions	that	a	politician	
chooses	to	take	can	vary	based	on	the	party	make	up	of	their	districts.		The	politicians	view	
of	the	policy	can	change	based	on	the	fundamental	parameters	in	the	policy	such	as	the	
timing	of	changes,	the	concentration	of	costs	or	benefits,	and	whether	there	is	someone	
coalescing	public	opinion	about	that	policy.	
Trust	is	also	an	important	variable	and	can	affect	outcomes	of	a	political	situation.		
The	two	sides	in	a	negotiation	need	trust	to	be	able	to	come	to	an	agreement	or	even	to	
negotiate	in	good	faith.		The	U.S.	political	process	has	become	more	partisan,	clannish,	and	
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ideologue-based	in	recent	years	and	this	led	to	less	ability	to	address	crises	or	agree	on	
policy.		Presidents	Obama	and	George	W.	Bush	are	the	most	divisive	presidents	in	the	
history	of	America	when	determined	by	looking	at	the	percent	of	their	party	that	approves	
of	them	and	the	percentage	of	the	other	party	that	disapproves	of	them.174		With	little	trust	
between	the	two	parties	and	increased	polarization	of	the	political	system,	the	risk	of	
political	positioning	as	being	an	attempt	score	political	points	by	one	side,	makes	it	tough	
for	the	other	side	to	take	a	politically	unpopular	position	in	case	the	negotiation	was	
conducted	for	primarily	political	reasons.		It	is	often	the	case	that	unpopular	political	actions	
need	to	be	taken	for	the	greater	good	or	short	term	costs	must	be	imposed	for	long-term	
benefits	that	will	be	discounted	politically	in	the	minds	of	the	voters	compared	to	the	
immediacy	of	the	costs.		A	potential	example	of	this	from	the	financial	crisis	is	the	so-called	
bank	bailout	in	which	an	unpopular	vote	was	viewed	as	necessary	to	avoid	massive	
economic	hardship.		However,	despite	the	great	need,	the	vote	was	not	passed	initially	due	
to	the	tough	political	stand	it	would	require.		It	was	not	until	significant	pork	was	included	
and	key	special	deals	were	cut	that	enough	votes	could	be	collected	for	the	bill	to	pass.		In	
cases	such	as	these	where	the	nature	of	a	policy	response	makes	it	tough	for	lawmakers	to	
enact,	delegation	becomes	a	more	compelling	option	because	it	allows	tough	decisions	to	
be	made	without	the	unpopular	policy	being	traced	back	to	individual	elected	officials	and	
because	it	can	help	minimize	the	effect	that	short-term	politics	has	on	shaping	public	policy.		
This	was	the	idea	behind	the	legislation	introduced	in	2009	to	create	a	bi-partisan	fiscal	
commission	as	well	as	the	Simpson-Bowles	commission	that	followed	and	which	was	
charged	with	coming	up	with	a	credible,	bipartisan	plan	to	cut	the	budget.	
	 In	addition	to	the	votes	themselves,	the	parties	compete	in	areas	such	as	agenda	
setting	and	stirring	public	opinion	in	an	attempt	to	shape	the	political	landscape.		The	
agenda	can	be	used	to	avoid	unwanted	and	unpopular	votes.		It	also	can	be	used	to	approve	
solutions	in	a	de	facto	manner	that	otherwise	would	need	to	be	voted	for.		Politicians	use	
tools	such	as	priming	and	narrative	building	for	much	the	same	purpose	and	these	as	well	
will	be	a	space	in	which	multiple	sides	and	individuals	compete.		The	conflict	over	these	
areas	comes	from	logical	self-interest	as	politicians	can	effectively	get	cherished	policy	as	
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part	of	appropriations	bill	it	can	be	very	beneficial	to	a	political	party	which	can	win	a	
political	battle	without	even	fighting	and	risking	looking	partisan	in	the	midst	of	a	crisis.		In	
also	can	be	a	useful	end	run	around	unwanted	political	fights	and	can	avoid	unwanted	
notice	and	attention	on	the	actions	that	are	taken.		In	the	U.S.,	much	of	the	media	coverage	
of	politics	focuses	on	the	battle	between	the	parties	rather	the	details	of	public	policy	being	
created.		This	has	more	drama	and	is	often	easier	to	understand.		Because	of	this	media	
focus,	politicians	can	often	gain	by	doing	an	end	run	around	the	open	political	process	by	
achieving	their	ends	more	discretely.	
The	majority	party	who	has	an	institutional	advantage	due	to	having	the	majority	of	
voters	in	that	house	and	the	chairmanships	of	the	committees	can	generally	control	the	
agenda	in	a	house	of	congress.		In	addition,	in	the	House	of	Representatives	the	Speaker	of	
the	House	and	the	rules	committee	have	powerful	agenda	setting	powers	and	are	controlled	
by	the	party	in	the	majority	in	the	house.		They	will	also	have	additional	resources	such	as	
additional	staff	above	that	of	the	opposition	party	and	this	also	helps	the	party	in	power	set	
the	agenda.		The	president	however,	even	as	an	outsider,	has	at	least	as	much	power	to	set	
the	agenda	as	the	leaders	in	congress	due	to	his	visibility.	
Bicameral	legislatures,	when	compared	with	unicameral	ones,	increase	stability	and	
the	so-called	stickiness	of	the	status	quo.		The	ability	to	shape	policy	in	congress	depends	on	
the	relative	power	of	the	parties	and	houses	as	well	as	institutional	constraints,	political	
views,	and	cohesiveness	that	they	can	use	this	to	affect	the	other	house.		This	power	can	be	
modeled	with	a	divide	the	dollar	game	since	agreement	or	conflict	is	often	along	one	
dimension.		The	interaction	between	the	two	houses	has	an	effect	on	the	cumulative	actions	
of	the	two	houses,	as	does	the	structure	of	the	two	institutions.		If	there	is	potential	for	
gridlock	in	one	or	both	of	the	houses	it	can	make	delegation	or	executive	action	more	
attractive	options	for	enacting	policy.	
The	president	never	has	complete	control	over	policy	though.		Other	individuals	are	
also	able	to	help	shape	the	government’s	creation	of	public	policy	as	well	as	its	response	to	
a	crisis.		Even	individuals	such	as	the	two	2008	presidential	nominees	were	able	to	help	
shape	the	policy	used	to	deal	with	the	crisis	though	they	had	relatively	little	formal	power	as	
individual	senators.		Yet	when	John	McCain	suspended	his	campaign	to	go	back	to	
Washington	to	help	resolve	the	issue	and	Barack	Obama	followed	suit,	they	became	major	
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shapers	of	public	opinion.175		They	acted	as	leaders	of	their	party	and	thus	their	public	
stances	caused	shifts	in	public	sentiment	and	in	the	actions	of	members	of	congress	that	
supported	them.		
In	addition,	the	president	will	often	rely	upon	trusted	advisors	or	those	in	key	
positions	and	allow	them	to	shape	much	of	the	policy	that	gets	enacted	during	their	
presidency.		The	president’s	support	for	and	from	his/his	executive	staff,	agency	heads,	and	
other	key	member	of	the	bureaucracy	changes	the	dynamic	between	the	executive	branch	
and	the	congress	and	shifts	how	crises	are	responded	to.		In	the	case	of	the	financial	crisis	
the	president	said,	“If	Hank	Paulson	and	Ben	Bernanke	say	it’s	going	to	work	and	help	
stabilize	the	financial	system,	we	are	for	it.”176		He	backed	up	his	verbal	commitment	by	
spending	political	capital	supporting	the	policies	drafted	by	the	Federal	Reserve	and	
Treasury	Department.	
Policy	comes	about	as	an	interplay	between	all	these	political	actors.		Policy	is	not	an	
indivisible	whole	bursting	forth	fully	formed,	but	rather	a	collection	or	ideas	and	opinions	
stitched	together	and	the	specifics	of	what	is	contains	is	a	battlefield	fought	over	by	many	
forces.		Inter-branch	bargaining	is	one	of	the	means	used	to	shape	policy,	but	there	are	a	
great	many	more	that	contribute	as	well.	
	 There	are	benefits	and	drawbacks	to	having	different	factions	controlling	policy	
creation.		Among	the	drawbacks	is	that	this	may	lead	to	less	beneficial	policy	or	even	to	
questions	of	government	legitimacy	and	effectiveness.		For	instance,	Members	of	Congress	
are	limited	in	their	potential	to	craft	ideal	policy	by	their	provincial	interests.		In	particular,	
they	represent	only	a	small	subset	of	the	nation.		This	is	true	of	senators,	who	on	average	
only	represent	1/50th	of	the	nation’s	population,	but	this	is	even	truer	of	members	of	the	
House	of	Representatives,	who	represent	one	of	435	congressional	districts.		Thus	they	will	
be	tied	to	their	own	narrow	viewpoints	though	they	will	help	shape	the	policy	of	the	nation	
as	a	whole.	
Presidential	influence	over	congress	has	been	greatest	when	the	president	has	
higher	approval	ratings.		As	stated	by	Richard	Neustadt,	“public	standing	is	a	source	of	
																																																						
175	Paulson,	Jr.,	Henry	M.		On	the	Brink:	Inside	the	Race	to	Stop	the	Collapse	of	the	Global	Financial	System.		
New	York:	Business	Plus.		2010	
176	Paulson.		2010.		296.	
111	
influence	for	him,	another	factor	bearing	on	their	willingness	to	give	him	what	he	wants.”177		
This	however	does	not	always	guarantee	success	or	an	easy	path	to	enact	changes.		Obama	
came	to	power	with	a	large	mandate	after	winning	365	of	the	538	electoral	votes	and	the	
majority	of	the	actual	votes	so	it	appeared	that	he	would	have	some	room	for	maneuvering.		
Obama’s	ability	to	sway	congress	was	also	expected	to	be	at	its	highest	as	this	is	during	the	
early	part	of	the	president’s	term,	the	so-called	honeymoon	period	and	this	honeymoon	
period’s	effect	may	well	have	been	larger	due	to	the	historic	nature	of	the	presidency	so	
one	may	have	surmised	that	he	would	be	able	to	push	through	a	number	of	policy	
proposals.		In	actuality	though,	President	Obama	struggled	to	enact	many	of	his	proposals	at	
first.	
The	dynamics	of	policy	creation	during	a	crisis	differs	from	a	non-crisis	situation	due	
to	a	number	of	distinct	reasons.		In	a	non-crisis	situation	a	public	defeat	of	a	policy	that	is	
put	forward	can	often	have	a	severe	negative	political	effect	for	the	proposer	of	the	bill	and	
thus	they	will	try	to	avoid	a	public	defeat	of	a	bill	that	they	associated	themselves	with	or	
which	is	viewed	as	being	part	of	their	agenda.		This	leads	to	hesitancy	putting	forward	a	bill	
that	is	liable	to	end	in	failure.		During	a	crisis	however,	there	is	more	political	reward	for	
taking	action	and	often	a	severe	political	downside	to	holding	up	action.		This	makes	the	
president	and	other	political	leaders	more	likely	to	put	forward	proposals	to	change	policy.		
This	can	lead	to	competing	proposals	that	often	try	to	outdo	each	other	in	audaciousness	in	
order	to	have	the	backers	of	these	proposals	be	seen	as	a	brave	leader.	
After	proposing	a	policy,	the	author	or	chief	proponent	of	the	policy,	often	the	
president,	will	try	to	shepherd	the	policy	through	the	process	of	adoption.		The	president	
does	not	only	try	to	convince	individual	members	of	congress,	but	essentially	becomes	the	
head	of	a	coalition	supporting	the	bill.		The	coalition	will	also	do	what	they	can	to	shape	the	
political	space	to	help	the	bill	end	in	a	better	solution.		The	administration	has	limited	supply	
of	resources	including	such	key	resources	as	the	president’s	time	and	legislative	support	and	
so	like	all	rational	actors	they	use	their	resources	in	a	manner	that	is	most	effective	for	
them.		In	cases	in	which	the	vote	will	already	pass	by	a	wide	margin,	there	is	little	reason	for	
the	president	or	his	staff	to	work	hard	to	push	the	bill	except	for	credit	claiming.		In	part	he	
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is	able	to	enact	changes	by	getting	party	leadership	in	congress	to	agree	to	his	proposals.		
He	can	then	count	on	congressional	leadership	to	ensure	that	they	have	the	necessary	votes	
and	to	convince	those	that	are	unsure.		Not	all	members	are	persuadable	about	an	issue	so	
the	administration	and	congressional	leadership	focuses	its	efforts	on	those	that	are.	
There	are	still	many	centers	of	power	in	the	congress.		While	Committee	Chairmen	
may	not	be	as	powerful	as	they	were	before	the	reforms	of	the	1970s,	they	can	exert	
significant	control	over	legislation.		This	is	particularly	true	for	legislation	that	falls	in	the	
province	of	the	committee	and	these	days	with	the	Speaker	of	the	House	often	sending	a	
bill	to	multiple	committees,	the	committee	often	has	some	control	and	influence	over	a	
large	number	of	pieces	of	legislation.		Bills	can	be	killed	or	be	amended	in	committee	and	a	
committee’s	recommendations	can	often	have	significant	effect	on	shaping	the	final	bill.		
During	a	crisis	however,	congress	becomes	more	monolithic	as	bills	are	expedited	through	
congress	giving	members	of	congress	less	time	to	even	determine	what	is	in	the	bill.		The	
roles	of	committees	changes	during	a	crisis	and	in	general	become	less	powerful	as	time	
becomes	scarcer	and	as	salience	increases.		
	 There	is	also	recourse	for	the	president	in	that	if	he	cannot	push	through	legislation,	
he	can	often	achieve	many	of	the	same	ends	other	ways	such	as	by	using	executive	orders	in	
which	the	president	can	change	policy	and	the	actions	of	government	without	a	law	being	
passed.		This	gives	him	some	bargaining	power	with	congress	as	he	is	not	fully	reliant	on	
congress	and	can	thus	bargain	and	give	away	a	small	part	of	his	agenda	in	return	for	
congress	being	willing	to	work	with	him.		This	can	increase	the	public’s	perception	of	the	job	
that	the	president	is	doing.		Legislation	also	can	be	used	to	allow	for	future	executive	orders	
and	can	give	the	president	ability	to	pursue	action.	
Political	actors	have	different	views	as	to	whether	bureaucracy	should	function	as	a	
coherent	whole.		The	president	typically	thinks	so	and	has	at	least	nominal	control	over	the	
whole	bureaucracy	and	endeavors	to	bring	much	of	the	power	of	the	bureaucracy	to	bear	
on	some	large	or	intractable	issues.		Whereas	members	of	congress	typically	can	exert	some	
control	over	parts	of	the	bureaucracy	and	agency	and	department	heads	are	likewise	limited	
in	their	formal	power	to	their	own	fiefdom	and	at	best	can	work	with	others.		Committee	
chairs	and	many	other	congressional	leaders	benefit	by	the	fragmented	nature	of	the	
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bureaucracy	because	it	gives	them	control	over	their	sphere	without	interference	from	the	
party	leadership.		During	a	crisis	the	president	will	make	an	increased	appeal	to	control	the	
bureaucracy.		This	attempt	to	centralize	power	can	help	it	become	more	responsive	and	
thus	better	capable	of	dealing	with	crises.	
	 Even	when	congress	attempts	to	curtail	executive	authorities,	the	president	can	
often	find	ways	around	the	restrictions.		Furthermore	the	mere	act	of	trying	to	impose	limits	
on	executive	prerogative	can	inadvertently	cause	these	powers	to	become	strengthened	as	
congress	implicitly	approved	of	powers.		Mayer	describes	the	reporting	requirements	
imposed	by	the	Hughes-Ryan	amendments	to	the	Foreign	Assistance	Act	and	the	
Intelligence	Oversight	Act	in	1980	saying,	“The	mere	fact	that	congress	required	the	
president	to	report	on	such	activities	was	read	by	the	courts	as	a	congressional	recognition	
of	the	president’s	right	to	conduct	them.”178	
One	method	the	president	has	of	increasing	his	ability	to	get	his	way	is	to	go	public	
and	put	pressure	on	congress	to	go	along	with	his	proposal.		It	can	help	the	president	get	his	
agenda	passed	or	to	gain	acceptance	from	congress	particularly	if	their	agenda	is	popular	
with	the	public.		However,	going	public	has	a	tendency	to	alienate	congress	and	thus	is	
relatively	incompatible	with	bargaining.		Therefore	to	be	affective	the	president	must	decide	
whether	to	rely	on	going	public	and	a	more	coercive	approach	to	handling	congress	or	
whether	to	rely	on	bargaining	and	working	together	with	congress.		As	it	requires	less	
compromise	and	working	with	congress,	going	public	seems	particularly	enticing	to	
presidents	that	do	not	have	a	long	background	in	or	ties	to	congress.		For	instance	those	
that	came	to	office	as	an	outsider	such	as	a	governor	would	be	less	prepared	and	inclined	to	
bargain.179		They	are	thus	more	likely	to	go	public	and	try	to	exert	pressure	on	congress.		In	a	
crisis	the	temptation	to	go	public	is	even	higher	since	the	issue	often	already	has	a	high	level	
of	salience	and	often	the	public	is	looking	to	the	president	to	lead	during	a	crisis.		This	is	
especially	true	in	areas	such	as	foreign	and	defense	policy	in	which	the	president	can	serve	
as	a	surrogate	representing	the	country.		In	addition,	lobbying	congress	and	using	
negotiation	can	be	slow	especially	with	the	historic	devolution	of	power	from	a	few	
powerful	individuals	to	the	current	system	in	which	most	members	of	congress	to	chair	
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either	a	committee	or	a	subcommittee	and	thus	is	not	always	well	suited	to	dealing	with	
crises,	which	often	evolve	rapidly.180	
If	the	opposition	party	holds	congress,	it	has	little	incentive	to	help	the	president	
achieve	his	agenda,	but	rather	it	will	work	diligently	to	thwart	the	president	so	that	the	
president’s	policy	does	not	get	implemented.		This	both	stops	policies	that	congress	does	
not	approve	of	from	being	implemented	and	also	can	cause	the	president	to	look	
ineffectual.		In	1985,	House	Republican	Whip,	Richard	Cheney,	said,	"Polarization	often	has	
very	beneficial	results.		If	everything	is	handled	through	compromise	and	conciliation,	if	
there	are	no	real	issues	dividing	us	from	the	Democrats,	why	should	the	country	change	and	
make	us	the	majority?"181		During	the	time	period	examined	in	this	paper	there	are	
numerous	instances	of	congress	trying	to	sabotage	or	sideline	presidential	proposals.		Crises	
can	both	be	used	by	the	president	to	regain	the	initiative	as	well	as	a	pretext	for	congress	to	
ignore	the	president’s	proposals.	
The	president	derives	considerable	power	advantage	due	to	his	informational	
advantages	and	the	fact	that	he	can	keep	information	secret	in	a	number	of	ways	such	as	
classifying	it	using	the	nation’s	classification	system	which	was	itself	almost	completely	set	
up	through	presidential	executive	orders.		The	president	also	limits	the	dissemination	of	key	
information	through	using	executive	privilege.		In	addition	to	his	ability	to	protect	data,	he	
has	additional	informal	advantages	due	to	his	links	and	contacts	and	his	unique	position	in	
the	political	hierarchy	as	well	as	having	the	advantages	due	to	the	vast	resources	he	can	
bring	to	bear	to	find	out	relevant	information.		The	president	gains	by	having	these	
informational	advantages	and	takes	steps	to	ensure	that	he	maintains	this	advantage	over	
congress	and	others.		An	example	of	this	was	President	Bush	ordering	the	Secretary	of	
Health	and	Human	Services	not	to	make	the	costs	of	the	president’s	proposal	for	a	Medicare	
prescription	drug	plan	public	as	the	cost	would	lead	to	a	weakening	of	support	for	the	bill.182		
In	a	crisis	this	advantage	is	maximized	as	the	president	and	his	staff	is	the	natural	
coordination	point	and	because	the	president	has	more	opportunity	to	shield	data	from	
congress	and	other	parties	under	the	reasoning	that	this	secrecy	is	required	by	the	crisis.	
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There	is	a	trend	in	politics	to	look	more	at	short	term	politics	than	the	long	term	
needs	of	the	nation	and	this	can	lead	to	the	crafting	less	desirable	policy.		This	is	particularly	
true	in	crises	when	there	is	more	public	attention	and	thus	public	pressure	on	the	president	
to	deal	with	the	imminent	threat.		Henry	Kissinger	said,	"There	is	a	problem	that	as	the	
pressures	of	their	electoral	process	have	increased,	governments	have	become	more	and	
more	tactically	oriented.		The	more	tactically	oriented	they	are,	the	more	short-term	their	
policies.		The	more	short-term	their	policies,	the	less	successful	they	are."183		More	complex	
problems	or	those	that	are	less	visible	and	comprehensible	to	the	public	often	will	get	less	
emphasis	than	simple,	symbolic	actions	that	can	be	performed	quickly.	
Beryl	Sprinkel,	chair	of	Council	of	Economic	Advisors	under	Reagan	said,	"It	turns	out	
that	good	economic	policies	that	bring	you	better	growth,	better	employment,	lower	
inflation	and	higher	levels	of	prosperity	usually	have	short-run	cost."		Further	saying,	"You	
go	through	the	pain	first,	and	then	you	get	the	goodies	later.		If	I	could	change	something,	I	
would	certainly	get	the	goodies	up	front	because	it	would	solve	a	lot	of	political	problems."		
This	leads	to	less	desirable	policy	since	it	is	unpopular	in	the	short	term.184		Crises	lead	to	an	
even	shorter	time	horizon	and	thus	the	risk	of	poor	policy	meant	to	address	the	needs	of	a	
temporary	situation	is	even	more	pronounced.		It	has	been	argued	about	many	financial	
crises	that	the	spark	of	their	creation	was	legislation	designed	to	deal	with	previous	crises.		
For	instance,	mark	to	market	accounting	that	seemed	like	a	good	idea	during	the	Savings	
and	Loan	crisis	deepened	the	2007	financial	crisis.	
	
3. Hypotheses	
	
	 Following	the	review	of	some	of	the	theoretical	framework,	this	paper	looks	to	see	
form	hypotheses	based	off	of	the	framework	this	paper	is	working	from	and	the	previous	
research	that	has	been	done	on	delegation.		While	there	are	several	potential	questions	that	
can	be	investigated,	this	paper	will	focus	on	five	questions	in	particular	with	regard	to	crises	
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and	the	use	of	delegation:	whether	the	abdication	hypothesis	is	correct,	what	determines	
the	agents	that	are	delegated	to,	what	determines	the	constraints	that	congresses	uses,	the	
extent	of	unilateral	executive	action	during	the	crisis,	and	the	extent	that	implicit	delegation	
was	used	during	the	crisis.	
The	existence	of	a	crisis	can	be	viewed	as	an	environmental	variable	and	it	is	one	
with	significant	effects	both	on	policy	taken	and	also	on	the	manner	in	which	the	policy	is	
decided	on	and	implemented.		Delegation	is	often	a	needed	tool	to	deal	with	crises.		Often	
the	slow,	deliberate	method	of	shaping	policy	that	congress	typically	uses	is	not	able	to	
handle	fast	changing,	complex	situations	that	require	immediate	response.		The	president	as	
a	single	decision	maker	is	able	to	steer	the	ship	of	state	far	more	nimbly	than	the	often	over	
politicized	body	of	congress	where	parties	battle	for	political	position.		Agencies	also	have	
advantages	over	congress	in	that	they	have	and	can	gain	specialized	knowledge	in	key	area,	
they	have	the	size	and	scope	to	handle	detailed	issues,	and	they	often	have	a	structure	in	
place	to	deal	with	these	crises.	
One	would	expect	that	the	president	will	make	a	case	for	strengthening	the	
authority	of	the	executive	branch	and	state	that	additional	powers	are	warranted	to	deal	
with	the	crisis.		Congress	would	also	be	expected	for	electoral	reasons	to	take	steps	to	
address	the	crisis.		As	the	crisis	begins	to	subside	the	expectation	would	be	that	the	
government	will	begin	to	shift	from	simply	being	reactive	to	being	more	proactive	the	
executive	agencies	and	congress	will	work	both	alone	and	in	conjunction	to	change	the	
system	so	that	the	likelihood	of	a	similar	crisis	occurring	again	in	the	future	is	decreased.		
With	time,	one	would	expect	executive	and	legislative	branches	to	rolls	back	some	of	the	
responses	the	government	made	to	the	crisis	that	are	judged	as	too	extreme	or	no	longer	
needed	after	the	crisis.	
	
	
3.1	Abdication	Hypothesis	
	
	 There	have	been	many	attempts	to	determine	whether	congress	delegates	its	
authority	to	further	its	own	political	interests	by	avoiding	difficult	decisions	or	whether	it	
uses	delegation	for	more	positive	reasons.		In	all	likelihood,	congress’s	actions	are	likely	far	
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more	nuanced	and	do	not	lead	to	generalities.		Congress	is	made	up	of	hundreds	of	
individuals	making	decisions	for	differing	reasons.		While	the	collective	action	of	congress	
can	be	analyzed	for	general	trends,	a	reasonable	expectation	based	on	the	varying	
preferences	of	its	members	is	that	members	of	congress	delegate	both	to	avoid	making	the	
tough	decisions	as	well	as	for	more	positive	reasons	such	as	a	desire	to	create	better	policy.		
Members	of	congress	typically	have	multiple	goals	such	as	to	get	elected	and	to	help	the	
public	interest	as	they	see	it.		While	these	may	vary	in	importance	to	members	of	congress	
and	the	relative	pull	of	these	influences	vary	based	on	the	political	situation	and	the	
question	being	examined,	they	will	all	continue	to	affect	the	actions	of	individual	members	
of	congress	and	the	body	as	a	whole.		It	may	be	expected	that	in	a	crisis	when	their	nation	
and	its	citizens	are	most	at	risk	that	members	of	congress	would	be	more	inclined	to	focus	
more	on	ensuring	that	the	best	policy	is	put	in	place	and	in	the	correct	manner	as	opposed	
to	being	more	focused	on	political	issues.		This	belief	in	altruistic	intensions	in	the	face	of	a	
severe	crisis	is	consistent	with	the	belief	in	the	rationality	of	members	of	congress.		The	
assumption	of	bounded	rationality	implies	that	members	of	congress	will	chose	the	best	
options	to	meet	their	goal	given	the	knowledge	that	they	have,	but	it	does	not	specify	what	
their	goals	are	or	imply	that	they	need	be	only	their	individual	self-interest.	
	 Likewise	when	faced	with	a	crisis,	the	theory	would	predict	that	the	president	would	
likely	be	more	inclined	to	delegate	for	altruistic	reasons	and	the	desire	to	have	better	policy	
created	rather	than	political	calculations.		In	addition,	the	president	would	be	expected	to	
take	executive	action	even	if	it	is	unpopular.		This	is	particularly	true	for	those	that	do	not	
need	to	be	reelected	since	they	have	nothing	to	lose	electorally.		Even	without	election	
concerns,	presidents’	may	focus	on	their	legacy,	however	this	tends	to	be	less	immediate	
and	focused	on	short-term	political	scorekeeping	and	therefore	more	likely	to	delegate	to	
produce	good	policy	rather	than	to	avoid	blame.	
	 Because	of	the	severity	of	the	crisis	there	was	far	more	scrutiny	of	the	actions	of	
congress	and	the	president.		According	to	abdication	theory	this	would	give	lawmakers	a	big	
reason	to	make	sure	not	to	take	unpopular	actions	as	these	would	be	high	profile	and	would	
carry	a	bigger	cost	than	would	be	the	case	in	usual	situations.	
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3.2	Agents	
	
The	structure	of	delegation	is	important	in	that	it	can	determine	the	actions	
government	will	take	and	this	will	affect	the	laws	and	regulations	that	result.		One	of	the	key	
determinants	of	the	effects	of	delegation	is	who	the	agent	will	be	that	is	delegated	to.		
Agents	have	a	host	of	factors	that	determine	how	they	will	act	and	in	what	situation	it	
makes	sense	to	delegate	to	them.		Among	these	factors	are	the	size	of	the	agency,	what	
issues	they	are	focused	on,	how	independent	they	are	from	the	president,	how	immune	
they	are	to	the	threat	of	regulatory	capture,	their	ideology,	and	their	specialization.		By	
assuming	that	congress	and	the	agents	will	act	rationally	in	their	own	best	interests	to	the	
extent	to	which	they	are	able	to	determine	these,	the	choice	of	agents	that	congress	
delegates	powers	to	will	be	strategically	chosen	to	accomplish	goals	and	to	pursue	a	specific	
agenda.		Congress	thus	looks	at	the	specifics	of	various	potential	agents	to	make	a	
determinate	of	which	agency	to	delegate	to	or	whether	to	create	a	new	entity	to	be	the	
receptacle	of	delegated	power.	
Congress	will	ideally	choose	an	agent	with	some	expertise	in	a	field	as	expertise	will	
generally	lead	to	better	policy	since	those	with	knowledge	of	a	field	are	better	situated	to	
know	what	the	proper	actions	to	take	are.		Congress	will	thus	tend	to	aim	to	delegate	to	an	
agent	with	expertise	in	a	field	so	long	as	it	wishes	for	an	effective	organization.		There	are	
however,	often	multiple	potential	offices,	departments,	and	agencies	that	would	serve	well	
as	a	potential	target	for	delegation.		Congress	can	determine	whom	amongst	these	to	
delegate	to	based	on	congress’	view	of	the	competence	of	these	entities.		One	can	reason	
that	congress	will	choose	an	agent	that	will	best	meet	their	needs	and	often	this	will	be	to	
effectively	deal	with	a	problem	and	create	sensible	rules.		They	would	want	an	agent	that	
had	similar	views	on	the	issues	on	the	table	as	congress	did.		While	congress	is	a	collection	
of	different	individuals,	one	can	suppose	a	median	floor	voter	or	a	median	voter	of	the	
dominant	coalition	and	it	is	this	person	that	the	agency	would	be	expected	to	have	similar	
views	to.		The	agent	will	also	be	more	likely	to	be	selected	as	an	agent	if	they	hold	similar	
political	views	to	those	held	by	congress	and	if	they	are	of	the	same	party	that	controls	
congress.		Some	agencies	have	political	leanings	in	large	part	due	to	their	employees	self-
selecting	what	agency	to	work	for	and	choosing	issues	that	interests	them.		For	instance	the	
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Environmental	Protection	Agency	tends	to	be	more	left-leaning	while	those	in	the	military	
tend	to	be	more	right-leaning.		We	hypothesize	that	a	rational	Congress	also	factors	in	the	
leanings	of	the	agencies	themselves	as	well	as	just	their	leaders.	
	 Laws	can	be	written	in	various	ways	and	this	too	can	affect	the	choices	relating	to	
delegation.		An	act	that	is	vague	can	give	more	wiggle	room	for	the	agent	whereas	one	that	
is	more	concrete	limits	freedom	of	action.		Vague	laws	that	delegate	power	can	also	lead	to	
questions	by	the	judiciary	as	to	the	acceptability	of	the	law.		This	can	cause	legal	
complications	and	it	can	take	a	while	for	these	to	become	accepted	and	this	can	slow	down	
the	adoption	process	for	these	new	policies.		This	can	be	seen	in	the	Credit	Repair	
Organizations	Act,	which	was	Title	IV	of	The	Consumer	Credit	Protection	Act,	which	was	
designed	to	protect	buyers	of	credit	repair	services.		However,	the	act	was	not	clearly	laid	
out	so	that	key	questions,	such	as	whether	consumers	can	sue	credit	card	companies	even	if	
there	is	a	clause	in	their	contracts	saying	that	all	disputes,	must	be	settled	by	arbitration.		
After	the	U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	for	the	9th	Circuit	ruled	in	the	CompuCredit	Corp.	v.	
Greenwood,	that	consumers	did	have	this	right,	the	Supreme	Court	took	up	the	issue.185		
The	Supreme	Court	in	an	8-1	decision	overturned	the	ruling	of	the	lower	court.		Discussing	
the	confusion	the	wording	of	the	law	create,	Justice	Scalia	wrote	a	majority	position	that	
stated,	“Had	Congress	meant	to	prohibit	these	very	common	provisions	in	the	CROA,	it	
would	have	done	so	in	a	manner	less	obtuse.”			
Agencies	are	not	all	created	equal.		Their	structure,	history,	personnel,	and	
numerous	other	factors	can	greatly	affect	their	tendencies.		For	instance	the	Department	of	
Defense	and	the	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	will	have	differing	views	
of	their	mandate,	their	mission,	and	their	place	in	the	political	system.		Often	the	decisions	
made	when	setting	up	the	industry	linger	for	many	years	after	the	agency	was	designed	and	
created.		Thus	agencies	can	reflect	the	era	and	political	climate	in	which	they	are	first	
created.		This	can	affect	policy	creation.	
Among	the	ways	to	categorize	agencies,	they	have	been	placed	by	some	in	
categories	such	as	regulatory	agencies,	redistributive	agencies,	constituency	agencies,	policy	
agencies.		Individuals	that	choose	to	work	in	or	lead	one	type	of	organization	differ	from	
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those	at	another.		Likewise	members	of	congress	overseeing	one	of	these	types	of	agencies	
often	differ	from	those	on	other	types.		As	an	example,	members	of	Congress	overseeing	
the	United	States	Department	of	Agriculture,	a	constituency	agency,	are	more	likely	to	be	in	
an	advocacy	role	for	programs	and	typically	come	from	districts	with	a	large	number	of	
farmers	and	farm	interests.	
This	leads	to	competition	between	principals	to	influence	the	agent.		Occasionally	
they	work	in	tandem	to	have	an	outsized	influence	on	agency	actions	and	to	work	to	resolve	
intractable	issues.		Often	however	the	interests	of	the	president	and	various	members	of	
congress	do	not	align.	
	 In	instances	where	congress	writes	legislation	delegating	power,	it	is	able	to	choose	
to	whom	to	delegate	these	powers	and	it	has	numerous	options.		The	choice	of	agent	is	a	
key	factor	in	the	act	of	delegating.		As	this	paper	assumes	that	congress	is	made	up	of	
rational	political	actors	one	would	expect	congress	will	select	agents	that	best	match	their	
political	goals,	whether	they	be	avoiding	blame	or	creating	optimal	policy.		The	selection	of	
an	agent	matters	because	different	agents	have	different	goals,	capabilities,	and	freedom	of	
action.		
	
3.3	Constraints	
	
The	structure	of	the	delegation	combines	with	the	target	of	the	delegation	to	truly	
determine	the	nature	of	the	delegation	and	the	effects	of	it	being	the	method	used.		
Constraints	greatly	shape	the	dynamics	of	the	delegation	and	the	actions	of	those	involved	
in	the	delegation.		Constraints	can	be	used	by	the	principal	doing	the	delegating	to	constrain	
the	actions	of	the	agent	delegated	the	power.		However,	they	can	also	be	used	to	focus	
actions	or	ensure	efficient	action.		By	requiring	the	agent	to	work	in	conjunction	with	
another	agent,	constraints	can	ensure	proper	coordination	of	all	the	individuals	in	the	
government	with	expertise	in	an	area	or	a	stake	in	the	results.		They	can	also	ensure	that	the	
agent	does	not	go	too	far	from	the	typical	policy	responses	that	have	been	used	in	the	past.		
There	is	a	sizable	contingent	among	governmental	agencies	that	have	a	stake	in	the	status	
quo	and	wish	to	preserve	past	decisions	and	will	push	back	against	excessive	changes.		
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Constraints	can	make	sure	that	a	new	agency	or	an	agency	entrusted	with	a	new	power	
does	not	deviate	too	far	from	congress’	desired	policy	changes.	
We	would	expect	that	because	of	the	importance	and	scope	of	the	legislation	that	
was	enacted	in	response	to	the	economic	crisis,	that	numerous	constraints	would	be	
employed	to	keep	agency	actions	aligned	with	the	preferences	of	congress.			In	addition,	this	
paper	would	expect	that	the	types	of	constraints	employed	would	be	consistent	with	and	
dictated	by	the	goals	that	congress	is	trying	to	achieve.		
Constraints	on	time	can	also	be	used	to	ensure	that	a	solution	does	not	become	
open-ended,	but	rather	the	policy	response	to	the	crisis	is	designed	to	meet	the	current	
crisis.		This	is	the	case	if	power	is	given	for	a	certain	amount	of	time	or	an	agency	is	designed	
to	dissolve	after	a	certain	amount	of	time.		Constrains	can	also	slow	down	action	if	congress	
requires	a	certain	amount	of	study	or	certain	specific	actions	before	it	may	take	action.		
Time	constraints	can	also	speed	up	actions	or	ensure	that	certain	steps	are	taken	in	a	
timeframe	that	congress	feels	is	acceptable.		Congress	may	want	to	show	a	credible	
commitment	to	resolving	an	issue	and	by	enforcing	milestones	and	fixed	dates	for	actions	
such	as	findings	and	reports	it	can	ensure	the	timeline	is	met.		There	is	some	loss	in	that	the	
agent	does	not	have	the	ability	to	make	its	own	timelines.		For	instance,	if	congress	requires	
a	proposal	and	a	report	by	a	board	by	a	certain	time,	it	can	cause	inefficiencies	if	the	agent	
has	to	prematurely	take	action.		It	may	be	able	to	produce	better	results	with	more	time	and	
would	be	able	to	solve	the	problem.	
Spending	limits	also	can	assure	that	the	agent’s	scope	of	action	is	constrained.		For	
agencies	to	be	able	to	enact	sweeping	changes,	there	is	often	a	need	for	the	agent	to	have	
the	necessary	resources	to	deal	with	the	issue.		One	of	the	most	important	resources	for	an	
agency	is	funding	which	can	be	used	by	the	agent	a	number	of	ways	to	achieve	a	goal.		One	
of	the	other	key	resources	that	is	needed	by	an	agency	is	manpower.		The	more	people	that	
can	be	dedicated	to	a	task,	and	the	better	fit	they	are	for	the	task,	the	more	likely	they	will	
be	able	to	succeed	at	that	task.		Thus	if	congress	delegates	to	a	large,	well-staffed	agency	it	
will	better	enable	the	agency	to	accomplish	what	was	dedicated,	but	it	would	also	be	
enabling	the	agency	to	push	its	own	agenda.		By	having	significant	resources,	including	
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people,	and	not	needing	to	rely	on	others	to	supply	these,	the	agency	has	less	dependencies	
and	more	capabilities	which	can	be	leverage	to	pursue	actions	that	it	views	as	best.	
Guidance	is	also	an	important	tool	of	congress.		Congress	is	able	to	give	some	
guidance	so	that	the	agency	knows	what	it	is	supposed	to	achieve	and	the	aims	of	congress	
as	the	delegating	power.		Congress,	by	assigning	goals	in	the	delegation	itself,	can	assure	
vigilance	by	the	agency	being	delegated	to.		It	can	also	lay	out	goals	so	that	the	agency	
knows	what	it	is	asked	to	accomplish	and	in	the	case	of	multiple	or	contrasting	goals,	
congress’	guidance	can	balance	priorities	or	prioritize	these.		By	including	such	guidance	in	
the	law	delegating	authority,	the	agency	legally	must	be	attuned	to	congress’	desired	goals.		
Thus	by	explicitly	stating	these	goals,	congress	can	make	explicit	what	it	is	that	they	would	
like	to	achieve	and	make	the	agency	focus	on	these.		This	guidance	also	helps	to	exclude	
other	goals	that	the	agency	might	otherwise	focus	on	or	substitute	instead	if	congress	only	
implies	its	goals.	
Oversight	is	another	method	congress	can	use	to	set	priorities	and	ensure	that	the	
agencies	continue	to	focus	on	these	rather	than	staking	out	their	own	goals.		Congress	can	
set	up	hearings	and	thus	perform	direct	oversight.		Hearings	are	a	powerful	way	to	adjust	
the	course	of	an	agency.		Congress	can	harangue	an	administrator	that	congress	feels	is	not	
doing	a	good	job	or	is	going	against	congress’	wishes.		The	mere	threat	of	these	actions	is	
enough	to	keep	an	agency	in	line.		This	threat	to	the	agency	and	its	heads	can	be	used	for	
leverage	to	allow	lawmakers	to	achieve	goals	that	they	or	their	voters	are	interested	in	and	
allows	for	case	work	on	behalf	on	their	constituents.		This	case	work	helps	members	of	
congress	politically.	
	 Constraints	can	be	designed	in	such	a	way	that	certain	individuals,	companies,	or	
industries	are	specifically	exempted	from	the	actions	on	an	agent.		This	can	be	done	to	
decrease	the	resistance	to	the	bill	allowing	it	to	pass	since	entrenched	interests	that	are	not	
threatened	will	not	work	hard	to	counter	the	bill	as	they	have	less	at	stake.		Exempting	
groups	or	individuals	is	also	useful	for	members	of	congress.		If	a	member	of	congress	can	
get	a	constituent	or	company	in	their	district	exempted	from	regulation	this	can	garner	
them	a	great	deal	of	good	will	which	can	lead	to	future	votes	and	campaign	contributions.		
Exemptions	can	also	be	used	to	stop	an	agency	from	being	overzealous	and	creating	poor	
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policy	which	does	not	take	into	account	important	factors	or	which	is	too	universal	and	does	
not	take	into	account	or	make	allowances	for	the	specifics	of	the	situation.		It	can	also	allow	
members	of	congress	help	their	key	constituencies.	
	 Along	with	the	exceptions	that	congress	makes	in	the	law	when	it	sets	forth	
delegation,	it	can	also	set	forth	compensation	that	must	be	paid	or	allowances	made	for	
those	organizations	and	people	that	are	adversely	affected	by	the	actions	of	the	agency.		
Like	exemptions,	making	compensations	can	make	the	delegation	less	disruptive	to	the	
group	regulated	or	affected	by	the	agency’s	power.		This	makes	the	opposition	to	the	new	
law	less	determined	to	combat	the	new	bill	and	more	likely	to	compromise.		Compensations	
and	exemptions	often	are	the	result	of	compromises	in	which	law	makers	use	it	as	a	bone	
for	other	law	makers	or	affected	interest	groups.		They	can	be	used	to	ensure	that	agency	
actions	are	not	unnecessarily	severe	or	disruptive.		Thus	congress	can	build	in	gradualism	or	
mercy	that	will	help	companies	adapt	to	new	rules.		This	can	be	particularly	important	
during	economic	crises	since	it	takes	time	for	markets	to	become	efficient	and	congress	
does	not	wish	to	do	more	damage,	which	a	particularly	severe	or	far-reaching	law	can	do	
even	if	it	addresses	a	genuine	national	need.		This	is	especially	true	because	markets	rest	to	
a	great	extent	on	expectations	of	the	future	and	confidence	in	the	markets	could	be	
damaged	if	an	agency	took	too	aggressive	a	step.	
	 Judicial	review	is	a	way	to	oversee	the	actions	of	an	agency.		It	can	be	employed	to	
ensure	that	an	agency’s	actions	are	approved	of	by	constituents.		If	there	is	significant	
unhappiness	in	the	agency’s	actions	or	if	an	entity	is	adversely	affected	they	have	recourse	
to	rectify	the	situation	and	effectively	overturn	the	agency’s	actions.		It	is	powerful	in	so	far	
as	individuals	and	organizations	can	bring	a	case	and	the	vast	legal	system	can	deal	with	
them	as	opposed	to	taking	congress’	limited	time.		This	allows	congress	to	provide	oversight	
of	the	agencies	at	a	low	cost	to	itself.		It	is	a	fire	alarm	rather	than	police	patrol	method	of	
overseeing	the	agency.		This	blunts	the	risk	to	congress	of	an	unpopular	decision	that	could	
have	been	traced	back	to	congress.		Often	entities	have	access	to	the	court	system	by	
general	provisions	such	as	those	contained	in	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act,	but	
congress	has	the	ability	to	make	additional	provisions	for	access	to	judicial	review.		These	
can	be	used	for	various	purposes	such	as	to	protect	entrenched	interests.		Judicial	review	
can	be	particularly	important	in	the	case	of	economic	regulation	since	it	is	often	difficult	to	
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know	in	advance	the	true	effect	of	regulations	and	judicial	review	can	ensure	that	adverse	
unintended	consequences	do	not	cause	more	harm	than	they	do	good.		It	can	also	be	useful	
as	regulation	outlives	its	needs.	
	 Serving	a	similar	function	as	judicial	review	are	provisions	made	to	give	those	
adversely	affected	by	agency	actions	the	right	to	appeals	and	which	layout	a	formal	appeals	
procedure.		By	making	allowances	for	appeals,	congress	can	give	individuals	and	companies	
a	way	around	the	laws	and	regulations	created	by	an	agency.		This	can	avoid	an	excessive	
action	by	an	agency	and	assure	that	specifics	are	being	taken	into	account	and	that	the	
decision	is	not	so	politicized.		It	can	also	make	the	process	have	more	of	an	appearance	of	
being	fair.	
	 Congress	also	can	make	rulemaking	requirements	so	that	agencies	must	comply	with	
the	processes	and	procedures	that	congress	lays	out	in	the	law.		As	with	most	constraints,	
rulemaking	constraints	limit	the	freedom	of	action	of	the	agent.		There	are	a	vast	array	of	
rulemaking	requirements	that	congress	has	the	option	of	using	when	it	delegates	authority	
to	an	agent.		These	can	require	agents	justify	their	actions.		They	might	also	give	
requirements	for	the	agency	to	make	a	decision	with	an	eye	to	a	certain	goal.		This	directs	
the	agency	and	gives	it	a	course	of	action	far	after	the	initial	administrator	of	the	agency	has	
left	or	alternatively	it	can	give	a	new	agency	direction	before	the	culture	of	the	agency	is	
formed	or	its	structure	is	truly	set.		This	is	a	powerful,	flexible	power	held	by	congress	in	that	
it	can	be	used	to	address	a	variety	of	issues.		It	can	limit	the	power	of	an	agency,	set	the	
course	of	future	action,	change	the	means	or	ends	of	agency	action	and	help	determine	in	
what	situation	the	agent	should	take	action	and	in	what	situations	it	should	not.	
	 Limits	on	delegation	can	also	include	limits	to	the	appointment	power	of	the	agent.		
This	can	limit	the	ability	of	congress	and	the	president	to	fully	determine	the	people	that	will	
lead	the	agency.		The	leader	of	the	agency	or	members	of	a	board	largely	set	the	priorities	
for	the	entity	in	question	and	have	final	say	over	the	actions	of	the	agency.		Thus	the	ability	
to	determine	who	is	a	member	of	the	agency	can	be	an	important	power	for	an	agency	or	
others.		There	can	be	other	appointment	power	limits	such	as	congress	determining	how	
long	someone	can	serve	for.		Setting	time	limits	for	appointments	can	change	the	strength,	
internal	consistency,	and	actions	of	the	agency.		If	the	head	of	an	agency	is	appointed	for	a	
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long	period	it	will	give	them	more	independence	so	that	they	can	chart	the	course	of	the	
agency	with	less	oversight.		Longer	appointments	are	important	because	they	can	stop	the	
president	from	selecting	a	specific	individual	for	a	position.		Thus	appointees	who	are	
appointed	to	positions	with	longer	term	will	tend	to	be	less	tied	politically	to	the	president	
and	they	do	not	need	to	make	their	actions	accord	with	the	president’s	wishes	in	order	to	
be	reappointed.		The	appointment	procedure	also	can	determine	whether	the	agency	head	
serves	at	the	pressure	of	the	president	or	whether	they	cannot	be	easily	replaced	and	it	also	
determines	who	gets	a	say	in	the	act	of	appointing	an	agency	head.		The	Senate	typically	is	
given	some	role	in	the	appointment	process	when	the	president	appoints	someone	for	that	
position.		This	is	due	to	Article	II,	Section	2,	paragraph	2	of	the	United	States	Constitution	
which	states,	“He	[the	president]	shall	have	power,	by	and	with	the	advice	and	consent	of	
the	Senate,	to	make	treaties,	provided	two	thirds	of	the	Senators	present	concur;	and	he	
shall	nominate,	and	by	and	with	the	advice	and	consent	of	the	Senate,	shall	appoint	
ambassadors,	other	public	ministers	and	consuls,	judges	of	the	Supreme	Court,	and	all	other	
officers	of	the	United	States,	whose	appointments	are	not	herein	otherwise	provided	for,	
and	which	shall	be	established	by	law:	but	the	Congress	may	by	law	vest	the	appointment	of	
such	inferior	officers,	as	they	think	proper,	in	the	President	alone,	in	the	courts	of	law,	or	in	
the	heads	of	departments.”186		This	passage	clearly	lays	out	that	for	many	offices	the	
congress	is	able	to	determine	which	person	or	persons	are	able	to	make	appointments	and	
the	process	used.		There	are	often	additional	provisions	laid	out	in	legislation	that	gives	
other	individuals	the	ability	to	role	in	the	appointment	process.			
	 Delegation	can	also	be	designed	in	such	a	way	that	fully	enacting	an	agent’s	proposal	
would	require	legislative	action	to	be	taken	afterward	to	finalize	the	action	of	the	agent.		
This	is	a	weak	form	of	delegation	that	vests	limited	power	in	the	agent.		This	is	useful	for	
advisory	panels	and	similar	organizations	which	congress	wishes	to	take	initiative	on	an	
issue,	but	on	which	congress	would	like	final	decision	making	authority.		The	action	needed	
by	congress	is	not	necessarily	to	decide	about	the	issue	at	hand,	but	instead	can	be	on	
related	topics	so	that	it	is	essentially	a	contingent	delegation	that	depends	on	congress’	
actions.		Alternatively	the	delegation	may	be	a	proposal	that	congress	must	specifically	take	
action	authorizing	the	agent	proposed	action.		An	example	of	this	was	the	so	called	
																																																						
186	US	Constitution	Article	II,	Section	2,	Paragraph	2	
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Supercommittee	which	has	some	agenda	setting	power,	but	which	needed	congress	in	
order	to	implement	their	proposals.	
Delegation	requiring	legislative	action	is	closely	related	to	the	legislative	veto.		The	
legislative	veto	allowed	congress	to	unilaterally	nullify	an	action	of	an	agency.		It	is	a	post	
hoc	power	of	congress	allowing	it	to	stop	actions	this	it	disapproves	of	even	after	the	agency	
creates	them.		Legislative	vetoes	were	created	in	which	only	one	chamber	of	congress	is	
able	to	override	the	actions	of	the	agency.		This	allows	congress	or	a	part	of	it	oversee	an	
agency	and	give	it	far	less	leeway	in	that	all	its	actions	can	be	easily	overridden	all	without	
going	through	the	normal	process	of	law	making.		The	Supreme	Court	however	ruled	that	
the	ability	of	congress	to	use	the	legislative	veto	to	overturn	agency	regulations	was	
unconstitutional	due	to	its	circumventing	the	regular	rules	of	law	making.		However,	it	is	
argued	by	some	that	implementations	of	a	legislative	veto	are	still	in	law	and	used	today	
despite	this	type	of	constraint	being	ruled	unconstitutional.	
Congress,	when	it	writes	legislation	that	contains	delegation,	often	includes	
transparency	provisions.		These	can	take	the	form	of	requiring	public	hearings,	which	are	
useful	to	members	of	congress	in	that	they	help	gage	public	support	for	proposed	courses	of	
actions	that	the	agency	suggests.		This	can	help	members	of	congress	determine	
stakeholders	and	either	distance	themselves	from	unpopular	proposals	or	take	credit	and	
associate	themselves	with	popular	proposals.		Public	hearings	thus	serve	the	politician’s	
interests	by	being	an	efficient	information	gathering	technique	in	which	there	is	very	little	
congressional	staff	effort	required.		Public	hearings	serve	an	addition	function	beyond	
transparency	and	their	political	benefits	to	individual	lawmakers	in	that	they	can	help	
improve	policy.		These	hearings	garner	feedback	from	people	and	these	can	lead	to	better	
information	from	which	to	develop	a	policy	and	may	include	counter	suggestions	that	are	
better	than	the	initial	proposal.		Public	hearings	also	turn	policy	making	into	a	two-way	
endeavor	in	which	those	that	are	governed	can	communicate	with	those	making	laws.		This	
makes	government	more	representative	and	responsive	to	the	will	of	the	people	and	thus	
broadly	it	becomes	more	democratic.	
	 Constraints	on	delegated	power	greatly	affect	the	manner	of	policy	creation	and	are	
an	important	tool	by	which	congress	can	ensure	policy	will	remain	consistent	with	certain	
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policy	objectives	that	congress	wishes	pursued.		This	paper	hypothesizes	that	constraints	
will	form	an	important	part	of	the	delegation	and	that	the	types	of	delegation	used	would	
be	consistent	with	goals	that	the	enacting	coalition	is	trying	to	achieve	and	the	method	of	
policy	creation	that	they	favor.		
Agency	heads	are	typically	chosen	in	large	part	due	to	their	association	with	one	
party.		This	political	identification	can	help	the	president	determine	to	what	extent	the	
interests	of	a	potential	agency	head	aligns	with	their	own	views.		In	the	hectic	time	after	an	
election,	it	is	difficult	for	a	president	and	their	transition	team	to	fully	vet	candidates	to	run	
an	agency	and	so	substituting	for	a	full	knowledge	of	a	candidate’s	views,	abilities,	and	
willingness	to	do	as	directed	by	the	president	are	an	assessment	of	their	party	loyalty	and	
past	history.		Delegation	can	be	affected	by	specifics	such	as	the	length	of	time	that	an	
agency	head	or	member	of	a	board	are	appointed	for	and	thus	congress	and	the	president	
will	alter	these	and	other	factors	in	order	to	ensure	the	resulting	policy	better	meets	their	
preferences.	
Limiting	who	can	be	appointed	to	head	an	agency	or	to	another	key	position	can	
help	assure	that	the	actions	of	the	agency,	which	are	largely	set	and	controlled	by	the	goals	
of	the	head	of	the	agency,	can	in	turn	be	influenced	by	congress.		Congress	tries	to	ensure	
that	those	who	are	given	such	power	and	responsibility	have	views	that	are	within	the	
mainstream	of	congress’s	views.		In	addition,	the	power	to	select	the	individual	or	to	limit	
who	the	executive	can	choose	for	the	position	helps	ensure	that	the	allegiance	of	the	
appointed	individual	would	be	to	those	that	helped	in	their	nomination	and	would	be	
directed	towards	congress	in	general	rather	than	to	the	executive.		This	power	over	the	
nomination	process	can	also	help	gain	control	even	of	those	that	are	merely	aspiring	to	one	
of	these	offices,	but	not	currently	up	for	an	office.		This	occurs	because	office	seekers	know	
their	actions	may	at	a	future	time	have	their	views	and	actions	be	questioned	if	they	don’t	
conform	to	congressional	preferences.	
Despite	potentially	not	having	much	experience,	the	head	of	an	agency	has	sizable	
control	over	an	agency.		An	agency	head	has	considerable	power	to	help	or	hurt	the	career	
prospects	of	both	other	political	appointees	and	career	bureaucrats	within	the	agency.		Thus	
when	congress	uses	its	ability	to	affect	appointments	to	leadership	positions	at	a	federal	
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agency,	this	can	help	ensure	compliance	by	the	agency	to	the	desired	actions	and	outcomes	
that	congress	prefers.		It	also	gives	members	of	congress	power	over	that	agency	that	can	
be	beneficial	for	performing	casework	on	behalf	of	constituencies.	
Appointment	power	limits	can	also	be	used	to	dictate	the	manner	of	choosing	a	head	
of	an	agency,	office,	or	board.		They	can	be	used	to	make	sure	the	process	is	equitable	to	
multiple	parties	such	as	by	splitting	appointments	between	different	governmental	bodies	
or	powers.		Alternatively	they	can	be	used	to	stack	the	deck	and	ensure	that	the	agent	or	
agents	selected	fit	with	congress’	goals.		For	instance,	there	could	be	an	appointment	power	
limit	in	which	the	person	appointed	has	to	come	from	an	industry	or	be	accredited	and	thus	
their	views	and	goals	would	more	likely	be	tied	toward	the	status	quo.		Alternatively	a	
constraint	on	appointments	could	effectively	require	an	activist	who	was	pushing	for	change	
be	appointed	if	congress	designed	the	limit	of	delegation	thusly.	
Another	type	of	appointment	power	limit	is	a	limit	on	the	length	of	time	that	an	
individual	can	serve	in	the	role	they	are	appointed	to	or	a	specified	length	of	the	term	of	the	
appointment.		Serving	a	long	time	in	a	position	can	allow	an	agency	head	to	gain	their	own	
power	base	and	a	chance	to	gain	expertise	in	the	area	which	both	would	tend	to	increase	
the	independence	of	that	political	actor	and	allow	them	more	leeway	to	pursue	their	own	
goals	and	to	counter	calls	from	congress	for	certain	action.		Similarly	by	having	the	term	of	
appointment	be	short,	the	bureaucrat	knows	that	they	will	require	congress	to	help	them	
get	confirmed	again	to	that	or	another	position	when	their	term	is	up.		For	those	seeking	to	
continue	in	government	service,	either	in	their	current	appointment	or	in	a	more	powerful,	
more	prestigious	position	they	have	a	need	to	stay	in	the	good	graces	of	congress	to	
accomplish	these	ends	and	thus	they	have	a	powerful	incentive	to	be	responsive	to	the	
desires	of	congress.	
This	difference	can	be	seen	in	the	appointment	of	the	members	of	the	Board	of	
Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System	who	are	appointed	to	14-year	terms.		This	long	
period	gives	them	considerable	flexibility	and	freedom	to	pursue	sound	monetary	policy	
without	resorting	to	short	term	political	expediencies.		Those	on	the	board	are	able	to	
increase	the	time	frame	they	are	focused	on	and	make	decisions	based	on	the	needs	of	the	
nation	rather	than	on	the	needs	of	a	political	party	or	on	their	personal	need	to	be	
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reappointed.		This	can	also	help	ensure	consistent	policy	as	they	do	not	need	to	shift	policy	
every	election	to	deal	with	new	political	realities.		This	independence	is	generally	considered	
a	good	thing	to	have	in	a	central	bank	and	many	other	countries	also	have	similarly	isolated	
and	protected	central	banks.		However,	there	is	a	tradeoff	between	freedom	of	action	and	
accountability	and	too	much	independence	can	lead	to	lax	oversight.	
The	belief	that	congress	will	use	constraints	strategically	is	based	off	the	idea	that	
Congress	will	try	to	make	sure	it	approves	of	the	policy	that	is	implemented	and	thus	will	
want	constraints	over	agent’s	actions.		As	there	are	a	vast	array	of	constraint	types	that	
could	be	used	and	ways	to	implement	them,	congress	will	use	these	to	help	to	best	achieve	
their	goals.		The	choice	of	constraints	and	the	way	to	structure	the	delegation	go	hand-in-
hand	with	the	decision	to	delegate	and	are	part	of	the	decision	to	delegate	and	how	to	
structure	the	delegation.	
One	would	expect	that	due	to	the	nature	of	the	crisis,	constraints	that	could	lead	to	
policy	being	created	quickly,	such	as	time	constraints,	would	be	used	significantly,	whereas	
constraints	that	may	slow	implementation	of	agency	regulations	such	as	judicial	review	
constraints	would	be	used	comparatively	less	often.		It	is	also	to	be	expected	that	congress	
will	use	reporting	requirements	and	public	hearing	requirements	significantly	as	large	shifts	
in	policy	are	able	to	be	made	quickly	in	a	crisis	and	congress	will	want	to	ensure	that	it	is	
aware	of	the	policy	that	is	being	propounded,	determine	who	the	affected	interest	groups	
are,	and	ascertain	the	political	ramifications	of	these	policy	changes.	
	
3.4	Unilateral	Executive	Action	
	
	 Policy	can	be	created	using	a	number	of	methods	such	as	direct	congressional	action,	
delegation	of	policymaking	authority	to	the	administration,	and	unilateral	executive	action.		
This	paper	will	investigate	the	use	of	unilateral	executive	action	in	response	to	the	crisis.		
Due	to	the	increased	public	scrutiny	during	crises	and	a	tendency	for	the	public	to	look	to	
the	president	to	lead	in	such	circumstances	one	might	expect	significant	unilateral	executive	
action.		Furthermore	the	existence	of	significant	gridlock	during	this	period	and	the	
importance	of	reacting	swiftly	to	a	financial	crisis	which	can	be	exacerbated	if	confidence	in	
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the	financial	system	withers	would	also	lead	to	expectations	of	extensive	use	of	unilateral	
power.		
The	approach	used	to	analyze	unilateral	actions	is	similar	to	that	used	by	Warber	
when	he	set	out	five	tenets	of	Unilateral	Theory:	“(1)	presidents	are	rational	actors	who	
maximize	their	unilateral	action	powers	to	the	fullest	in	order	to	enact	their	agendas,	(2)	
unilateral	powers	are	useful	tools	for	presidents	to	use	in	achieving	their	policy	agendas,	(3)	
presidents	are	strategically	motivated	in	deciding	when	and	how	to	use	unilateral	powers,	
(4)	presidents	will	be	more	successful	in	using	unilateral	powers	to	achieve	results	in	certain	
policy	domains	than	in	pursuing	their	policy	agendas	through	traditional	legislative	
strategies,	and	(5)	there	are	costs	associated	with	the	exercise	of	unilateral	powers.”187		
These	assumptions	argue	that	the	president	will	perform	unilateral	action	when	he	feels	the	
benefits	of	such	an	action	exceed	the	costs.	
	 In	the	words	of	William	Howell,	“It	is	impossible	to	articulate	a	theory	of	presidential	
power	without	having	a	theory	of	Congress	and	the	judiciary.		In	this	sense,	the	divisions	
between	presidency,	congressional,	and	judicial	scholars	appear	entirely	artificial.		The	
influence	each	institution	has	over	public	policy	depends	on	the	check	that	others	place	
upon	it…		A	theory	of	direct	presidential	action,	at	base,	must	be	a	theory	of	political	
institutions.”188		Therefore	the	paper	will	try	to	look	at	the	context	and	the	specifics	of	this	
period	to	see	what	may	have	influenced	the	president	to	decide	whether	to	use	unilateral	
executive	action	during	this	period	to	address	the	financial	crisis	or	to	modify	the	financial	
regulatory	system.	
	 All	other	things	being	equal,	one	should	expect	high	levels	of	unilateral	executive	
action	during	a	crisis.		There	is	a	need	for	fast	and	decisive	action,	which	is	one	characteristic	
of	unilateral	executive	action.		Additionally	in	a	crisis	there	will	be	more	pronounce	calls	for	
the	president	to	take	action	to	resolve	the	crisis	and	unilateral	executive	action	is	an	
effective	way	for	the	president	to	show	that	he	is	taking	action	to	address	the	crisis.		
																																																						
187	Warber,	Adam	L.		Executive	Orders	and	the	Modern	Presidency:	Legislating	from	the	Oval	Office.		Boulder,	
CO:	Lynne	Rienner.		2006.		13.	
188	Howell,	William	G.		2003.		113.	
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As	Howell	argues,	“the	president’s	freedom	to	act	unilaterally	is	defined	by	
Congress’s	ability,	and	the	judiciary’s	willingness,	to	subsequently	overturn	him.”189			
	
3.5	Implicit	Delegation	
	
While	considerable	delegation	is	explicit	and	takes	the	form	of	congress	creating	a	
law	that	delegates	some	of	its	power	and	authority	to	another	body,	some	power	is	
implicitly	delegated.		This	can	often	take	the	form	of	an	individual	agency	claiming	a	power	
that	it	was	not	explicitly	given	by	the	constitution	or	by	a	law.		We	would	expect	higher	
amounts	of	delegation	during	a	financial	crisis	because	time	is	such	an	important	factor	and	
policy	needs	to	be	created	in	a	timely	manner.		It	follows	then	that	in	the	depth	of	the	crisis	
when	there	is	the	greatest	need	there	is	likely	to	be	more	implicit	delegation.		In	addition,	
with	higher	level	of	gridlock	we	would	expect	higher	levels	of	implicit	delegation	as	direct	
congressional	action	and	explicit	delegation	becomes	more	difficult.		
	
4. Case	Study	
	
Around	December	2007	there	began	to	be	a	major	downturn	in	the	economy.		This	
downturn	became	a	recession	followed	by	a	persistent	economic	slowdown	punctuated	by	
high	unemployment	rates	and	a	low	rate	of	GDP	growth.		To	deal	with	the	threat	to	the	U.S.	
economy	that	was	posed	by	a	lingering	economic	malaise,	the	government	took	a	number	
of	actions	to	reinvigorate	the	economy	and	insolate	individuals	from	the	damage	done	to	
the	economy.		In	this	chapter	the	paper	looks	at	the	actions	that	congress	took	to	examine	
how	and	when	delegation	was	used.		This	paper	also	look	at	other	implicit	forms	of	
delegation	such	as	some	far	reaching	executive	orders	taken	by	the	congress	with	powers	
previously	delegated	to	him	by	the	congress.		Among	the	large	number	of	actions	congress	
took	are	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008,	the	Emergency	Economic	
Stabilization	Act	of	2008,	the	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009,	the	
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American	Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009,	the	Helping	Families	Save	Their	Homes	Act	
of	2009,	and	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act.	
	 These	individual	actions	are	part	of	a	collective	attempt	to	deal	with	these	financial	
challenges	such	as	the	increase	in	foreclosures	and	the	large	increase	in	unemployment.		
Many	methods	were	used	by	congress	to	deal	with	this	crisis	and	several	of	these	relied	
heavily	on	delegation.		Agencies	lent	each	other	personnel	and	supported	each	other’s	plans	
crafting	more	of	a	government-wide	solution	than	a	collection	of	small	solutions.		The	
executive	branch	worked	largely	as	a	network	rather	than	a	hierarchical	body.		It	allowed	
them	to	address	issues	collectively	as	a	team	and	bring	more	power	and	tools	to	bear	on	the	
issue	in	ways	that	they	could	not	otherwise.	
	 Different	agencies	needed	to	work	with	each	other	because	they	each	have	formal	
powers	that	could	come	into	play	and	which	could	contribute	to	the	shared	goal.		Many	
agencies	had	a	stake	in	the	stabilization	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	and	effort	to	
stabilize	these	was	part	of	a	combined	plan	to	address	the	financial	crisis	in	America	and	
boost	faith	in	the	financial	markets.		In	order	to	do	this	many	agencies	were	required	to	take	
actions	such	as	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency,	which	as	the	regulator	over	the	GSEs,	
had	considerable	powers	over	them.		Likewise	the	Treasury	Department	was	delegated	
some	authority	in	this	arena	that	it	too	could	bring	as	did	the	Department	of	Housing	on	
Urban	Development.	
The	issue	of	decreasing	confidence	in	the	market	was	taken	up	by	Ben	Bernanke,	the	
Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	who	said,	“Rising	credit	risks	and	intense	risk	
aversion	have	pushed	credit	spreads	to	unprecedented	levels,	and	markets	for	securitized	
assets,	except	for	mortgage	securities	with	government	guarantees,	have	shut	down.”		The	
Fed	and	other	agencies	worked	to	secure	markets	in	order	to	decrease	this	risk	aversion.		
There	was	lost	output	and	lost	jobs	due	to	the	recession	and	the	actions	of	congress	sought	
to	ameliorate	these.		As	Ben	Bernanke	stated	in	a	speech	about	the	downturn,	“Government	
policy	responses	around	the	world	will	be	critical	determinants	of	the	speed	and	vigor	of	the	
recovery.”190	
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Throughout	this	period	there	were	record	high	levels	of	partisanship.191		Midway	
through	the	financial	crisis,	the	nation	was	presented	with	a	decision	on	how	to	proceed	to	
solve	the	crisis.		This	was	manifested	in	the	form	of	a	presidential	election	that	was	
ultimately	won	by	the	Democrat,	Barack	Obama.		There	were	a	large	number	of	factors	
affecting	the	voting	habits	in	the	election,	but	for	the	Obama	administration	the	election	
was	viewed	as	a	mandate	on	what	policies	he	would	pursue	with	regards	to	the	crisis.		The	
Republicans	in	congress,	however,	were	less	inclined	to	implement	some	of	these	proposals.	
Veto	players,	political	actors	whose	refusal	is	sufficient	to	forestall	a	policy	change,	
were	able	to	limit	the	types	of	available	actions	that	congress	could	take.		For	instance	
during	the	112th	congress,	which	served	during	the	second	half	of	President	Obama’s	1st	
term,	only	283	public	laws	were	enacted.192		The	motivations	for	the	Republicans	to	work	
with	the	administration	were	slight	and	so	they	assessed	their	political	options	and	
determined	it	was	in	their	interests	or	those	of	their	supporters	to	support	the	
administration’s	plans.		
Typically	as	power	shifts	both	political	parties	continue	to	find	reasons	to	work	
together.		Those	that	gain	control	of	the	House	still	have	reason	to	compromise	and	not	
change	the	rules	too	much.		This	is	due	to	a	realization	that	they	need	to	work	with	the	
other	side	and	that	in	short	order	they	may	be	in	the	minority.		The	minority	has	similar	
reasons	to	put	up	with	any	changes	enacted	by	the	majority	since	they	may	soon	be	in	the	
majority	and	democratic	institutions	lead	to	a	long	term	view	of	the	situation.		Due	to	
electoral	trends	such	as	districts	becoming	more	polarized,	much	of	the	impetus	to	work	
together	had	vanished.	
	 Dealing	with	the	crisis	meant	walking	a	fine	line.		The	government	needed	to	make	
the	crisis	seem	dire	enough	to	necessitate	immediate	and	large-scale	action,	but	did	not	
want	to	risk	spooking	markets	and	adding	to	the	problems	or	eroding	faith	in	the	economic	
system,	which	would	make	the	crisis	worse.		In	the	context	of	the	financial	crisis,	painting	
too	bleak	a	picture	might	promote	a	run	on	banks,	risk	of	negative	pressure	on	big	financial	
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companies,	and	hoarding	of	funds	by	individuals	and	companies	and	related	paradox	of	
thrift	problems.		A	potential	solution	were	closed	hearings	where	those	who	are	
knowledgeable	about	the	state	of	the	crisis	and	the	direction	it	is	going	can	give	honest	
assessments	and	advice	without	the	information	becoming	publicly	available	to	have	
adverse	effects	on	the	behavior	of	corporations	or	individuals.		It	also	is	in	part	why	the	
minutes	of	the	meetings	of	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System	are	sealed	for	
years	after	the	meeting.	
	 Trust	in	the	market	has	a	positive,	reinforcing	cyclical	effect	that	can	help	lift	the	
markets	from	out	of	the	crisis	whereas	negative	events	build	upon	themselves	which	helped	
contribute	to	the	severity	of	the	crisis.		An	example	of	this	positive	cycle	is	when	Warren	
Buffet	agreed	to	buy	$10	billion	in	shares	and	another	$5	billion	worth	of	warrants.		This	
signaled	confidence	in	the	markets	and	in	Goldman	Sachs,	a	major	firm	that	was	under	
serious	financial	stress,	from	one	of	the	world	richest	and	savviest	investors.		This	positive	
step	helped	build	confidence	in	one	of	the	largest	bank	holding	companies	and	thus	had	a	
positive	reinforcing	step.		The	investment	itself	was	dependent	on	positive	signs	of	
government	action.		Mr.	Buffet	in	discussing	the	thinking	behind	his	investment	said,	“If	I	
didn’t	think	the	government	was	going	to	act,	I	would	not	be	doing	anything	this	week.”193	
	 Regulations	were	weak	in	large	part	due	to	the	significant	political	power	that	the	
financial	industry	has	and	has	used	to	decrease	regulations	upon	the	industry.		Between	
1999	and	2008,	the	financial	industry	reported	$2.7	billion	in	spending	on	lobbying	the	
federal	government,	which	was	one	of	the	largest	lobbying	efforts	during	that	period.194		
Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	spent	$164	million	during	that	period	on	lobbying	and	saw	
very	favorable	rules	that	enabled	them	to	be	very	profitable.	
The	presidential	race	was	unusually	close	in	2004,	however	the	administration	did	
not	feel	that	it	lacked	a	mandate	and	did	not	shrink	from	action	that	it	felt	was	right	and	this	
tendency	to	strive	for	big	policy	change	was	reinforced	by	Republican	control	of	the	House	
and	Senate.		The	president	can	lead	opinion	or	follow	opinion.	
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The	period	this	paper	is	investigating	includes	the	end	of	George	W.	Bush’s	second	
term	and	all	of	President	Obama’s	first	term.		President	Obama	came	to	power	with	a	large	
majority	of	voters	voting	for	him	and	his	message	of	change.		This	at	least	would	seem	to	
give	him	a	large	mandate	with	which	to	work	from.		However,	he	choose	to	use	the	
mandate	to	push	through	a	bill	that	revamped	the	health	insurance	industry	and	the	
ensuing	protracted	fight	in	light	of	a	weakening	financial	picture	weakened	his	support	
among	voters	and	in	congress	by	the	time	he	approached	his	economic	proposals.		
President	Bush	by	contrast	by	2007	was	very	unpopular	and	had	very	little	in	the	way	of	
mandate	and	struggled	to	work	with	Democratic	factions	in	the	congress.		The	expectation	
on	the	eve	of	the	financial	crisis	was	that	he	and	his	new	Treasury	Secretary,	Hank	Paulson,	
would	not	be	able	to	do	much	more	than	serve	out	the	remainder	of	the	president’s	term.		
Mark	Peterson	quotes	a	policy	aide	who	worked	in	the	Johnson	White	House,	describing	the	
power	that	comes	from	popularity,	“when	a	president	is	less	popular,	he	loses	control	over	a	
department	and	its	secretary.		They	will	not	help	him	on	the	Hill	as	much,	and	they	have	
more	of	their	own	power.”195		Thus	the	president’s	ability	to	control	agents	can	be	impaired	
by	a	lack	of	popularity,	which	in	turn	can	increase	congress’	ability	to	control	agencies	and	
enact	changes	upon	them.	
	
4.1	Nature	of	the	Crisis	
	
The	financial	crisis	of	2007–08	was	a	severe	economic	pullback	that	began	in	2007	in	
response	to	a	housing	bubble	and	then	rippled	out	to	many	other	parts	of	the	economy.		
Much	of	the	onset	of	the	crisis	was	initially	due	to	a	weakening	in	the	subprime	mortgage	
market.		This	was	a	large	market	which	by	the	end	of	2006,	accounted	for	20	percent	of	all	
new	mortgages.”196		This	however	did	not	stay	merely	a	mortgage	crisis,	but	had	numerous	
spillover	effects	that	in	turn	led	to	new	causes	of	economic	weakness.		While	many	had	
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predicted	localized	decreases	in	home	prices,	but	there	would	not	be	a	nationwide	decrease	
in	such	prices.197		
	 The	unexpectedly	high	number	of	defaults	in	subprime	mortgages	was	largely	due	to	
an	increase	in	the	laxity	of	mortgage	lending	rules.		Individual	mortgage	originators	and	
financial	firms	were	incentivized	to	create	more	loans	and	the	focus	was	systematically	
moved	away	from	managing	risk.		Securitization	was	part	of	the	cause	for	this	desire	of	
banks	to	increase	the	number	of	loans	they	had	and	to	be	less	concerned	with	the	likelihood	
that	the	loan	would	be	repaid	rather	than	focusing	on	whether	the	loan	were	conforming	
and	thus	could	be	sold	to	Fannie	Mae	or	Freddie	Mac.		As	defaults	began	to	rise,	this	took	a	
toll	on	the	earnings	of	financial	firms	that	had	bought	tranches	of	home	mortgage	securities.		
These	companies	began	having	large	losses	in	this	class	of	assets	that	were	also	often	
difficult	to	sell.		As	investors	began	to	sense	weakness	in	some	financial	institutions	they	
began	to	put	financial	pressure	on	those	companies.		This	coupled	with	a	drying	up	of	
funding	sources	put	severe	liquidity	pressure	on	several	large	financial	firms.		Bear	Sterns	
was	able	to	be	saved	through	a	deal	orchestrated	by	the	government,	however	when	
Lehman	Brothers,	at	the	time	the	fourth	largest	investment	bank	in	America,	went	bankrupt	
it	led	to	a	further	tightening	of	credit	markets	and	a	further	disintegration	of	trust	in	the	
financial	system.		This	led	to	runs	on	banks	and	other	financial	companies.		Other	companies	
were	endangered	due	to	losses	from	the	mortgage	defaults	or	the	Lehman	bankruptcy	or	
through	loss	transfer	mechanisms	such	as	credit	default	swaps	or	threats	from	counter	party	
exposure.		
Leading	up	to	the	crisis	there	had	been	significant	deregulation	for	decades	as	it	was	
often	in	congress’	interests	to	deregulate	as	it	often	was	for	executive	agencies.		There	was	
not	a	powerful	interest	group	that	gained	by	there	being	more	restrictions	and	regulations	
on	financial	and	housing	industries.		Regulations	tended	to	cut	into	profits	and	salaries	and	
thus	the	financial	industry	spent	considerable	funds	trying	to	get	the	government	to	
decrease	regulations.		This	was	true	even	after	the	savings	&	loan	crisis	that	was	in	large	
part	caused	by	deregulation.		In	fact	the	changes	congress	made	to	address	the	
deteriorating	competitive	positions	of	Savings	&	Loans	such	as	the	Depository	Institutions	
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Deregulation	and	Monetary	Control	Act	and	the	Garn-St.	Germain	Act	contributed	to	the	
trend	towards	deregulation	of	the	financial	industry	and	to	the	crisis.		The	Garn-St.	Germain	
Act,	for	instance,	greatly	increased	the	kinds	of	loans	that	banks	and	thrifts	could	issue.		
Many	of	the	new	types	of	loans	that	they	could	offer,	such	as	adjustable-rate	mortgages	and	
interest-only	loans,	have	had	very	high	default	rates	during	the	economic	crisis	and	in	large	
part	contributed	to	the	mortgage	crisis	and	the	subsequent	intertwined	crises.	
There	was	also	significant	interest	by	those	in	the	industry	to	grow	and	become	ever	
larger.		These	companies	and	industry	pressure	groups	thus	had	reason	to	lobby	congress	to	
remove	restrictions	on	growth	of	banks.		In	response	to	this,	in	1999	congress	passed	the	
Gramm–Leach–Bliley	Act198	that	effectively	repealed	Glass-Steagall	Act	provisions	that	had	
separated	commercial	banks,	investment	banks,	and	insurance	companies.		The	Gramm–
Leach–Bliley	Act	thus	allowed	companies	in	these	areas	to	compete	in	these	other	fields	and	
merge	with	other	types	of	entities	and	thereby	potentially	grow	larger.		Another	act	of	
congress	was	the	passage	of	the	Riegle-Neal	Interstate	Banking	and	Branching	Efficiency	Act	
of	1994	that	lets	nationally	chartered	banks	offer	branches	nationwide	so	long	as	the	bank	
acquires	branches	in	other	states	by	means	of	a	merger.		These	acts	and	other	removals	of	
regulations	led	to	a	wave	of	consolidations	that	led	to	the	emergence	of	companies	that	are	
too	large	to	fail	and	which	due	to	their	size	complicated	the	response	to	the	crisis.		In	
addition	to	the	growth	in	the	number	of	too	large	to	fail	companies,	the	Gramm-Leach-Bliley	
Act	made	it	more	difficult	for	regulators	to	get	a	sense	of	the	financial	system	in	an	area	that	
they	are	not	regulating.		The	act	itself	was	a	response	to	Citibank’s	purchase	of	insurance	
giant,	Traveler	Group,	and	the	divestiture	that	the	Glass-Steagall	Act	would	thus	have	
necessitated	if	congress	did	not	take	action	to	remove	the	provisions	that	the	Gramm-
Leach-Bliley	Act	removed.		From	1998	to	2007	the	assets	of	the	five	largest	U.S.	banks	
increased	from	$2.2	trillion	to	$6.8	trillion	and	the	assets	of	the	five	largest	investment	
banks	increased	from	$1	trillion	to	$4	trillion.199	
One	of	the	main	bodies	designed	to	ensure	liquidity	and	stability	in	the	markets	was	
the	Federal	Reserve	that	was	created	by	congress	in	1913	to	deal	with	issues	such	as	bank	
runs	of	which	there	had	been	a	half	dozen	in	the	preceding	40	years.		Ben	Bernanke,	the	
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Chairman	of	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	System,	felt	that	the	Fed	had	
been	lax	in	its	regulation	of	the	mortgage	market	and	went	further	saying,	“I	think	it	was	the	
most	severe	failure	of	the	Fed	in	this	particular	episode.”200		Others	such	as	the	HUD	
Secretary,	Alphonso	Jackson,	also	felt	that	regulation	was	not	all	it	should	be	and	reflected	
on	the	period	leading	to	the	crisis	by	saying,	“Everybody	was	making	a	great	deal	of	money	
…	and	there	wasn’t	a	great	deal	of	oversight	going	on.”201	
Regulation	was	not	just	weak	at	the	national	level,	but	was	weak	at	the	state	level	as	
well.		This	was	because	national	regulators	jealously	protected	their	realms	of	authority.		
Both	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	and	the	Office	of	Thrift	Saving	issued	
rules	that	barred	states	from	enforcing	their	regulations	on	thrifts	and	banks	and	left	
regulation	of	these	to	their	national	regulators	and	threatening	state’	attorneys	general	not	
to	try	to	interfere.202		National	regulators	thought	it	was	their	prerogative	to	regulate	
nationally	chartered	entities	and	that	states	were	specifically	barred	from	that	action.		
Those	states	that	did	try	to	regulate	national	banks	also	had	to	deal	with	banks	arguing	
these	jurisdictional	issues	as	well.		For	instance,	the	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	Report	mentions	
that	Wachovia,	a	North	Carolina-based	bank,	refused	to	abide	by	North	Carolina	regulations,	
because	as	a	national	bank	it	only	fell	under	the	regulatory	jurisdiction	of	the	Office	of	the	
Comptroller	of	the	Currency	(OCC).203		This	led	to	a	four-year	legal	confrontation	with	the	
Supreme	Court	ultimately	siding	with	Wachovia	and	determining	that	the	OCC	was	the	sole	
regulator	of	mortgage	lending	with	jurisdiction	over	Wachovia.		The	OCC	and	the	OTS	get	a	
large	percent	of	their	funding	from	assessment	from	the	banks	and	thrifts	that	they	
regulated.		This	made	them	concerned	about	continuing	to	be	the	regulator	for	the	entities	
they	regulate	and	this	gives	them	perverse	incentives	such	as	a	tendency	to	be	easy	on	
those	they	regulate	so	that	they	will	continue	to	be	selected	as	the	regulator	by	these	
entities.	
Credit	ratings	agencies	also	played	a	part	in	this	crisis	in	that	there	were	systematic	
problems	with	ratings.		The	Nationally	Recognized	Statistical	Rating	Organizations	were	
given	a	special	place	in	that	the	law	contains	several	capital	requirements,	restrictions	on	
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purchasing	certain	assets,	and	other	regulations	that	are	dependent	upon	securities	being	
rated	a	certain	class	of	asset	by	one	of	the	national	ratings	agencies.		Laws	such	as	the	
Secondary	Mortgage	Market	Enhancement	Act	of	1984204	enhanced	the	power	of	these	
rating	agencies	and	made	them	pivotal	to	the	financial	system.		However,	credit	rating	
companies	were	paid	by	companies	that	created	securities	and	as	these	companies	
benefitted	by	having	better	rated	securities,	agencies	would	be	tempted	to	rate	them	better	
than	they	would	be	otherwise.		This	was	combined	with	an	increase	in	the	number	of	CDOs.		
Mortgages	were	bundled	together	and	securitized	and	the	various	tranches	were	rated.	
Often	they	were	rated	AAA	even	though	the	underlying	assets	that	comprised	these	equities	
were	far	riskier.		The	rating	agencies	relied	on	unrealistic	models	and	rated	tens	of	
thousands	of	securities	AAA	that	within	a	year	or	two	were	downgraded	significantly.		This	
led	to	a	worsening	of	the	financial	situation.		These	agencies	had	been	mostly	unregulated	
until	the	Credit	Rating	Agency	Reform	Act	of	2006205	at	which	point	there	was	some	
regulation	of	their	methodologies.		
Among	the	items	that	have	been	argued	as	being	some	of	the	causes	of	the	crisis,	
many	of	these	were	government	actions.		These	include	the	Gramm-Leach-Bliley	Act206	
which	effectively	repealed	the	Glass-Steagle	act,	the	Commodity	Futures	Modernization	Act	
of	2000207	which	ensured	that	derivatives	would	not	be	regulated,	and	the	Community	
Reinvestment	Act208	and	other	actions	taken	by	congress	which	led	to	greater	lending	to	the	
poor	and	those	with	poor	credit	histories.		In	these	instances	congress	took	actions	that	
were	popular	and	had	positive	short	term	effects	without	focusing	on	potential	problems	
that	may	occur	down	the	line.		In	some	instances,	it	may	have	been	that	these	unintended	
consequences	were	unforeseen,	but	in	others	there	was	likely	a	decision	made	about	the	
benefits	that	accrued	to	constituents	now	and	this	outweighed	consideration	of	potential	
problems	that	might	occur	at	some	period	in	the	future.		The	examples	here	are	not	to	say	
that	congress	was	the	only	part	of	government	that	took	actions	that	contributed	to	the	
crisis.		The	Mark-to-Market	rules	put	forward	by	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	
which	government	how	financial	companies	value	their	assets,	and	the	actions	of	Fannie	
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Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	have	been	put	forward	by	many	as	causes	of	the	crisis	as	well	and	in	
this	latter	case,	the	GSE’s	had	a	similar	conflict	between	short	term	advantage	and	the	
potential	for	long	term	catastrophe	to	that	of	congress.	
During	the	crisis	the	size	of	Federal	Housing	Association’s	balance	sheet	increased	as	
a	result	of	this	and	grew	to	over	$1	trillion.209		Due	to	a	worsening	mortgage	market,	this	
portfolio	led	to	major	losses	and	required	hundreds	of	millions	of	additional	funding	from	
the	Treasury	Department	to	supply	it	with	adequate	capital.		Most	of	these	losses	were	due	
to	the	initial	portfolio	it	insured	shortly	after	the	FHA	Modernization	Act	of	2008	during	the	
midst	of	the	financial	crisis	of	2007–08.210		This	funding	was	partly	recovered	due	to	a	$25	
billion	out	of	court	settlement	with	certain	large	banks	that	the	federal	and	state	
governments	alleged	had	acted	improperly	making	foreclosures	in	a	fraudulent	manner	and	
without	taking	the	appropriate	steps	such	as	reading	and	signing	the	foreclosure	
documents.		This	resulting	settlement	of	this	so	called	the	robo-signing	crisis	had	up	to	$1	
billion	in	funds	set	aside	to	cover	the	FHA	losses.		The	FHA	emergency	fund	was	legally	
required	to	equal	at	least	2%	of	the	outstanding	loans	of	the	agency,	but	even	this	legal	
requirement,	which	is	only	half	what	private	insurers	need	to	hold,	had	not	been	upheld	in	
practice.211		FHA	can	raise	funds	through	the	premiums	it	charges	for	its	insurance	services	
and	it	can	raise	its	rates	as	the	need	arises.		FHA	picked	up	much	of	the	slack	in	the	
mortgage	insurance	market	that	had	previously	been	serviced	by	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	
Mac.		In	part	this	increase	in	loans	insured	by	FHA	was	due	to	congressional	action	taken	in	
2011	to	make	FHA	loans	more	attractive	than	those	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.	
	 Partisanship	was	intense	during	this	period,	but	the	leadership	of	the	two	parties	
saw	the	importance	of	working	together	on	this	important	topic.		In	the	words	of	Barney	
Frank,	chairman	of	the	House	Committee	on	Financial	Services,	“...in	this	case	the	
enactment	of	the	Troubled	Assets	Relief	Program	(TARP),	illustrate	the	importance	of	
bipartisanship.		The	leadership	of	both	parties	in	both	houses	accepted	the	need	for	action	
when	Hank	and	Ben	Bernanke	outlined	it	to	us.”212		There	were	still	a	significant	number	of	
issues	that	needed	to	be	decided	during	this	period	and	often	these	involved	significant	
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conflict	and	differences	of	opinions	and	important	issues	tend	to	have	more	conflict.		Thus	
there	was	a	great	deal	of	negotiation	as	there	is	negotiation	in	most	political	actions.		The	
negotiations	included	negotiation	between	houses.		Houses	negotiate	in	conference	
committee	and	in	deciding	what	to	propose	initially	and	when	different	parties	with	
competing	aims	control	them	these	negotiations	can	be	quite	bitter.	
	
4.2	Actions	Taken	
	
As	the	crisis	become	deeper,	those	in	government	began	to	pay	attention	and	
started	trying	to	come	up	with	ways	to	improve	the	situation.		In	response	to	the	crisis	
congress	took	some	action	itself	ultimately	passing	some	key	laws.		Initially	efforts	were	
focused	on	dealing	with	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis.		In	2007,	the	first	major	signs	of	the	
crisis	appeared	with	large	firms	in	the	industry	going	bankrupt	and	then	severe	weakness	
faced	by	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.		The	first	major	action	of	congress	to	address	the	
crisis	did	not	come	until	mid-2008,	by	which	point	the	housing	crisis	had	already	become	
pronounced	though	it	was	still	not	viewed	as	a	systemic	risk.	
	 Policy	creation	during	this	period	was	largely	piecemeal	and	did	not	form	a	
consistent	whole.		The	public	policies	created	had	different	goals,	methods,	and	enactors	
and	were	largely	reactionary	and	therefore	rapidly	changed	to	respond	to	shifting	events.		In	
addition,	the	timeframe	of	the	policies	varied	widely.		Some	policies	were	focused	on	the	
current	crisis,	some	were	focused	on	avoiding	future	crises,	and	some	focused	on	pursuing	
goals	unrelated	to	the	crisis	and	were	more	opportunistic	in	their	nature.		While	the	
financial	crisis	went	on,	political	actors	continued	to	try	to	advance	their	legislative	agenda	
and	they	often	found	that	using	the	financial	crisis	as	cover	helped	advance	their	agenda.		
Thus	the	financial	crisis	was	used	to	justify	decreasing	governmental	expenditures,	funding	
green	companies,	and	health	care	reform,	etc.	
	 Industry	groups	and	lobbyist	also	attempted	to	shape	the	policy	responses	that	were	
being	crafted.		During	the	first	nine	months	of	2009,	the	financial	industry	spent	$344	
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million	on	lobbying	and	as	of	October	2009,	1537	lobbyists	representing	the	financial	
industry	were	registered	to	work	on	financial	regulation	proposals	before	congress.213	
	
4.2.1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
	
President	George	W.	Bush	signed	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	
2008214	into	law	on	October	3,	2008.		It	was	bundled	together	with	the	Energy	Improvement	
and	Extension	Act	of	2008	and	the	Tax	Extenders	and	Alternative	Minimum	Tax	Relief	Act	of	
2008	which	comprise	the	other	two	sections	of	this	law.		However,	the	law	is	most	widely	
known	for	establishing	a	$700	billion	fund	to	stabilize	the	economy	by	economically	
supporting	banks	and	other	U.S.	financial	institutions.		This	fund	called	the	Troubled	Asset	
Relief	Fund	(TARP)	was	a	controversial	provision	that	the	president	and	most	economists	at	
the	time	felt	was	required	in	order	to	stave	off	a	catastrophic	threat	to	the	U.S.	financial	
system,	but	which	was	very	unpopular	with	voters	who	saw	it	essentially	as	a	way	to	bail	out	
rich,	over-privileged	individuals	that	had	made	bad	financial	decisions	and	who	now,	it	was	
believed,	should	take	the	losses.		The	fund	was	given	authority	to	buy	mortgage	backed	
securities	at	a	time	when	these	financial	instruments	were	struggling.		This	unpopularity	of	
the	bill	made	it	difficult	for	members	of	congress	to	support	it.		Though	most	elites	felt	the	
bill	was	necessary,	this	was	also	acknowledged	to	be	a	tough	political	position	to	take	for	
members	of	congress	as	it	would	greatly	hurt	their	reelection	chances.		This,	along	with	
dissatisfaction	of	House	Republicans,	contributed	to	the	initial	version	of	the	bill	being	
rejected	by	the	House	of	Representatives.		Following	this	initial	rejection	of	the	bill	The	Dow	
Jones	Industrial	Average	dropped	7%	and	The	Nasdaq	dropped	9.1%.215		The	two	major	
party’s	nominees	for	president,	Barack	Obama	and	John	McCain	issued	a	joint	statement	
saying	that	they	supported	the	TARP	legislation	and	they	wanted	congress	to	pass	the	bill.216		
Similarly	President	George	W.	Bush	stated	the	importance	of	passing	the	bill	and	said	that	
the	economic	market	may	suffer	catastrophic	failure	if	this	is	not	addressed.		Ultimately	
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after	a	good	deal	of	political	wrangling	the	bill	was	passed	though	groups	of	lawmakers	on	
both	sides	remained	opposed	to	its	provisions.	
The	bill	did	not	originate	in	congress,	but	instead	was	initially	proposed	by	the	
Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	Henry	Paulson,	and	was	supported	and	encouraged	by	the	
president.		Congress	did	however	shape	this	legislation	to	some	extent.		An	example	of	this	
can	be	seen	in	the	lessoning	of	the	discretion	that	was	delegated	to	the	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury	in	the	enacted	law	when	compared	to	the	power	delegated	to	the	Treasury	
Secretary	in	Paulson’s	initial	proposal.		Specifically	the	clause	stating,	“Decisions	by	the	
Secretary	pursuant	to	the	authority	of	this	Act	are	non-reviewable	and	committed	to	agency	
discretion,	and	may	not	be	reviewed	by	any	court	of	law	or	any	administrative	agency.”	
which	would	have	removed	all	oversight	of	the	TARP	program,	was	not	included	in	the	final	
legislation	and	thus	led	to	move	oversight	an	control	of	the	activities	of	the	Treasury	
Department	with	regard	to	administering	TARP.		TARP	was	initially	a	very	open	ended	
proposal	when	the	Treasury	gave	their	initial	draft	to	the	congress.		Congress	expanded	and	
fleshed	out	the	proposal,	taking	it	from	the	three	pages	when	it	was	first	proposed	to	169	
pages	when	it	ultimately	was	enacted.	
Agencies	bargain	with	congress	both	in	a	formal	context	and	a	more	informal	
context.		The	Treasury	department	felt	that	they	needed	an	effectively	unlimited	amount	of	
money	available	to	avert	a	major	crisis	and	needed	congress	to	approve	this	vast	spending	
ability.		Treasury	went	to	congress	and	put	forth	a	plan	with	a	rough	order	of	magnitude	as	
an	initial	bargaining	position.		Knowing	that	congress	would	not	approve	spending	authority	
in	the	trillions,	the	Treasury	Secretary	pushed	for	spending	power	on	the	order	of	several	
hundred	billion	dollars	while	still	leaving	vagueness	in	the	request.		This	was	put	forward	
because	it	was	a	large	sum	that	would	have	an	effect	without	being	close	enough	to	the	
psychologically	important	figure	of	one	trillion	dollars	so	that	it	had	a	better	chance	of	
passing.		The	Treasury	Secretary	also	took	steps	to	set	an	aggressive	timeline	to	pass	this	
legislation.217		He	used	the	crisis	as	a	call	to	action	and	an	ultimatum.		When	prompted	what	
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would	happen	if	legislation	was	not	passed	that	would	provide	for	these	powers,	Secretary	
Paulson	said,	“May	god	help	us	all.”218	
The	$700	billion	purchase	authorization	was	given	to	the	Treasury	Department	which	
was	given	the	discretion	of	determining	what	actual	assets	to	purchase.		The	hope	was	that	
the	purchase	of	assets	by	this	program	would	help	solve	the	lack	of	liquidity	in	credit	
markets.		It	was	also	designed	to	boost	investor	confidence,	and	stabilize	the	economy.		Ben	
Bernanke	in	his	testimony	before	the	Senate	stated	his	support	for	TARP	by	saying,	
“Purchasing	impaired	assets	will	create	liquidity	and	promote	price	discovery	in	the	markets	
for	these	assets,	while	reducing	investor	uncertainty	about	the	current	value	and	prospects	
of	financial	institutions.	More	generally,	removing	these	assets	from	institutions'	balance	
sheets	will	help	to	restore	confidence	in	our	financial	markets	and	enable	banks	and	other	
institutions	to	raise	capital	and	to	expand	credit	to	support	economic	growth.”219	
The	TARP	Funds	were	managed	and	invested	by	Office	of	Financial	Stability,	a	new	
office	within	the	Treasury	Department	that	was	established	by	the	Emergency	Economic	
Stabilization	Act	of	2008.		The	office	was	headed	by	the	Assistant	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	
for	Financial	Stability,	who	is	appointed	by	the	president	and	confirmed	by	the	senate.		The	
actual	specifics	of	the	asset	purchases	were	left	to	the	Office	of	Financial	Stability	and	the	
actual	types	of	assets	changed	over	time	as	the	first	head	of	the	office,	Neel	Kashkari,	saw	fit	
to	make	changes.		Initially	the	Office	of	Financial	Stability	ran	the	Capital	Purchase	Program	
which	purchased	primarily	Mortgage	backed	Securities	by	buying	preferred	stock	and	equity	
warrants	so	as	to	have	first	claim	over	assets.		Warrants	are	a	type	of	call	option	that	in	this	
case	allowed	the	government	to	have	a	potential	upside	if	crisis	subsided	and	the	stock	
market	improved.		The	Office	of	Financial	Stability	essentially	forced	institutions	to	take	
money	in	return	for	an	equity	stake	in	order	to	shore	up	cash	poor	financial	institutions.		
After	the	initial	Mortgage	backed	Securities	purchase	program,	TARP	expanded	its	focus	to	
purchasing	collateralized	debt	obligations	(CDOs)	which	were	hit	very	hard	by	the	downturn	
in	the	housing	market	and	it	let	the	value	of	these	assets	to	decrease	and	liquidity	to	dry	up	
in	this	market.		This	helped	define	a	price	of	these	assets	and	increased	liquidity	which	was	
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beneficial	for	banks	that	had	balance	books	which	contained	significant	amounts	of	CDOs	
that	could	neither	be	sold	nor	accounted	for	appropriately.			
The	TARP	program,	according	to	its	administrator,	Neel	Kashkari,	dealt	with	seven	
main	areas	and	initiatives:	the	Mortgage-backed	securities	purchase	program,	an	Insurance	
program,	a	loan	purchase	program,	an	equity	purchase	program,	homeownership	program,	
compliance,	and	executive	compliance.		It	had	relatively	free	range	of	how	to	spend	the	
money	it	was	entrusted	with	though	the	act	did	set	up	oversight	agencies	to	ensure	that	the	
money	was	spent	appropriately.	
The	Treasury	Department	was	able	to	determine	the	criteria	that	financial	
institutions	must	meet	in	order	to	take	part	in	the	TARP	program.		It	took	advantage	of	this	
by	disallowing	golden	parachute	provisions	in	the	compensation	packages	of	senior	
executives	and	putting	a	number	of	other	restrictions	on	the	compensation	for	senior	
executives.		This	was	in	part	a	response	to	political	requirements	and	resentment	of	the	
public	over	spending	public	money	to	pay	the	salaries	of	rich	bankers,	particularly	when	
these	bank	executives	had	done	such	a	poor	job	that	they	took	their	banks	to	the	brink	of	
bankruptcy.		This	desire	not	to	be	seen	helping	bankers	was	intensified	due	to	the	fact	that	
the	Treasury	Secretary,	Hank	Paulson,	had	formerly	been	the	head	of	one	of	these	
investment	banks	and	that	most	of	those	that	he	brought	in	to	address	the	crisis	also	had	
been	investment	bankers	themselves.		The	Treasury	Department	realized	that	even	the	
appearance	of	impropriety	could	incite	backlash	against	the	Treasury	Department’s	actions	
to	save	the	banks	and	imperil	the	financial	rescue	attempts	being	made.		Neither	was	the	
Treasury	Department	alone	in	focusing	on	compensation.		On	February	5,	2009,	the	Senate	
voted	to	limit	executive	bonuses.		Compensation,	particularly	when	so	many	were	suffering	
economically,	is	the	sort	of	issue	that	could	grab	the	public’s	attention	and	cause	voter	a	
revolt.	
President	Bush	authorized	the	Treasury	to	use	TARP	funds	for	any	purpose	that	the	
Treasury	Secretary	felt	was	needed	to	alleviate	the	crisis.		On	March	23,	2009,	the	Treasury	
Secretary	took	advantage	of	this	authority	by	creating	the	Public-Private	Investment	
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Program	for	Legacy	Assets.220		This	program	was	designed	to	buy	toxic	assets	that	were	
being	held	by	banks	and	to	do	so	with	maximum	impact	by	leveraging	private	assets.		It	was	
designed	to	share	risk	and	to	help	determine	the	true	asset	price	by	having	interested	
investors	bid	on	the	asset.		This	price	discovery	function	is	very	useful	in	so	far	as	illiquid	
markets	had	left	banks	unsure	as	to	the	true	value	of	these	assets.		This	plan,	with	its	
divergence	from	past	initiatives,	came	about	in	part	through	the	desires	of	Timothy	
Geithner,	the	new	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	who	has	assumed	office	a	little	under	two	
months	previously.		This	shows	how	an	administration	can	shift	over	time	due	to	new	
leadership	put	in	place	by	the	president	and	senate	which	can	spotlight	both	the	consistency	
and	the	inconsistency	of	agencies	depending	on	circumstances.		This	is	an	inherent	effect	
that	delegation	needs	to	adapt	to	and	which	needs	to	be	factored	in	when	congress	makes	
the	decision	to	delegate.	
Banks	are	categorized	into	5	categories	based	on	the	CAMELS	evaluation	system,	
which	in	turn	determined	their	likelihood	to	receive	money	TARP	funds.221		However	the	
actual	criteria	methodology	was	kept	secret.		This	lack	of	transparency	was	purposely	
designed	into	the	system	as	it	was	intended	to	stop	worry	about	specific	banks	that	could	
lead	to	a	bank	run	and	also	designed	so	that	the	system	could	not	be	gamed.		However,	with	
regard	to	the	valuation	of	troubled	assets,	the	Treasury	is	mandated	that	it	must	make	
public	much	of	its	methodology	including	the	methods	it	used	for	pricing,	purchasing,	and	
valuing	these	assets.		It	also	requires	the	Treasury	Department	to	do	this	within	two	days	of	
the	purchase	of	their	first	assets.		Furthermore	this	act	requires	disclosure	and	openness	for	
those	organizations	that	receive	funding.		The	level	of	disclosure	required	of	these	
organizations	is	at	the	discretion	of	the	Treasury	Department.	
Congressional	influence	continued	to	play	a	role	in	the	administration	of	the	
program.		Congress	by	its	nature	continues	to	control	some	levers	of	powers	over	the	
administration.		The	Wall	Street	Journal	suggested	a	negative	influence	of	congress	in	that	
select	members	of	congress	tried	to	funnel	money	into	troubled	banks	in	their	districts	
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despite	the	fact	that	by	the	standard	rating	system	employed	to	evaluate	which	banks	are	in	
line	to	receive	funds.222			
Likewise,	as	head	of	the	Executive	Branch,	the	president	was	involved	in	many	
aspects	of	administering	TARP.		He	also	directly	had	power	directly	delegated	to	him	by	
congress.		As	part	of	TARP,	the	president	was	made	responsible	for	putting	forward	a	rule	
that	places	a	fee	on	banks	to	cover	tax	payer	losses	due	to	the	program.	
This	provision	to	recoup	TARP	losses	requires	that	five	years	after	the	end	of	the	
TARP	program	the	head	of	the	OMB	must	submit	a	report	to	congress	detailing	the	net	
finances	of	the	TARP	program.223		Should	this	program	show	that	TARP	had	lost	money,	the	
president	is	mandated	to	submit	a	proposal	to	congress	on	how	to	recoup	the	losses	from	
those	that	benefitted	by	the	program	or	for	the	financial	industry	in	general.		There	is	no	
requirement	that	congress	institute	the	plan,	but	it	does	set	the	agenda	and	could	be	
viewed	as	reassuring	that	at	worst	TARP	would	be	revenue	neutral	and	would	not	adversely	
affect	the	budget	or	contribute	to	the	national	debt.		This	provision,	despite	its	lack	of	teeth,	
helped	ensure	passage	for	this	law	as	it	provided	coverage	for	congress.	
In	the	2013	budget	proposal	submitted	by	the	president,	a	provision	was	included	to	
charge	banks	the	$61	billion	that	would	be	required	to	cover	the	cost	of	the	TARP	program.		
One	of	the	requirements	of	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	was	that	by	
2013	the	president	lay	forth	a	plan,	“that	recoups	from	the	financial	industry	an	amount	
equal	to	the	shortfall	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program	does	not	
add	to	the	deficit	or	national	debt.”224		The	president’s	proposal,	though	required	to	be	
submitted,	does	not	automatically	get	approved.		It	is	congress	that	has	the	power	to	tax	
and	the	president’s	proposal	would	only	take	effect	if	congress	approves	of	it.		In	such	a	
situation	it	behooves	the	president	to	suggest	a	popular	course	of	action.		The	suggestions	
he	made	focused	on	recovering	costs	by	placing	a	tax	on	large	financial	companies.		There	
was	a	populist	backlash	that	made	just	such	a	proposal	immensely	popular	and	which	
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helped	counter	accusations	of	bailing	out	rich	bank	executives	with	tax	payer	money.		By	
making	the	president	supply	the	plan,	congress	could	avoid	the	political	risks	of	either	
seeming	too	cozy	with	rich	bankers	or	angering	the	powerful	banking	industry.		There	was	
significant	uncertainty	about	how	the	public	would	view	the	proposal,	which	depended	on	a	
shift	in	public	sentiment	as	well	as	additional	unknowns	such	as	the	endurance	of	the	issue’s	
salience	at	such	point	as	the	proposal,	needs	to	be	submitted.		Congress	loses	politically	by	
raising	taxes	on	the	general	populace	and	generally	by	cutting	programs.		They	also	do	not	
want	to	vote	to	place	new	taxes	on	banks,	which	hurts	those	members	that	approve	it	
because	financial	services	firms	are	major	contributors.		The	end	date	for	the	president	to	
submit	a	proposal	ensured	that	an	action	would	be	taken	and	that	a	plan	to	recoup	the	
money	would	be	written	however	it	was	far	enough	in	the	future	as	to	let	the	topic	become	
less	partisan	and	to	see	the	full	effects	of	the	TARP	and	determine	its	full	costs.		Whether	
the	actual	revenue	matches	the	actual	costs	has	no	importance	in	terms	of	the	economics	of	
the	situation	and	is	an	artificial	construct,	however	there	is	significant	symbolic	value	in	it	
for	congress.	
The	Treasury	Department	was	able	to	use	the	power	that	was	delegated	to	it	and	the	
money	it	was	allocated	by	this	act	for	a	host	of	different	initiatives.		Among	these,	it	created	
a	Systemically	Significant	Failing	Institutions	program	to	help	support	key	institutions	that	
could	pose	a	threat	to	take	down	other	large	financial	institutions	and	create	a	domino	
situation.		Primarily	these	funds	went	to	AIG	and	were	used	to	benefit	AIG	counterparties	
that	would	suffer	significant	financial	losses	in	the	event	that	AIG	were	forced	to	file	for	
bankruptcy.225	
Other	programs	that	the	Treasury	Department	enacted	in	response	to	powers	and	
spending	authority	given	in	part	of	this	act	are	the	Automotive	Industry	Financing	Program,	
the	asset	guarantee	program,	and	the	targeted	investment	program	which	is	a	designed	to	
help	ailing	major	banks	that	could	threaten	the	stability	of	the	banking	system.		Clearly	from	
the	breadth	of	activities	that	the	Treasury	engaged	in	with	the	funds	and	authority	that	this	
act	provides,	it	is	clear	that	the	Treasury	was	given	a	great	deal	of	latitude	as	to	how	to	
address	the	financial	problems	that	the	nation	was	having.		In	addition,	the	Treasury	
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Department	was	also	given	authority	to	create	standards	for	executive	compensation	for	
financial	institutions	that	sell	equity	stakes	to	the	Treasury.	
TARP	was	similar	to	the	Reconstruction	Finance	Corporation	(RFC)	that	the	congress	
and	President	Hoover	created	in	the	1932	to	deal	with	the	Great	Depression.		It	was	an	
independent	entity	that	made	loans	to	financial	institutions	and	other	companies	and	gave	
funds	to	local	and	state	government,	which	was	ultimately	merged	with	the	FDIC	during	
World	War	II.			TARP	was	in	part	modelled	off	entities	such	as	the	RFC.	
TARP	also	was	used	to	fund	a	number	of	other	types	of	entities	such	as	auto	
companies	and	cities.226		Few	individuals	were	even	aware	that	the	Treasury	created	a	$50	
billion	fund	to	help	cities	get	funding	or	exactly	what	the	restrictions	were	on	how	its	
funding	could	be	put	to	use.	
TARP	is	not	an	easily	understood	concept	and	its	resonance	with	the	public	is	largely	
at	the	emotional	level	of	symbolism	rather	than	as	a	reasoned	rationed	decision	or	long	held	
beliefs.		Considerable	effort	was	expended	by	both	political	parties	to	frame	the	TARP	
bailout	which	in	turn	led	to	significant	pressure	being	placed	on	politicians	writing	the	law.		
Likewise	when	the	law	is	implemented	political	pressure	influenced	how	the	law	is	
implemented.				
The	Treasury	initially	argued	for	TARP	by	saying	that	it	would	be	used	to	buy	
mortgages	and	mortgage-backed	securities	as	well	as	other	assets.		However	the	actual	
implementation	did	not	actually	buy	these	assets,	but	focused	on	other	types	of	assets	
instead.		Initially	Treasury	pushed	for	there	to	be	no	judicial	review	of	TARP,	but	this	
proposal	did	not	meet	with	congress’	approval.	
	 There	were	different	views	of	how	quickly	action	should	be	taken	with	regard	to	
TARP	legislation.			The	president	and	many	of	the	key	agency	heads	thought	that	it	was	
important	to	act	quickly	so	as	to	support	the	market	before	a	negatively	reinforcing	cycle	
began	and	the	market	began	to	decrease.227		On	the	other	side	were	individuals	such	as	
Senator	Richard	Shelby,	the	ranking	Republican	on	the	Senate	Committee	on	Banking,	
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Housing,	and	Urban	Affairs,	who	felt	more	time	should	be	spent	deliberating	about	the	plan	
and	determining	whether	it	would	be	beneficial	or	would	hurt	the	economy.228		To	show	
support	for	his	plan	he	referred	to	a	prominent	petition	signed	by	192	economists	that	were	
opposed	to	TARP.		Part	of	the	TARP	program	was	a	program	to	insure	troubled	assets.		This	
was	a	contentious	issue	with	many	politicians,	even	those	that	supported	the	bill,	opposed	
to	it.		In	the	end,	a	compromise	was	reached	and	the	insurance	provision	was	included	and	
made	a	mandatory	provision	that	Treasury	must	provide	a	troubled	asset	insurance	
program.229		Ultimately,	when	TARP	was	passed,	Treasury	complied	with	this	provision	and	
complied	with	the	letter	of	the	law,	but	created	an	insurance	program	with	such	high	
premium	rates	that	it	would	not	be	used	by	anyone	and	thus	that	piece	of	the	law	was	
effectively	voided.	
The	Treasury	Department	and	the	president	lobbied	congress	to	release	funds	for	
TARP.		TARP	was	structured	so	that	the	funding	for	it	came	in	three	tranches.		The	first	two	
were	released	pretty	easily,	but	the	third	slice	of	funds	required	congress’	approval	and	
congress	was	skeptical	to	take	such	a	step	due	to	the	unpopularity	of	such	an	action.		
Congress,	by	keeping	this	power	for	themselves	as	opposed	to	creating	some	nonpartisan	
commission,	put	themselves	in	a	tough	position	politically	as	TARP’s	unpopularity	did	not	
abate,	but	rather	grew	with	its	passage	and	use.		The	Treasury	Secretary	however	felt	that	
the	money	was	needed	because	much	of	the	previous	funding	had	already	been	tied	up	in	
the	Capital	Purchase	Program	to	prop	up	banks	and	in	helping	the	critically	important	
insurance	company,	AIG.230		There	was	still	the	potential	for	a	need	for	major	action	by	the	
government	in	response	to	new	emergencies	and	Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	wanted	to	be	
prepared	for	such	an	eventuality	with	adequate	funding	and	authorities	to	deal	will	
problems	as	they	arose.		The	president	agreed	with	this	plan	and	so	the	administration	
lobbied	congress	to	get	access	to	the	remaining	TARP	funds.		The	administration	was	not	
merely	asking,	but	also	was	willing	to	negotiate	to	get	a	deal	done.		In	order	to	get	the	funds	
released,	the	administration	signaled	their	willingness	to	giving	some	of	TARP	money	to	the	
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automakers	if	congress	approved	the	additional	funds	as	well	as	homeowner	relief.231		This	
made	the	democrats	who	controlled	both	houses	more	likely	to	support	the	allocation	of	
the	funds	under	Bush	rather	than	waiting	for	the	next	president	who	would	be	a	Democrat.	
Initially	the	administration	hoped	to	avoid	the	politically	difficult	move	of	having	to	ask	for	
this	last	slice	of	TARP	funding,	but	with	the	continued	weakening	of	Citigroup	and	the	huge	
shock	it	would	be	to	the	system	if	this	financial	giant	fell	and	the	likelihood	that	symbolically	
important	GM	would	soon	file	for	bankruptcy,	the	administration	began	to	plan	on	how	to	
request	the	funds	in	order	to	be	prepared.		Ultimately	president-elect	Obama	also	
supported	releasing	funds	before	he	came	into	power	and	this	helped	bolster	the	
administration’s	position.		However,	due	to	politics,	the	action	that	congressional	released	
the	funds	was	done	after	the	election.	
After	the	presidential	election	the	political	dynamic	changed	and	the	lame	duck	
congress	had	a	dubious	mandate	for	action.		This	is	one	of	the	structural	factors	that	
affected	the	actions	performed	during	that	period.		With	roughly	130	legislative	days	a	year,	
Congress	is	not	in	session	much	of	the	year	and	this	too	can	affect	the	ability	of	congress	to	
formulate	a	response	to	a	crisis	since	even	during	the	crisis	congress	closed	down	for	a	
while.232	
TARP	was	initially	designed	to	be	used	to	directly	purchase	illiquid	assets	and	build	
liquidity	in	the	market	and	it	was	sold	to	congress	and	the	public	as	being	for	that	purpose.		
However,	once	TARP	was	enacted	it	became	apparent	to	those	in	the	Treasury	that	the	
illiquid	asset	program	would	take	far	longer	to	set	up	than	expected	and	would	have	less	
effect	due	to	the	amount	of	money	that	could	be	invested	in	such	a	large	market.233		It	was	
thus	decided	to	scrap	the	plan	for	an	illiquid	asset	purchase	program	and	focus	on	other	
areas	in	which	TARP	funds	could	have	a	larger	and	more	immediate	effect	such	as	capital	
investments	that	provided	more	benefit	for	dollar	spent.	
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Congress	could	not	formally	affect	the	direction	set	out	by	the	Treasury	Secretary	
about	what	to	do	with	TARP	funds.		The	delegation	was	very	broad	and	was	structured	in	
such	a	way	as	to	give	the	Treasury	Department	significant	discretion	as	to	the	actions	it	
would	take.		Congress	could	however	take	certain	steps	with	regard	oversight	and	could	try	
to	change	agents’	actions	when	they	diverged	from	congresses	intensions	as	they	did	with	
usage	of	the	TARP	fund.		Hearings	are	one	of	the	methods	that	congress	relied	upon	the	
most	and	the	Treasury	Secretary	and	other	administration	officials	certainly	had	to	testify	at	
these	and	were	called	to	task	by	angry	members	of	the	congress.		In	his	November	18th	
testimony	before	the	House’s	Financial	Services	Committee	Secretary	Paulson	received	
comments	such	as	Representative	Maxine	Waters’	accusation,	“You,	Mr.	Paulson,	took	it	
upon	yourself	to	absolutely	ignore	the	authority	and	the	direction	that	this	Congress	has	
given	you.”	
Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	argued	that	TARP	was	an	attempt	at	a	comprehensive	
solution	and	thus	would	be	an	improvement	over	the	way	the	government	had	been	
approaching	the	crisis	up	to	that	point	however	others	were	less	convinced	that	this	would	
be	an	improvement	over	the	status	quo.		The	Ranking	Member	on	the	Senate	Banking	
Committee,	Richard	Shelby	stated	his	view	of	TARP	thusly,	“Rather	than	establishing	a	
comprehensive,	workable	plan	for	resolving	the	crisis,	I	believe	this	legislation	merely	
codifies	Treasury’s	ad	hoc	approach.”234	
The	Capital	Assistance	Program	was	part	of	this	act	and	ended	up	replacing	the	
Capital	Purchase	Program.		This	made	a	number	of	changes	in	the	program	itself	such	as	
requiring	those	that	accepted	money	to	agree	to	adopt	standard	loan	foreclosure	mitigation	
measures	and	increased	reporting	requirements.235	
TARP	was	overseen	by	a	number	of	entities.		These	were	often	quite	critical	of	the	
Treasury	Department	and	the	Fed.		SIGTARP	for	instance	criticized	the	way	the	structure	of	
the	AIG	assistance	was	organized	and	the	multibillion	dollar	bailout	of	AIG’s	counterparties.		
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However	these	reports	were	made	far	after	the	fact	and	had	little	ability	to	change	the	
actions	of	the	Treasury	Department	in	its	running	of	the	TARP	program.		
In	addition	to	TARP,	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	also	
authorized	the	Federal	Reserve	to	pay	interest	on	reserve	and	excess	reserve	balances	if	the	
Federal	Reserve	felt	such	action	was	appropriate.		This	delegation	gave	it	a	new	tool	with	
which	to	stabilize	the	economy.			
The	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	was	one	of	three	sections	of	Public	Law	
110-343.		The	other	two	of	which	were	the	Energy	Improvement	and	Extension	Act	of	2008	
and	the	Tax	Extenders	and	Alternative	Minimum	Tax	Relief	Act	of	2008.		The	first	of	these	
provided	economic	incentives	designed	to	increase	the	adoption	of	green	technologies.		The	
president	on	numerous	occasions	attempted	to	tie	the	issue	of	environmentalism	and	the	
strength	of	the	economy	together.		His	rhetoric	helped	associate	these	goals	together	and	
this	helped	get	green	initiatives	passed	by	offering	the	prospect	of	new	green	jobs.		The	
second	of	these	sections	of	the	act	functioned	as	a	patch	to	stop	the	alternative	minimum	
tax	from	affecting	as	many	people	as	it	would	otherwise.		It	also	included	tax	credits	and	
breaks,	and	temporarily	increased	the	FDIC	deposit	insurance	limit	from	$100,000	to	
$250,000.	
	
4.2.2 American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009 
	
The	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009236	was	a	piece	of	legislation	
designed	to	help	bolster	the	flagging	job	market.		It	was	signed	into	law	February	2009	and	
authorized	spending	on	education,	health,	infrastructure,	energy,	and	tax	initiatives	
designed	to	boost	spending	on	key	areas.237		It	also	expanded	the	unemployment	insurance	
program	to	increase	the	amount	of	benefits	given.		In	addition,	the	act	included	numerous	
congressional	priorities	that	were	not	tied	to	fixing	the	current	problem.		These	included	
popular	provisions	such	as	adding	a	cap	to	the	amount	of	compensation	to	executives	of	
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banks	that	received	funds	in	the	bailout	that	political	popular	with	Main	Street	America.238		
The	central	tenant	of	this	act	was	that	federal	government	spending	would	help	prop	up	the	
economy	and	make	up	for	decreased	capital	expenditures	by	businesses.		Section	3	of	the	
American	Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	listed	the	reasons	for	the	act.		These	include	
assisting	those	hardest	hit	by	the	recession,	creating	or	preserving	jobs,	investing	in	areas	
that	will	improve	efficiency	or	long	term	growth,	and	plugging	gaps	in	state	and	local	
governments.		The	act,	however,	included	provisions	not	directly	related	to	these	goals,	but	
which	were	needed	either	to	assure	that	the	act	passed	or	to	achieve	other	political	ends.	
The	act	itself	was	written	primarily	by	the	Democratic	Congressional	committee	
leaders	and	their	staffs.		It	was	a	very	partisan	bill	with	all	177	Republicans	in	the	House	of	
Representatives	that	voted,	voted	against	it.		Similarly	244	out	of	255	House	Democrats	
voting	voted	against	the	bill.239		In	the	Senate	all	Democrats	voted	for	the	bill	whereas	all	
but	3	of	the	Republicans	voted	against	the	bill.		This	shows	how	partisan	this	bill	was.		The	
majority	party	and	the	House	Rules	Committee	used	restrictive	rules.	
There	were	significant	differences	between	the	bills	initially	passed	by	the	Senate	
and	the	House	of	Representatives.		The	Senate	had	considerable	sway	in	the	debate	and	
while	the	two	houses	worked	out	the	differences	between	the	two	bills,	approximately	$150	
billion	from	the	House	bill	was	modified	or	removed.	
Among	the	funds	allocated	in	this	act,	were	$48.6	billion	to	the	State	Fiscal	
Stabilization	Fund.240		Besides	its	economic	stimulus	effects,	this	Department	of	Education	
controlled	fund	was	an	attempt	to	shore	up	state	education	programs	and	advance	
education	reforms.		State	governors	had	significant	access	to	this	fund	though	there	were	
numerous	restrictions	on	the	dispersal	of	these	funds.		The	Department	of	Education	was	
able	to	use	its	initiative	to	determine	the	amount	of	funds	that	would	be	dispersed.		The	
intensity	of	the	debate	changed	the	actions	of	political	actors.		For	instance,	House	
Democrats	had	promised	very	publicly	to	allow	a	two	day	of	public	review	and	discussion	
before	the	final	conference	report	came	up	for	a	vote,	however	they	did	not	delay	the	vote	
this	long.	
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4.2.3 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 
	
The	Helping	Families	Save	Their	Homes	Act	of	2009241	was	signed	into	law	on	May	
20,	2009.	The	bill	was	designed	to	make	it	easier	for	homeowners	struggling	to	pay	their	
mortgage	to	keep	their	homes.	There	are	several	sections	of	this	bill	that	address	this	goal.		
In	one	section,	the	bill	makes	it	easier	for	homeowners	to	declare	chapter	13	bankruptcy.	It	
gives	considerable	authority	to	the	Secretary	of	Agriculture	to	authorize	loan	modifications	
and	payouts	to	a	financial	institution	that	agrees	to	lower	the	amount	of	principal	owed	by	
the	borrower.	In	addition,	it	amends	the	HOPE	for	Homeowners	Program	and	among	other	
changes	gives	authority	to	the	Secretary	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development.	It	also	
extended	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	till	December	31,	2013.	The	
Helping	Families	Save	Their	Homes	Act	of	2009	also	set	the	Comptroller	General	as	an	
overseer	of	the	TARP	program.	
The	initial	purpose	of	the	act	was	designed	to	give	federal	judges	authority	to	alter	
mortgage	agreements	on	homes.		However	this	controversial	provision	was	dropped	before	
the	bill	was	approved	and	became	law.242	
	
4.2.4 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
	
In	2009,	congress	overwhelmingly	passed	a	bill	that	sought	to	battle	fraud,	which	
had	become	an	issue	during	the	financial	and	mortgage	crisis,	as	fraud	tends	to	increase	at	
such	times.		Every	Democrat	from	both	houses	voted	for	the	bill	as	did	as	did	many	
Republicans.243		The	act	had	several	effects	including	creating	a	more	encompassing	
definition	of	fraud	against	the	United	States.		Among	the	new	actions	that	would	now	
qualify	as	fraud	against	the	U.S.	would	be	fraud	with	regard	to	federal	assistance,	which	
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includes	grants	and	other	government	funds	from	many	of	the	recently	enacted	programs	
such	as	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program	and	the	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	act	
of	2009.		It	thus	helped	provided	oversight	in	the	form	of	increased	punishment	in	order	to	
deter	fraud	which	otherwise	might	increase	in	an	environment	of	such	government	
programs.		Furthermore,	by	punishing	those	that	engaged	in	this	behavior	more	severely,	it	
made	the	public	feel	better	about	the	usage	and	oversight	of	federal	dollars.	
Additionally	Section	5	of	the	Fraud	Enforcement	and	Recovery	Act	of	2009	created	
the	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	Commission	to,	"examine	the	causes	of	the	current	financial	and	
economic	crisis	in	the	United	States.”		It	was	also	tasked	with	publishing	a	report	at	the	end	
of	the	process	and	was	told	to	refer	any	criminal	wrong	doing	it	uncovers	to	whichever	
attorney	general	has	jurisdiction	over	the	wrong	doing.		It	was	a	temporary	commission	that	
was	designed	to	disband	within	60	days	of	submitting	its	final	report.		The	commission	was	
given	authority	to	hold	hearings	and	issue	subpoenas.		It	was	designed	so	that,	"no	member	
of	Congress	or	officer	or	employee	of	the	federal	government	or	any	state	or	local	
government	may	serve	as	a	member	of	the	Commission."		This	made	it	an	ad	hoc	
commission	with	ostensibly	less	politically	invested	in	the	results	of	the	report	and	less	
reason	to	say	or	not	say	things	due	to	political	or	career	considerations.	
The	committee	was	important	because	it	would	be	the	most	thorough	governmental	
narrative	of	the	crisis	and	would	thus	have	a	key	role	in	shaping	the	historical	understanding	
of	the	crisis	much	as	the	Pecora	Commission	did	for	the	Great	Depression.		It	also	performed	
the	important	task	of	assigning	blame.		In	addition,	by	listing	causes	of	the	crisis,	it	
effectively	argued	for	or	against	specific	public	policies	by	saying	they	had	a	positive	or	
negative	affect	in	the	crisis.		Even	basic	conclusions	of	the	commission	such	as	that	the	
financial	crisis	was	avoidable	had	political	implications.	
		However	when	the	congressional	commission	published	a	thorough	report	detailing	
its	findings,	it	was	largely	split	along	party	lines	with	Republican	members	writing	dissenting	
statements.		The	commission	consisted	of	five	members	selected	by	of	each	house	of	
congress:	three	from	the	majority	part	and	two	from	the	minority	party.		Thus	this	
legislation	ensured	that	the	Democrats	would	have	a	6-4	majority	on	the	commission	which	
was	otherwise	supposed	to	be	non-partisan	and	which	allowed	them	to	take	steps	such	as	
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voting	6-4	to	limit	dissenting	opinions	in	the	official	report	to	nine	pages	as	compared	to	
well	over	400	for	the	commission’s	opinion.		The	commission	was	supposed	to	provide	
answers	as	to	the	cause	of	the	crisis	and	to	evaluate	how	the	government	dealt	with	the	
problem	so	as	to	give	an	accounting	to	the	American	people,	but	also	to	provide	knowledge	
for	more	enlightened	policy	making	in	the	future	so	future	crises	or	the	one	that	was	
continuing	to	linger	on	at	that	point	could	better	be	dealt	with	or	avoided.		However,	the	
extent	to	which	this	information	was	or	will	be	leveraged	can	be	called	into	question.		In	
fact,	in	his	dissenting	opinion,	Peter	Wallison,	a	member	of	the	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	
Commission,	raised	the	question	of	why	bother	to	have	the	commission	at	all	since	congress	
took	major	action	such	as	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	without	waiting	for	the	commission’s	report	
and	recommendation	to	inform	it	as	to	whether	such	an	act	would	be	beneficial	with	
regards	to	this	sort	of	crisis	and	as	it	largely	was	political	rather	than	investigative.244	
The	commission	had	a	number	of	time	constraints	placed	on	it	such	that	it	was	
required	to	submit	their	report	to	the	president	and	to	the	congress	by	December	15,	2010	
though	this	did	give	the	commission	well	over	a	year	to	achieve	its	end.		Furthermore	within	
120	days	of	submitting	that	report,	the	commission	was	required	to	appear	before	the	
House	Financial	Services	Committee	and	the	Senate	Banking	Committee	to	answer	
questions	about	their	findings.	
	
4.2.5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
	
The	Dodd–Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act245	was	a	major	
piece	of	legislation	which	became	law	on	July	21,	2010	and	which	greatly	changed	financial	
regulation	in	the	United	States.		The	act	consolidated	agencies	charged	with	regulating	
financial	companies.		As	part	of	its	focus	on	improving	financial	regulation,	it	created	a	
consumer	financial	protection	agency	and	it	delegated	powers	to	the	FDIC	that	enabled	it	to	
gradually	shutdown	banks.		It	also	was	designed	to	implement	international	standards	and	
the	so	called	Volcker	Rule.	
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	 Not	all	members	of	congress	approved	of	the	delegation	contained	in	the	act.		Sen.	
Richard	Shelby	described	the	bill	as	being,	“a	2,300-page	legislative	monster…that	expands	
the	scope	and	the	powers	of	ineffective	bureaucracies.”246		The	agencies	and	administration	
had	differing	motivations	and	differing	views	of	the	act.		Hank	Paulson,	the	Treasury	
Secretary,	said	about	the	act,	“The	new	tools	in	this	legislation	will	help	mitigate	and	
manage	the	next	financial	crisis,	which	is	inevitable,	probably	within	the	next	six	to	10	
years.”247	
	 Congress	acted	in	response	to	administration	preferences.		The	bill	initially	came	
from	a	proposal	from	President	Obama.		After	the	bill	was	put	forward,	Obama	later	argued	
for	it	to	also	include	the	Volker	Rule.248		The	Volker	Rule	was	eventually	included	in	this	act	
as	well.		The	Volker	rule	prohibited	banks	from	engaging	in	proprietary	trading.		Many	
economists,	including	in	the	administration,	did	not	think	proprietary	trading	played	a	part	
in	the	crisis	and	saw	the	Volker	rule	more	as	good	politics	that	a	way	to	address	the	
weaknesses	in	the	financial	system	that	led	crisis.249	
	 Also	in	the	bill	is	a	section	giving	the	SEC	authority	over	whether	certain	
shareholders	can	modify	proxy	statements	to	place	desired	directors	of	the	company	as	
nominees	up	for	vote.		This	allows	the	SEC	to	regulate	this	important	issue.		Board	
membership	is	a	key	issue	that	affects	topics	such	as	governance	and	acceptable	behavior	
for	corporations.	
	 The	act	created	the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council	that	is	tasked	with	assessing	
systematic	risks	to	the	U.S.	financial	system.		The	council	also	is	supposed	to	promote	
discipline	in	the	markets	and	decrease	the	risk	of	financial	bubbles	and	moral	hazard	while	
at	the	same	time	also	ensuring	that	investor	confidence	stays	strong.		They	can	also	require	
large	financial	institutions,	excluding	banks,	to	submit	reports	to	the	council	detailing	their	
financial	situation,	their	risk	mitigation	plans	and	methods,	and	the	potential	adverse	effect	
that	the	agency’s	actions	can	have	on	the	U.S.	financial	system.		The	members	of	the	council	
consist	primarily	of	senior	members	of	the	executive	branch.		The	Financial	Stability	
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Oversight	Council	itself	is	overseen	and	can	be	audited	by	the	Comptroller	General	of	the	
United	States.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	also	created	the	
Office	of	Financial	Research,	a	Treasury	office,	which	is	designed	to	collect	financial	
information	from	certain	financial	institutions.		The	director	of	the	office	has	powers	to	
facilitate	the	collection	of	this	data	including	subpoena	power.		They	use	the	information	
they	gather	to	report	to	congress.		The	agency	can	determine	the	format	of	the	data	it	is	
collecting	and	require	agencies	to	adopt	this	format	when	providing	it	with	data.	
	 In	Title	II	of	Dodd-Frank	Act,	the	authority	is	granted	to	the	FDIC	and	the	Securities	
Investor	Protection	Corporation	(SIPC)	to	wind	down	operations	for	banks	and	other	
financial	institutions.		This	section	of	the	act	also	allows	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	with	
the	consultation	of	the	president,	to	appoint	an	individual	to	run	the	company	once	it	takes	
it	over.			
	 Prior	to	this	act	the	FDIC	and	SIPC	had	some	limited	powers	to	wind	down	operations	
of	certain	companies.		However,	this	act	greatly	enhanced	these	powers	and	increased	the	
number	of	entities	that	these	agencies	are	authorized	to	close	down.		Funds	were	set	aside	
for	this	purpose	in	the	form	of	the	“Orderly	Liquidation	Fund.”250		The	fund	is	able	to	be	
replenished	by	a	fee	on	financial	companies	that	varies	depending	on	the	risk	that	is	posed	
by	an	institution	and	the	status	of	the	economy.		A	limit	was	placed	on	the	amount	that	the	
Government	is	obligated	to	pay	when	a	company	is	liquidated.	
	 Title	III,	also	called	the	“Enhancing	Financial	Institution	Safety	and	Soundness	Act	of	
2010”,	was	designed	to	transfer	some	delegated	power	from	one	agent	to	others.		Financial	
institutions	had	engaged	in	effectively	selecting	their	regulators.		They	tended	to	pick	the	
least	restrictive	rules	and	this	led	to	a	situation	where	institutions	would	shop	for	regulators	
with	lax	rules	and	minimal	requirements.		This	also	gave	regulators	reason	to	further	relax	
their	rules	to	regulate	more	companies	and	thus	reap	more	in	the	way	of	fees.		As	part	of	
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the	attempt	to	reverse	this	trend,	this	act	abolished	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision	(OTS)	
and	merged	it	with	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency.251	
OTS	performed	particularly	poorly	as	an	oversight	agency	and	many	companies	that	
it	oversaw	had	catastrophic	failures.		These	include	Washington	Mutual,	American	
International	Group	(AIG),	and	IndyMac.		It	was	even	implicated	in	the	stock	backdating	that	
IndyMac	participated	in.		The	poor	regulatory	performance	of	OTS	during	this	period	was	
partly	due	to	the	fact	that	funding	for	OTS	came	from	fees	paid	by	the	institutions	they	
regulate.252		While	this	is	in	line	with	other	regulators	of	financial	institution,	it	led	to	the	
regulator	and	the	regulated	companies	being	tied	together	so	that	the	regulator	is	reliant	on	
the	regulated	and	is	thus	incentivized	to	take	it	easy	on	institutions	they	regulate.		OTS	was	
particularly	in	need	of	institutions	to	regulate,	as	there	had	been	a	decrease	in	the	number	
of	thrifts	and	thus	a	decrease	in	the	amount	of	funds	that	were	coming	in	to	the	agency.		
This	decrease	in	the	number	of	thrifts	also	led	to	the	existential	question	of	what	was	the	
agency’s	purpose,	which	led	to	the	agency	trying	to	expand	and	define	its	role.		The	fear	was	
that	members	of	congress	might	begin	to	doubt	the	need	for	a	separate	agency	to	regulate	
so	few	entities.		While	there	were	some	restrictions	about	who	could	use	a	specific	agency	
to	regulate	them,	all	a	company	needed	to	do	to	have	OTS	as	their	primary	regulator	was	to	
buy	or	open	a	thrift	and	many	companies	such	as	AIG	did	just	that.	
	 OTS	was	created	as	a	response	to	the	Savings	&	Loan	Crisis	of	the	1980s	in	which	
many	undercapitalized	banks	ultimately	needed	to	be	bailed	out	at	tax	payer	expense.		The	
day	that	the	OTS	was	created,	President	George	H.	W.	Bush	remarked,	“never	again	will	
America	allow	any	insured	institution	to	operate	without	enough	money.”253		The	OTS	and	
President	Bush’	remark	were	a	direct	result	of	the	failure	of	the	Federal	Home	Loan	Bank	
which	had	prior	to	the	creation	of	the	OTS	had	regulated	a	similar	area	and	had	failed	to	a	
similar	degree	that	OTS	would	fail	two	decades	later.		The	confidence	the	president	
professed	to	have	that	there	would	no	longer	be	undercapitalized	banks	operating	in	
America	proved	to	be	ill-founded	as	the	solution	that	was	put	in	place	to	avoid	this	sort	of	
result	helped	lead	to	the	same	result	albeit	through	different	means.	
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	 The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	includes	a	provision	that	requires	additional	reporting	from	
hedge	funds	and	similar	entities.254			Hedge	funds	and	the	shadow	banking	sector	have	
grown	as	a	percentage	of	financial	activity	taking	place	in	America	and	in	part	this	provision	
acknowledges	this	fact	and	puts	the	treatment	of	hedge	funds	more	on	par	with	other	large	
financial	entities.		There	was	concern	that	the	growth	of	the	shadow	banking	system	may	
eventually	lead	to	an	economic	crisis	in	the	future	and	this	act	took	steps	to	minimize	that	
risk.	
	 Another	provision	that	sought	to	minimize	the	risk	of	future	economic	crises	was	
Title	VI	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	that	amended	the	Bank	Holding	Company	of	1956	to	limit	
risky	investments	by	large	financial	companies.		It	principally	did	this	by	limiting	their	
ownership	of	hedge	funds	and	private	equity	funds.		This	formed	the	basis	for	the	highly	
contested	Volker	rule	that	ultimately	was	codified	and	fleshed	out	by	more	than	960	pages	
of	agency	rules	and	laws.	
	 Another	area	that	began	to	be	regulated	by	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	the	swaps	
industry.		In	Title	VII	of	the	act,	the	SEC	and	the	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	are	
given	responsibility	for	regulating	swaps	and	it	also	mandates	that	most	swaps	be	traded	
through	exchanges.		This	act	is	also	called	the	Wall	Street	Transparency	and	Accountability	
Act	of	2010	and	was	designed	to	rectify	weakness	in	the	financial	regulatory	market	and	
exemptions	that	had	been	in	place	due	to	the	Gramm-Leach-Bliley	Act,	which	was	enacted	
in	November	1999.		Swaps	are	a	type	of	derivative	in	which	two	parties	enter	into	a	contract	
to	“swap”	terms	of	contracts	such	as	interest	rates.		One	type	of	swap	called	a	Credit	Default	
Swap,	in	which	one	party	pays	another	party	to	assume	a	risk	of	a	credit	default,	had	a	
particularly	deleterious	effect	on	the	economy	during	the	crisis.		Congress	had	specifically	
prohibited	any	oversight	or	regulation	of	the	swap	and	options	market	to	prohibit	agencies	
that	at	the	time	were	trying	to	assert	an	authority	to	regulate	this	industry.	
	 Senator	Blanche	Lincoln	after	initially	requesting	fewer	restrictions	on	banks	use	of	
derivatives	and	being	opposed	by	the	administration	offered	a	populist	amendment	that	
would	almost	ban	banks	from	all	trading	of	derivatives.255		Geithner	and	others	saw	this	as	a	
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response	to	a	tough	election	battle	she	was	facing	from	an	opponent	attacking	her	from	the	
left.		Another	proposed	Dodd-Frank	amendment	was	proposed	by	Senators	Merkley	and	
Levin	and	proposed	a	broader	definition	of	proprietary	trading	in	the	hopes	of	having	a	
tougher	restrictions	on	bank’s	trading	activities.		It	was	a	more	expansive	definition	than	the	
administration	was	pushing	for,	but	had	the	support	of	Volker	himself	and	many	on	the	
liberal	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party.256			
	 Several	other	areas	were	addressed	by	the	act	that	sought	to	ensure	adequate	
regulation	of	the	financial	market	as	a	whole.			For	instance,	the	act	created	a	new	office	
called	the	Federal	Insurance	Office,	which	is	a	component	of	the	Department	of	the	
Treasury.		Along	with	responsibilities	such	as	administering	the	Terrorism	Insurance	
Program	it	was	given	responsibility	for	finding	gaps	in	the	regulation	of	the	insurance	
industry	and	was	charged	with	looking	for	problems	in	the	insurance	industry.	
	 One	of	the	widest	pieces	of	delegation	in	this	act	gives	power	to	the	Federal	Reserve	
Board	to	create	standards	that	would	limit	the	possibility	of	a	major	financial	institution	
posing	systematic	risk.257		It	can	use	the	power	delegated	to	it	in	this	part	of	the	act	to	set	
standards	in	a	wide	variety	of	areas.	
	 The	act	also	modifies	the	structure	and	authorities	granted	to	the	SEC	as	well	as	
allowing	it	to	regulate	new	entities	such	as	credit	rating	agencies.258		The	SEC	is	also	given	
authority	to	issue	rules	requiring	disclosure	when	retail	investors	make	purchases	and	also	
gave	authorities	over	broker-dealers	and	investment.		In	addition,	Dodd-Frank	Act	gave	
additional	enforcement	powers	to	the	SEC.		This	is	an	increase	in	the	capabilities	of	the	SEC	
and	the	actions	it	can	take,	but	is	not	a	delegation	of	congressional	authority.		The	act	also	
shielded	the	SEC	from	having	to	comply	with	freedom	of	information	requests	and	this	
change	made	the	SEC’s	actions	less	transparent.		Another	part	of	this	section	added	
regulations	for	asset-based	securities,	which	were	a	contributing	factor	to	the	economic	
downturn.	The	SEC	also	is	told	to	direct	exchanges	not	to	list	securities	of	companies	that	do	
not	meet	the	SEC	rules	on	executive	compensation.		This	gives	stronger	enforcement	to	the	
rules	that	the	SEC	comes	up	with.		This	action	was	required	one	year	from	the	act	being	
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passed.		Another	rule	that	the	SEC	was	given	responsibility	for	are	those	determining	what	
types	of	members	are	acceptable	on	a	company’s	compensation	committee,	which	is	used	
to	determine	pay	of	executives.	
	 Another	new	area	that	the	SEC	is	given	responsibility	for	is	overseeing	credit	rating	
agencies	and	in	particular	the	Nationally	Recognized	Statistical	Rating	Organizations	
(NRSROs)	that	the	U.S.	Federal	Code	gives	special	authority	to	and	whose	ratings	are	relied	
on	by	various	provisions	of	law.		The	crisis	showed	a	weakness	in	the	ability	of	these	ratings	
agencies	to	issue	ratings	that	accurately	reflect	the	current	state	of	companies	and	
securities.		This	in	part	was	viewed	as	a	conflict	of	interest	problem	in	which	companies	are	
incentivized	to	give	better	ratings	to	their	clients	in	order	to	increase	their	revenue	and	
profits.		The	SEC	among	other	powers	can	revoke	the	designation	of	an	NRSRO	if	there	is	a	
chronic	problem	with	the	integrity	of	its	rating	process.		It	also	may	issue	rules	that	are	
designed	to	prevent	a	conflict	of	interest	in	the	agency	between	sales	and	fair	and	honest	
ratings.			
	 Title	IX	Subtitle	F	makes	changes	to	the	way	the	SEC	operates	in	order	to	improve	its	
efficiency	and	effectiveness.		This	includes	management	controls	on	actions	as	well	as	
outlining	new	methods	of	oversight	of	the	SEC	by	the	GAO.		This	enables	congress	to	change	
the	actions	of	an	agency	and	the	method	whereby	it	performs	its	functions.		Typically	these	
are	powers	that	the	president	has	as	head	of	the	executive	branch.		Another	change	
contained	in	this	subsection	is	that	the	SEC	is	now	to	be	funded	primarily	by	filing	fees.		This	
will	help	keep	the	agency’s	independence	and	avoid	the	potential	for	conflicts	of	interest.		
This	title	also	creates	a	larger	role	for	the	Municipal	Securities	Rulemaking	Board	(MSRB)	
giving	it	authority	to	regulate	municipal	advisors.		This	act	also	restructures	this	board.		
While	the	MSRB	already	existed,	the	Public	Company	Accounting	Oversight	Board	(PCAOB)	
was	established	by	this	title.		The	PCAOB	is	a	subunit	of	the	SEC	and	is	given	authority	to	
regulate	public	accounting	firms.	
Many	of	the	restrictions	and	regulations	were	laid	out	explicitly	in	the	Act	with	
existing	regulatory	agencies	responsible	for	policing	agencies	based	on	the	rules	in	the	act.		
However,	the	regulators	that	were	specifically	assigned	entities	to	regulate	by	function	were	
given	authority	to	create	rules	for	various	asset	classes	and	may	also	offer	exemptions.	The	
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act	itself	also	exempts	specific	asset	classes	such	as	Qualified	Residential	Mortgages	from	
these	oversight	provisions.				
	 One	of	the	highest	profile	parts	of	the	Dodd–Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	
Consumer	Protection	Act	is	that	it	established	the	Bureau	of	Consumer	Financial	Protection	
within	the	Federal	Reserve.		The	bureau	is	responsible	for	regulating	financial	products	and	
services	that	are	targeted	to	individuals.		The	role	of	the	bureau	is,	"to	make	markets	for	
consumer	financial	products	and	services	work	for	Americans—whether	they	are	applying	
for	a	mortgage,	choosing	among	credit	cards,	or	using	any	number	of	other	consumer	
financial	products.”259		Ideally	this	also	would	be	how	congress	sees	its	role	in	this	area,	but	
in	practice	its	mission	is	not	always	the	same.	
The	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau	used	the	power	it	was	granted	by	the	
Dodd-Frank	Act	and	made	large	policy	changes.		An	example	of	this	was	on	February	16,	
2012	when	the	board	proposed	a	rule	to	begin	regulating	large	debt	collectors	and	the	
major	credit	bureaus	which	had	previously	not	been	regulated	entities.260		The	bureau	
linked	these	issues	to	the	financial	crisis	and	stated	that	the	need	to	regulate	these	entities	
was	also	due	to	the	increased	role	these	industries	have	in	the	lives	of	Americans.		Besides	
making	the	proposal	to	regulate	debt	collectors	and	credit	bureaus,	the	CFPB	make	
numerous	other	policy	decisions	such	as	setting	the	cutoff	of	which	companies	to	regulate.		
This	can	have	major	effects	on	its	powers.		The	CFPB	set	the	cut	off	for	regulating	consumer	
reporting	agencies	such	that	it	will	regulate	all	such	agencies	that	have	receipts	with	at	least	
$7	million	per	year.		At	this	threshold,	the	agency	will	not	only	regulate	the	three	major	
credit	bureaus,	Experian,	Equifax	and	TransUnion,	but	also	30	or	so	minor	companies	that	
record	information	on	individuals	that	are	largely	outside	of	the	traditional	financial	system.	
The	Act	also	gave	the	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau	authority	outlined	in	the	Truth	
in	Lending	Act	that	had	previously	belonged	to	the	Fed.	
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The	Mortgage	Reform	and	Anti-Predatory	Lending	Act,	Title	XIV	of	the	Dodd-Frank	
Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	also	focuses	on	the	Bureau	of	Consumer	
Financial	Protection	that	was	created	during	the	crisis	to	protect	individuals.		This	Title	was	
broken	up	into	eight	subtitles.			The	act	lays	down	restrictions	on	mortgage	originators.		
Most	of	these	restrictions	were	explicitly	laid	out	in	this	subsection	as	was	a	definition	of	the	
term	mortgage	originator,	but	the	board	is	left	discretion	to	tighten	standards	on	pay	for	the	
services	of	a	mortgage	originator.	
	 The	act	explicitly	limits	actions	of	actors.		It	lays	out	standards	for	residential	loans	
and	requires	certain	minimum	standards	such	as	that	the	loan	originator	must	believe	that	
individual	taking	out	the	loan	is	able	to	repay	it	and	that	revenue	of	the	borrower	must	be	
documented	and	it	limits	the	terms	of	certain	“high-cost”	mortgages,	changes	requirements,	
and	alters	existing	loans.	
	 The	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	not	loved	by	all.		For	instance	the	banking	industry	was	not	
supportive	of	the	changes	that	brought	about	tighter	regulation	of	the	banking	industry.		
Though	this	was	at	the	time	an	unpopular	viewpoint	to	have,	they	did	make	some	efforts	to	
spin	the	issue	and	try	to	reframe	the	debate	to	help	their	side’s	position.		The	president	of	
the	American	Bankers	Association	said,	“To	some	degree,	it	looks	like	they're	just	blowing	
up	everything	for	the	sake	of	change	[…]	[i]f	this	were	to	happen,	the	regulatory	system	
would	be	in	chaos	for	years.	You	have	to	look	at	the	real-world	impact	of	this.”261		By	
comparison,	the	Securities	Industry	and	Financial	Markets	Association,	a	major	lobbying	
group	for	the	financial	industry,	has	stated	support	for	the	law	ostensibly	to	stop	a	tougher	
law	from	being	enacted	instead.	
	 The	Dodd-Frank	Act	added	a	new	officer	to	the	Federal	Reserve’s	Board	of	Governors	
to	advise	the	board	and	oversee	the	regulation	of	financial	institutions	as	well	as	to	report	
to	congress.		This	position,	which	is	called	the	“Vice	Chairman	for	Supervision”,	serves	as	the	
board	chairman	when	the	chairman	is	absent.		It	also	lays	out	some	new	responsibilities	for	
the	GAO	to	oversee	and	audit	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	emergency	lending	facilities	that	
had	been	extended	since	December	1,	2007.		The	Federal	Reserve	is	also	given	new	
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oversight	responsibilities	by	the	act	and	was	mandated	to	develop	standards	for	industries	
that	they	oversee.		These	standards	were	required	in	a	number	of	areas	including	capital	
requirements,	liquidity	requirements,	concentration	requirements,	risk	management	
requirements,	limits	on	the	use	of	leverage,	and	reporting	requirements	related	to	an	
institution’s	credit	exposure.	
	 Title	XIII	amended	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008.		This	
amendment	greatly	reduced	the	quantity	of	funds	available	for	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	
Fund.		It	also	amended	the	Housing	and	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	and	the	American	
Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	so	that	money	that	was	made	by	the	program	was	
set	aside	for	deficit	reduction.		In	practice,	creating	bulwarks	between	spending	and	
revenue	so	that	money	is	assigned	for	a	purpose	is	usually	more	for	show	than	it	is	an	
effective	way	of	controlling	national	spending.		This	was	used	to	show	fiscal	discipline	in	
response	to	the	accusations	that	TARP	was	a	wasteful	bail	out	in	which	the	poor	were	
subsidizing	rich	bankers.		It	was	an	ad	hoc	constraint	on	the	delegation	that	was	inherent	in	
the	TARP	legislation.	
	 Dodd-Frank	also	creates	an	office	in	the	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	
Development	charged	with	counseling	individuals	about	homeownership	and	renting	
houses.		The	director	of	this	new	office	is	authorized	to	appoint	an	advisory	committee	to	
coordinate	media	to	educate	on	these	topics.		The	law	creates	limits	to	the	length	of	the	
term	that	can	be	served	and	the	number	of	appointees.		They	are	given	certain	powers	such	
as	the	authority	to	provide	education	assistance	as	well	as	certain	responsibilities	such	as	
tracking	foreclosures	and	defaults.		It	also	laid	out	rules	governing	escrow	for	the	purchase	
of	real	estate,	but	also	regulates	the	actions	of	mortgage	servicers.		In	addition,	limits	are	
places	on	the	situations	in	which	a	creditor	can	extend	credit	in	the	case	of	a	riskier	
mortgage.		These	mostly	consisted	of	steps	such	as	appraisals	that	needed	to	be	done	by	a	
certified	or	licensed	appraiser	before	a	loan	could	be	issued.		To	ensure	that	appraisals	are	
meaningful,	this	subtitle	charges	a	large	number	of	agencies	with	working	together	to	come	
up	with	standards	for	appraisals.		In	addition,	this	subtitle	regulates	the	settlement	process	
in	an	effort	to	make	it	more	transparent.	
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These	requirements	in	this	subtitle	were	clearly	a	reaction	to	the	systematic	failure	
in	ensuring	that	homes	were	worth	more	than	loans	and	thus	that	default	was	unlikely.		
These	changes	were	designed	to	stop	future	loans	from	having	the	same	weaknesses	as	
many	loans	during	the	housing	crisis	had	and	thus	they	aimed	to	stop	the	problem	from	
reasserting	itself.		The	solution	however	focused	squarely	on	the	loan	originator	and	
avoided	placing	any	blame	on	individuals	who	took	out	loans	despite	an	inability	to	pay	back	
the	loans.		Blaming	mortgage	companies	was	a	popular	charge	whereas	demonizing	those	
individuals	that	defaulted	would	have	been	very	bad	politically	for	the	members	of	
congress.		Presumably	however	congress	could	create	an	entity	or	empower	a	body	to	
better	assure	that	individuals	did	not	act	in	a	reckless	or	fraudulent	manner	when	taking	out	
loans	as	they	individual	taking	the	loan	is	as	much	part	of	the	broken	system	as	those	who	
issued	the	loans.		With	no	stakes	in	the	game	the	loan	originators	did	not	have	an	incentive	
to	scrutinize	the	loans	they	make	to	see	if	they	were	likely	to	be	paid	back.	
	 The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	included	a	number	of	unconnected	provisions	that	among	
other	things	task	agencies	to	issue	reports	on	areas	of	interest	to	congress.		Some,	but	not	
all	of	these	are	related	to	the	financial	crises	whereas	others	use	the	bill	mostly	as	a	vehicle	
to	pass	desired	changes.	
The	Volker	Rule	has	been	one	of	the	major	provisions	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act.		It	
largely	limits	the	ability	of	banks	to	make	certain	types	of	investments	using	their	own	
money	though	it	does	contain	numerous	loopholes.		It	is	also	one	of	the	more	contentious	
provisions	of	the	act	as	many	individuals	feel	that	it	will	make	it	harder	for	U.S.	banks	to	
compete	with	foreign	banks.		John	Walsh,	the	acting	Comptroller	of	the	Currency,	
encapsulated	this	view	in	his	remarks	before	the	House	Financial	Services	Committee	when	
he	stated,	“United	States	banks	competing	with	these	foreign	banks	will	operate	at	a	
competitive	disadvantage,”262		The	rule	was	designed	to	go	into	effect	July	21,	2012	so	that	
there	would	be	time	for	banks	to	adapt	and	the	effect	of	the	rule	on	commercial	banks	is	
not	excessively	onerous.		The	Volker	Rule	makes	a	policy	tradeoff	between	bank	profits	and	
stability	of	the	financial	system.		It	is	designed	to	deal	with	structural	problems	and	
systematic	risks	in	the	system	and	thus	is	a	direct	response	to	the	financial	crisis.		However,	
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the	financial	firms	that	would	be	affected	lobbied	against	this	rule	both	before	its	becoming	
part	of	the	law	and	after	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	passed.	
The	Volker	rule	followed	a	complex	route	to	becoming	part	of	the	law.		The	rule	was	
initially	proposed	in	the	Senate	as	an	amendment	but	was	not	put	to	a	vote.		A	version	of	
the	Volker	Rule	was	later	encompassed	in	the	Merkley-Levin	Amendment,	which	was	a	
somewhat	stronger	version	of	the	Volker	Rule	and	which	put	additional	restrictions	on	
banks.		The	amendment,	however,	was	not	voted	on	either.		Instead	it	was	attached	to	
another	amendment	which	in	turn	was	then	withdrawn	by	that	amendment’s	sponsor,	Sam	
Brownback.		The	bill	was	initially	approved	by	the	Senate	without	any	version	of	the	Volker	
rule	being	included.		However,	in	conference	committee	when	the	House	and	Senate	
reconciled	their	versions	of	the	bill,	the	Merkley-Levin	amendment	was	included	in	resulting	
legislation.		However,	as	the	votes	were	incredibly	tight	in	the	Senate	and	hinged	on	a	
Republican,	Scott	Brown,	voting	for	the	bill,	allowances	had	to	be	made	so	that	he	would	
vote	yes	for	the	bill	and	gave	them	a	filibuster-proof	majority	in	the	Senate.		These	changes	
meant	that	the	rule	was	loosened	so	that	proprietary	trading	in	many	government-backed	
securities	was	exempted	from	the	proprietary	trading	restrictions	in	the	initial	Merkley-
Levin	Amendment.		The	rule	itself	is	in	part	a	piece	of	delegation	in	that	though	it	gives	a	
general	set	of	restrictions	on	actions,	ultimately	the	specifics	of	how	to	implement	the	rule	
were	left	to	the	Financial	Services	Oversight	Council	(FSOC).	
The	FSOC	sought	public	comment	on	the	rule	and	how	best	to	implement	it.		This	
enabled	those	involved	to	give	their	feedback	and	guide	the	resulting	actions	of	the	agency.		
This	opportunity	was	taken	advantage	of	by	many	corporations	such	as	Goldman	Sachs	and	
Bank	of	America.		After	the	Republican’s	retook	the	house,	the	Chairman	of	the	House	
Financial	Services	Committee,	Representative	Spencer	Bachus,	stated	his	intention	to	slow	
implementation	of	the	Volker	Rule	and	questioned	its	usefulness	in	a	statement	he	released	
which	stated,	"The	U.S.	capital	markets	are	the	deepest	and	most	liquid	of	any	in	the	world.		
The	question	for	this	Committee	is	whether	implementation	of	the	Volcker	Rule	in	its	
current	form	represents	a	self-inflicted	wound	that	will	undermine	the	competitiveness	of	
our	markets	and	raise	borrowing	costs	on	a	broad	range	of	U.S.	businesses,	thereby	
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damaging	our	economy."263		By	October	2011,	a	draft	of	regulations	of	the	Volker	rule	had	
been	put	together,	which	due	to	consultation	constraints	on	the	delegation	was	then	
approved	the	SEC,	The	Federal	Reserve,	The	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency	and	
the	FDIC	and	three	months	later	was	approved	by	CFTC.		The	public	had	until	Feb	13,	2012	
to	comment	on	the	draft	proposal.		There	was	a	good	bit	of	complexity	to	the	regulation	
that	handled	any	details,	but	left	less	to	judgment	decisions.		Paul	Volker	himself	said,	“I’d	
write	a	much	simpler	bill.		I’d	love	to	see	a	four-page	bill	that	bans	proprietary	trading	and	
makes	the	board	and	chief	executive	responsible	for	compliance.		And	I’d	have	strong	
regulators.		If	the	banks	didn’t	comply	with	the	spirit	of	the	bill,	they’d	go	after	them.”264	
While,	Dodd-Frank	set	forth	the	Volker	Rule,	the	actual	rules	and	regulations	of	the	
Volcker	rule	were	laid	out	by	agencies	and	ended	up	totaling	more	than	963	pages.265		There	
was	considerable	delegation	involved	with	turning	a	hard-to-define	rule	into	concrete	
requirements.		In	addition,	the	administration	was	able	to	set	many	specifics	such	as	who	
the	rule	would	affect	and	when	it	would	take	effect.		There	was	a	continual	battle	over	the	
rules	that	were	put	in	place	and	how	they	would	be	written	and	their	implementation.		To	
quote	Timothy	Geithner,	“Reform	is	a	‘forever	war’.”266	
Since	the	enactment	of	Dodd-Frank	and	the	Volker	Rule	that	it	contains,	there	have	
been	numerous	attempts	by	the	financial	industries,	the	Republican	Party	and	others	to	
weaken	some	of	the	restrictions	and	requirements	that	the	Volker	Rule	imposed	on	financial	
institutions.		There	had	been	clashes	about	several	provisions	of	the	rules	such	as	whether	
collateralized	loan	obligations	(CLOs)	would	be	exempt	from	these	regulations.		In	January	
2014,	regulators	acceded	to	some	industry	requests	such	as	allowing	banks	to	hold	specific	
types	of	debt	so	long	as	these	debt	instruments	were	backed	by	trust	preferred	securities.267		
Several	court	cases	were	also	brought	which	slowed	implementation	of	much	of	the	Dodd-
Frank	Act.		It	was	years	for	the	regulations	mandated	by	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	to	go	into	
effect.		For	instance	at	the	four	year	anniversary	of	Dodd-Frank,	less	than	half	the	SEC	rules	
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were	final.268		Nearly	two	dozen	officials	have	a	vote	on	the	regulations	that	implement	the	
Volker	Rule.269		Kara	Stein,	one	of	the	five	SEC	Commissioners,	threatened	to	vote	against	
the	implementation	of	the	Volker	Rule	due	to	its	loose	limits	on	hedging	and	because	in	the	
proposed	rules	are	not	on	hook	for	rule	violations.		Because	the	two	Republican	
Commissioners,	Michael	Piwowar	and	Daniel	Gallagher,	already	planned	to	vote	against	the	
implementation,	Ms.	Stein’s	vote	was	needed	to	enact	the	SEC’s	regulations	regarding	the	
Volker	Rule.270		Ultimately,	the	rules	were	changed	so	that	hedging	of	a	portfolio	was	not	
exempted	from	Volker	Rule	restrictions.		This	change	in	rules	after	J.P.	Morgan	Chase	&	Co.	
disclosed	that	it	had	lost	billions	in	the	so	called	London	Whale,	transactions	that	J.P.	
Morgan	characterized	as	portfolio	hedging.		On	the	other	side	of	the	issue,	Senators	
Manchin,	Wicker,	and	Kirk	sent	a	letter	to	Ben	Bernanke	and	other	regulators	that	they	
wanted	the	rules	loosened	and	to	exempt	small	banks.	
To	ensure	that	financial	institutions	had	enough	capital	on	hand	to	survive	a	financial	
downturn,	a	provision	called	the	Collins	Amendment	was	included	in	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	
which	sets	risk-based	capital	requirements	and	set	maximum	limits	on	leverage.		In	order	to	
implement	the	Collins	Amendment	and	other	provisions	of	Dodd-Frank	the	Fed	announced	
on	December	20,	2011	a	series	of	steps	that	were	proposed,	“to	strengthen	regulation	and	
supervision	of	U.S.	bank	holding	companies	with	consolidated	assets	of	$50	billion	and	
nonbank	financial	firms	that	it	deems	as	being	systemically	important.”271		Among	the	
measures	the	board	proposed	were	liquidity	requirements,	capital	and	leverage	
requirements	based	on	a	company’s	risk,	mandatory	periodic	stress	tests,	limits	on	
counterparty	transactions	in	which	there	is	a	single	counterparty,	and	early	remediation	
requirements.		This	led	to	unintended	consequences	such	as	large	foreign-based	banks	with	
U.S.	presences,	such	as	Barclays	and	Deutsche	Bank,	trying	to	skirt	the	rules	by	switching	
entity	types.		This	potentially	enables	them	to	continue	operating	these	large	entities	with	
minimal	regulation	and	capital	cushions.		This	leads	to	these	forms	taking	higher	risk	and	be	
more	competitive	than	domestic	companies.	
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Other	entities	also	created	rules	and	policy	to	implement	the	broad	goals	and	
provisions	in	Dodd-Frank.		For	instance	the	FDIC	took	steps	to	implement	the	Volcker	Rule,	
Section	619,	and	Section	165,	which	required	stress	tests	of	certain	banks	and	created	policy	
as	part	of	this	process	of	fleshing	out	the	general	policy.		An	example	is	the	FDIC’s	
determination	of	what	is	the	process	and	the	required	pieces	for	the	stress	tests	that	the	
Section	165	of	Dodd-Frank	mandates.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	was	a	reaction	to	
the	crisis	and	was	designed	to	take	steps	to	avoid	a	future	crises.		It	has	been	argued	that,	
“politicians	and	political	ideologues	began	to	treat	the	hypotheses	that	confirmed	their	
predilections	as	if	they	were	established	facts,	and	these	theories	eventually	formed	the	
conventional	wisdom.		Thus,	conservatives	were	eager	to	blame	the	crisis	on	the	
government	…	while	liberals	were	eager	to	blame	the	crisis	on	capitalism	…”272	
Dodd-Frank	enhanced	the	Fed’s	regulatory	role	despite	the	relatively	poor	job	it	had	
done	as	a	regulatory	agency	previously.		This	increase	in	its	regulatory	powers	is	juxtaposed	
against	plans	prior	to	the	crisis	that	had	focused	on	changing	regulatory	agencies,	which	
would	have	decreased	the	Feds	responsibilities	in	this	area.273		Despite	its	poor	performance	
as	a	regulator,	many	felt	that	the	Fed’s	relationships,	experience,	and	authority	would	make	
it	the	best	choice	for	a	regulator	to	oversee	the	stability	of	the	entire	financial	system.274	
Agencies	tried	to	affect	the	course	of	the	Dodd-Frank	legislation.		The	Fed	had	only	a	
five-member	legislative	affairs	team,	but	it	used	those	as	well	as	its	politically	connected	
board	members	both	in	DC	and	at	the	12	regional	banks	to	curtail	argue	against	several	
provisions	that	the	Fed	and	its	leaders	did	not	think	were	in	its	best	interests.		At	the	period	
that	Dodd-Frank	was	being	debated,	there	was	strong	anti-fed	fervor	in	congress	as	well	as	
the	public.		This	manifested	itself	as	a	push	for	more	transparency	as	well	as	calls	for	the	fed	
to	be	stripped	of	powers	and	its	role	as	a	regulator.		In	the	end	a	compromise	was	
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hammered	out	which	would	increase	transparency	of	the	Fed’s	actions	while	still	allowing	
the	fed	discretion	in	its	day	to	day	activities.		The	amendment	passed	the	senate	96-0	and	
even	Senator	Bernie	Sanders	who	had	initially	proposed	a	much	stronger	amendment	
supported	the	amendment.		Other	lobbying	groups	such	as	Community	Bankers	of	America	
pushed	for	their	own	preferred	policy.		In	the	case	of	Community	Bankers	of	America	they	
wanted	the	Fed	to	remain	the	regulator	for	small	banks.		They	were	powerful	because	there	
were	politically	connected	bankers	in	so	many	congressional	districts	and	they	used	this	to	
ensure	political	leverage.	
Dodd-Frank	also	created	a	new	Fed	position,	a	vice-chair,	who	was	put	in	charge	of	
the	Fed’s	regulation	mission.		However	despite	the	creation	of	the	role,	the	president	never	
nominated	an	individual	to	fill	this	role.	
Dodd-Frank	called	for	stress	tests	that	among	other	things	can	determine	whether	
profits	can	be	distributed	to	shareholders	or	buy	back	its	stock.		This	was	not	a	mere	
hypothetical	power,	but	was	used	to	stop	distributions	for	several	large	banks	that	the	Fed	
judged	to	be	under-capitalized.		Much	of	this	power	is	in	the	hands	of	administrators	rather	
than	laid	out	in	clear,	concise	rules.	
	
4.2.6 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
	
To	deal	with	long-term	structural	deficits,	Republicans	pushed	for	actions	to	deal	
with	deficit	spending	and	in	particular	pushed	for	spending	cuts.		Seeing	that	at	that	time	
the	Republicans	were	on	the	politically	popular	side	of	this	issue,	the	president	embraced	a	
failed	senate	proposal	and	issued	Executive	Order	13531	which	created	The	National	
Commission	on	Fiscal	Responsibility	and	Reform,	commonly	referred	to	as	the	Simpson-
Bowles	Commission.		The	commission	was	ostensibly	set	up	to	find	a	compromise	of	how	to	
tackle	long	term	debt	reduction.275		It	began	its	work	in	April	2010	and	released	its	report	
and	had	its	final	vote	in	December	of	that	year.		It	was	structured	as	a	presidential	
commission	set	up	by	President	Obama	in	Executive	Order	13531,	but	the	majority	of	its	18	
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members	were	members	of	congress.		The	commission	was	designed	to	create	a	blueprint	
for	deficit	reduction	which	could	then	be	voted	up	or	down	by	congress	but	not	amended.		
However	in	order	to	be	automatically	introduced	to	congress	to	vote	on,	the	proposal	
needed	a	14	vote	supermajority	of	commission	members	to	support	the	proposal.		In	
practice	this	did	not	happen	and	only	11	commissioners	voted	for	the	proposal	and	the	
proposal	never	made	it	to	the	floor	of	congress	for	a	vote.		The	high	number	of	votes	
required	to	meet	the	minimum	number	of	votes	needed	to	ensure	action	was	a	constraint	
as	was	the	end	date	for	the	commission	to	report	by.		The	commission	met	in	secret	and	this	
allowed	it	to	work	out	possible	solutions	without	the	limitations	or	immediacy	of	focusing	
on	politically	popular	positions.		While	congress	determined	the	ultimate	say	of	whether	to	
vote	for	the	deal	or	against	the	deal,	the	fact	that	the	details	were	worked	out	by	another	
entity	and	the	proposal	has	closed	rules	whereby	it	could	not	alter	the	agreement,	made	
this	a	piece	of	delegation	in	an	important	topic	area.		The	structure	of	this	type	of	delegation	
is	very	similar	to	the	BRAC	commission	or	to	treaties	negotiated	by	the	president	under	Fast	
Track	authority.		Ultimately	the	structure	of	the	delegation	hurt	it.		Because	the	commission	
was	largely	created	by	President	Obama	and	he	would	receive	credit	for	its	
accomplishments,	this	risked	making	some	members	to	be	less	receptive	to	the	process.		
One	of	the	co-chairman	believed	he	saw	this	tendency	and	stated	the	purpose	of	some	of	
those	that	voted	against	the	proposal,	“was	to	stick	it	to	the	president.”276	
	
4.2.7 Budget Control Act of 2011 
	
In	2011,	there	was	considerable	fighting	over	whether	to	raise	the	debt	ceiling	and	
over	other	debt-related	initiatives.		The	Republicans	tried	and	in	part	succeeded	on	getting	
the	Democrats	to	give	ground	on	spending.		Some	of	the	capitulations	they	wrangled	out	of	
Democrats	that	came	about	during	protracted	negotiations	on	raising	the	federal	debt	limit,	
on	continuing	resolutions	needed	to	keep	the	government	open,	and	on	the	annual	budget	
were	implemented	in	the	Budget	Control	Act	of	2011.277		As	part	of	the	deal,	a	large	
percentage	of	these	reductions	were	designed	to	be	determined	by	a	commission	rather	
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than	by	congress	directly.		Congress	set	up	the	Joint	Select	Committee	on	Deficit	Reduction,	
also	referred	to	as	the	Supercommittee.	
This	committee	was	required	to	come	to	an	agreement	to	cut	at	least	$1.2	billion	in	
federal	spending,	but	many	in	both	parties	were	urging	for	a	grand	compromise	that	would	
yield	even	deeper	cuts	and	help	limit	the	projected	rise	in	the	ratio	of	national	debt	to	
GDP.278		The	way	the	bill	was	designed,	the	Supercommittee,	congress	and	the	president	all	
had	deadlines	on	their	actions	and	if	they	fail	to	meet	these	deadlines,	automatic	cuts	are	
triggered.		The	cuts	were	designed	to	be	unappealing	to	both	parties	in	order	to	increase	the	
willingness	of	the	parties	on	the	panel	to	compromise.		The	initial	agreement	to	delegate	to	
the	Supercommittee	was	an	agreement	to	cut	a	predetermined	amount	from	the	budget;	
the	details	were	left	till	later	once	the	goal	was	determined.		The	Supercommittee	was	
instructed	on	a	minimum	goal	and	were	free	to	use	whatever	method	they	deemed	
appropriate	to	reach	it.		The	design	of	the	committee	was	such	that	it	needed	a	majority	in	
order	to	trigger	the	next	phase	where	congress	votes	on	the	bill.		The	bill	that	the	
Supercommittee	would	propose	could	not	be	amended	by	either	house	of	congress,	could	
not	be	filibustered	by	the	senate,	and	must	be	voted	up	or	down.		This	ensured	that	the	deal	
that	the	committee	agreed	to	would	either	be	accepted	as	agreed	on	or	else	tough	cuts	
would	be	automatically	enforced	and	thereby	the	committee’s	compromise	would	likely	be	
accepted.		Besides	ensuring	the	deal	was	approved,	the	tough	sanctions	also	encouraged	a	
deal	for	the	committee	in	the	first	place.	
The	members	of	the	committee	were	members	of	congress,	but	the	creation	and	
empowering	of	this	committee	is	still	a	delegation	as	the	body	was	separate	and	distinct	
from	congress	as	a	body.		In	that	sense,	delegating	to	any	congressional	committee	is	a	form	
of	delegation,	but	to	this	joint,	select	committee	this	is	even	more	so.		While	all	members	
are	part	of	congress	and	the	committee	is	a	congressional	committee,	there	is	nothing	
inherent	to	these	characteristics	that	changes	the	nature	of	the	delegation	much.		If	the	
committee	included	a	couple	members	that	were	not	members	of	congress	it	would	not	
change	the	nature	of	the	decision	or	the	resulting	compromise.		It	also	would	not	greatly	
threaten	the	legitimacy	of	the	body	or	this	method	of	creating	policy.		As	for	the	committee	
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being	a	congressional	committee	rather	than	an	advisory	committee	that	has	been	used	in	
other	instances,	either	way	the	creation	of	the	bill	is	done	by	a	collection	of	individuals	
appointed	to	a	role	and	the	ultimate	up	and	down	decision	will	rest	with	congress.		The	
committee	itself	is	unlike	most,	in	that	it	can	write	legislation.		The	members	on	a	
committee	do	have	an	effect	on	the	committee	process	and	more	importantly	on	its	results.		
In	this	case,	the	panel	is	composed	of	twelve	members:	three	members	from	each	party	in	
each	house.		Thus	the	members	reflect	the	interests	of	the	party	heads	in	both	of	the	
houses	of	congress	as	these	chose	the	members	of	their	party	in	their	house	that	would	
represent	the	party	on	the	panel.		The	members	of	the	board	thus	vary	depending	on	who	
appointed	them.		However,	one	general	trend	is	that	the	members	did	not	tend	to	be	party	
leaders	who	typically	lead	their	parties	in	congress.		This	lack	of	formal	power	makes	
creating	a	deal	that	much	more	of	a	challenge.		Four	members	of	the	board	were	on	the	
earlier	Simpson-Bowles	commission	and	all	four	voted	against	the	deal	created	by	that	
commission.			
In	the	end,	this	piece	of	delegation	was	not	effective	in	this	situation.		While	the	
general	belief	is	that	neither	side	wanted	the	talks	to	break	down	and	have	severe	
automatic	cuts	kick	in,	neither	side	was	willing	to	compromise	enough	for	a	deal	to	be	
reached.		This	led	to	a	stalemate	in	which	after	months	of	discussion	and	negotiation,	the	
committee	was	unable	to	create	a	series	of	cuts	that	would	be	acceptable	to	both	parties.		
Thus	what	had	initially	been	created	in	the	hopes	of	bipartisan	compromise	broke	down	and	
ultimately	led	to	partisan	bickering.		On	November	21st,	more	than	three	and	a	half	months	
after	the	committee	was	first	established,	its	two	co-chairs	were	forced	to	issue	a	statement	
saying,	”After	months	of	hard	work	and	intense	deliberations,	we	have	come	to	the	
conclusion	today	that	it	will	not	be	possible	to	make	any	bipartisan	agreement	available	to	
the	public	before	the	committee’s	deadline.”279		The	deadline,	which	was	put	there	to	force	
an	agreement,	became	an	unattainable	goal	and	well	before	that	it	became	clear	that	no	
deal	was	likely	to	be	reached.		The	chairs	expressed	regret	that	no	deal	was	able	to	be	
reached,	but	others	on	the	board	try	to	use	the	failure	politically	and	point	blame	at	the	
other	side.		Near	the	end	of	the	committee’s	deliberation,	there	came	a	shift	in	which	an	
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alternative	was	presupposed	in	that	congress	could	remove	the	automatic	cuts	that	would	
kick	in	since	they	could	just	pass	legislation	vetoing	that	part	of	the	bill.		President	Obama	
came	out	against	such	a	move	and	stated	that	he	would	veto	any	such	measures,	but	he	did	
so	after	the	panel	conceded	defeat	so	that	this	potential	way	out	appeared	viable	while	the	
panel	was	still	negotiating.280		If	his	goal	was	to	force	a	compromise,	the	appropriate	time	to	
state	his	unwillingness	to	accept	a	reversal	of	the	automatic	cuts	would	have	been	early	in	
the	process	and	so	those	negotiating	could	only	have	seen	two	alternatives:	compromise	or	
unacceptable	cuts	to	areas	that	they	particularly	care	about.		One	cannot	however	be	sure	
of	the	president’s	policy	preferences.		The	sequester	cuts	kicked	in	though	the	nature	of	the	
cuts	was	not	desired	by	either	side.		Ultimately	the	Bipartisan	Balanced	Budget	Act	of	2013	
decreased	the	size	of	the	sequester	cuts	in	2014	and	2015.		The	decrease	in	cuts	was	paid	
for	by	other	savings	and	by	extending	the	sequester	two	additional	years	beyond	2020	when	
the	sequester	cuts	were	initially	due	to	expire.	
In	negotiations	such	as	this,	those	involved,	including	the	president,	are	likely	not	to	
show	their	true	policy	preferences	and	thereby	undercut	their	hand.		He	may	well	have	
wished	for	the	automatic	cuts,	which	trimmed	what	were	typically	very	politically	difficult	
areas	to	trim	such	as	defense.		As	spending	on	defense	had	increased	so	much	in	the	last	
decade	and	he	tended	to	be	more	of	a	dovish	president,	it	was	possible	that	this	was	his	
preferred	result.		However	for	observers	it	looked	like	a	failure	of	congress	and	the	political	
process	and	when	the	news	leaked	out	that	the	Supercommittee	was	going	to	announce	
later	that	day	that	the	committee	had	been	a	failure	and	was	not	able	to	reach	an	
agreement,	the	U.S.	stock	market	reacted	very	unfavorably	to	the	news	and	soon	after	
Standard	and	Poor’s	downgraded	the	United	States’	credit	rating	thereby	marking	the	first	
time	that	the	debt	had	been	downgraded	less	than	AAA.	
The	committee	members	anticipating	the	way	the	failure	of	the	committee	would	be	
perceived	focused	on	pointing	fingers	and	half	the	committee	members	went	on	Sunday	
political	news	shows	to	try	to	place	the	blame	for	the	stalemate	on	member	of	the	other	
party	and	there	intractableness.		This	inability	to	come	to	an	agreement	was	similar	to	many	
other	instances	of	gridlock	such	as	the	Simpson-Bowles	commission	and	the	negotiations	
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between	Speaker	of	the	House	Boehner	and	President	Obama	over	a	grand	bargain	that	
would	reduce	4	billion	from	the	deficit	over	the	course	of	10	years.		In	all	these	cases,	those	
involved	stated	a	desire	to	solve	the	problem	and	that	they	saw	the	deficit	as	a	major	long-
term	crisis	that	required	a	bi-partisan	solution.		Thus	those	involved	had	reason	to	work	
together	to	solve	these	structural	deficits,	but	despite	this	apparent	agreement	on	the	
major	goal,	they	were	unable	to	determine	the	particulars	of	how	to	reach	that	goal.		
One	potential	problem	with	this	delegation	is	that	congress	continues	to	have	the	
ability	to	countermand	the	negative	repercussions	that	would	kick	in	if	no	deal	was	reached.		
Congress	can	pass	legislation	rewriting	the	rules	that	the	Budget	Control	Act	of	2011	put	in	
place.		This	tendency	can	be	seen	in	the	Gramm–Rudman–Hollings	Balanced	Budget	Act	of	
1985281	and	the	Budget	and	Emergency	Deficit	Control	Reaffirmation	Act	of	1987282	that	was	
used	in	the	1980s	to	limit	deficit	spending	by	using	the	threat	of	automatic	spending	cuts.		
However,	despite	budgets	through	this	era,	the	cuts	were	countered	and	eventually	
removed	when	the	congress	passed	the	Budget	Enforcement	Act	of	1990283	and	switched	to	
the	PAYGO	method	of	limiting	budgetary	spending.		The	strongest	method	to	guard	against	
this	is	a	prior	public	commitment	or	the	framing	of	the	issue	by	those	who	wish	to	ensure	
that	congress	does	not	skirt	a	tough	issue	by	removing	the	punishment	for	inaction.		The	
president	in	particular	can	set	expectations	for	the	board	and	raise	its	profile	so	that	the	
public	will	not	allow	the	taking	of	the	easy	course.		The	act	also	ensured	a	congressional	
vote	on	a	balanced	budget	amendment.		The	amendment	bill	was	not	able	to	garner	the	
required	2/3rd	of	votes	in	either	the	house	or	the	senate	and	thus	was	never	sent	to	the	
states	to	be	ratified.	
The	act	itself	also	included	an	increase	in	the	debt	ceiling	that	was	needed	for	the	
U.S.	to	continue	deficit	spending.		Thus	it	was	viewed	as	imperative	to	pass	the	bill	as	the	
U.S.	approached	the	debt	ceiling	and	the	potential	of	a	debt	default	became	more	
pronounced.		The	Republicans	insisted	on	cuts,	but	the	two	sides	could	not	fully	work	out	
the	specifics.		Instead	some	cuts	were	laid	out	in	this	act	and	went	into	effect	and	the	
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second	set	was	left	up	to	the	discretion	of	the	panel.		The	act	was	similar	to	the	SAFE	
Commission	proposal	that	Representative	Frank	Wolf	had	proposed	previously.	
	 The	Republicans	were	able	to	shift	the	debate	from	how	much	additional	stimulus	
there	would	be	and	shifted	it	to	a	question	of	reducing	the	national	debt.		The	Republicans	
in	control	of	the	House	were	most	responsible	for	this	change	and	in	large	part	played	a	
major	rule	in	blocking	many	of	the	proposals	that	Obama	and	the	Democratically	controlled	
Senate	proposed.		It	was	this	change	in	public	sentiment	that	allowed	the	Republicans	to	
play	hardball	in	the	debt	limit	negotiations	and	thus	were	able	to	push	through	the	Budget	
Control	Act	of	2011.		This	was	in	effect	a	pivot	from	a	focus	on	the	short	term	economic	
problems	to	a	wider,	more	expansive	look	at	the	long	term	economic	weakness	faced	by	the	
country.		Thus	the	short	term	crisis	was	used	as	a	method	to	improve	the	long-term	financial	
picture	of	the	nation.		The	time-frame	and	definition	were	shifted	in	the	minds	of	voters	by	
tying	together	the	short-term	crises	and	the	long-term	crises.		This	is	despite	the	fact	that	by	
cutting	short-term	spending	in	order	to	improve	the	deficit	situation	would,	according	to	the	
common	economic	view,	hurt	the	recovery.		While	not	all	economists	agree	that	Keynesian	
stimulus	will	help	the	recession	and	questions	about	multiplier	effects	are	common,	the	
prevailing	view	is	that	economic	stimulus	is	one	way	to	help	the	economy.	
By	threatening	to	throw	the	country	into	sovereign	default	on	its	debt,	the	
Republicans	were	able	to	maneuver	the	Democrats	into	going	along	with	some	of	these	
changes.		By	using	brinksmanship	the	Republican	was	able	to	push	the	Congress	to	agree	to	
some	cuts	and	to	perform	a	delegation	to	cut	additional	spending.		There	was	however	
some	risks	as	the	Democrats	used	this	to	paint	the	Republicans	as	being	reckless	and	
irresponsible.		In	addition,	the	hard	line	of	the	Republicans	ran	the	risk	of	inadvertently	
actually	leading	to	a	debt	default	since	neither	side	knew	the	actions	the	other	side	was	
willing	to	take.		
The	Budget	Control	Act	was	designed	in	such	a	way	that	there	were	three	separate	
increases	to	the	debt	ceiling	that	could	be	authorized	by	the	act.		The	second	and	third	
increases,	which	amounted	to	the	bulk	of	the	acts	increases,	required	the	president	to	
request	the	money	and	had	a	provision	so	that	congress	could	act	to	stop	the	debt	ceiling	
increase.		As	congress	could	only	stop	the	increase	with	a	joint	resolution,	which	would	be	
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subject	to	veto	by	the	president,	congress	could	be	pretty	sure	that	the	increases	would	be	
implemented.		However,	by	implementing	the	bill	this	way,	congress	could	tag	the	president	
with	most	of	the	responsibility	with	raising	the	debt	ceiling.		This	was	a	political	liability	in	
that	political	environment.	
On	Nov	9,	2011,	the	president	issued	another	executive	order.284		This	one	
attempted	to	cut	government	waste.		By	using	an	executive	order	the	president	was	able	to	
bypass	a	congress	that	was	mired	down	in	gridlock	and	had	a	large	contingent	that	saw	it	as	
politically	expedient	to	counter	the	president's	proposals.		The	executive	order	sought	to	cut	
government	spending	on	travel	and	technology	by	20%.		It	does	this	by	limiting	the	pieces	of	
technology	such	as	phones	and	laptops	that	are	issued	to	government	employees.		Similarly	
it	is	designed	on	cutting	back	on	the	amount	of	official	travel	as	well	as	items	that	are	
viewed	as	frivolous	such	as	mugs	or	t-shirts.	
President	Obama	suggested	that	he	be	given	the	power	to	consolidate	agencies.285		
Presidents	had	these	powers	for	52	years	until	1984	at	which	point	congress	removed	this	
provision.		This	power	would	force	congress	to	have	an	up-down	vote	that	would	either	
approve	or	reject	the	president’s	proposal	within	90	days	of	the	proposal.		This	is	a	
delegation	and	affects	other	delegations.		The	power	the	president	requests	currently	
resides	with	congress.		Obama	analysis	of	this	delegation	was	that	it	allowed.			He	stated	it	
thusly,	“Congress	first	granted	this	authority	to	presidents	in	the	midst	of	the	Great	
Depression,	so	that	they	could	swiftly	reorganize	the	executive	branch	to	meet	the	changing	
needs	of	the	American	people”286		If	the	president	can	reshuffle	the	bureaucracy	then	
powers	delegated	to	agencies	can	be	changed	by	the	president’s	actions.		The	president	
wanted	to	use	this	power	to	consolidate	a	number	of	agencies	that	he	argued	would	get	rid	
of	duplication	and	would	make	the	government	more	efficient	and	streamlined.		He	initially	
proposed	consolidating	six	agencies:	the	Commerce	Department,	Export-Import	Bank,	the	
Office	of	the	U.S.	Trade	Representative,	the	Overseas	Private	Investment	Corporation,	the	
Small	Business	Administration,	and	the	Trade	and	Development	Agency.		The	estimation	
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from	the	administration	is	that	the	consolidation	would	allow	a	cut	in	1,000-2,000	jobs,	
which	would	save	around	$3	billion	over	the	decade.287		This	consolidation	was	a	shuffling	of	
the	structure	of	these	organizations	and	by	changing	the	structure	it	can	change	the	
resulting	policies	and	preferences.		For	instance,	the	Office	of	the	United	States	Trade	
Representative	is	currently	under	the	Executive	Office	of	the	President	of	the	United	States	
and	thus	has	a	great	deal	of	freedom	from	congressional	actions.		Furthermore	the	United	
States	Trade	Representative	is	currently	a	cabinet	level	position,	but	after	the	reshuffle	once	
the	trade	representative	will	be	under	the	head	of	the	new	agency	and	thus	may	eventually	
no	longer	be	a	cabinet	level	position	despite	President	Obama’s	assurances	that	he	does	not	
intend	to	change	this.		This	change	in	stature	of	the	position	would	affect	the	amount	of	
power	that	the	organization	has	and	would	effectively	deemphasize	the	project	of	trade	
liberalization.		It	would	also	complicate	the	USTR,	which	is	already	a	very	small	streamlined	
organization.		In	part	this	request	was	likely	to	claim	the	popular	position	of	cutting	
expenses	and	making	government	more	efficient	that	the	Republicans	had	previously	been	
championing.		Thus	asking	for	and	using	this	power	would	be	largely	a	political	action	as	
would	congress	granting	the	power.		The	administration’s	position	is	well	summed	up	by	the	
Deputy	Director	for	Management	and	Chief	Performance	Officer	at	the	Office	of	
Management	and	Budget	when	he	states,	“The	government	we	have	is	not	the	government	
we	need.		The	last	reorganization	of	the	whole	government	was	done	by	Herbert	Hoover.		
Since	then,	agencies	have	been	layered	on	top.”288		To	push	for	this	power	President	Obama	
implicitly	compared	the	government	to	an	inefficient	company	when	he	said,	“This	is	the	
same	sort	of	authority	that	every	business	owner	has	to	make	sure	that	his	or	her	company	
keeps	pace	with	the	times.”		He	further	asked	for	this	delegation	by	making	the	claim	that	
he	will	use	it	well	and	thus	will	be	self-policing.		To	this	end	he	states,	“Let	me	be	clear,	I	will	
only	use	this	authority	for	reforms	that	result	in	more	efficiency,	better	service,	and	a	leaner	
government.”289	
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	 His	proposal	suggested	making	the	Small	Business	Administration	a	cabinet	level	
agency,	which	would	give	it	more	prominence.		This	change	would	imply	administration	
support	for	and	emphasis	on	small	business	and	this	is	nearly	universally	approved	of.			
By	giving	the	president	the	initiative	to	initially	propose	what	to	cut,	he	gains	
considerable	ability	to	set	the	agenda.		He	will	focus	on	issues	of	interest	to	him	and	cut	
funds	to	certain	areas	he	is	not	happy	with.		Other	groups	of	course	would	have	different	
priorities.		The	right	wing	paper,	the	Wall	Street	Journal,	proposed	consolidating	the	nation’s	
47	job	creation	programs	as	a	way	to	cut	overlap	and	wasteful	inefficiency.		This	suited	their	
ideology	as	this	cut	programs	that	typically	are	popular	with	liberals	and	unpopular	with	
conservatives	and	had	a	conservative	president	been	in	power	they	might	propose	such	a	
change.		Obama,	being	more	left	wing,	was	more	interested	in	cutting	trade	and	commerce	
agencies	that	are	approved	of	by	conservatives	while	liberals	are	less	sure	of	their	value.	The	
proposal	itself	would	not	greatly	affect	the	budget	and	thus	was	likely	more	of	a	symbolic	
and	political	move	rather	than	a	major	change	in	policy.		It	was	also	not	bipartisan	or	done	
in	coordination	with	congress.				
The	restructuring	however	does	not	reflect	where	the	government	is	spending	its	
efforts.		The	Commerce	Department	is	many	times	larger	than	any	of	the	other	agencies	
that	are	proposed	getting	merged	with	it	both	in	terms	of	employees	and	budget.		This	
means	these	other	agencies	are	at	risk	of	being	subsumed	into	the	whole	and	being	
deemphasized	when	the	commerce	entity	in	effect	becomes	the	parent	entity	in	this	
merger.		Even	though	NOAA,	a	large	part	of	the	Commerce	Department	would	be	shifted	to	
the	Interior	Department	under	the	plan,	the	Commerce	Department	still	would	account	for	
nearly	90%	of	the	employees	in	the	combined	agency.		By	comparison,	the	agency	will	have	
10	times	as	many	employees	as	the	Small	Business	Administration	which	Obama	proposes	
making	a	Cabinet	level	agency.			
These	agencies	do	have	closely	related	function,	but	currently	serve	distinct	
purposes	and	thus	have	been	separate.		While	the	Commerce	Department	handles	a	wide	
number	of	issues	and	areas	related	to	commerce,	the	Export-Import	bank	focuses	on	the	
much	more	narrow	task	of	helping	US	Businesses	export	their	goods,	OPIC	helps	the	US	get	
established	overseas,	USTR	tries	to	push	international	trade	policies,	the	small	business	
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administration	helps	support	and	grow	small	business,	and	the	Trade	and	Development	
agency	focuses	on	opening	emerging	markets	up	to	US	exports	
	 Of	course	not	all	proposals	to	delegate	powers	become	law.		A	piece	of	proposed	
legislation	that	did	not	pass	through	congress	was	a	proposal	for	a	national	infrastructure	
bank.		This	proposal	was	proposed	in	the	Senate	in	2007.		The	following	year	the	President	
stated	his	support	for	the	bill	and	it	has	reemerged	a	number	of	times	since,	including	as	a	
component	of	the	American	Jobs	Act,	but	it	has	yet	to	become	law.	
	 An	economics	issue	that	congress	largely	handled	itself	were	provisions	of	the	
Economic	Growth	and	Tax	Relief	Reconciliation	Act	of	2001	(EGTRRA)	and	the	Jobs	and	
Growth	Tax	Relief	Reconciliation	Act	of	2003	(JGTRRA)	which	together	are	generally	referred	
to	as	“the	Bush	tax	cuts”.		The	tax	cuts,	which	were	created	as	a	temporary	act	with	a	sunset	
provision,	were	scheduled	to	expire	December	31st,	2010.		This	led	to	serious	negotiation	
between	both	parties	as	that	date	approach	to	determine	what	structure	the	cuts	should	
be.		The	three	alternatives	were	to	let	the	tax	cuts	expire,	extend	them	for	some	length	of	
time,	and	modify	what	tax	rates	are	cut	and	pass	this	new	tax	cut.		While	letting	the	tax	cuts	
expire	would	have	gone	a	long	way	toward	improving	the	long	term	debt	problems	the	
country	faced.		Due	to	the	short	term	fiscal	downturn,	the	Democrats	wanted	to	keep	the	
tax	cuts	in	order	to	stimulate	the	economy.		The	Republicans	meanwhile	tend	to	like	lower	
taxes	and	smaller	government	and	thus	also	wanted	to	keep	the	taxes	in	place.		In	addition,	
neither	side	wanted	to	be	branded	as	causing	the	largest	single	increase	in	taxes	in	the	
history	of	the	United	States.		The	temporary	tax	cut	was	in	large	part	designed	to	be	passed	
into	law	in	part	because	it	would	appear	to	be	a	comparatively	small	cost	however	it	was	
also	designed	so	that	those	later	would	not	find	it	easy	to	allow	it	to	expire.		Many	other	
provisions	with	yearly	adjustments,	sunset	provisions,	and	donut	holes	are	designed	
similarly	for	this	reason.		Ultimately	the	Republicans	took	the	position	that	the	tax	cuts	
should	be	extended	in	their	current	form	while	the	Democrats	said	the	tax	cuts	should	only	
be	extended	for	those	that	are	not	rich.		Within	a	year	of	the	initial	tax	cuts	being	passed,	a	
significant	effort	was	put	forward	to	make	the	tax	rebates	permanent	and	multiple	bills	with	
that	goal	passed	the	Republican	controlled	House	of	Representatives.		In	practice,	they	
wanted	the	tax	cuts	to	expire	on	those	whose	yearly	income	was	greater	than	$250,000,	but	
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would	be	extended	for	everyone	else.		Later	after	a	lack	of	willingness	of	the	Republicans	to	
accede	to	this	proposal,	the	cutoff	was	raised	to	$1,000,000.	
President	Bush	pushed	for	the	tax	cut	publicly.		In	his	2003	State	of	the	Union	
speech,	President	Bush	laid	out	plans	for	a	$726	billion	tax	cut.		The	proposal	was	not	
popular	with	everyone	as	much	of	the	cuts	come	from	cuts	to	dividend	taxes	and	thus	was	
most	beneficial	to	the	rich	and	least	beneficial	to	the	poor	and	thus	was	not	popular	with	
some	Democratic	law	makers.		However	the	large	size	of	the	tax	cut	was	alarming	to	some	
Republican	law	makers	that	were	concerned	with	budget	deficits.		However,	the	economy	
was	weak	and	the	president	made	the	case	that	tax	cuts	were	needed	to	stimulate	the	
economy	saying,	“To	create	economic	growth	and	opportunity,	we	must	put	money	back	
into	the	hands	of	the	people	who	buy	goods	and	create	jobs.”290		Congress	ultimately	passed	
the	tax	cut,	but	not	to	the	size	that	the	president	wanted.		There	were	future	tax	cuts	in	
2004	as	the	election	year	made	cuts	politically	beneficial	to	both	parties.		The	initial	
proposal	had	to	be	cut	back	in	part	because	the	democrats	did	not	want	Bush	to	have	a	
political	victory.291	
The	Republicans	wanted	the	focus	to	be	on	this	issue	and	all	44	Republican	senators	
threatened	to	stop	all	other	legislation	until	the	tax	cut	issues	had	been	resolved.		The	
Republicans	had	enough	votes	to	stop	a	cloture	vote	and	they	were	able	to	use	these	to	get	
significant	leverage.		The	Democrats	were	able	twice	to	get	their	proposals	passed	the	
House	of	Representatives,	but	could	not	get	the	bills	passed	the	Senate	due	to	the	
coherence	of	the	Republican	delegation	in	the	Senate.		After	these	two	failed	attempts	at	
changing	the	nature	of	the	tax	cut	and	with	less	than	a	month	to	go	before	the	cuts	would	
expire,	the	president	interceded	and	was	able	to	negotiate	a	deal	with	the	Republican	
contingent.		Throughout	the	process,	the	president	had	assigned	a	couple	key	aids,	the	
Treasury	Secretary	and	the	head	of	the	OMB	to	help	nail	down	a	compromise.		The	tax	cuts	
were	extended	two	years.		As	part	of	the	package,	the	Alternative	Minimum	Tax	(AMT)	was	
adjusted	so	that	it	would	affect	less	people,	the	estate	tax	rules	were	adjusted,	and	some	
stimulus	was	included.		This	allowed	both	sides	to	get	something	of	interest	to	them	and	
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was	able	to	push	off	the	contentious	issue	again	until	after	the	2014	election.		This	
benefitted	the	president	since	it	might	sidetrack	his	other	priorities	and	was	a	high	risk.		
While	congress	ultimately	approved	the	deal	and	passed	it	as	the	Tax	Relief,	Unemployment	
Insurance	Reauthorization,	and	Job	Creation	Act	of	2010,292	it	can	be	viewed	as	a	sort	of	
delegation	as	the	president	and	his	advisors	largely	stepped	in	and	shaped	the	structure	of	
the	bill	along	with	Republican	Senators.		Congress	as	a	body	was	given	an	agreement	to	vote	
on	that	was	essentially	a	fait	accompli	that	could	not	really	be	altered	and	thus	they	could	
only	accept	or	reject	the	treaty	much	as	the	case	with	foreign	treaties	that	the	president	
negotiates	under	the	provisions	of	Fast	Track.	
	 Following	the	TARP	legislation,	The	Treasury	Department	injected	capital	into	all	the	
major	banks	in	the	belief	that	many	banks	were	all	undercapitalized.		The	banks	were	
effectively	forced	to	accept	the	additional	capital	in	return	for	preferred	equity.		However,	
during	the	crisis	this	was	cheap	capital.		The	TARP	Congressional	Oversight	Panel	estimated	
that	these	capital	injections	included	a	22%	subsidy	to	the	banking	sector.293	
	
4.2.8 Other Responses to Economic Crises 
	
The	president	and	congress	also	took	steps	to	decrease	the	government’s	costs	by	
decreasing	salaries	and	benefits	for	government	employees.		This	includes	freezing	the	pay	
of	government	workers	other	than	members	of	the	military,	making	government	workers	
pay	more	towards	their	pensions,	and	making	military	veterans	pay	more	for	health	care	
through	the	Federal	Health	care	system.		This	was	a	relatively	painless	cut	politically	since	
freezing	wages	does	not	seem	like	a	decrease	in	salary	though	with	inflation	it	was	a	
decrease	in	real	economic	terms.		The	difference	between	a	standard	salary	increase	of	a	
little	over	2%	and	no	increase	is	far	less	of	a	gap	psychologically	than	a	difference	between	
no	increase	and	a	0.1%	decrease.		This	sentiment	of	the	populace	has	an	effect	on	policy	
formation	since	it	affects	public	sentiment.		Government	workers	are	relatively	easy	targets	
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for	cuts	as	there	is	a	perception	that	government	workers	are	overpaid	and	underworked.294		
These	perceptions	were	encouraged	by	Republicans,	who	typically	prefer	smaller	
government.		This	perception	also	has	some	truth	in	that	Federal	Government	employees	
earn	far	more	on	average	than	the	typical	American	worker.		Also	there	is	not	much	in	terms	
of	geographical	distribution	of	government	employees.		The	majority	of	Federal	government	
workers	live	in	Maryland,	Virginia,	or	Washington,	D.C.,	which	are	politically	rather	
homogenous,	and	thus	senators	and	the	president	are	not	too	worried	politically	about	
getting	reelected	and	they	will	not	be	that	hurt	by	this	action.	
Steps	were	taken	to	provide	a	safety	net	such	as	extending	unemployment	
insurance.		This	was	relatively	popular	with	voters	and	so	congress	enacted	many	of	these	
changes	themselves.		Other	steps	taken	during	the	downturn	were	to	stimulate	the	
economy	in	the	hopes	of	stabilizing	it	and	helping	it	begin	to	grow	again.		An	example	of	a	
policy	that	was	put	in	place	for	this	second	reason	was	a	cut	in	the	payroll	tax.		By	its	
structure	this	act	should	help	put	money	in	the	pockets	of	those	that	are	most	likely	to	
spend	it.		Payroll	tax	is	a	relatively	flat	or	regressive	tax	and	so	returning	money	will	mean	
most	of	it	ends	up	going	to	those	that	are	relatively	poor	who	were	more	likely	to	need	the	
money	and	more	likely	to	spend	the	money	than	the	rich.		This	helps	ensure	a	decent	
multiplier	for	that	money	that	was	returned	to	the	economy	and	thus	that	it	would	have	a	
bigger	effect	on	the	economy	than	other	actions	would.		This	was	temporarily	cut,	with	the	
cut	being	equivalent	to	an	act	with	a	sunset	provision.		There	was	enough	reason	to	
convince	lawmakers	to	agree	to	extend	the	provision	based	on	the	continuing	weakness	in	
the	economy.		This	temporary	measure	allowed	the	topic	to	be	readdressed	rather	than	
becoming	a	permanent	change.		However,	popular	actions	can	continued	to	be	patched	
rather	than	fixed	long	term.		The	extension	was	more	complex	than	it	could	have	been	
otherwise	as	the	Republicans	who	were	less	in	favor	of	extending	this	reduction	in	the	
payroll	tax	asked	for	considerations	in	return	for	their	acceptance	of	their	proposal	and	they	
were	ultimately	able.		Among	these	was	a	decrease	in	the	costs	of	federal	pensions.		Public	
opinion	had	also	begun	to	move	against	congress	as	a	whole	for	being	perceived	as	
dysfunctional	and	gridlocked.		This	was	an	additional	motivator	to	get	congress	to	agree	on	
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a	deal	so	that	both	sides	could	be	seen	as	doing	the	nation's	work	and	effectively	managing	
the	crisis.	
The	president	made	policy	based	on	certain	assumptions	and	models,	but	could	not	
be	assured	of	their	validity	and	had	an	even	tougher	time	explaining	them	to	the	public	or	
congress.		The	Obama	administration	released	predictions	that	the	stimulus	would	create	or	
preserve	up	to	3.6	million	jobs	over	a	baseline	in	which	the	stimulus	had	not	been	
implemented.295		As	jobs	continued	to	be	lost	and	there	was	a	net	job	loss	in	the	United	
States	it	was	hard	for	the	public	to	see	increasing	unemployment	and	understand	that	the	
stimulus	was	creating	jobs.		This	was	not	helped	by	the	fact	that	the	jobs	created	or	those	
that	were	saved	due	to	stimulus	could	not	be	counted	and	often	the	complex	state	of	the	
economy	made	it	so	one	could	not	be	determined	if	a	job	was	saved	due	to	stimulus.		Since	
the	jobs	were	not	countable,	there	was	no	way	to	verify	that	these	jobs	were	saved	or	
created.		Rather	the	administration	used	the	model	that	was	used	to	predict	the	jobs	saved	
and	used	it	to	say	that	it	proved	that	they	were	saved.		This	was	a	theoretical	approach	
rather	than	an	empirical	method.		This	is	risky	since	the	model	could	well	be	off	which	the	
administration	model	of	unemployment	certainly	was.		There	were	millions	of	jobs	lost	
during	the	beginnings	of	the	stimulus.		Between	October	2007	when	the	Troubled	Asset	
Relief	Program	was	signed	into	law	and	December	2008,	roughly	eight	million	jobs	lost	
according	to	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics.296		While	there	was	a	lag	time	between	when	
TARP	and	other	stimulus	were	passed	and	when	they	would	begin	to	be	implanted	or	begin	
to	have	an	effect,	the	typical	view	of	citizens	does	not	take	this	into	effect.		The	population	
also	does	not	take	into	effect	the	long	term	growth	in	the	U.S.	labor	force	which	required	
significant	job	creation	just	to	keep	the	percentage	of	employable	American	employed	the	
same.		Politically	it	was	in	the	interests	of	the	politicians,	and	particularly	the	administration	
in	power	that	will	most	be	blamed	if	the	economy	is	doing	poorly,	in	powers	to	point	out	
these	factors	and	manage	expectations.		Unfortunately	in	a	crisis	the	timeframe	of	people	
and	thus	also	those	of	politicians	are	shortened	and	the	tendency	is	to	focus	on	the	more	
immediate	crisis.		This	leads	to	changes	in	how	stimulus	is	structured	as	well	as	how	to	
approach	longer	term	issues	tied	up	with	the	crisis.		The	president	in	particular	must	be	
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aware	of	this	sentiment	in	this	situation	because	even	though	he	has	very	little	control	over	
the	economy	in	the	public	imagination	the	president	has	extensive	powers	to	control	the	
economy	and	can	effect	change	quickly.		He	thus	gets	blamed	if	the	economy	is	weak.		This	
is	the	reason	that	the	Clinton	campaign	used	its	“It’s	the	economy,	stupid”	slogan	when	he	
campaigned	against	George	H.	W.	Bush.	
The	unemployment	rate	was	found	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	to	be	around	
4.7%	in	October	2007	when	TARP	passed	and	continued	to	rise	for	the	following	months	
until	it	was	around	10%.297		The	unemployment	rate	is	a	measure	of	the	amount	of	the	
workforce	that	is	looking	for	a	job,	but	is	currently	unemployed.		This	measurement	
excludes	a	number	of	potential	workers	such	as	those	that	are	“under-employed”,	those	
that	are	employed	at	a	part-time	job	that	want	a	full-time	job,	and	those	that	have	given	up	
looking	for	work.		Thus	the	measure	used	by	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	greatly	
understated	the	effects	on	workers.		Before	the	recession,	the	economy	was	in	strong	
shape,	being	near	full	employment,	and	thus	the	comparison	made	by	voters	was	even	
more	of	a	stark	contrast	since	the	especially	strong	economy	made	the	situation	appear	
worse	than	it	would	otherwise.		Unemployment	is	typically	viewed	as	a	lagging	indicator	so	
it	will	drop	after	the	actual	economy	had	already	begun	to	suffer.		In	the	crisis,	the	ratio	of	
the	working-age	population	that	was	employed	to	that	which	was	not	employed	was	the	
lowest	since	1947.		There	were	also	vast	disparities	hidden	in	the	unemployment	rate.		
Certain	geographic	areas	had	a	far	higher	than	the	average	unemployment	rates	and	certain	
groups	such	as	African-Americans	and	men	also	were	well	above	average	and	teen	
unemployment	was	a	record	high.		While	teens	and	African-Americans	typically	have	higher	
rates	of	unemployment	than	society	as	a	whole	these	already	high	rates	of	unemployment	
increased	significantly	during	the	crisis.			Policy	that	the	government	creates	would	need	to	
be	aware	and	address	these	disparities	to	be	fully	effective	and	meet	the	needs	and	
expectations	of	their	constituencies.	
The	high	unemployment	rate	had	major	direct	effects	such	as	increases	in	federal	
outlays	for	social	spending	and	a	decrease	in	taxes	receipts.		There	are	also	follow	on	effects	
such	as	less	revenue	for	businesses	as	the	unemployed	spend	less.		The	biggest	effect	
however	is	a	decrease	in	trust	in	the	system	and	a	decrease	in	optimism	about	the	future	of	
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the	economy.		Many	of	the	aspects	of	the	crisis	also	led	to	a	decrease	in	confidence	in	the	
financial	system,	the	political	system,	and	a	belief	of	how	it	will	affect	them.		The	modern	
economic	system	is	predicated	on	trust	and	would	grind	to	a	halt	without	faith	in	the	
system.		Banks,	which	thrive	through	lending	or	investing	vast	multiples	or	their	assets,	
would	not	be	able	to	lend	or	to	avoid	bank	runs	and	bankruptcy.		Businesses	would	not	be	
able	to	get	funds	and	avoid	liquidity	crisis.		Businesses	would	have	to	cut	back	on	
investments	and	lay	off	people.		More	individuals	would	lose	jobs	and	their	houses	thereby	
exacerbating	the	crisis.		It	would	stop	the	dynamism	of	the	U.S.	economy.		In	addition,	these	
all	negatively	affected	the	U.S.	stock	and	bond	markets	which	decreases	the	wealth	effect	
which	in	turn	decreases	the	tendency	to	spend	and	thus	GDP	as	well	as	weakening	the	
savings	held	by	many	and	making	it	tougher	for	individuals	to	struggle	along.	
This	severity	of	the	crisis	led	to	extraordinary	actions.	The	president	and	the	Treasury	
Secretary	have	significant	emergency	powers	that	enable	them	to	deal	with	economic	
crises.		Most	of	these	powers	initially	came	from	Depression	era	legislation.		These	include	
regulatory	powers	over	banks	in	the	Federal	Reserve	System.		Much	of	its	power	is	informal	
powers	and	the	power	to	persuade	much	as	the	president’s	power	or	other	agency	heads.		
In	large	part	it	is	up	to	the	administrator	of	an	agency	to	define	their	role	for	themselves.		
The	president	also	takes	his	own	view	of	presidential	powers	and	will	assert	powers	that	are	
not	directly	laid	out	in	the	congress.	
	 Congress	gives	significant	leeway	to	agencies	during	a	crisis.		Congress	often	wanted	
action	taken	on	an	issue,	but	could	not	take	action	itself	or	even	delegate	powers	in	a	timely	
manner	due	to	internal	conflict,	being	adjourned,	political	unpopularity	of	the	actions,	or	
other	reasons.		During	the	Lehman	Brothers	crisis,	the	Treasury	secretary	mentioned	to	
Barney	Frank,	who	was	the	Chairman	of	the	House	Financial	Services	Committee,	that	he	
wanted	additional	powers	to	wind	resolve	the	crisis.		In	the	words	of	the	Treasury	Secretary,	
Congressman	Frank,	“encouraged	the	Fed	and	Treasury	to	interpret	our	existing	powers	
broadly	to	protect	the	system,	saying	‘If	you	do	so,	I’m	not	going	to	raise	legal	issues.’”298	
	 The	Fed	and	Treasury	were	thus	able	to	act	quickly	under	powers	they	could	assert	
they	had.		Congress	in	comparison	was	slow	to	act.		Reform	of	the	Housing	market	and	
Government	Sponsored	Enterprises	that	was	the	root	cause	of	the	crisis	dragged	on	as	no	
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quick	reforms	were	made.		Congress	is	a	deliberative	body.		In	many	situations	it	can	be	a	
good	thing	to	act	in	a	moderated,	level	headed	way	rather	than	rushing	into	decisions	that	
may	prove	poor	or	ill	thought	out	in	the	future.		However,	this	does	mean	that	its	actions	
are	often	not	immediate	and	GSE	Reform,	which	was	a	major	issue	of	debate	in	2008,	is	was	
still	lingering	several	years	later	as	lawmakers	debate	the	ultimate	shape	of	the	reform	and	
even	whether	it	should	be	a	piecemeal	reform	or	more	comprehensive.		This	slowness	to	act	
was	of	course	not	solely	due	to	the	processes	of	congress.		Congress	relies	to	a	considerable	
extent	on	the	administration	and	so	they	based	reforms	off	of	proposals	such	as	those	in	
Treasury’s	mandated	report	“Reforming	America’s	Housing	Finance	market:	A	Report	To	
Congress”	which	was	issued	in	February	2011.		This	leads	to	the	central	point	of	the	manner	
in	which	policy	is	created.		In	this	instance,	it	was	in	direct	response	to	the	crisis	even	if	not	
immediate	in	time	to	it	and	relied	heavily	on	the	administration	and	agencies	to	shape	the	
public	policy	that	eventually	congress	would	formally	adopt	albeit	with	some	modifications.	
	 The	Treasury	pressed	for	significant	new	powers	during	the	crisis	such	as	the	ability	
to	buy	equity	in	Fannie	or	Freddie,	a	temporary	increase	in	the	line	of	credit	that	Treasury	
was	allowed	to	extend	to	these	two	housing	entities,	and	allowing	the	Federal	Reserve	to	
get	access	to	the	GSE’s	financial	data	as	a	consultative	regulator.299		It	also	pushed	for	
significant	spending	power	with	Treasury	head	Paulson	saying,	“If	you	want	to	make	sure	it	
is	used,	make	is	small	enough	and	it’ll	be	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy…	It	would	be	self-
defeating	to	start	putting	limitations	on	a	plan…	I	think	that	if	you	have	a	squirt	gun	in	your	
pocket	you	may	have	to	take	it	out,”	Paulson	said.		He	continued	by	saying,	“If	you	have	a	
bazooka	in	your	pocket,	and	people	know	you	have	a	bazooka,	you	may	never	have	to	take	
it	out.”300		Much	of	these	powers	that	were	requested	were	granted	in	the	Housing	and	
Economic	Recovery	Act	(HERA)	that	was	enacted	July	30,	2008.	
The	president	was	able	to	use	his	veto	and	in	conjunction	with	his	party,	he	is	able	to	
force	concessions	to	his	view	point.		For	instance	during	the	crisis	both	sides	wanted	
agencies	to	have	emergency	powers	to	support	Fannie	and	Freddie	and	the	housing	market	
in	general,	however	the	Democrats	were	insisting	on	block	grants	to	state	and	local	
governments	which	was	disliked	by	both	the	president	and	the	vast	majority	Republicans	in	
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the	House	of	Representatives.301		Ultimately	the	president’s	position	forced	the	Democrats	
agreed	to	structure	the	emergency	power	in	a	way	that	did	not	include	these	block	grants.	
Barney	Frank	wrote	that,	“Here,	another	important	point	about	our	government	
must	be	noted:	in	times	like	this,	the	initiative	is	inevitably	and	inescapably	with	the	
executive	branch.		Congress	can	respond	to	requests,	modify	them,	and	in	some	cases	
refuse	to	act,	but	it	is	virtually	impossible	for	Congress	to	initiate	action	in	a	crisis	of	this	
sort.”302		Congress	could	however	take	steps	to	block	action	or	counter	the	administration.	
Congressman	Frank	also	made	the	assertion	that	the	Republicans	initially	
understood	the	need	to	govern	responsibly	and	address	the	crisis	in	a	constructive	way,	but	
that	once	they	lost	the	White	House	and	the	congress	they	no	longer	felt	compulsion.		
Though	Representative	Frank	was	in	the	opposing	political	party,	his	comments	were	
phrased	as	merely	a	political	fact	of	life	predicated	on	the	structure	of	the	political	system	
and	the	balance	of	power	and	saying	that	had	the	situations	been	reversed	that	the	
Democrats	would	act	the	same.			Frank’s	point	can	be	seen	in	the	Republicans	refusing	to	
raise	the	debt	ceiling	much	as	many	Democrats	had	when	George	W.	Bush	was	in	office.		
Obama	had	voted	against	raising	the	debt	limit	when	a	Republican	was	president,	but	once	
he	became	president	and	wished	to	increase	the	debt	limit	he	characterized	votes	against	
the	measure	as	irresponsible	and	dangerous.	
	 Other	entities	were	involved	in	the	creating	policy	and	responding	to	the	crisis	as	
well	such	as	New	York	State’s	Superintendent	of	Insurance,	Eric	Dinallo.		Because	of	the	
centralization	of	much	of	the	U.S.	financial	industry	in	the	New	York	City	area,	the	state	level	
agency	he	led	was	the	regulator	for	a	large	percentage	of	the	nation’s	bond	insurers.		There	
was	no	federal	regulator	for	these	entities	and	so	policies	or	emergency	actions	taken	to	
deal	with	the	huge	losses	of	this	group	of	monoline	insurers	due	to	losses	incurred	from	
residential	mortgage-backed	securities	that	they	insured	or	from	collateralized	debt	
obligations	they	insured	that	were	backed	with	residential	mortgage-backed	securities.		
Superintendent	Dinallo	was	also	required	for	cash	strapped	insurance	company,	American	
International	Group	or	AIG,	to	raise	by	raising	$40	billion	by	selling	off	subsidiaries.		AIG,	as	
the	largest	underwriter	of	commercial	insurance	in	America,	was	a	systematically	important	
financial	entity	that	was	severely	undercapitalized.		The	abilities	of	various	federal	entities	
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to	resolve	this	crisis	were	limited	and	so	they	required	help	at	the	state	level.		The	Federal	
Reserve	Board	determined	that	it	could	not	legally	act	to	loan	money	to	AIG	because	it	was	
not	a	bank.303	
	 In	addition,	other	entities	from	the	private	trade	association,	International	Swaps	
and	Derivatives	Association,	to	the	UK’s	Financial	Services	Authority	played	some	sort	of	role	
in	response	to	the	crisis.		In	addition,	several	lesser	known	government	agencies	played	a	
part.		For	instance,	OFHEO,	the	regulator	for	Fannie	and	Freddie,	negotiated	a	deal	to	get	
them	to	raise	more	capital	in	return	for	a	reduction	in	a	surcharge	that	OFHEO	had	placed	
on	these	two	GSEs.	
	 The	unwinding	of	Glass-Steagel	and	the	gradual	deregulation	had	left	a	patchwork	of	
regulator	each	with	their	own	rules	and	powers.		This	caused	problems	in	cases	such	as	
Lehman	Brothers	since	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	which	regulated	
investment	banks,	lacked	the	authority	to	take	over	one	of	these	banks	and	wind	down	the	
bank.		This	power	however	was	available	for	commercial	banks	and	this	power	allowed	their	
regulator,	the	FDIC,	the	ability	to	minimize	the	negative	effects	and	minimize	the	threat	of	
major	financial	havoc	caused	by	the	failure	of	one	of	these	entities.	
	 The	new,	updated	regulatory	framework	was	designed	to	deal	with	the	systematic	
weaknesses	of	the	prevailing	system	in	order	to	minimize	the	chance	of	a	similar	crisis	
occurring	again	in	the	future.		It	was	put	together	through	a	hodgepodge	of	competing	plans	
and	recommendations	that	through	the	political	process	ended	up	shaping	what	changes	
actually	got	implemented.		While	it	is	not	easy	to	determine	the	cause	of	each	action	it	is	
clear	that	most	of	these	changes	were	due	in	large	part	to	actors	other	than	the	congress.		
Proposals	such	as	the	Treasury	Department’s	Blueprint	for	a	Modernized	Financial	
Regulatory	System	formed	much	of	the	basis	of	this	reform.		Likewise	agencies	strove	to	
have	changes	that	they	liked	enacted	and	thwart	those	that	they	didn’t.		The	Fed	fought	to	
keep	and	expand	its	role.304	
Similarly,	the	concept	for	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program	was	brought	to	the	
congress	from	the	Treasury.		While	the	agency	kept	the	initial	proposal	basic	and	left	many	
of	the	details	and	legalese	to	congress	to	decide	the	major	part	of	the	plan	was	already	
structured	by	the	time	congress	received	it.		In	addition,	TARP	itself	left	almost	full	
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discretion	over	what	to	do	with	the	vast	amount	of	funds	it	entailed	to	the	Treasury.		The	
president	was	also	involved	on	shaping	TARP	and	made	sure	it	had	certain	provisions	as	he	
pushed	for	its	adoption.	
HERA,	while	being	an	act	of	congress,	actually	gave	the	Treasury	Department	the	
ability	to	decide	how	the	government	would	address	the	crisis.		Contained	in	this	legislation	
was	an	immense	delegation	of	power	which	allowed	the	Treasury	to	spend	funding	however	
it	though	would	best	improve	the	financial	situation.		Even	more	unusual	is	that	the	act	was	
essentially	a	blank	check	in	that	it	contained	no	limit	on	the	amount	of	funds	that	the	
Treasury	Department	could	use	for	these	initiatives.		Rather	the	only	practical	limitation	on	
Treasury’s	spending	power	was	the	national	debt	ceiling	which	as	part	of	this	act	was	itself	
increased	$800	billion.305			
	 The	heads	of	HUD,	SEC,	the	Fed,	the	Treasury,	FDIC,	and	other	Government	entities	
worked	in	conjunction	on	several	big	issues	posed	by	the	crisis.		Agencies	needed	to	work	
together	and	they	face	a	coordination	problem	of	working	to	find	a	solution.		This	is	an	area	
where	the	president	and	key	staff	members	such	as	the	President’s	Chief	of	Staff	and	the	
Executive	Office	of	the	President	were	needed	interact	to	achieve	desired	aims.		
	 Agencies	that	were	delegated	to	often	then	attempted	to	stretch	the	delegation	to	
allow	them	to	take	actions	that	were	not	strictly	within	the	intended	scope	of	the	
delegation.		An	example	of	this	is	the	Treasury	Department’s	backstopping	of	Fannie	Mae	
and	Freddie	Mae’s	debt.		They	were	given	temporary	authorization	ending	December	31,	
2009	to	use	government	funds	to	cover	losses	at	these	two	entities,	however	the	Treasury	
Department	interpreted	the	delegation	as	meaning	merely	that	they	had	that	date	to	sign	
an	agreement	with	these	entities.		Treasury	structured	these	agreements	as	keepwell	
agreements	that	would	be	an	open	ended	commitment	that	would	commit	the	government	
to	cover	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	in	losses	far	into	the	future	and	beyond	the	initial	
time	period	authorized	for	delegation.306	
	 Another	emergency	power	of	the	Treasury	Department	is	the	Exchange	Stabilization	
Fund.		Under	normal	situations	the	Treasury	and	other	agencies	had	little	power	to	fund	
entities.		However	in	a	crisis	the	Treasury	agency	had	significant	powers	under	the	Gold	
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Reserve	Act	of	1934.307		The	Exchange	Stabilization	Fund	gave	the	power	to	stabilize	the	
dollar	by	“intervening	in	the	foreign	exchange	market.”		The	agency	once	again	had	
considerable	power	to	determine	what	was	a	crisis	and	what	actions	count	as	intervening	in	
foreign	exchange	markets	and	what	actions	meet	the	goal	of	stabilizing	the	dollar.		Treasury	
could	not	act	unilaterally,	but	instead	in	order	to	access	the	tens	of	billions	of	dollars	in	the	
fund	the	president	had	to	sign	off	on	it.308		Treasury,	with	the	support	of	the	president,	used	
$50	billion	to	guarantee	deposits	in	money	market	funds.		This	was	a	response	to	the	
breaking	of	the	buck	and	the	worry	in	the	financial	markets	that	that	had	caused.		Whether	
this	strictly	was	required	for	the	goal	of	stabilizing	the	dollar	or	this	action	was	taken	with	a	
different	goal	in	mind	the	authority	for	it	was	determined	by	the	interpretation	of	the	
president	and	the	Treasury.			This	was	clearly	an	area	where	the	administration	had	gained	
powers	to	set	policy	apart	from	congress.		This	can	also	been	seen	in	the	1994	tapping	of	the	
Emergency	Stabilization	Fund	during	President	Clinton.		In	which	the	Department	of	the	
Treasury	and	the	president	used	the	fund	to	supply	$20	billion	to	Mexico	to	deal	with	the	
Mexican	Peso	Crisis	despite	the	fact	that	when	the	president	had	tried	to	get	congress	to	act	
directly	and	give	the	financial	support	to	Mexico	by	passing	the	Mexican	Stabilization	Act,	
congress	voted	against	just	such	a	measure.		The	money	market	guarantee	was	modified	by	
the	influence	of	Sheila	Bair	who	convinced	the	Treasury	Department	to	put	date	limits	on	
the	funds	that	can	be	insured	so	that	it	did	not	pose	an	undue	risk	to	banks	since	there	
would	be	less	reason	for	people	to	put	money	in	banks	since	they	could	put	their	money	in	a	
money	market	fund	and	be	protected	and	get	larger	returns.		It	was	unintended	
consequences	like	this	that	fast	legislation	risked	missing.		All	the	details	could	not	be	
worked	out	and	the	consequences	not	determined	that	quickly.		The	money	market	
guarantee	program	was	announced	September	19	and	was	opened	10	days	later.309	
	 The	FDIC	had	been	given	authority	to	give	financial	assistance	to	banks	and	thrifts	so	
long	as	the	assistance	was	less	costly	than	liquidation	and	winding	down	the	entity	would	
be.		However	this	least	cost	restriction	could	be	set	aside	if	it	would	protect	the	nation	
against	systematic	risk.		The	FDIC	could	not	unilaterally	act	to	void	this	provision,	but	rather	
in	addition	to	two	thirds	of	the	FDIC	board	of	directors,	it	is	also	required	the	approval	of	the	
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Treasury	Secretary	and	two	thirds	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board.		This	allowed	the	FDIC	to	
give	assistance	to	Wachovia	to	help	put	together	a	deal	for	it.		In	the	actual	case,	with	speed	
being	imperative,	the	votes	were	not	even	collected	in	that	the	Treasury	Secretary	was	not	
even	asked	for	his	acceptance	as	he	was	out	of	the	office	and	instead	an	Assistant	Secretary	
of	the	Treasury,	David	Nason,	approved	it	instead.310	
The	FDIC,	with	input	from	other	agencies,	put	together	the	Temporary	Liquidity	
Guarantee	Program	(TLGP)	to	guarantee	certain	types	of	unsecured	debt.		This	would	be	
useful	to	many	large	financial	companies.		It	however	was	tied	together	with	TARP	
investment	in	and	capitalization	of	these	companies.		Thus	companies	would	have	to	use	
both	of	these	programs	and	would	thus	submit	to	the	restrictions	of	TARP	which	include	the	
maximum	compensation	that	executives	could	receive,	limitations	on	the	size	of	dividends	
that	could	be	paid	for	the	next	three	years,	limits	on	golden	parachute	payments,	and	also	
changed	the	tax	treatment	of	yearly	incomes	in	excess	of	$500,000.	
	 The	FDIC	pushed	a	loan	modification	proposal	to	stop	those	in	houses	from	
defaulting	with	the	goal	of	decreasing	the	national	foreclosure	rate.		While	the	so	called	
IndyMac	Protocol	FDIC	administrator,	Sheila	Bair,	put	forward	was	not	enacted	by	George	
W.	Bush,	it	was	for	the	most	part	adopted	by	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency	as	well	as	
the	Government	Sponsored	Enterprises	which	it	regulated,	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac,	as	
well	as	the	Hope	Now	Alliance,	a	public-private	partnership	that	was	developed	by	the	
Departments	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	and	Treasury,	and	individual	financial	
companies	such	as	Citigroup.		This	was	not	as	effective	at	stopping	foreclosures	as	many	
may	have	wished,	but	it	positively	affected	millions	of	individuals	and	was	once	again	a	
major	effort	taken	almost	entirely	by	the	executive	branch	despite	the	fact	that	the	congress	
was	ultimately	able	to	pass	the	Housing	and	Economic	Recovery	Act.	
	 The	FDIC	also	created	the	Temporary	Liquidity	Guarantee	Program	to	encourage	
interbank	lending	and	thus	allowed	banks	to	better	meet	their	liquidity	needs.		Later	this	
program	was	extended	to	key	nonbank	companies	such	as	GE	Capital,	the	finance	subsidiary	
of	industrial	giant	General	Electric.	
	 America	also	worked	in	concert	with	other	nations	to	address	the	economic	crisis,	
which	affected	other	areas,	such	as	Europe,	quite	significantly	as	well.		An	example	of	this	
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was	the	October	10th	agreement	coming	out	of	the	G7	finance	ministers	meeting	in	which	
member	nations	agreed	to	a	broad	five	point	framework	that	included	taking	decisive	action	
and	using	all	available	tools	to	support	systematic	financial	institutions,	unfreeze	credit	and	
money	markets,	ensure	that	financial	institutions	can	raise	capital,	provide	enough	deposit	
insurance	to	restore	confidence	and	prevent	bank	runs,	and	take	appropriate	steps	to	
improve	the	mortgage	and	securitization	market		while	improving	financial	transparency.311		
These	sorts	of	agreements	are	entered	into	by	the	Treasury	Secretary	on	behalf	of	the	
nation,	but	do	not	need	to	be	ratified	by	congress	and	thus	are	another	form	of	executive	
power	that	can	be	used	in	crises.		Though	general	in	nature,	this	agreement	was	important	
for	the	United	States	and	the	world	and	this	agreement	was	designed	to	minimize	the	
tendency	of	beggar	thy	neighbor	economic	policies	in	which	each	nation	tries	to	further	its	
goals	individually	rather	than	coordinating	with	others	to	make	the	whole	world	better	off.		
President	Bush’s	comments	after	the	meeting	show	the	importance	of	such	agreements,	“As	
our	nations	carry	out	this	plan,	we	must	ensure	the	actions	of	one	country	do	not	contradict	
or	undermine	the	actions	of	another.	In	our	interconnected	world,	no	nation	will	gain	by	
driving	down	the	fortunes	of	another.	We're	in	this	together.	We	will	come	through	it	
together.”312		This	was	an	important	point	because	without	such	agreements	nations	may	
look	at	their	own	individual	needs	and	take	actions	that	risk	making	the	whole	worse	off.		An	
example	is	the	Financial	Services	Authority	in	the	United	Kingdom	who	as	the	U.K.	regulator	
for	Citigroup	imposed	a	$6.4	billion	cash	lockup	that	protected	interests	of	U.K.	though	at	a	
cost	of	greatly	reducing	liquidity	and	greatly	increasing	the	chance	that	Citigroup	would	fail	
and	damage	the	global	banking	system.313	
Congress	was	also	at	risk	of	taking	action	that	might	make	the	crisis	worse	by	
focusing	on	its	own	goals.		Looking	at	the	words	of	individual	members,	it	appears	congress	
tempted	to	play	populist	messages	and	demonize	the	banks	though	this	would	have	risks	of	
causing	the	situation	to	get	worse	as	it	could	stigmatize	programs	that	are	set	up	to	help	
financial	systems	since	limitations	on	compensation	and	dividends	would	be	unpopular	with	
executives	though	it	would	score	points	with	members	of	congress.		Likewise,	placing	blame	
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and	having	hearings	and	other	backward	looking	actions	could	be	popular	with	people,	but	
would	take	focus	off	of	how	to	improve	the	current	situation.		Congress	also	is	given	
addition	leverage	during	a	crisis	and	can	get	away	with	actions	without	looking	at	costs	or	
how	to	allocate	scarce	resources.		Thus	congress	gets	the	credit	for	programs	such	as	Car	
Allowance	Rebate	System	also	known	as	the	Cash	for	Clunkers	program	as	well	as	some	
foreclosure	programs	that	were	popular,	but	not	necessarily	effective	in	combatting	the	
crisis	considering	the	costs	of	these	programs.	
	 Even	more	contentious,	but	more	important,	than	the	Cash	for	Clunkers	program	
was	the	bailout	of	the	auto	companies.		President	Bush	was	opposed	to	an	auto	bailout	on	
principal.		It	went	against	his	free	market	convictions	and	he	felt	the	car	companies	had	
brought	their	poor	state	of	affairs	upon	themselves	through	years	of	poor	decisions	as	
opposed	to	it	being	solely	caused	by	a	shock	to	the	system	related	to	the	housing	crisis.		Nor	
did	he	want	his	last	major	act	in	office	to	be	a	bailout.314		Likewise	others	in	the	
administration	such	as	the	Treasury	Secretary	opposed	the	auto	bailout	as	well.		However,	it	
became	clear	that	if	a	large	auto	company	went	under	it	would	make	the	crisis	more	
pronounced	and	increase	suffering.		President	Bush	thus	announced	a	plan	to	use	TARP	
funds	to	help	support	the	three	major	U.S.	car	manufacturers	from	bankruptcy.315		This	was	
an	executive	action	though	the	democratically	controlled	house	largely	viewed	it	positively	
with	the	minority	Republicans	opposed	to	it.		However,	a	prior	attempt	of	congress	to	enact	
an	auto	bailout	was	unsuccessful.316		The	auto	bailout	included	a	loan	of	$9.4	billion	in	TARP	
funds	to	General	Motors	with	an	additional	$4	billion	in	loans	if	congress	released	the	rest	of	
the	TARP	funds.		While	the	loans	provided	significant	help	to	the	car	manufacturers,	the	
help	was	structured	in	such	a	manner	as	to	keep	the	pressure	on	these	organizations	to	
change	and	become	more	competitive.		In	order	to	ensure	change.	the	executive	branch	
added	provisos	such	as	that	the	car	companies	would	within	a	couple	months	have	to	
submit	proposals	on	how	to	restructure	and	would	have	to	meet	certain	criteria.		If	the	
criteria	were	not	met,	the	government	could	collect	on	the	loan.		This	would	almost	
assuredly	push	General	Motors	into	bankruptcy	and	thus	this	gave	the	government	
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tremendous	leverage	over	the	company	to	ensure	that	GM	took	the	appropriate	actions	as	
viewed	by	the	government.		This	also	allowed	the	outgoing	administration	to	put	in	place	a	
framework	that	could	constrain	both	the	company’s	actions	and	even	those	of	the	next	
administration.	
Another	unpopular	position	that	was	taken	during	the	crisis	was	the	government	
accepting	a	share	of	losses	from	Bank	of	America’s	acquisition	of	Merrill	Lynch.		This	allowed	
the	deal	to	be	consummated	and	Merrill	Lynch	was	saved	thereby	avoiding	a	situation	that	
would	have	further	weakened	the	economy.		This	however	was	an	action	of	the	
administration	rather	than	congress	or	the	president	and	thus	did	not	receive	much	media	
attention	or	lead	to	criticism	of	those	in	power.	
On	December	6,	2007,	in	response	to	the	crisis	the	president	outlined	a	proposal	to	
freeze	interest	rates	for	five	years	thereby	minimizing	the	damage	that	ARMs	were	doing	to	
home	affordability	for	those	with	that	class	of	loan.317		This	HOPE	Now	initiative	was	
generally	criticized	as	being	ineffective	and	poor	policy.318		This	was	in	part	because	it	was	a	
comparatively	minor	fix	for	the	major	mortgage	crisis	that	ultimately	unfolded	and	because	
there	were	minimal	potential	benefits	to	homeowners	under	the	proposal	since	interest	
rates	continued	to	fall	throughout	much	of	the	crisis	as	the	Fed	cut	its	interest	rates.		Thus	
ARMs	that	would	have	been	reset	without	Hope	Now	would	not	have	gone	up	much	or	
been	that	big	a	burden	on	borrowers.		
There	were	numerous	public-private	responses	to	this	crisis	such	as	when	the	
Treasury	agency	and	other	federal	agencies	worked	to	ensure	that	a	private	deal	could	be	
reached	to	rescue	Bear	Sterns	from	bankruptcy	with	the	Treasury	taking	on	some	of	the	risk	
posed	by	Bear	Stern’s	assets	to	ensure	a	deal	could	be	reached.		Another	example	is	the	
creation	of	the	Master	Liquidity	Enhancement	Conduit,	a	proposed	mechanism	for	helping	
Structured	Investment	Vehicles	which	were	struggling	to	find	funding	and	which	it	was	
worried	would	be	forced	to	sell	Asset	backed	Securities	at	bargain	basement	prices	which	
would	then	exacerbate	the	crisis.		The	Master	Liquidity	Enhancement	Conduit,	which	
allowed	these	SIVs	to	sell	their	illiquid	assets	and	create	a	market	and	help	establish	prices	
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for	these	assets,	was	put	forward	and	promoted	by	the	Treasury	Agency	though	the	actual	
implementation	was	left	to	private	banks	and	never	fully	came	to	fruition.319	
	 The	Fed	introduced	the	Term	Auction	Facility	(TAF)	in	December	2007	to	increase	
funding	for	the	banking	system	by	auctioning	collateralized	loans.320		The	program	largely	
helped	U.S.	branches	foreign	banks.		Due	to	the	way	this	would	be	viewed	politically,	the	
Fed	and	administration	did	not	wish	it	known	that	the	bulk	of	the	money	went	to	support	
foreign	banks	and	so	they	made	sure	this	remained	secret.	
	
4.2.9 Other Governmental Actions 
	
	 In	response	to	the	large	debts	of	GSEs,	the	government	took	over	Fannie	Mae	and	
Freddie	Mac.		This	was	a	major	move	as	these	entities	had	trillions	of	dollars	on	their	
balance	sheets	and	together	had	11,000	employees.		These	two	companies	racked	up	
potentially	huge	losses	that	the	United	States	government	would	ultimately	be	responsible	
for	paying,	whereas	any	gains	would	have	accrued	to	shareholders	and	thus	there	was	an	
asymmetry	that	led	to	systematic	risks	being	ignored.		Yet	despite	the	structural	problems	of	
these	organizations,	they	were	essential	for	a	well-functioning	housing	market.		As	the	crisis	
unfolded,	the	housing	finance	market	became	less	fluid	and	potential	purchasers	of	homes	
had	more	trouble	finding	financing	for	their	purchases.		This	housing	crisis	threatened	to	
spread	into	the	rest	of	the	economy	and	threaten	the	strength	and	stability	of	the	economy	
in	general	which	the	government	hoped	to	forestall	with	their	extraordinary	actions.		In	the	
words	of	Treasury	Secretary	when	announcing	the	government	takeover	of	these	two	
agencies,	"Our	economy	will	not	recover	until	the	bulk	of	this	housing	correction	is	behind	
us,	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	are	critical	to	turning	the	corner	on	housing."321	
Prior	to	the	federal	takeover	of	GSEs	Paulson	had	requested	from	congress	the	
ability	to	use	money	to	support	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	and	congress	had	approved	
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this	request.322		This	action	was	not	approved	of	by	all.		Armando	Falcon,	the	former	head	of	
OFHEO	and	one	that	began	an	early	investigation	of	the	agencies’	actions,	described	the	
government	takeover	as,	“a	shareholder	bailout	financed	by	the	U.S.	taxpayers”.323		Mr.	
Falcon	is	referring	to	the	fact	that	by	taking	this	action	those	that	held	the	debt	of	these	
companies	was	backed	up	by	the	United	States’	government.		This	secured	the	rights	of	
Asian	central	banks	and	other	debt	holders	and	at	a	potentially	high	cost	to	U.	S.	tax	payers.		
This	was	popular	with	those	that	had	their	investments	shored	up.		A	Bank	of	China	
spokesman,	Wang	Zhaowen,	stated	his	support	for	this	U.	S.	action	by	saying,	"We	think	it's	
a	very	positive	action	by	the	U.S.		It	has	come	from	being	an	invisible	regulator	and	to	
coming	to	the	front	lines	to	save	the	market".324		Those	at	the	Treasury	Department	
discussed	their	actions	with	major	holders	of	debt	insured	by	these	two	entities.		Leading	up	
to	this	action	those	at	the	Treasury	gathered	data	and	opinions	from	these	stakeholders	and	
also	took	steps	to	reassure	them	about	the	action.		When	the	government	took	control	of	
these	entities,	they	also	affected	the	actions	of	these	agencies	by	appointing	new	heads	for	
the	agencies.		Treasury	Secretary	Paulson	proposed	the	idea	of	a	cash	infusion	or	takeover	
of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	to	the	president	during	an	August	28	Oval	Office	meeting	
with	the	President	and	senior	administration	officials.		He	was	given	approval	to	continue	to	
pursue	the	plan.		Thus	the	Department	of	the	Treasury	acted	as	an	agent	and	the	president	
in	part	acted	as	a	principal.		Paulson	worked	with	several	other	members	of	the	
administration	to	draft	the	plan	and	determine	the	details.		The	heads	of	Fannie	Mae	and	
Freddie	Mac,	Daniel	H.	Mudd	and	Richard	Syron	respectively,	were	informed	that	the	
organizations	they	headed	were	being	taking	over,	but	though	they	did	not	approve	there	
was	little	they	could	do	to	thwart	the	administration’s	intentions.			
The	takeover	of	these	two	agencies	was	not	the	only	step	taken	by	the	government	
to	shore	up	the	housing	market.		Concurrent	with	the	takeover	of	these	government-
sponsored	enterprises,	the	government	announced	a	program	to	buy	up	to	$5	billion	worth	
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of	mortgage	backed	securities.		This	action	was	designed	to	subsidize	mortgages	and	
improve	the	liquidity	of	the	mortgage	market.	
The	Federal	Reserve	had	intervened	to	keep	the	economy	on	solid	footing	when	
Bear	Stearns	was	faced	with	significant	economic	challenges	and	had	intervened	when	faced	
with	the	weakness	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.		However,	in	order	to	avoid	setting	a	
precedent	and	enshrining	moral	hazard	in	place,	neither	the	Fed	nor	the	Treasury	
Department	interceded	when	Lehman	Brothers	was	on	the	point	of	failure	to	keep	the	
major	financial	company	viable.		The	Fed	did	however	take	steps	to	cushion	the	blow	when	
Lehman	Brothers	declared	bankruptcy	such	as	announcing	new	lending	procedures	thereby	
decreasing	the	chances	that	the	failure	of	one	of	the	nation’s	largest	investment	banks.		The	
Fed	also	took	several	other	extraordinary	steps	such	as	lending	$85	billion	to	American	
International	Group	(AIG).325		This	helped	to	keep	the	company	afloat.		In	return	for	this	
loan,	the	government	received	almost	80%	of	AIG	stock.		Shortly	after	that	move,	the	
Federal	Reserve	worked	in	conjunction	with	central	banks	from	Europe,	Canada,	and	Japan	
to	provide	up	to	$180	billion	to	lenders	in	those	countries	so	that	they	could	provide	loans	
and	liquidity	and	stabilize	the	economy.326	
	 The	Federal	Open	Market	Committee	(FOMC)	had	prior	to	this	been	delegated	the	
authority	to	oversee	the	nation's	open	market	operations	which	enables	the	FOMC	to	
effective	set	the	monetary	policy	for	the	nation.		This	Federal	Reserve	committee	used	its	
control	over	interest	rates	and	the	money	supply	to	help	stimulate	the	economy	and	
mitigate	the	liquidity	crisis	in	the	markets.		While	this	power	was	not	specifically	delegated	
for	this	crisis,	this	authority	had	been	delegated	and	was	used	to	deal	with	this	crisis.		Many	
of	these	same	powers	had	been	used	to	respond	to	previous	crises	including	the	Great	
Depression.	
There	were	a	handful	of	executive	orders	issued	by	the	president	to	deal	with	the	
financial	crisis.		In	one	week	Obama	created	at	initiative	to	spur	job	growth	for	veterans	
through	the	use	of	targeted	tax	credits,	he	also	pushed	for	student	loan	relief	in	order	to	
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decrease	the	long	term	burden	of	college	loans	on	graduates,	as	well	as	making	regulatory	
efficiency	changes	for	small	businesses.	
An	instance	of	delegation	that	was	used	to	deal	with	the	crisis	was	an	emergency	
assessment	of	20	basis	points	assessed	by	the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Committee	(FDIC).		
This	was	used	to	recapitalize	an	insurance	fund	that	had	nearly	been	exhausted	due	to	a	
large	number	of	banks	failures	during	the	downturn.	
In	addition,	the	FDIC	also	created	the	Temporary	Liquidity	Guarantee	Program	which	
was	designed	to	insure	senior	unsecured	debt	issued	within	a	given	date	range	to	entities	
that	meet	certain	criteria.327		Similar	to	the	actions	of	the	FDIC,	the	Farm	Credit	
Administration,	which	oversees	agricultural	credit	organizations,	also	took	similar	actions	
during	the	financial	crisis	for	agricultural	credit	organizations.	
Another	piece	of	delegation	that	played	a	role	in	the	crisis	was	the	delegation	of	the	
creation	of	accounting	rules	and	accepted	practices	to	the	Financial	Accounting	Standards	
Board	(FASB),	a	nonprofit	entity	initially	created	by	the	Security	and	Exchange	Commission.		
FASB	issued	Statements	of	Financial	Accounting	Standards	No.	157	requiring	institutions	to	
mark	to	market.		That	is	to	say	that	the	value	they	can	claim	for	assets	on	their	balance	
sheets	must	equal	the	fair	market	value	that	the	asset	can	be	sold	for	in	the	current	market.		
This	was	designed	to	deal	with	a	prior	crisis,	but	this	led	to	a	weakening	in	the	balance	
sheets	of	numerous	financial	companies,	which	in	turn	exacerbated	the	crisis	as	it,	caused	
companies	to	face	a	shortfall	of	assets	to	liabilities.		While	the	magnitude	of	the	effect	
caused	by	this	rule	change	has	been	greatly	debated	there	are	many	who	feel	that	this	was	a	
major	contributor.		An	example	of	this	is	William	Isaac,	the	former	chair	of	the	FDIC,	who	
aired	this	criticism	by	saying,	“The	SEC	has	destroyed	$500	billion	of	bank	capital	by	its	
senseless	marking	to	market	of	these	assets	for	which	there	is	no	marking	to	market,	and	
that	has	destroyed	$5	trillion	of	bank	lending.		That’s	a	major	issue	in	the	credit	crunch	
we’re	in	right	now.	The	banks	just	don’t	have	the	capital	to	start	lending	right	now,	because	
of	these	horrendous	markdowns	that	the	SEC’s	approach	required."328			In	response	to	
concerns	about	the	effect	of	the	mark	to	market	rule,	FASB	has	fast	tracked	a	revision	called	
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Statements	of	Financial	Accounting	Standards	No.	157-d	that	would	rectify	this	change.		
Section	133	of	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	requires	the	SEC	in	
conjunction	with	Treasury	and	the	Fed	to	investigate	the	effects	of	the	mark	to	market	
accounting	rule	and	section	132	of	the	act	gives	the	SEC	authority	to	suspend	the	rule	if	it	
believes	that	doing	so	is	in	the	public	interest.	
The	Federal	Reserve	created	several	programs	designed	at	addressing	areas	of	
economic	weakness.		The	Commercial	Paper	Funding	Facility	was	design	to	increase	liquidity	
in	short	term	markets	and	thereby	increase	the	amount	and	availability	of	funding	for	
households	and	businesses.329		It	was	the	Fed’s	first	program	focusing	on	the	commercial	
paper	market.		The	program	was	designed	to	purchase	commercial	paper	from	firms.		It	did	
not	have	many	restrictions	on	the	firms	it	would	buy	from	and	was	used	by	several	non-
financial	firms	such	as	Harley-Davidson	and	McDonalds	as	well	as	by	financial	companies.		It	
also	allowed	foreign	companies	to	leverage	this	program	and	UBS,	Dexia,	and	Barclays	alone	
accounted	for	more	than	$160	billion	of	the	$738	billion	that	was	loaned	out	under	this	
program.	
On	November	2011,	the	president	announced	a	series	of	initiatives	he	referred	to	as	
"We	Can't	Wait"	campaign"	which	was	designed	to	get	jobs	for	veterans.330		This	was	not	a	
particularly	well	designed	program	in	terms	of	decreasing	unemployment,	however	is	was	
politically	very	popular	and	could	make	the	administration	appear	to	be	pro-veteran	and	
working	to	create	jobs,	which	are	both	important	images	to	foster	at	this	time.	The	first	of	
these	initiatives	is	the	Returning	Heroes	credit	which	the	White	House	is	pushing	and	which	
would	applies	to	all	veterans	not	just	recent	veterans.	Another	program	is	the	Veteran	Gold	
Card	which	provides	those	that	served	since	9/11	a	series	of	job	tools	and	career	support.	
The	funding	came	from	funds	already	dedicated	to	the	Department	of	Labor	and	thus	the	
president	is	able	to	sidestep	congress.	From	the	president’s	standpoint,	if	he	can	tie	
employment	subsidies	to	a	popular	issue	such	as	supporting	U.S.	veterans	it	can	help	him	
get	a	law	passed	and	thus	he	has	an	incentive	to	pursue	it	though	it	may	not	be	the	best	or	
most	efficient	solution	to	the	problem.	
																																																						
329	Wallach,	Philip	A.		To	the	Edge:	Legality,	Legitimacy,	and	the	Responses	to	the	2008	Financial	Crisis.		
Brookings	Institution	Press.		2015.		Pg.	95.	
330	Jackson,	David.		“Obama’s	Latest	Executive	Orders	Affect	Veterans”		USA	Today.		October	25,	2011.	
203	
However,	historically	tax	breaks	targeted	in	return	for	the	hiring	of	certain	groups	
are	not	an	efficient	way	to	bring	down	the	total	number	of	unemployed.	It	typically	creates	
a	substitution	effect	rather	than	an	additive	affect.	At	the	time	of	the	announcement,	the	
unemployment	rate	for	veterans	was	considerably	lower	than	the	unemployment	rate	at	
large	and	so	the	group	was	not	a	good	candidate	for	segmenting	the	unemployed	and	
providing	benefits	to	some.	However,	there	are	other	factors	than	just	economic	efficiency.	
Policy	may	be	created	to	increase	equity	or	provide	benefits	that	may	otherwise	help	
society	such	as	allocating	funds	for	convict	reform	or	drug	treatment	centers,	which	besides	
helping	the	targeted	group	may	provide	positive	externalities.	
	
5. Results	
	
5.1	Abdication	Hypothesis	vs.	Delegation	Hypotheses	
	
	 This	case	study	can	help	us	investigate	whether	the	abdication	hypothesis	or	the	
delegation	hypothesis	is	more	consistent	with	the	actions	of	congress	during	this	period	or	if	
the	actual	actions	of	the	government	are	somewhere	between	these.		That	is	to	say	whether	
congress	makes	its	decision	to	delegate	based	on	individual	political	considerations	or	in	
order	to	yield	better	public	policy	than	could	be	achieved	by	congress.		Congress	took	
numerous	actions	during	this	period	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		By	looking	at	the	probable	
causes	of	congress’	actions	and	the	specifics	of	the	examples	of	congressional	delegation	
one	can	help	see	if	the	actions	accord	with	one	hypothesis	or	the	other.		It	can	be	difficult	to	
definitively	determine	what	are	the	motivations	of	individual	members	of	congress	or	of	
congress	as	a	whole.		However,	by	looking	at	general	trends	and	looking	at	the	actions	of	
lawmakers	as	the	actions	of	rational	actors,	this	paper	will	attempt	to	come	up	with	some	
reasonable	explanations	for	their	actions.			
By	their	nature	crises	can	have	a	profound	effect	upon	the	wellbeing	of	a	nation.		
There	is	an	optimistic	belief	by	some	that	members	of	congress	have	a	desire	to	take	
positive	actions	and	do	what	they	see	as	right	despite	significant	research	has	reported	to	
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show	that	congressmen	first	and	foremost	goal	is	to	be	reelected	with	secondary	goals	of	
gaining	more	power.		This	view	says	that	the	desire	for	power	and	reelection	are	not	the	
sole	motivations	why	congressmen	run	for	office	and	serve	their	terms.		The	desire	of	
members	of	congress	to	be	elected	in	part	is	due	to	a	desire	to	do	what	they	feel	is	good	for	
the	nation.		In	a	crisis,	there	is	a	call	to	do	what	matters	and	members	of	congress	will	in	
these	pivotal	moments	be	more	drawn	than	normal	to	do	an	important,	much	needed	act	as	
opposed	to	focusing	solely	on	reelection	or	feathering	their	nest.		High	media	scrutiny	
accentuates	this	phenomenon,	but	in	part	it	is	also	due	to	the	concept	of	civil	service	and	a	
wish	to	honor	their	position	and	do	a	good	job.	
Both	those	that	subscribe	to	the	abdication	hypothesis	and	the	delegation	
hypothesis	ascribe	the	decision	to	delegate	on	a	rational	strategic	choice.		Where	they	differ	
is	how	the	principal	gains	by	delegation,	but	both	hypotheses	view	the	decision	of	whether	
to	delegate	as	a	strategic	decision	that	is	used	to	further	the	goals	of	the	individuals	or	
bodies	delegating	power.	
	 Both	the	proponents	of	the	abdication	hypothesis	and	the	delegation	hypothesis	also	
agree	that	congressional	oversight	of	the	bureaucracy	is	minimal.		This	concurs	with	the	
actions	of	congress	during	this	period.		The	difference	between	these	two	hypotheses	is	that	
the	delegation	hypothesis	assumes	that	congress	still	maintains	control	of	the	
administration	due	to	its	powers	such	as	appropriation	and	its	power	to	appoint	agency	
heads.	
	 Delegation	was	very	widely	employed	by	congress	during	this	period.		The	question	
becomes	whether	this	delegation	was	used	by	congress	to	avoid	making	difficult	political	
decisions	that	would	hurt	members	of	congress	politically	or	whether	it	was	used	by	
congress	to	ensure	that	better	policy	is	created	than	it	would	be	if	it	was	left	to	congress	to	
decide.		Key	acts	of	delegation	in	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	include	the	regulation	of	the	consumer	
finance	industry	and	the	delegation	of	regulations		
Different	law	makers	had	differing	motivations	and	in	the	case	of	most	lawmakers	it	
is	likely	that	they	had	multiple	motivations	and	so	this	question	boils	down	to	determining	
the	predominant	motivation	of	members	of	congress	as	this	can	help	determine	what	
congress	will	do	and	how	delegation	can	be	used	to	improve	the	situation.	
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According	to	the	delegation	hypothesis	one	of	the	key	reasons	that	the	level	of	
delegation	was	high	during	this	period	was	that	politicians	did	not	want	to	be	seen	making	
unpopular	decisions.		The	theory	would	expect	that	politicians	would	want	to	distance	
themselves	from	decisions	that	many	felt	equated	to	be	bailing	out	rich	Wall	Street	CEOs	at	
the	expense	of	those	on	Main	Street.		During	this	period	the	public	was	very	focused	on	
political	events	and	this	increase	in	salience	of	and	interest	in	the	issues	made	it	particularly	
politically	dangerous	for	politicians	to	go	against	the	public’s	populism	by	promoting	policy	
that	might	be	good	for	the	nation,	but	which	did	not	play	well	on	TV.		This	can	be	seen	in	the	
fact	that	TARP	was	initially	voted	down.		By	delegating,	it	also	allowed	members	of	congress	
members	to	rail	against	the	actions	of	the	government	and	to	be	seen	representing	their	
constituents	while	at	the	same	time	getting	the	policy	that	they	want.		There	were	certainly	
several	politicians	who	supported	governmental	action	in	response	to	the	crisis	who	
nonetheless	spoke	to	the	constituents	of	their	outrage	about	the	actions	being	taken.		This	
use	of	delegation	is	consistent	with	the	abdication	hypothesis.	
Along	a	similar	line,	delegation	minimizes	uncertainty.		Uncertainty	of	how	the	policy	
would	turn	out	and	how	people	would	feel	about	the	policies	led	to	uncertainty	about	what	
actions	to	take	or	what	bills	it	is	in	their	best	interest	to	be	seen	opposing.		Position	taking	
becomes	complicated	and	downside	risk	increases.		Politicians	are	interested	in	in	
minimizing	risk	even	if	they	are	not	fully	able	to	capitalize	on	the	upside	if	they	happen	to	
select	a	policy	that	ends	up	being	popular.		Thus	politically	it	makes	sense	for	most	
politicians	to	delegate	to	avoid	these	risks.			
	 Many	of	the	decisions	made	in	response	to	the	crisis	by	governmental	agencies	were	
very	unpopular.		It	stands	to	reason	that	these	policies	would	also	have	been	very	unpopular	
had	they	been	made	by	congress.		Decisions	to	use	public	money	to	bail	out	struggling	
banks,	cutting	spending	on	certain	programs,	propping	up	failing	automakers,	bailing	out	
those	who	lost	money	on	their	home	would	all	have	hurt	politicians’	politically.		
Many	actions	of	congress	seem	consistent	with	the	abdication	hypothesis.		Acts	of	
delegation	were	largely	consistent	with	the	expectation	this	paper	has	in	which	congress	will	
try	to	avoid	tough	political	decisions.		During	this	period,	congress	passed	very	few	bills	
relating	to	the	financial	crisis	and	those	that	it	did	pass	primarily	delegated	power	to	the	
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administration	and	bureaucracy.		As	the	political	environment	made	necessary	responses	
such	as	financial	support	for	the	financial	industry	very	unpopular,	this	lack	of	direct	action	
by	congress	would	seem	to	go	along	with	the	expectations	that	the	abdication	hypothesis	
would	predict.		Conversely,	Congress	is	more	willing	to	pass	popular	bills	that	give	benefits	
to	constituents	and	are	broadly	popular.		The	only	major	direct	legislation	during	this	period	
that	didn’t	delegate	the	majority	of	the	decision	was	the	Economic	Stimulus	Act	of	2008.						
	 During	this	period	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency	was	given	the	power	to	lower	
the	goals	laid	forth	by	congress	on	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.		These	goals	include	
popular	provisions	such	as	requiring	a	certain	amount	of	loans	to	go	to	poor	or	other	
individuals	that	would	otherwise	find	it	difficult	to	get	a	loan.		However,	this	push	towards	
lending	to	riskier	individuals	can	contribute	to	housing	market	instability	and	economic	
losses.		By	delegating	this	decision,	congress	is	able	to	get	credit	for	setting	these	laudable	
and	popular	social	goals	while	muting	its	effect	on	the	economy	during	the	crisis.		It	is	able	
to	rollback	its	provisions	without	taking	criticism	for	doing	so	as	it	certainly	would	for	direct	
action.		
It	appears	that	members	of	congress	were	not	disinterested	actors	solely	seeking	to	
create	efficient	public	policy	and	congress	did	not	always	approve	of	policy	changes	even	
ones	that	were	viewed	generally	as	being	good.		Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	had	made	
very	substantial	donations	to	a	large	number	of	members	of	congress	and	had	spent	large	
sums	on	lobbying.331		This	had	enabled	these	GSEs	to	get	governments	support	when	
drafting	legislation	that	had	enabled	them	to	be	very	profitable	companies.		The	
contributions	that	they	had	given	and	continued	to	give	throughout	the	early	part	of	the	
crisis	made	it	so	they	had	a	lot	of	support	in	congress	that	would	oppose	the	
administration’s	proposal	of	nationalizing	the	entities	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		Congress	was	
unwilling	to	act	until	well	into	the	crisis	to	take	actions	that	most	viewed	as	in	the	public	
good.		
On	September	7,	2008,	Director	Lockhart	of	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Association	
announced	that	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	were	being	placed	under	Federal	Housing	
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Finance	Association	receivership	and	assumed	the	power	of	the	board	and	management	of	
these	organizations.332		This	move	by	FHFA	was	part	of	the	larger	governmental	effort	to	
address	this	crisis.		Hank	Paulson	went	on	record	as	saying	that,	“conservatorship	was	the	
only	form	in	which	I	would	commit	taxpayer	money	to	the	GSEs.”333		This	conservatorship	
had	profound	implications	and	included	the	appointment	of	Herbert	Allison	the	following	
day	as	the	Chief	Executive	of	Fannie	Mae.		In	addition,	the	FHFA	authorized	stronger	backing	
for	mortgage-backed	securities	which	would	protect	the	holders	of	these	financial	
instruments.		Similarly	the	Chief	Executive	of	Freddie	Mac	was	replaced	with	David	
Moffett.334		Also	the	actions	of	these	two	organizations	were	constrained	so	that	all	lobbying	
ceased,	they	would	no	longer	pay	dividends	on	their	stock,	and	they	adjusted	pay	packages	
for	executives.	
The	authority	to	place	these	GSEs	into	conservatorship	came	from	the	passage	of	the	
Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	which	set	up	the	FHFA	as	the	oversight	agency	of	
the	GSAs	and	granted	FHFA	the	power	to	put	them	into	conservatorship.		Congress	
delegated	this	important	power	and	responsibility	to	a	new	agency	rather	than	making	the	
important	decision	to	place	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	into	conservatorship	themselves.	
Congress	received	considerable	funding	and	support	from	the	GSEs	which	were	
known	to	have	very	strong	lobbying	machines	and	to	be	quite	vindictive	to	politicians	that	
opposed	them.		This	likely	contributed	to	the	decision	to	delegate	this	power	which	was	
used	just	over	a	month	after	the	law	was	enacting.		The	fact	that	the	lag	between	delegating	
this	power	and	the	usage	of	it	was	so	short,	particularly	as	the	agency	was	just	staring	up,	
points	out	that	the	economic	fundamentals	did	not	change	in	the	intervening	period.		Nor	
did	congress	lack	the	ability	to	determine	whether	there	was	a	need	for	conservatorship.		
That	decision	was	in	a	less	complex	issue	area	and	required	less	specialized	knowledge	than	
many	during	this	period	and	was	within	congress’	capability.		Congress	seemed	to	want	the	
GSEs	placed	into	conservatorship	as	can	be	seen	by	their	handing	this	power	out	at	this	time	
and	they	had	the	ability	to	do	so,	however	rather	than	enacting	this	politically	tough	
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decision	themselves	they	delegated	it	to	an	agency	that	had	less	politically	to	lose	by	this	
action.		This	appears	to	go	along	with	the	abdication	hypothesis.		However,	it	could	also	be	
viewed	as	congress	realizing	its	own	inability	to	address	the	problem,	delegated	the	task	to	
an	agency	as	it	knew	the	resulting	policy	and	the	new	limitations	on	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	
Mac	would	be	good	for	the	country.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	delegated	away	the	powers	and	responsibilities	associated	with	
assuring	that	the	financial	system	was	stable.		While	this	was	popular	with	the	general	
public,	the	regulatory	burden	that	was	placed	upon	financial	institutions	was	very	unpopular	
in	the	industry	as	were	specific	actions	that	eventually	needed	to	be	taken	against	various	
financial	companies.		Financial	companies	are	major	donors	to	congress	and	congress	would	
wish	to	avoid	the	politically	difficult	act	of	imposing	heavy	regulatory	costs	upon	this	major	
industry.		Congress	however	gets	credit	with	the	public	for	the	laudable	goal	of	passing	
legislation	to	ensure	stability	in	the	financial	system,	even	though	it	sidestepped	the	costs	
associated	with	taking	action	themselves.	
Similarly,	the	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau	is	given	considerable	power	to	
regulate	consumer	financial	products.		This	is	seen	as	a	worthwhile	goal	by	the	general	
public,	but	is	incredibly	unpopular	among	the	financial	companies	that	would	be	regulated.		
By	delegating	away	this	authority	to	the	CFPB,	congress	get	the	political	benefit	of	being	
seen	as	taking	action	to	protect	the	public,	but	minimizes	the	ill-will	from	financial	
companies	that	see	profits	eroded	or	costs	rise	as	a	result	of	the	new	regulations	mandated	
by	the	CFPB.		
Once	again	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program	(TARP)	is	a	good	example	as	well.		
TARP	was	incredibly	unpopular	due	to	its	supposed	cost	despite	the	fact	that	it	was	viewed	
by	many	economists	as	being	necessary	to	forestall	a	much	deeper	crisis.335		Voting	for	TARP	
would	have	been	viewed	as	hurting	reelection	chances	for	most	members	of.		In	the	initial	
vote	on	this	piece	of	legislation,	it	was	voted	down.		This	led	to	panic	in	the	markets,	
heightening	the	crisis	and	driving	home	the	stakes	involved.		After	this	initial	rejection,	
congressional	leadership	and	the	president	tried	to	shore	up	support	for	the	legislation	and	
																																																						
335	Johnson,	Bridget.		“Frank	Reflects	on	TARP	as	Most	Successful,	Most	Unpopular	Program	in	U.S.	History”		PJ	
Media.		December	31,	2012.		https://pjmedia.com/blog/frank-reflects-on-tarp-as-most-successful-most-
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soon	after	it	was	passed.		However	this	was	in	part	due	to	the	poor	response	to	the	initial	
rejection	of	the	legislation	that	showed	that	rejecting	the	legislation	would	be	a	political	risk	
as	well.			
TARP	was	also	passed	in	part	because	of	the	sweeteners	that	convinced	otherwise	
skeptical	lawmakers	to	vote	for	it.		These	included	popular	tax	provisions	and	other	
provisions	that	were	popular	such	as	an	increase	in	the	cap	that	the	FDIC	would	insure	
banking	deposits	for.		Many	of	these	popular	provisions	were	not	directly	related	to	
addressing	the	crisis.		Though	congress	was	able	to	address	the	crisis	with	this	bill,	it	
required	congress	crafting	a	bill	based	on	other	issues	to	create	a	log	roll	as	opposed	to	
solely	crafting	policy	to	address	the	crisis	that	was	unfolding.	
The	vote	to	set	up	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Fund	initially	failed	which	led	to	large	
declines	in	the	stock	market,	which	demonstrated	how	pervasive	was	the	belief	that	the	
TARP	bill	needed	to	pass	and	that	congress	needed	to	take	action.		However,	it	did	not	
initially	pass	because	it	was	also	an	incredibly	unpopular	vote	that	it	was	believed	would	
hurt	those	voting	for	it	politically.		However,	as	unpopular	as	this	vote	and	its	provisions	to	
delegate	to	the	administration	the	power	to	bailout	financial	institutions	were,	it	would	
have	been	a	far	more	unpopular	vote	for	politicians	to	directly	bail	out	the	financial	
institutions	themselves.		Similarly	votes	such	as	to	delegate	the	power	to	cut	spending	seem	
designed	to	avoid	congress	needing	to	take	the	blame	for	cuts	which	are	necessary	to	keep	
the	debt	level	manageable.		Cutting	spending	and	raising	taxes,	which	were	required	in	
order	to	minimize	the	deficit,	are	generally	very	unpopular.		Members	of	congress	largely	
called	for	cuts,	but	did	not	put	forward	any	specifics	as	to	where	the	cuts	would	come	from.		
The	public	is	broadly	accepting	of	cutting	government	spending	in	general,	it	is	specific	cuts	
that	would	require	politicians	putting	forward	a	specific	plan,	that	tend	to	be	unpopular.		To	
say	that	cuts	must	be	made	without	laying	out	the	specific	cuts,	congress	was	able	to	avoid	
tough	political	decisions.		These	actions	are	similar	to	when	congress	attempted	on	a	couple	
instances	to	delegate	away	much	of	the	responsibility	for	raising	taxes	or	deciding	what	
spending	cuts	should	be	implemented.	
While	it	delegated	away	a	lot	of	tough	choices,	congress	took	several	popular	actions	
itself.		As	part	of	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008,	congress	included	a	
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provision	that	gave	$7,000	to	first	time	homebuyers	as	well	as	some	other	types	of	
homebuyers.		The	American	Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	later	increased	this	to	
$8,000.336		This	part	of	the	act	did	not	delegate	power,	but	instead	specifically	laid	out	how	
the	credit	should	be	structured.		The	tendency	of	congress	to	enact	popular	policies	
themselves	while	delegating	those	less	popular	would	seem	to	support	the	abdication	
hypothesis.		Homebuyers	greatly	benefited	from	the	act	whereas	those	that	would	need	to	
pay	for	the	program	were	dispersed	and	thus	the	program	was	popular	with	those	that	were	
benefitted	without	having	many	opponents.		Congress	also	directly	gave	funds	in	some	
instances	such	as	the	$400	per	person	refundable	tax	credit	provision	in	the	in	the	American	
Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009.	
	 Similarly,	in	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	is	a	provision	that	
protects	members	of	the	military	from	being	foreclosed	on	while	they	are	out	of	the	
country.		In	this	ultra-patriotic	period,	this	was	popular	provision	and	avoided	the	potential	
bad	press	that	such	cases	might	make.		This	policy	was	also	made	directly	by	congress	rather	
than	being	delegated.		Similar	provisions	such	as	the	provisions	in	the	American	Recovery	&	
Reinvestment	Act	of	2009	which	reimbursed	service	members	for	losses	on	the	sale	of	their	
primary	residence	due	to	moves	were	also	make	directly	by	congress	and	would	seem	to	be	
made	for	similar	reasons.		
Congress	enacted	certain	provisions	that	were	not	necessarily	approved	of	by	those	
in	the	executive	branch	such	as	including	a	limit	on	executive	compensation	for	companies	
receiving	TARP	funds.		Some	in	the	executive	branch	thought	this	limit	would	make	
companies	less	likely	to	use	these	programs	that	were	being	created	to	help	companies	and	
to	add	liquidity	to	financial	markets.		However,	congress	was	attuned	to	the	ear	of	the	
public	and	took	action	that	they	knew	would	make	government	support	for	these	firms	
more	publicly	acceptable.		The	public	did	not	want	to	support	a	corporate	bailout,	which	
was	viewed	by	some	as	welfare	for	the	rich,	and	so	congress	was	being	more	responsive	to	
the	needs	of	the	public	and	more	democratic.		However,	as	to	the	question	of	how	well	the	
law	addresses	the	needs	of	the	nation	in	preventing	the	crisis,	factors	such	as	the	pay	that	
companies	pay	their	executives	were	mostly	of	a	distraction	and	a	populist	issue,	and	did	
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not	address	the	root	cause	of	the	crisis	or	help	ameliorate	the	crisis.		The	Democrats	pushed	
for	a	number	of	provisions	that	would	limit	executive	compensation	and	golden	parachutes.		
These	may	have	some	symbolic	value,	but	did	not	directly	address	the	crisis	itself	and	they	
held	risks	for	the	programs	that	were	designed	to	diminish	the	crisis.			The	Treasury	
Secretary	thought	limits	on	executive	compensation	would	stigmatize	TARP	and	make	it	less	
likely	to	be	successful	as	companies	might	be	less	willing	to	take	TARP	funds	due	to	these	
provisions.		Ultimately	the	power	to	limit	executive	compensation	for	companies	that	
received	government	assistance	was	granted	to	Special	Master	for	TARP	Executive	
Compensation,	more	popularly	known	as	the	Pay	Czar,	rather	than	being	set	by	congress	or	
by	using	the	$500,000	salary	cap	that	the	Obama	administration	had	initially	been	
pushing.337	
While	many	of	the	actions	taken	by	congress	during	this	period	seem	consistent	with	
the	abdication	hypothesis,	this	is	not	to	say	that	this	was	congress’	only	motivation	and	
many	of	the	acts	of	delegation	that	politically	benefitted	policy	makers	they	also	were	
consistent	with	an	attempt	to	use	delegation	to	achieve	better	policy.		Due	to	hyper-
partisanship,	congress	struggled	for	much	of	this	period	to	pass	bills	and	could	objectively	
see	delegating	to	an	external	body	as	increasing	the	likelihood	of	a	positive	policy	outcome	
resulting.		In	addition,	considerable	time	and	effort	was	required	to	deal	with	all	the	
consequences	of	the	financial	crisis	and	congress	might	have	felt	that	it	did	not	have	the	
ability	to	deal	with	all	of	these	especially	during	periods	where	its	time	and	attention	were	
focused	on	other	issues	such	as	reforming	the	United	States	health	care	systems.	
	 During	this	period	there	was	extensive	gridlock	and	so	getting	bills	passed	took	a	
considerable	amount	of	time	and	effort.		This	means	that	policy	created	by	congress	would	
not	be	very	adaptable	and	could	not	to	be	made	by	congress	in	a	timely	manner,	however	
policy	creation	could	potentially	still	be	adaptable	and	implemented	quickly	if	it	were	made	
by	the	bureaucracy.		Responding	in	a	timely	manner	was	important	during	the	crisis	as	
confidence	was	weakening.		Weakening	confidence	during	a	financial	downturn	leads	to	
more	individuals	holding	on	to	money	rather	than	spending	it.		This	situation	is	the	so	called	
Paradox	of	Thrift,	in	which	the	rational	actions	of	individual	market	participants	to	conserve	
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their	money	during	a	crisis	leads	to	a	drop	in	aggregate	demand	and	consumption	and	that	
makes	the	economy	weaker.		Similarly	and	perhaps	more	dangerously	is	the	fact	that	crises	
lead	to	bank	runs	and	their	modern	day	equivalents.		Actions	were	taken	to	assure	those	
lending	money	in	swap	markets,	individuals	and	corporations	holding	funds	in	banks	for	fear	
of	a	bank	run	which	could	quickly	bring	down	major	financial	institutions.		A	slow	response	
to	a	crisis	allows	faith	in	the	system	to	falter,	which	can	allow	the	crisis	to	deepen.		Congress	
and	the	president	realized	the	need	for	vigorous	action	and	used	this	as	justification	for	
taking	action	in	the	form	of	delegation	to	the	agencies.		
Another	example	where	delegation	made	strategic	sense	to	enact	policy	was	The	
Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau,	which	pitted	the	interests	of	financial	corporations	
vs.	those	of	individuals	and	often	poor	and	less	educated	Americans.		The	concept	of	the	
CFPR	had	been	a	liberal	goal	pushed	for	years	by	Elizabeth	Warren	and	others	that	could	not	
get	traction	until	the	crisis	and	the	change	in	public	opinion	that	came	with	it.		This	was	a	
major	piece	of	delegation	that	began	to	regulate	an	area	that	had	been	largely	unregulated	
previously.		This	appears	to	be	an	attempt	to	create	new	policy	that	one	party	viewed	as	
beneficial	since	the	political	environment	would	finally	allow	it	to	pass.		This	delegation	
allowed	these	decisions	to	be	made	outside	of	the	politically	charged	atmosphere	of	
congress.		This	insulated	this	policy	so	that	after	the	crisis,	the	pro-business	lobby	would	
have	more	difficulty	undoing	this	policy	decision.		It	was	largely	a	popular	action	and	
congress,	or	at	least	the	majority	Democratic	Party,	would	have	gained	by	taking	actions	
directly.		However	this	would	have	risked	the	policy	long	term	and	also	would	have	had	
congress	dealing	with	complex	financial	situations.		Thus	congress	appeared	to	have	taken	
action	to	create	policy	that	they	viewed	as	worthwhile	as	opposed	to	focusing	on	political	
considerations.	
	 Certain	pieces	of	delegation	seemed	necessitated	by	a	need	of	expertise,	time,	and	
attention	that	congress	was	not	able	to	manage.		An	instance	was	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	
requiring	financial	regulatory	agencies	to	create	regulations	governing	the	validation	models	
used	by	the	mortgage	market.	338		These	rules	were	in	a	very	complex	policy	area,	may	need	
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to	be	adjusted	from	time	to	time,	and	would	take	a	long	time	to	flesh	out.		These	reasons	
would	all	lead	to	more	delegation	and	be	consistent	with	the	delegation	hypothesis.	
	 Congress	and	the	president	can	act	on	their	own	or	else	delegate	decisions	and	
authority	to	another	entity.		Assuming	rational	self-interest,	if	delegating	better	achieves	
congress’	goals	than	direct	action	would	then	congress	will	delegate,	whereas	when	direct	
action	is	in	congress’	self-interest	congress	tends	to	act	itself.		This	appears	largely	to	be	
what	happened	during	the	financial	crisis.		Whether	delegation	is	in	congress’	interest	is	
generally	thought	to	depend	on	numerous	factors	such	as	whether	congress	is	of	the	same	
party	as	the	president	and	whether	the	decision	is	likely	to	be	popular	or	not.		The	
abdication	hypothesis	assumes	that	congress	primarily	tries	to	avoid	decisions	that	will	
reflect	poorly	on	members	of	congress	and	thereby	hurt	them	politically.		More	positive	
theories	view	congress	as	wanting	to	delegate	to	arrive	at	better	political	solutions	that	
better	meet	the	nation’s	needs.	
	 Ceteris	paribus,	for	popular	bills	Congress	would	typically	prefer	to	pass	the	bill	
directly	so	that	they	can	have	more	control	and	get	credit	for	the	policy.		Congress	is	
however	cognizant	of	the	fact	that	on	many	national	matters	or	in	cases	of	emergencies,	the	
population	looks	to	the	president	to	lead	the	nation	and	propose	the	appropriate	national	
policies.		Thus	one	may	hypothesize	that	congress	will	tend	to	accede	to	the	president’s	lead	
in	such	situations	as	it	would	be	viewed	as	overstepping	the	bounds	of	their	role	by	
opposing	the	sole	nationally	elected	leader.		For	unpopular	bills,	congress	will	choose	to	
delegate	power	especially	to	a	bureaucracy.		This	action	also	delegates	power	to	the	
appropriate	congressional	committee	or	committees	that	oversees	the	agency	since	they	
will	be	able	to	do	case	work	and	gain	politically	from	this	role.		This	too	is	a	form	of	
delegation	as	those	on	the	committee	have	a	different	set	of	interests	than	the	average	
floor	voter.		When	public	scrutiny	is	highest	such	as	during	a	crisis,	congress	will	be	
especially	risk	adverse	and	try	to	delegate	away	decisions	that	will	likely	be	unpopular.	
	 	
5.2	The	Selection	of	the	Agents	of	Delegation	
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	 There	are	numerous	instances	of	delegation	during	this	period.		A	review	of	them	
shows	that	there	were	general	trends	in	the	agents	that	were	selected	for	acts	of	
delegation.		We	take	as	an	axiom	that	the	principals	that	delegated	power	acted	rationally	in	
their	own	perceived	best	interests	and	that	the	agents	of	delegation	were	strategically	
selected	by	congress.		Thus	we	are	able	to	look	at	the	motivations	of	the	choice	of	agent	by	
looking	at	these	trends	that	congress	displayed	in	selecting	agents.	
The	implementation	of	the	major	bills	such	as	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	
and	Consumer	Protection	Act	left	most	of	the	major	decisions	in	the	hands	of	bureaucrats	
rather	than	enshrined	in	statutory	law.		The	implementation	of	these	bills	comprised	the	
most	important	governmental	action	during	this	period	and	were	arguably	more	important	
that	the	broad-based	rules	set	down	by	congress.		These	responses	were	instances	in	which	
“the	devil	is	in	the	details”	and	the	seemingly	smaller	choices	made	on	how	to	implement	
some	of	these	broad	goals	were	what	determined	if	they	would	be	successful,	who	would	
be	the	beneficiaries	and	losers	in	any	governmental	actions,	and	the	methods	that	would	be	
used.		These	decisions	comprise	the	bedrock	of	political	action.	
For	instance,	the	text	of	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	is	vague	
which	allows	for	significant	discretion	by	the	Treasury	and	other	organizations	that	are	
delegated	powers	under	the	act.		One	instance	of	this	is	that	when	defining	eligibility	for	
TARP	program	funds	the	act	limits	this	eligibility	to	“financial	institutions”	with	“significant	
operations”	in	the	United	States.		As	these	phrases	are	not	defined	it	allowed	the	Treasury	
to	determine	the	meanings	of	what	constitutes	a	“financial	institution”	and	how	large	an	
operation	constitutes	“significant	operations”.		The	Treasury	Department	used	its	authority	
to	determine	that	“financial	institution”	was	a	broad	and	inclusive	term	that	included	a	host	
of	corporations	outside	of	the	scope	of	just	banks.		An	example	was	the	significant	
assistance	provided	to	AIG,	a	large	insurance	company.	
The	vast	majority	of	the	major	policy	changes	that	resulted	in	response	to	the	crisis	
were	made	by	governmental	agencies	that	were	delegated	powers.		This	is	true	both	in	the	
short	term	response	to	the	crisis	in	which	steps	were	taken	to	ameliorate	the	situation	as	
well	as	years	later	when	the	financial	regulatory	system	was	getting	restructured	in	order	to	
forestall	or	mitigate	potential	future	financial	crises.		It	may	seem	somewhat	intuitive	that	in	
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the	depth	of	the	crisis	that	additional	power	is	delegated	to	executive	agencies	that	can	
address	the	crisis	more	quickly	than	congress,	have	greater	expertise	in	the	financial	
services	industry,	and	have	more	time	and	attention	to	dedicate	to	working	on	a	crisis	than	
does	congress	which	is	more	limited	in	size.		However,	much	of	these	reasons	to	delegate	
power	to	the	bureaucracy	in	a	crisis	do	not	hold	true	when	the	need	is	less	immediate	and	
the	focus	of	legislation	is	to	improve	the	regulatory	regime	so	as	to	better	protect	against	
future	crises.		In	this	situation,	speed	is	less	pivotal	than	taking	the	time	to	ensure	that	
effective	policy	is	created	and	the	capabilities	and	expertise	of	congress	are	less	of	a	
detriment	as	they	can	rely	on	expertise	from	the	GAO	and	the	rest	of	the	legislative	branch	
as	well	as	much	of	the	executive	branch	which	congress	can	have	report	or	testify.		
Fertile	ground	for	exploring	the	choice	of	the	agents	that	congress	chooses	to	
delegate	to	are	those	situations	in	which	congress	creates	a	new	office	or	agency	and	
delegates	powers	to	the	new	entity	that	it	set	up.		Investigating	these	situations	is	useful	
because	congress	has	an	opportunity	to	tailor	the	agent’s	characteristics	to	its	preferences,	
which	gives	observers	a	change	to	see	what	characteristics	congress	preferred	for	the	entity.			
Congress	gave	certain	authorities	to	specific	agencies	in	its	attempt	to	deal	with	the	
crisis.		These	were	deliberate	decisions	and	thus	trends	in	these	decisions	show	us	what	
congress.		There	were	reasons	that	congress	delegated	such	vast	powers	to	the	Treasury	
Department	and	not	to	the	Commerce	Department.			There	appear	to	be	a	handful	of	
motivations	that	appeared	to	determine	the	use	of	the	agent	or	agents	selected:	ensuring	
agent	independence,	agent	expertise,	ensuring	coordination,	allowing	for	more	vigorous	
action,	and	to	ensure	continued	attention	to	an	issue.		Below	this	paper	looks	at	the	reasons	
for	delegation	and	agency	selection	that	appeared	to	present	themselves	most	frequently.	
	
5.2.1 To Ensure Agent Independence 
	
Congress	on	repeated	occasions	during	its	response	to	the	financial	crisis	appears	to	
have	focused	on	making	sure	the	agent	that	power	is	delegates	to	is	able	to	be	independent	
of	political	considerations	and	pressure	from	various	interested	actors	and	that	it	is	likely	to	
remain	so	in	the	foreseeable	future.		This	in	part	seems	to	be	a	response	to	regulatory	
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capture	that	took	place	at	agencies	such	as	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision	and	to	a	lesser	
extent	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission.		It	also	stems	from	the	realization	that	
there	are	powerful	political	interests	that	might	be	interested	in	meddling	for	political	or	
economic	gain.		The	financial	industry	is	one	of	the	largest	industries	in	America	and	by	
lobbying	it	can	have	considerable	sway	in	congress	and	with	the	administration.		Several	
instances	are	listed	below	in	which	ensuring	agency	independence	appears	to	be	one	of	the	
prime	motivations	for	the	choice	of	agent.		This	is	not	to	say	that	this	is	the	only	motivation,	
and	certainly	other	factors	such	as	expertise	in	the	area	were	a	factor	as	well,	but	
independence	is	a	significant	factor	in	this	decision.	
The	political	process	can	exert	influence	on	the	policy	making	process	and	can	lead	
to	policy	that	is	not	as	efficient	or	as	beneficial	to	the	nation	as	policy	that	was	created	
without	these	influences.		Thus	if	congress	can	select	an	agent	that	is	isolated	from	political	
considerations,	this	could	lead	to	better	policy.				
Cooper	and	West	suggested	a	reason	for	the	use	of	delegation	was	that	agencies	are	
less	political	than	congress	and	consequently	can	make	better	policy	since	they	could	focus	
on	what	is	the	best	policy	for	the	nation	rather	than	scoring	political	points.339		The	crisis	did	
seem	to	show	agencies	as	being	less	political.		Though	agencies	were	largely	led	by	political	
figures,	the	agencies	still	acted	less	political.		Henry	Paulson,	who	was	the	member	of	the	
bureaucracy	who	had	the	most	control	over	the	initial	government	responses	to	the	crisis,	
acted	more	as	a	technocrat	than	a	politician.		In	part	this	was	due	to	his	being	new	to	the	
political	world	and	instead	coming	from	the	financial	world.		In	addition,	when	he	ultimately	
entered	the	political	world	he	was	reluctant	to	do	so	and	twice	resisted	the	offer	of	being	
nominated	as	Treasury	Secretary	and	took	the	position	more	from	a	sense	of	duty	or	giving	
back	than	from	a	wish	to	help	his	career	or	get	into	politics.		There	had	long	been	a	revolving	
door	so	that	the	key	financial	leaders	such	as	the	head	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Treasury	
Secretary,	and	the	Commerce	Secretary	would	often	come	from	the	finance	world,	serve	in	
politics	briefly,	and	then	go	back	to	finance.				
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	 The	president	appointed	the	cabinet	and	many	members	had	long	political	careers	
prior	to	joining	the	Bush	administration.		As	these	ran	departments	and	agencies	it	would	
seem	there	was	significant	risk	that	the	administration	would	be	as	political	as	congress.		
However	before	congress	delegated	power	they	would	know	who	they	were	delegating	to,	
at	least	who	would	initially	wield	those	powers.		This	foreknowledge	could	allow	the	
congress	to	avoid	delegating	to	overly	political	agencies	and	individuals.		In	practice	much	of	
the	delegation	to	deal	with	the	financial	crisis	was	to	bureaucrats	that	were	not	political.		
Many	of	these	were	new	to	public	service	and	were	not	planning	to	make	a	career	in	public	
service	or	were	in	positions	that	were	insulated	from	political	concerns	so	that	they	could	or	
would	act	more	as	technocrats.	
Much	of	the	delegation	was	to	executive	agencies	and	so	the	question	might	arise	
about	how	much	independence	these	agencies	have	since	the	president	is	the	head	of	the	
executive	branch.		The	administration	however	only	has	limited	control	over	the	executive	
branch	agencies.		An	example	of	this	can	be	seen	in	that	much	of	the	administration	such	as	
the	Secretary	For	Housing	and	Urban	Development,	Shaun	Donovan,	wanted	Fannie	Mae	
and	Freddie	Mac	to	write	down	mortgages	and	help	struggling	home	owners	whereas	the	
Acting	Director	of	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency		(FHFA),	which	regulates	these	two	
entities,	barred	them	from	writing	down	loans	as	this	would	be	expensive	for	taxpayers.340		
This	is	despite	the	fact	that	President	Obama	appointed	the	Acting	Director,	Edward	
DeMarco.	
When	congress	created	the	Office	of	Financial	Research	in	response	to	the	financial	
crisis,	it	built	in	some	safeguards	to	ensure	agent	independence	once	the	agency	was	up	and	
running.		For	instance	the	director	of	the	Office	of	Financial	Research	is	appointed	to	the	
position	for	six	years	so	that	the	director	will	have	more	independence	from	the	executive	
branch	than	if	it	was	a	shorter	period	or	expired	in	conjunction	with	the	president’s	term.		In	
addition,	a	provision	in	the	bill	that	created	the	Office	of	Financial	Research	states	that	no	
agency	can	compel	the	director	of	the	office	to	testify	to	them	before	he	submits	his	report	
to	congress.		This	helps	ensure	independence	of	this	agency	from	the	presidential	
administration.			
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Likewise,	by	setting	up	the	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau	as	part	of	the	
Federal	Reserve	this	help	shields	the	CFPB	from	congressional	and	presidential	tampering.		
The	Federal	Reserve,	being	a	central	bank,	was	specifically	given	far	more	independence	
than	other	agencies	and	thus	by	making	the	CFPB	as	an	independent	agency	located	inside	
the	Federal	Reserve,	in	turn	gives	it	additional	independence	that	it	would	not	have	it	was	
made	a	part	of	another	organization.		Subject-wise	there	is	not	much	reason	to	place	this	
bureau	in	the	Fed	as	opposed	to	other	agencies,	however	the	structure	of	the	Fed	protects	
it	from	outside	influences	and	that	may	be	the	reasoning	of	those	that	created	it	and	made	
it	part	of	the	federal	reserve.		The	CFPB	is	likely	to	be	unpopular	with	business	interests	that	
often	are	politically	connected	and	have	concentrated	interests	when	compared	to	the	
dispersed	interests	of	consumers.		Thus	protecting	the	independence	of	the	agency	is	
important	if	congress	wants	to	ensure	that	the	administration	and	members	of	congress	do	
not	interfere	with	the	bureau.		The	CFPB	has	ties	to	the	executive	branch	in	that	the	
president	appoints	the	director.		However	the	5-year	term	of	the	appointment	does	allow	
some	freedom	for	the	director.			
Not	only	did	congress	take	steps	to	shield	the	CFPB	from	outside	from	congressional	
and	presidential	interference,	but	it	also	created	this	agent	so	that	it	would	not	be	unduly	
influenced	by	other	agencies	including	the	Federal	Reserve,	in	which	it	resides.		The	Fed	is	
prohibited	from	directing	an	employee	of	the	board	or	trying	to	influence	its	director,	
impeding	the	bureau	or	changing	the	role	of	the	bureau.		This	is	unusual	in	that	the	Fed	is	
the	parent	organization	of	this	new	board	and	yet	it	has	little	say	in	how	this	entity	is	run	
and	the	checks	on	this	entity	all	come	from	other	entities.		This	is	similar	to	prior	federal	law	
that	prohibits	the	Treasury	Secretary,	“from	interfering	with	the	specific	actions	of	
regulators	like	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	currency	and	the	Office	of	Thrift	
Supervision,	even	though	they	are	nominally	part	of	the	department.”341	
In	addition,	to	designing	delegation	to	protect	an	agency	from	the	administration	
and	congress,	it	also	can	be	designed	to	protect	the	agency	from	the	influence	of	special	
interests.		Typically	concentrated	interests	are	more	able	to	influence	agencies	and	
members	of	congress	and	can	thus	get	the	law	amended	to	meet	their	desires.		Consumers	
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as	a	whole	are	not	a	concentrated	interest	whereas	financial	industry	trade	groups	and	even	
large	individual	companies	have	significant	power	and	considerable	interest	at	stake	in	
weakening	regulations	and	consumer	protections	as	weakening	these	may	increase	profits.		
As	such,	keeping	this	consumer	protection	function	isolated	from	these	special	interests	and	
pressure	groups	so	that	the	interests	of	consumers	would	continue	to	be	represented.		
There	are	countless	similar	examples	of	this	such	as	agricultural	marketing	orders	that	help	
a	handful	of	large	agricultural	firms,	but	which	lead	to	higher	prices,	wasted	products,	and	
inefficiency	in	the	markets.		There	are	very	few	interest	groups	that	represent	consumer	
interests.		Schlotzman	and	Tierney	did	a	survey	of	3,000	citizen	groups	and	of	these	only	one	
was	focused	primarily	on	consumer	interests.342		It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	Fed	is	a	good	
place	for	this	new	board	since	this	protects	is	from	congress,	the	president,	and	interests	
that	put	pressure	on	an	agency.	
For	the	Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program,	congress	did	not	want	the	president	to	be	
directly	in	charge	of	financial	decision-making.		The	president	was	not	popular	with	congress	
and	had	political	challenges	that	would	make	it	difficult	for	him	and	his	administration	to	
make	the	appropriate	changes	that	needed	to	be	taken.		Congress	thus	gained	by	delegating	
to	an	insulated	technocratic	individual.	
	 Almost	no	authority	was	delegated	to	the	president	in	the	Dodd-Frank	Act.		Almost	
all	authority	that	was	delegated,	was	delegated	to	agencies	and	their	heads.		In	part	this	
seems	this	was	in	order	to	keep	this	power	out	of	the	hands	of	the	president	and	future	
presidents.		The	president	was	still	the	head	of	the	executive	branch	and	thus	could	exert	
some	nominal	control	over	executive	agencies.		However,	much	of	the	delegation	during	
this	period	seems	to	have	been	designed	to	minimize	the	ability	of	the	president	and	other	
administrative	officials	from	being	able	to	affect	policy.			
	 Much	of	the	authority	delegated	was	to	the	Federal	Reserve.		This	included	much	of	
the	regulation	of	financial	companies	and	much	of	the	responsibility	for	the	stability	of	the	
financial	system.		The	Federal	Reserve	had	specifically	been	designed	to	be	insulated	from	
the	political	considerations	of	the	administration,	which	is	viewed	as	a	best	practice	for	a	
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central	bank	that	needs	to	focus	on	long	term	issues	and	be	willing	to	make	unpopular	
decisions.		One	factor	leading	to	its	independence	is	that	the	term	length	for	members	of	
the	Federal	Reserve	Board	of	Governors	is	14	years	so	that	while	Governors	are	nominated	
by	the	president	and	confirmed	by	the	senate,	they	do	not	have	to	worry	about	
reappointment	and	other	political	considerations.		This	independence	along	with	their	
expertise	seems	to	be	the	key	reasons	they	were	given	so	much	new	authority	after	the	
crisis	despite	a	mediocre	showing	in	the	run	up	to	the	crisis.			
Independence	is	important	in	this	context	because	financial	institutions	lobby	for	
lesser	restrictions	on	them	as	these	impose	a	cost	on	these	institutions	and	members	of	
congress	and	the	administration	often	champion	the	cause	of	such	institutions	when	
weighed	against	the	slight	potential	of	one	of	them	failing	or	a	threat	to	the	financial	crisis.		
The	Fed	can	take	a	longer-term	view	and	balance	current	costs	against	potentially	
devastating	long-tail	events	that	may	occur	in	the	future.	
Similar	to	the	additional	powers	given	to	the	Federal	Reserve,	in	response	to	the	
crisis	and	to	avoid	future	crises,	congress	authorized	and	delegated	extensive	powers	to	the	
Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council.			As	the	FSOC	represents	the	interests	of	a	politically	
weak	and	dispersed	interest	group	it	is	particularly	at	risk	of	political	manipulation	and	
ineffectiveness	unless	provisions	are	made	for	it	to	remain	independent.		To	help	ensure	
this,	Congress	designed	it	so	that	the	council’s	power	is	not	circumscribed	by	the	Federal	
Advisory	Committee	Act	as	most	Federal	Advisory	Committees	are.		It	also	has	extensive	
funding	sources	and	thus	is	relatively	unconstrained	financially.		In	addition,	it	also	has	
power	to	direct	the	Office	of	Financial	Research,	which	is	another	new	organization	that	was	
created	under	this	act	and	this	gives	it	additional	capabilities.	
	 In	contrast	to	these	new	agencies	that	were	created	in	response	to	the	crisis	and	
which	were	delegated	authority,	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision	had	its	authorities	
transferred	to	other	organizations	and	was	effectively	shut	down	and	merged	into	the	OCC.		
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	eliminated	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision	in	part	due	to	its	poor	
regulatory	culture	in	effect	merging	it	with	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency.		
For	years	OTS	had	been	known	as	a	lax	regulator	and	had	used	that	to	lure	financial	
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companies	to	choose	it	as	its	regulatory	agency.343		This	was	in	OTS’	interests	as	it	received	
revenue	from	the	companies	it	regulated.		It	had	been	the	regulator	of	American	Insurance	
Group	(AIG),	Washington	Mutual,	and	IndyMac,	who	were	three	of	the	large	financial	
companies	that	struggled	the	most	during	this	period	due	to	excessive	risk-taking.		OTS	had	
repeatedly	shown	instances	of	regulatory	capture	and	had	in	the	minds	of	congress	proven	
that	in	its	current	form	and	culture	it	could	not	be	independent	enough	to	make	policy	
decisions	or	to	regulate	effectively.	
Another	key	regulatory	agency	that	congress	created	in	response	to	the	financial	
crisis	and	delegated	extensive	power	to	was	the	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Board.		The	
structure	of	the	CFPB	was	determined	by	the	interplay	of	various	groups	and	it	is	a	good	
example	to	show	how	important	the	structure	of	an	agency	and	the	choice	of	agent	was	to	
congress.344		Republican	senators	on	the	whole	preferred	a	more	decentralized	organization,	
which	is	often	a	sign	that	they	wanted	a	weaker	regulator	with	less	power.		This	design	
choice	could	be	for	other	reasons	and	other	organizations	such	as	the	SEC	and	FDIC	do	have	
a	decentralized	structure	that	are	run	by	executive	boards.		However	the	assumption	that	its	
design	was	to	weaken	the	board	is	supported,	by	the	fact	that	those	that	pushing	for	a	
decentralized	board	also	opposed	the	proposed	nomination	of	Elizabeth	Warren	who	was	
seen	as	wanting	to	strengthen	the	organization.			
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	was	written	in	such	a	manner	that	the	board	could	only	perform	
its	functions,	such	as	regulating	nonbank	financial	companies,	if	the	agency	had	a	head	and	
it	would	not	have	this	ability	without	one.345		As	Richard	Cordray	stated	in	a	blog	post	
following	his	eventual	appointment,	“Now,	with	a	director,	the	C.F.P.B.	can	exercise	its	full	
authorities	—	with	respect	to	both	banks	and	nonbanks	—	to	help	those	markets	operate	
fairly,	transparently,	and	competitively.”346		Elizabeth	Warren,	the	president’s	initial	choice	
for	this	position	and	one	of	the	architects	of	the	new	agency,	was	never	nominated	due	to	
her	being	viewed	as	to	liberal	and	too	likely	to	push	for	a	strong,	aggressive	agency	and	thus	
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it	was	believe	that	the	Senate	would	not	approve	her	nomination.		Instead	he	appointed	her	
as	a	special	assistant	to	the	president,	which	allowed	her	to	perform	a	key	role	in	
establishing	the	agency	while	not	requiring	a	nomination.		Though	she	helped	initially	shape	
the	board,	by	being	in	that	position	rather	than	as	the	head	of	the	board,	it	limited	actions	
that	the	CFPB	could	take.			
The	Republicans	also	were	unwilling	to	approve	the	president’s	nominee	for	this	role	
and	the	nomination	lingered.		The	unwillingness	of	the	Republicans	to	approve	the	
nomination	was	due	to	their	playing	hardball	and	trying	to	force	a	change	in	the	structure	of	
the	agency	in	which	the	director	would	be	replaced	by	a	five-member	board.		In	May	2011,	
44	Republicans	senators	signed	a	letter	stating	that	they	would	not	approve	a	nomination	of	
an	agency	head	and	instead	they	would	insist	on	a	five-member	board.			As	that	was	out	of	a	
total	of	47	Republican	senators	it	was	clear	that	the	party	as	a	whole	was	very	opposed	to	
the	structure	of	the	board	and	they	had	enough	support	to	filibuster	and	block	any	
nomination.		The	structure	of	the	board	is	important	because	it	is	harder	to	accomplish	
major	changes	with	a	board	as	there	is	not	a	singular	person	pressing	for	their	vision	to	be	
realized	and	because	the	law	was	written	in	such	a	way	as	the	head	of	the	board	was	very	
powerful.		The	board	still	had	some	capabilities	without	a	head	and	could	exercise	powers	
and	authority	that	were	given	to	by	shifting	existing	powers	from	existing	agencies	such	as	
the	Federal	Trade	commission,	it	was	limited	as	to	what	new	policy	agendas	it	could	pursue	
or	new	restrictions	it	could	enact.	
With	regard	to	President	Obama’s	appointment	of	Richard	Cordray	to	the	Consumer	
Financial	Protection	Bureau,	the	president	wrote,	“I	nominated	Richard	for	this	job	last	
summer.		And	yet,	Republicans	in	the	Senate	kept	blocking	his	confirmation	–	not	because	
they	objected	to	him,	but	because	they	wanted	to	weaken	his	agency.”347		He	viewed	the	
actions	of	congress	as	explicitly	trying	to	weaken	the	agency	so	that	it	is	less	effective	and	
thus	is	not	as	able	to	do	what	it	is	charged	to	do.		Control	of	congress	had	changed	from	
when	the	law	had	been	enacted	until	the	point	when	Obama	went	to	nominate	someone	to	
head	the	agency.		In	the	intervening	period	the	Republicans	had	become	the	majority	in	the	
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House	and	had	deeply	cut	the	Democrat’s	majority	in	the	house	to	a	point	where	the	
minority	was	able	to	block	the	majority.		Obama	and	the	Democrats	frame	this	as	the	
Republicans	thwarting	the	will	of	the	majority.		Obama,	for	instance	with	respect	to	the	
Republican’s	stopping	the	appointment,	stated,	“I	will	not	stand	by	while	a	minority	in	the	
Senate	puts	party	ideology	ahead	of	the	people	they	were	elected	to	serve,”348		These	
debates	over	the	structure	and	leadership	of	agencies	were	not	confined	to	the	CFPB.		It	
took	17	months	after	the	creation	of	the	Office	of	Financial	Research	for	it	to	get	a	leader	
	 The	Federal	Reserve	was	specifically	designed	to	be	insulated	from	political	
concerns.		Long	terms	of	office	and	little	oversight	by	congress	leads	to	those	at	the	central	
bank	not	being	overly	influenced	by	congress	and	thus	able	to	take	a	long	term,	
disinterested	view	of	the	economic	system	and	take	the	appropriate	actions	to	improve	the	
long	term	economic	situation	of	the	nation	rather	than	focusing	on	short	term	political	
concerns.		This	has	long	been	upheld	as	the	ideal	for	central	banks	as	it	leads	to	better	
economic	policy.		However,	congress	is	not	always	happy	with	the	Fed	doing	as	it	sees	fit	
and	so	during	the	crisis,	some	in	congress	tried	to	make	political	hay	by	demagoguery	
against	the	Federal	Reserve	and	proposing	more	formal	oversight	of	the	Fed	as	a	way	of	
reining	it	in.	
There	is	reason	to	believe	that	agencies	acted	less	politically	than	congress	during	
the	crisis.		Individuals	such	as	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	Paulson	acted	in	a	manner	that	
appeared	that	they	were	not	interested	in	improving	their	political	prospects	or	those	of	
their	party,	but	rather	were	more	focused	on	mitigating	the	crisis.		By	comparison,	congress’	
actions	seemed	very	political.		Examples	of	this	were	the	negotiations	over	raising	the	debt	
limit	and	over	passing	a	continuing	regulation	to	fund	the	government	where	much	of	the	
debate	seemed	to	be	related	to	political	positioning	and	improving	the	election	prospects	of	
individual	members	of	congress.		In	addition,	many	votes	seemed	very	partisan	and	political	
based	off	of	the	percent	of	members	of	congress	that	voted	along	party	lines	and	seemed	to	
be	motivated	by	political	reasoning.		In	these	actions,	members	of	congress	spent	
considerable	time	and	energy	framing	the	debate	so	that	the	actions	taken	would	be	
popular	with	their	base.		This	was	primarily	due	to	electoral	reasons	rather	than	to	affect	
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the	text	of	the	bill	of	itself	though	there	was	an	aspect	that	by	making	an	action	unpopular	it	
could	force	the	actions	of	the	other	side	and	lead	to	more	preferred	political	actions.		
However,	even	this	view	seems	to	show	that	there	was	partisanship	as	can	be	seen	in	that	
this	framing	was	taken	in	part	to	use	political	considerations	to	force	the	hand	of	the	other	
side	whereas	an	insulated	bureaucrat,	such	as	the	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	would	
not	be	much	moved	by	these	arguments.	
Under	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008,	the	Treasury	Department	
also	was	empowered	to	make	determinations	as	to	whether	hedge	funds	and	other	non-
traditional	financial	entities	should	qualify	for	federal	assistance.		This	proposition	is	a	
politically	charged	one	in	that	hedge	funds	are	viewed	as	being	tools	of	the	rich,	who	have	
done	well,	while	the	poor	have	struggled.		Congress	would	find	it	difficult	to	vote	for	a	
provision	that	is	so	unpopular	and	which	appears	as	if	the	poor	had	to	bail	out	the	rich,	
however	a	more	insolated	agency	has	more	political	leeway	to	institute	this	if	it	felt	that	it	
would	be	broadly	beneficial.		Congress	made	a	decision	that	delegating	in	this	instance	
made	the	most	sense.		
	
5.2.2 Agency Expertise and Capabilities 
	 	
The	Treasury	and	the	Federal	Reserve	were	two	of	the	organizations	that	were	
delegated	to	the	most	during	this	period.		These	were	also	the	organizations	with	the	
greatest	knowledge	of	the	financial	areas	that	required	most	governmental	responses.		
Beyond	just	expertise	in	the	subject	matter,	the	delegation	seemed	to	be	to	organizations	
that	already	had	similar	powers	and	were	able	to	get	things	done.		Comparatively	little	
authority	was	delegated	to	the	Commerce	Department	and	the	Labor	Department	during	
this	period	despite	their	missions	of	promoting	economic	grow	and	protecting	workers	
being	closely	aligned	with	the	needs	during	the	crisis.		This	is	largely	due	to	the	expertise	of	
the	former	agencies	when	compared	to	those	of	the	latter	agencies.		These	latter	
organizations,	like	congress,	did	not	have	the	depth	of	expertise	in	financial	markets	that	
congress	would	prefer.	
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	 There	were	several	instances	in	which	congress	created	broad	goals,	but	left	large	
parts	of	the	policy	creation	up	to	agencies.		A	good	example	of	this	is	the	Volcker	Rule,	
which	was	a	section	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	that	tried	to	stop	banks	from	engaging	in	
proprietary	trading,	trading	on	behalf	of	themselves	rather	than	their	clients.		When	the	rule	
actually	was	implemented	it	ended	up	being	hundreds	of	additional	pages	of	regulations.		
These	covered	the	harder	questions	such	as	when	exactly	does	trading	count	as	proprietary	
trading,	what	restrictions	to	place	on	financial	institutions,	and	what	reporting	and	
regulatory	requirement	would	be	implemented	to	deal	with	this.		In	addition,	the	agencies	
determined	the	timeline	that	the	new	rules	were	implemented.		Thus	though	this	may	
initially	seem	to	some	as	congress	determining	policy	and	the	agency	merely	filling	in	the	
details,	in	actuality	many	of	the	key	decisions	were	made	by	the	agencies	rather	than	
congress.		These	details	ultimately	determined	the	effect	the	policy	would	have,	how	it	
would	be	implemented,	who	would	be	affected,	and	the	extent	to	which	it	changed	the	
behavior	of	banks	and	other	financial	institutions.		While	Dodd-Frank	was	passed	in	June	
2010,	the	regulations	implementing	the	Volcker	Rule	were	not	written	and	approved	until	
December	2013	and	most	of	its	the	rules	did	not	take	effect	until	July	2015.349		Congress	
relied	on	agencies	to	set	make	most	of	the	complex	and	involved	policy	decisions	regarding	
the	Volker	Rule	and	numerous	other	policies.	
A	section	of	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	that	demonstrates	the	
need	for	expertise	and	that	congress	looked	for	this	when	selecting	agents	is	the	Mortgage	
Disclosure	Improvement	Act	of	2008,	which	amended	the	Truth	in	Lending	Act	making	
changes	to	mandatory	waiting	periods	were	put	into	place	to	ensure	the	process	is	working,	
due	diligence	is	being	done,	and	that	those	getting	loans	use	loan	information	in	an	
informed,	considered	manner.		In	order	for	this	law	to	have	an	effect,	the	Federal	Reserve	
published	rule	changes	to	Regulation	Z	that	provide	certain	rules	on	timing	of	actions	for	
creditors.350		This	decision	to	delegate	to	the	bureaucracy	allowed	expertise	to	be	brought	
to	bear	when	creating	policy.		It	also	allowed	the	proper	timeframe	and	attention	to	be	
given	to	such	a	complex	area.	
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Through	reporting	requirements	and	similar	powers,	congress	had	the	capability	to	
acquire	the	information	and	expertise	it	would	need	to	make	policy	about	financial	
regulation	directly,	however	congress	in	the	overwhelming	number	of	instances	delegated	
this	authority	and	the	responsibility	for	these	decisions	to	governmental	agencies	and	their	
heads.		The	SEC	has	already	written	several	hundred	pages	of	regulations	and	rules	as	a	
result	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	and	numerous	other	agencies	have	similarly	set	down	
numerous	regulations.			The	majority	of	the	new	regulations	necessitated	by	the	Dodd-Frank	
Act	were	left	to	the	SEC	to	determine	and	write.		For	instance,	the	SEC	was	given	authority	
to	exempt	an	issuer	or	class	of	issuer	if	the	burden	of	the	regulation	falls	disproportionally	
on	small	issuers.	
The	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	authorized	the	Federal	Reserve	to	
start	paying	interest	on	reserves.		This	act	of	delegation,	in	which	the	Fed	could	determine	
what,	if	any,	level	of	interest	to	pay,	allowed	for	better	public	policy	since	the	Federal	
Reserve	was	able	to	act	quickly	compared	to	congress	and	vary	the	rate	as	the	need	arises	
or	as	more	information	becomes	available.		The	decision	to	delegate	the	power	to	set	this	
interest	rate	rather	than	indexing	it	to	a	benchmark,	appeared	to	be	largely	to	allow	for	
expertize	to	be	used	and	to	allow	quick	changes	as	the	need	arises.		Ben	Bernanke,	the	
Chairman	of	Federal	Reserve	Board	felt	that	the	ability	to	pay	interest	on	reserves	would	be	
a	useful	ability,	but	was	unsure	how	to	use	it	and	so	he	experimented	with	different	
applications	of	this	authority	and	tried	three	different	rates	within	the	first	40	days	after	the	
bill	was	enacted.		He	was	quoted	as	saying,	"We're	not	quite	sure	what	we	have	to	pay	in	
order	to	get	the	market	rate,	which	includes	some	credit	risk,	up	to	the	target.	We're	going	
to	experiment	with	this	and	try	to	find	what	the	right	spread	is.”351		The	ability	to	
experiment	in	this	way	came	because	details	such	as	rates	that	could	be	paid	on	deposits	
were	left	to	the	Federal	Reserve	to	determine	rather	than	being	determined	by	congress.		
There	was	little	to	gain	politically	for	congress	by	delegating	since	controlling	the	rates	
would	allow	congress	to	have	significant	leverage	over	the	powerful	banking	industry	and	
could	allow	members	of	congress	to	do	favors	for	this	group	which	would	likely	have	
brought	increased	donations.		However,	congress	still	opted	to	delegate	this	power	to	an	
organization	better	able	to	analyze	economic	data	and	make	this	decision.	
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The	Emergency	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	also	delegated	the	power	to	the	SEC.		
The	SEC	was	given	the	authority	to	suspend	mark-to-market	accounting	requirement.		This	
delegated	a	complex	decision	that	could	not	be	as	fully	examined	by	congress	as	it	could	by	
this	specialized	agency.		This	complexity	appears	to	be	one	of	the	main	motivators	for	this	
action.		
Along	with	expertise	is	the	concept	of	an	agencies	capabilities	being	a	reason	to	
delegate	to	that	agent.		Part	of	the	advantage	of	delegating	to	an	agency	is	that	it	allows	the	
agency	to	quickly	try	numerous	different	methods	to	solve	the	crisis	at	hand.		This	ability	to	
try	numerous	solutions	is	an	efficient	way	to	find	a	solution	rather	than	throwing	money	and	
placing	hopes	in	only	a	couple	initiatives.		It	also	allows	initiatives	to	be	shut	down	if	it	turns	
out	not	to	be	successful	or	is	no	longer	needed.		In	fast	moving	crises,	it	is	good	to	have	the	
adaptability	that	agencies	provide.		
Congressional	action	was	difficult	due	to	political	gridlock,	political	unpopularity	of	
actions	that	would	prop	up	the	market,	and	uncertainty	over	the	depth	of	the	financial	
downturn.		However,	agencies	were	better	able	to	handle	these	and	set	policy	to	deal	with	
the	financial	downturn.		Some	agencies	are	better	at	this	task	than	others	which	led	to	them	
being	delegated	more	power	and	responsibility.		The	Treasury	Department	in	particular	was	
able	to	try	numerous	methods	of	resolving	the	financial	crisis.		It	was	not	know	exactly	what	
programs	would	be	successful	and	which	would	not	and	so	many	were	tried	concurrently	or	
in	quick	succession	to	stabilize	various	parts	of	the	market.	
	 	
5.2.3 Ensure Coordination 
	
During	the	crisis	there	was	a	need	for	action	on	various	fronts	to	adequately	address	
the	weakness	in	the	economy	and	its	effects	on	people’s	lives.		To	ensure	the	best	results,	
policy	needed	to	be	coordinated,	and	in	order	for	this	to	happen	the	various	agencies	
needed	to	coordinate	with	each	other.		By	designing	delegation	to	ensure	coordination,	the	
government	tried	to	avoid	the	gaps	in	oversight	that	contributed	to	this	crisis.	
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Delegation	during	this	period	delegation	was	structured	in	such	a	way	as	to	facilitate	
various	organizations	to	work	together	and	the	agents	of	delegation	were	selected	or	
created	accordingly.		For	instance	Section	203	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	
Consumer	Protection	Act	set	forth	procedures	for	agencies	to	make	recommendations	for	
the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council.	
	 There	was	a	good	bit	of	coordination	during	this	period.		For	instance,	while	the	
Central	Bank	is	its	own	institution	and	thus	in	theory	shielded	from	the	administration	and	
politics,	in	practice	this	separation	gave	way	to	coordination.		The	weekly	breakfasts	
between	the	Treasury	Secretary	and	Central	Bank	head	during	this	time	was	one	sign	of	
this.352	
Thus	the	Fed	also	coordinated	with	and	took	actions	in	conjunction	with	other	
nation’s	central	banks	as	in	this	globalized,	multipolar	world,	the	U.S.	cannot	act	unilaterally	
to	address	crises,	but	can	produce	better	results	by	working	with	other	nations.		An	example	
of	this	working	with	other	nations	was	on	October	8,	2008	when	the	Fed	reduced	their	
interest	rates	in	conjunction	with	the	Bank	of	Canada,	the	Bank	of	England,	the	European	
Central	Bank,	Sveriges	Riksbank,	and	the	Swiss	National	Bank.353		This	was	a	new	precedent	
for	action	in	that	the	Fed	had	never	decreased	its	rates	in	conjunction	with	other	central	
banks	prior	to	this	action.354		Congress	had	delegated	these	authorities	to	the	Fed.	
The	creation	of	agencies	and	offices	is	perhaps	there	area	where	you	can	see	
coordination	of	policy	creation	most	exemplified.		The	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council	is	
a	prime	example	in	that	the	members	of	the	council	include	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	
the	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency,	the	Chairman	of	the	
National	Credit	Union	Administration	board,	and	the	directors	of	the	CFPR,	SEC,	FDIC,	CFTC,	
FHFA,	OFR,	and	Federal	Insurance	Office.		These	are	the	key	agencies	that	would	need	to	
coordinate	during	a	financial	crisis.		By	creating	the	council	and	delegating	significant	power	
to	it,	congress	ensures	that	policy	would	be	created	in	conjunction	with	various	agencies	
and	coordinated	together.		This	contrasted	with	the	immediate	response	to	this	crisis	where	
the	Treasury	Secretary,	Chairman	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	and	head	of	the	Federal	Reserve	
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Bank	of	New	York	worked	together	to	the	exclusion	of	other	agency	heads	and	crafted	the	
bulk	of	the	policy	response	unilaterally.		This	led	to	situations	where	the	decision	was	made	
to	effectively	guaranteed	money	market	funds	without	any	thought	as	to	how	that	would	
adversely	affect	the	banking	sector.		
The	Federal	Insurance	Office	Act	of	2010355	created	an	office	in	the	Treasury	
Department	to	oversee	the	insurance	market.		The	Federal	Insurance	Office	was	given	
preemption	in	some	areas	over	state	regulators	who	historically	had	been	the	main	
regulators	of	the	insurance	market.		The	act	also	alters	insurance	regulation	such	that	with	
the	change	only	an	insurance	company’s	home	state	can	regulate	or	levy	premium	taxes	on	
it.		This	helped	harmonize	the	insurance	regulations	across	states.	
	
5.2.4 To Give Attention to an Issue 
	
Congress	does	not	have	the	time	or	inclination	to	focus	on	certain	issues	once	they	
are	out	of	the	public	spotlight.		With	this	self-knowledge	congress	took	action	to	delegate	
powers	to	agents	that	could	keep	a	watchful	eye	on	specific	issues	and	craft	policy	
accordingly.		The	choice	of	agents,	and	creation	of	agents	in	particular,	were	selected	to	
ensure	focus	on	a	policy	sphere	far	into	the	future	and	in	some	instances	even	if	the	
coalition	that	passed	the	bill	in	congress	is	eventually	replaced	by	one	less	appreciative	of	
policy	creation.	
With	the	clear	need	for	regulation	of	banks	and	seeing	the	way	that	the	Federal	
Reserve	neglected	this	responsibility	in	place	of	more	glamorous	responsibilities.		The	Dodd-
Frank	Act	prohibited	subdelegation	of	the	Federal	Reserve	Board’s	authority	and	
responsibility	to	create	regulation	and	to	supervise	bank	holding	companies	to	a	Federal	
Reserve	Bank.		This	ensured	that	this	role	would	be	a	main	focus	of	the	Federal	Reserve.	
In	addition,	as	The	Federal	Reserve	had	always	focused	more	on	monetary	policy	to	
the	exclusion	of	its	responsibilities	such	as	regulation,	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	altered	its	
																																																						
355	Part	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act		
230	
structure	and	created	the	position	of	Vice-Chairman	for	Supervision.356		The	belief	being	that	
a	senior	official	at	the	Fed	with	supervision	and	regulation	as	part	of	their	explicit	portfolio	
would	lead	to	the	Fed’s	regulatory	functions	being	given	the	attention	that	congress	felt	
they	deserved.		It	was	hoped	that	this	change	would	help	change	the	focus	of	the	Federal	
Reserve	Board	which	is	a	regulatory	agency,	but	is	one	that	has	focused	on	its	other	areas	or	
responsibility	than	on	the	less	glamorous	role	of	regulation.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	required	the	SEC	to	create	an	Office	of	Credit	Ratings	to	
regulate	nationally	registered	statistical	rating	organization	(NRSRO).		The	act	also	amended	
several	acts	to	remove	the	special	place	that	credit	ratings	and	that	NRSROs	had	under	the	
former	law.357		This	step	was	taken	because	credit	ratings	were	viewed	as	being	inaccurate	
and	biased	and	further	that	the	reliance	on	ratings	was	blamed	by	some	as	contributing	to	
the	crisis.		Credit	ratings	are	an	area	that	was	largely	unregulated	by	the	government	prior	
to	the	crisis,	but	congress	wanted	to	ensure	that	going	forward	that	someone	would	pay	
attention	to	this	neglected	policy	area.		By	keeping	an	entity	followed	on	this	area	it	would	
also	allow	for	proactive	responses	to	changes	in	the	industry	rather	than	reactive	response	
that	only	occur	after	a	problem	has	occurred.			
There	were	different	types	of	regulators	that	have	different	goals.		The	Fed	and	OCC	
focused	on	risk	management	focusing	on	soundness	of	the	system	and	the	entities	that	
comprise	it.		Alternatively	the	SEC	used	rules	and	tests	to	ensure	that	the	system	is	fair	and	
that	investors	are	protected.358		Congress	delegated	authority	to	each	of	these	
organizations,	but	the	authorities	delegated	were	different	for	the	different	bodies	and	
were	designed	so	that	each	of	these	spheres	continued	to	be	monitored.	
The	CFPB	had	a	different	mandate	and	was	designed	to	protect	a	politically	weak,	
diffuse	interest,	namely	the	public,	from	the	powerful,	entrenched	powers	in	industry	and	
congress.		By	delegating	to	an	agency	charged	with	this	responsibility,	congress	can	ensure	
that	the	agent	would	continue	to	focus	on	this	core	mission.		Future	congresses	would	be	at	
risk	of	being	pulled	in	by	the	powerful	financial	interests	and	so	financial	protection	of	
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consumers	would	be	neglected	as	this	is	less	politically	valuable	to	legislators.		This	use	of	
delegation	to	entrench	the	current	congress’	policy	preferences	in	law	and	protect	it	also	
makes	political	sense	as	the	issue	was	very	partisan	with	the	democrats	generally	preferring	
more	regulation	of	Wall	Street	than	the	Republicans	who	in	general	tend	to	hold	more	free	
market,	laissez	faire	views.		At	the	time,	the	CFPB	was	established	the	Democrats	held	both	
houses	of	the	congress	and	the	presidency.		However,	they	knew	this	situation	would	not	
last	forever,	particularly	as	the	financial	crisis	at	the	time	led	most	experts	to	expect	that	the	
Republicans	would	pick	up	a	number	of	seats	in	both	houses.		The	act	was	politically	
valuable	in	that	it	made	it	look	like	the	president	and	the	congress	were	protecting	the	
common	everyman	though	the	actual	actions	of	what	would	be	done	could	not	be	told	yet.	
Another	method	that	was	used	to	ensure	that	attention	continued	to	be	paid	to	an	
issue	was	that	in	some	instances	congress	delegated	a	power	or	authority	to	multiple	
agencies	so	that	they	each	can	use	their	decision	making	authority	and	independent	
judgment.		An	example	of	this	is	Section	213	of	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	
Consumer	Protection	Act	that	gave	both	the	FDIC	and	Federal	Reserve	Board	the	authority	
to,	“ban	certain	activities	by	senior	executives	and	directors.”359	
	
	
5.3	The	Use	of	Constraints	
	
	 The	actions	of	congress	appear	consistent	with	the	hypothesis	that	constraints	are	
selected	strategically.		Constraints	on	delegation	are	used	to	allow	congress	to	delegate	
power	and	achieve	their	goals	while	still	assuring	that	the	agent	that	is	delegated	to	
performs	actions	that	are	circumscribed	such	that	they	will	be	consistent	with	congress’	
preferences.		There	are	numerous	types	of	constraints	that	can	be	used	and	there	are	
different	situations	in	which	each	would	be	used.		Congress	seems	to	understand	the	
constraints	available	to	it	and	uses	different	ones	as	different	needs	present	themselves.		
	 Upon	examining	the	use	of	constrains	during	and	in	response	to	the	financial	crisis	it	
appears	that	certain	types	of	constraints	were	used	by	congress	more	often	than	other	
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types	of	constraints.		For	instance	time	limit	constraints	and	consultation	requirements	were	
used	quite	extensively	during	this	period	and	had	significant	effects	on	the	resulting	policy	
that	was	created.		This	seems	consistent	with	congress	wanted	to	create	policy	quickly	and	
to	ensure	that	it	was	systematic	and	did	not	have	significant	holes	where	there	was	a	lack	of	
regulation.		Other	constraint	types	such	as	spending	limit	constraints	and	compensation	
constraints	were	used	far	less	frequently	and	had	minor	effects	on	policy.		
When	this	paper	evaluates	the	actions	during	this	crisis	period	it	looks	initially	to	see	
if	additional	powers	and	authority	are	delegated	to	the	executive	branch.		In	addition,	it	
factors	in	whether	additional	constraints	are	placed	on	agents	that	limit	their	freedom	of	
action.		Ceteris	paribus,	the	addition	of	new	constraints	upon	the	actions	of	agents	that	
have	been	delegated	power	effectively	decreases	the	power	of	the	agent	and	thereby	
decreases	the	amount	of	delegation.		There	are	a	number	of	types	of	constraints	that	are	
used	to	constrain	executive	action	which	congress	regularly	applies.	
Congress	tends	to	use	a	number	of	constraints	when	it	delegates	its	authority	to	act.		
By	using	these	constraints	it	attempts	to	ensure	that	the	actions	of	the	executive	branch	or	
other	agents	it	gives	power	to	act	on	its	behalf	will	be	acceptable	to	it.		This	is	all	in	
accordance	with	principal-agent	theory	and	has	consistently	been	a	key	method	of	
investigating	congress’	use	of	delegation.		By	limiting	an	agency’s	ability	to	act	freely	
congress	can	better	maintain	influence	over	an	agency	and	assure	that	actions	that	an	
agency	pursues	are	not	detrimental	to	congress’	interests.		There	are	a	vast	number	of	types	
of	constraints	that	congress	has	available	to	it	as	a	means	of	controlling	agency	actions.		
There	are	differing	effects	of	each	of	these	constraint	types	and	thus	varied	reasons	for	
congress	to	choose	each	of	these	constraints.		This	leads	to	congress	employing	various	
constraints	at	different	times	and	with	varying	frequency.	
Constraints	are	a	common	way	to	limit	the	power	of	the	agent	in	order	to	minimize	
agency	losses.		Constraints	can	limit	a	number	of	problems	involved	in	delegation	such	as	
adverse	selection	and	moral	hazard.		Constraints	can	also	resolve	information	disparity	and	
add	checks	to	limit	the	agent.		These	constraints	can	take	place	as	part	of	the	initial	
delegation	such	as	in	the	case	of	agency	design.		Alternatively	these	could	focus	on	actions	
that	can	continue	to	keep	the	agency	in	line	with	congress’	wishes.		These	can	be	structural	
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in	terms	of	the	rule	and	framework	that	is	used	for	the	delegation.		However,	these	
constraints	are	not	perfect	tools	and	these	limitations	combined	with	the	lack	of	complete	
information	mean	that	these	constraints	while	helpful,	cannot	completely	eliminate	agency	
loss.		McCubbins	and	Page	describe	this	situation	as	being	similar	to,	“walking	a	dog	with	a	
rubber	leash	on	a	dark	night.”		They	explain	the	analogy	by	pointing	out	that,	“The	leash	is	
not	a	perfect	instrument	of	control	to	begin	with,	and	control	is	made	more	difficult	by	
being	able	to	see	only	shadows	and	fragments	of	what	is	going	on.”360	
A	bill	can	be	written	in	a	very	detailed	way	so	as	to	limit	the	discretion	of	agencies.		
Huber	and	Shipan	used	word	length	as	a	way	to	measure	the	amount	of	discretion	given.361		
Among	their	results	is	a	finding	that	delegation	decreases	as	congressional	institutional	
capabilities	increase.		All	delegation	has	a	scope	that	defines	what	actions	the	agent	can	
take.		Typically	this	means	there	is	a	certain	amount	of	power	ceded	and	some	constrains	as	
to	the	means,	manner,	and	method	of	its	use.		Congress	is	unaware	of	the	full	capability	set	
of	an	agency	as	agencies	may	keep	this	hidden	if	the	agency	even	knows	this	itself.	
During	the	crisis	there	were	vast	amounts	of	delegation	and	along	with	this	congress	
enshrined	significant	numbers	of	constraints	in	the	law.		These	constraints	came	in	many	
varieties	and	there	were	different	causes	and	effects	of	each	of	them.	
Below	is	a	list	the	main	types	of	constraints	on	delegation	that	were	used	to	ensure	
that	the	bureaucracy	acts	in	a	manner	consistent	with	the	wishes	of	congress.		The	
categories	listed	are	broadly	based	on	those	laid	out	by	Epstein	and	O’Halloran	and	come	
from	their	investigation	of	the	literature	on	the	topic.362		This	paper	has	made	a	few	changes	
to	their	list,	grouping	those	together	that	have	considerable	commonality	and	
deemphasizing	those,	such	as	the	use	of	the	legislative	veto,	that	are	less	applicable	to	the	
current	U.S.	political	environment.	
This	paper	analyzed	the	six	key	laws	that	were	passed	during	this	period	and	which	
had	a	major	effect	on	economic	policy:	The	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008,	The	
Emergency	Stabilization	Act	of	2008,	The	American	Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009,	
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Helping	Families	Save	Their	Homes	Act	of	2009,	The	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	
Consumer	Protection	Act,	and	The	Budget	Control	Act	of	2011.		This	paper	then	looks	at	the	
relative	frequency	of	constraints.	
The	use	of	specific	types	of	constraints	can	tell	us	what	congress	is	trying	to	
accomplish	with	their	use	and	what	its	motivations	are.		For	instance,	congress	used	time	
limit	constraints	a	significant	amount	during	the	crisis	in	ways	that	appeared	primarily	to	
ensure	that	action	was	taken	by	the	bureaucracy	quickly	and	that	many	actions	that	were	
taken	and	bodies	created	to	deal	with	the	crisis	would	not	continue	beyond	the	immediate	
need	for	them,	but	would	rather	be	phased	out	at	such	time	as	the	current	crisis	had	been	
responded	to	adequately.		The	use	of	constraints	can	also	tell	us	about	the	preferred	
methods	congress	has	for	ensuring	agency	actions	are	in	accordance	with	congress’	goals.	
	 Certain	types	of	constraints	were	more	often	used	than	others	during	this	period.		In	
particular	rulemaking	constraints,	reporting	requirements	and	consultation	requirements	
accounted	for	the	majority	of	the	constraints	used.		Other	constraint	types	such	as	
appointment	powers,	restraints	requiring	executive	or	legislative	action,	spending	limits,	
compensation	constraints	and	appointment	power	limits	were	used	far	more	sparingly	
during	this	period.	
	
	
5.3.1 Time Limits 
	
	 Time	limits	are	constraints	that	limit	the	duration	of	the	delegation	and	which	expire	
at	a	given	time.		Sunset	provisions	are	another	name	for	time	limits.		These	can	take	the	
form	of	a	program	only	being	authorized	for	a	certain	period,	but	can	also	take	the	form	of	
other	time	limits.		Time	limits	such	as	these	may	be	modified	later	if	the	need	arises.	
	 Time	limits	can	help	congress	address	short-term	issues	without	permanently	giving	
up	the	power.		Furthermore	they	can	ensure	that	solutions	that	are	of	value	in	a	certain	
situation	don’t	outlive	their	usefulness	and	lead	to	unnecessary,	permanent	laws	or	to	an	
office	or	agency	that	were	designed	to	deal	with	the	present	situation	end	up	becoming	a	
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permanent	part	of	the	bureaucracy.		There	is	certainly	always	this	potential	otherwise	and	
scholars	have	pointed	to	a	number	of	instances	of	this.	
Sunset	provisions	ensure	that	laws	are	systematically	reviewed	and	reauthorized	if	
they	are	still	valuable	or	cancelled	if	they	are	no	longer	deemed	relevant	or	beneficial.		A	
strengthened	form	of	this	was	seen	in	a	provision	championed	by	Senator	Edmund	S.	
Muskie	in	the	1970s.363		This	proposal	would	have	cancelled	all	laws	after	a	certain	amount	
of	time.		This	would	have	led	to	a	systematic	reauthorization	of	entire	classes	of	spending	on	
a	periodic	basis	allowing	for	programs	to	be	evaluated	against	each	other	and	for	money	to	
be	redistributed	if	need	be.		This	forced	reexamination	of	laws	and	programs	can	be	useful	
when	dealing	with	a	crisis.		It	often	requires	vigorous	action	to	deal	with	the	crisis,	but	many	
of	these	steps	taken	to	counter	the	crisis	may	not	be	beneficial	once	the	crisis	has	passed.		
Thus	congress	will	sometimes	structure	these	responses	as	temporary	provisions.		
	 This	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	had	a	sunset	provision	so	that	it	would	only	
stay	in	place	for	three	years.		This	act	guarantees	new	subprime	mortgage	loans.		This	
provision	would	be	useful	to	calm	distressed	markets,	but	would	be	an	expensive	market-
bending	subsidy	that	would	lead	to	inefficiencies	and	extra	governmental	costs.		Thus	it	
could	help	deal	with	the	current	crisis,	but	would	make	for	an	expensive	giveaway	over	
time.		This	explains	why	the	sunset	provision	was	included	since	it	could	allow	the	act	to	
help	solve	the	current	crisis	while	not	being	an	open-ended	authorization.	
The	TARP	program	was	authorized	to	spend	the	money	for	a	fixed	period	that	
expired	October	2,	2010.		This	was	shortly	after	the	bill	was	passed.		The	close	end	date	was	
used	to	ensure	that	the	money	was	spent	to	prop	up	the	market	during	the	crisis	since	the	
need	was	immediate.		By	the	end	of	this	period	the	TARP	program	had	committed	$470	
billion	and	disbursed	$387.364			
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	gave	the	SEC	the	ability	to	create	disclosure	regulations	on	
issuers	of	asset-backed	securities	and	also	required	the	SEC	to	issue	regulations	limiting	the	
ways	that	these	securities	can	be	marketed.		This	limit	on	marketing,	which	covers	details	
such	as	warrantees	that	can	be	claimed	by	the	seller	of	the	security,	must	be	implemented	
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by	the	SEC	within	six	months	of	the	law	being	enacted.		This	is	a	constraint	on	the	SEC	that	
requires	a	specific	set	of	actions	by	a	certain	date.		This	ensures	that	the	issue	is	being	
tackled	and	thus	congress	can	also	claim	credit	for	solving	the	issue.		There	is	however	a	
tradeoff	if	the	timeframe	does	not	allow	for	the	agency	to	fully	investigate	and	propose	the	
best	set	of	regulations	that	it	might	otherwise	implement.		On	the	positive	side	a	set	date	
can	ensure	that	the	perfect	is	not	the	enemy	of	the	good.	
The	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	was	written	in	such	a	way	that	
the	authorities	given	to	the	Treasury	Department	with	regard	to	TARP	expired	December	31,	
2009.		This	ensured	that	this	program	and	the	vast	delegation	of	power	to	the	executive	
branch	would	be	close-ended	and	would	not	be	a	permanent	shift	of	power	to	this	
executive	agency.	
Another	example	of	an	act	of	delegation	with	a	time	limit	constraint	is	the	American	
Recovery	&	Reinvestment	Act	of	2008	delegated	authority	to	the	SBA	to	establish	a	
Secondary	Market	Lending	Authority	to	make	loans	to	the	systematically	important	
secondary	market	broker-dealers,	but	this	was	only	for	two	years	until	the	emergency	was	
over.	
Several	entities	that	were	created	during	the	economic	downturn	had	built	in	end	
dates	when	they	were	created.		For	instance	the	Recovery	Accountability	and	Transparency	
Board	and	the	Recovery	Independent	Advisory	Council	were	designed	to	terminate	
September	30,	2013.365	
	
5.3.2 Consultation Requirements 
	
	 Congress	can	require	that	an	agency	consult	with	one	or	more	other	agencies	or	
other	key	actors	as	part	of	the	agency’s	policy	making	process.		This	can	be	used	as	a	way	to	
gather	information	and	get	interest	groups	that	might	oppose	the	policy	to	state	their	
preferences	and	bring	pressure	to	bear	on	the	issue.		This	can	also	stop	the	problem	of	the	
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policy	being	implemented	before	congress	and	others	know	about	it	and	thus	avoid	
surprises.		This	in	turn	can	help	congress	avoid	negative	political	consequences	and	can	help	
stop	agencies	from	being	political	free	agents.		Consultation	requirements	can	be	used	to	
enfranchise	favored	constituents.366		Finally,	it	can	assure	good	communication	such	as	
between	two	agencies	that	need	to	work	in	conjunction	and	in	this	way	could	be	a	
component	of	good	governance	depending	on	its	use.	
Congress	sometimes	writes	legislation	that	requires	the	approval	of	other	executive	
branch	actors	before	a	certain	agency’s	proposal	is	enacted.		Congress	can	often	design	
delegation	in	such	a	way	that	the	agency	cannot	unilaterally	make	decisions	on	key	issue	
areas.		This	allows	congress	to	ensure	that	the	agency	does	not	diverge	too	far	from	the	
wishes	of	the	administration.		It	requires	agreement	of	the	agency	and	whatever	actor	
needed	to	approve	the	decision	whether	this	is	an	executive	agency,	the	president,	or	an	
agency	head.	
By	having	multiple	actors	involved,	congress	effectively	sets	up	checks	and	balances	
in	the	system	to	ensure	that	monitoring	is	performed	and	corrective	action	can	be	applied	
without	direct	intervention	of	congress	itself.		This	is	particularly	true	when	congress	designs	
the	system	so	one	agency	is	motivated	often	through	contrasted	interests	to	check	the	
actions	of	another.		This	can	effectively	set	up	a	comparatively	costless	form	of	oversight	in	
which	one	executive	agency	often	with	a	contrasting	goal	is	put	in	a	position	in	which	it	is	
incentivized	to	monitor	another	organization	and	ensure	that	the	agency’s	actions	do	not	
circumventing	congress’	wishes.		It	can	also	set	interests	against	interests	and	thereby	
ensure	that	little	gets	done	that	is	not	unobjectionable.	
This	action	can	create	and	institutionalize	veto	players	which	can	increase	the	
tendency	towards	the	status	quo	and	which	can	decrease	the	size	and	pace	of	change.		This	
in	turn	tends	to	lead	to	more	political	stability	and	to	a	tendency	for	proposals	that	are	more	
ideologically	mainstream	to	have	a	greater	chance	of	passing.		In	addition,	this	new	agency	
can	be	one	over	which	congress	has	considerable	control	and	thus	can	help	determine	what	
policy	is	allowed	to	be	created	by	the	agency	that	has	power	delegated	to	it.	
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A	consultation	constraint	that	was	put	in	place	on	TARP	funds	is	that	the	Treasury	
Department	was	ordered	to	consult	with	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	
System,	the	Federal	Deposit	Insurance	Corporation,	the	Comptroller	of	the	Currency,	the	
Director	of	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision,	and	the	Secretary	of	Housing	and	Urban	
Development	in	its	administration	of	the	program.		This	requirement	to	consult	with	other	
agencies	can	limit	the	actions	that	the	Treasury	Department	can	take	in	their	running	of	the	
TARP	program.		It	also	can	help	ensure	that	all	the	key	government	agencies	were	on	the	
same	page	and	Treasury	was	not	determining	the	entire	government	response	to	this	crisis	
without	the	input	of	other	key	governmental	agencies.	
The	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council,	which	was	created	by	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	
is	able	under	certain	circumstances	to	set	the	Federal	Reserve	to	oversee	institutions	that	
the	council	views	as	a	risk	to	the	financial	system.		This	is	accomplished	through	the	actions	
of	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	and	the	approval	of	at	least	2/3rd	of	the	members	of	the	
council.		Thus	the	approval	of	multiple	actors	is	required.		The	council	was	comprised	of	the	
heads	of	several	agencies	that	had	a	role	to	play	in	ensuring	financial	stability.	
The	Bureau	of	Financial	Consumer	Protection	has	significant	power,	but	it	also	has	a	
number	of	checks	on	its	power	such	as	reports	it	must	file	and	the	fact	that	its	actions	may	
be	vetoed	by	a	2/3rd	vote	by	the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council.		The	need	to	get	the	
FSOC	to	approve	the	bureau’s	action	weakens	the	ability	of	the	bureau	to	act	and	strike	out	
on	its	own	and	engage	in	policy	freelancing	rather	than	following	the	wishes	of	the	
administration.	
	 The	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	creates	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	
Agency	and	delegates	to	it	and	its	director	significant	authority.		Among	the	checks	on	it	are	
a	requirement	that,	“Requires	the	Director,	before	issuing	any	regulations	about	the	
exercise	of	additional	authority	regarding	prudential	management	and	operations	
standards,	safe	and	sound	operations	of,	and	capital	requirements	and	portfolio	standards,	
to	consider	the	views	of	the	Chairman	of	the	Board	of	Governors	of	the	Federal	Reserve	
System	regarding	risks	posed	to	the	financial	system	by	the	regulated	entities.”367	
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	 Under	the	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009,	Trade	Adjustment	
Assistance	eligibility	is	increased.		The	Secretary	of	Labor	is	able	to	make	ruling	that	can	end	
up	providing	significant	assistance,	however	congress	put	in	a	consultation	requirement	that	
the	secretary	must	consult	with	certain	congressional	committees.368	
Dodd-Frank	included	a	provision	for	the	Board	of	the	FDIC	to	the	fullest	extent	
possible	to,	“rely	on	the	examination	reports	of	other	federal	or	state	regulatory	agencies,	
and	other	specified	required	reports,	relating	to	a	savings	and	loan	holding	company	and	
any	subsidiary”	and	“coordinate	with	other	federal	and	state	regulators”.369		These	
requirements	aim	to	avoid	a	duplication	of	effort	and	minimize	additional	overlapping	
regulatory	burdens.		In	addition,	the	law	helps	resolve	territorial	disputes	between	agencies	
which	see	themselves	as	regulators	for	bank	holding	companies	since	working	together	can	
help	speed	and	coordinate	responses	which	are	useful	during	the	crisis	and	after.	
The	Wall	Street	Transparency	and	Accountability	Act	of	2010	created	a	consultation	
requirement	that	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	and	Commodity	Futures	Trading	
Commission	to	consult	with	each	other	before	making	any	regulation	regarding	swaps,	swap	
dealers,	and	swap	participants.		Likewise,	the	act	requires	the	Commodity	Futures	Trading	
Commission	and	the	Federal	Energy	Regulatory	Commission	to	agree	to	a	memorandum	of	
understanding	about	how	the	two	organizations	would	use	their	overlapping	regulatory	
authorities.370		Furthermore,	it	requires	this	memorandum	of	understanding	to	be	
submitted	to	congress.	
Section	752	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	
requires	the	CFTC	and	the	SEC	are	required	to	consult	with	international	regulators	
regarding	swap	regulation.371		Whereas	Section	813	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	requires,	“the	
CFTC	and	the	SEC	to	coordinate	with	the	Board	to	develop	jointly	risk	management	
																																																						
368	Pub.L.	111-5,	Section	1857	
369	CRS	Summary	of	Section	of	604	of	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act		
370	Memorandum	of	Understanding	Between	The	U.S.	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	and	The	U.S.	
Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	Regarding	Coordination	In	Areas	of	Common	Regulatory	Interest.		
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftc-sec-mou030608.pdf	
371	Memorandum	of	Understanding	Between	The	Federal	Energy	Regulatory	Commission	and	the	Commodity	
Futures	Trading	Commission.		
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcfercjmou2014.pdf	
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supervision	programs	for	designated	clearing	entities.”372		The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	required	
the	banking	regulators	to	work	in	conjunction	with	the	SEC	to	set	rules	that	would	require	a	
securitizer	to	remain	a	portion	of	the	underlying	asset	or	credit	list.	
In	addition,	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	requires	that	certain	regulations	be	prescribed	
jointly.		This	coordinates	and	harmonizes	the	rules	of	various	regulators	with	regard	to	these	
regulation	areas.		These	areas	include	limiting	incentive	payments	if	they	encourage	
excessive	risk	or	excessive	payments.373		These	consultation	requirements	in	this	act	make	
sure	that	viewpoints	and	knowledge	from	multiple	agencies	were	represented	in	policy	
creation.		In	the	crisis	there	were	several	situations	in	which	one	agency	went	off	to	address	
a	crisis,	but	did	not	adequately	consult	other	agencies	to	see	how	they	would	be	impacted	
or	to	see	if	there	was	a	piece	of	the	picture	that	they	were	missing.	
TARP	was	implemented	in	such	a	way	that	if	there	was	uncertainty	as	to	whether	a	
bank	was	viable	long	term	and	thus	whether	it	was	a	candidate	that	would	receive	funds	
from	TARP	the	issue	would	be	decided	by	a	panel	comprised	of	representatives	from	the	
four	major	regulators	of	financial	institutions,	the	Office	of	Thrift	Supervision,	the	Federal	
Deposit	Insurance	Corporation,	the	Federal	Reserve,	and	the	Office	of	the	Comptroller	of	
the	Currency.		This	was	another	example	of	executive	agencies	working	together	to	address	
the	crisis	with	little	intervention	from	congress.	
Section	805	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	“authorizes	the	CFTC	and	the	SEC,	subject	to	
review	and	challenge	by	the	Federal	Reserve	Board	and	the	Council,	to	prescribe	risk	
management	standards	for	the	respective	designated	clearing	entities	and	financial	
institutions.”		The	rule	delegates	a	key	power	to	these	two	agencies,	but	adds	a	check	in	
that	if	they	take	actions	that	seem	unwarranted	that	the	Federal	Reserve	can	keep	the	
regulatory	agencies	in	line.	
	
5.3.3 Reporting Requirements 
	
																																																						
372	CRS	Summary	of	Section	of	813	of	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	
373	Pub.L.	111-203,	Section	956.	
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	 Congress	often	requires	that	an	agency	reports	in	a	certain	manner	or	at	a	certain	
time.		An	example	of	this	is	the	requirements	of	Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA),374	
which	requires	agencies	to	report	before	they	perform	actions	and	execute	policy	directives.		
This	is	ostensibly	to	allow	those	with	a	stake	in	the	agencies’	proposed	regulations	to	voice	
their	concerns,	but	conveniently	it	also	gives	congress	a	chance	to	address	potential	
problems	and	assure	that	the	agency’s	actions	are	consistent	with	congress’s	wishes	and	the	
needs	of	key	constituencies	and	advocacy	groups.		The	APA	requires	a	notice	of	proposed	
rulemaking	that	must	be	published	in	the	Federal	Register.		There	is	usually	a	90-day	waiting	
period	in	which	the	public	can	learn	about	and	comment	on	the	proposed	rule.		In	certain	
emergency	situations	this	process	can	by	bypassed,	but	it	is	required	in	the	vast	majority	of	
situation	and	there	are	often	stronger	reporting	requirements	than	just	those	required	by	
the	APA	reporting	requirements.		These	reporting	requirements	help	avoid	a	fait	accompli	in	
which	an	agency	acts	and	marshals	support	for	an	action	and	turns	public	opinion	in	favor	of	
their	plan	before	congress	is	able	to	stop.		This	can	in	effect	force	congress	into	accepting	
the	action	despite	misgivings	because	it	is	too	late	to	form	a	coalition	to	oppose	the	change	
or	to	do	so	would	be	politically	damaging	once	the	agency	has	shaped	the	political	
landscape	in	favor	of	the	agency	action.		It	also	allows	deals	to	be	made	with	the	agency	or	
allows	for	force	to	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	agency	in	order	to	change	their	position.	
	 Excessive	and	burdensome	reporting	requirements	can	also	undermine	
organizational	effectiveness.		As	stated	earlier	it	can	be	the	intension	of	congress	to	
overwhelm	and	limit	the	capabilities	of	an	organization	so	that	it	is	unable	to	do	much	
outside	of	activities	that	congress	advocates	and	so	that	the	agency	is	unable	to	take	actions	
it	feels	are	warranted.		This	can	be	good	for	congress	if	the	law	that	was	passed	is	broadly	
popular	and	perhaps	required	by	circumstances,	but	congress	in	practice	does	not	wish	
much	action.		An	example	of	this	is	additional	financial	regulation	which	often	sounds	good	
to	a	wide	swath	of	the	electorate,	but	which	in	practice	often	goes	against	the	powerful	
entrenched	interests	of	the	industry	and	which	has	tangible	costs	that	many	members	of	
congress	would	like	to	avoid.	
																																																						
374	Pub.L.	79-404	
242	
An	example	of	a	reporting	requirement	is	that	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	is	
required	to	report	to	congress	with	24	hours	of	taking	over	a	financial	institution.		
Furthermore	within	60	days	of	taking	over	the	company,	the	Secretary	must	issue	a	report	
to	be	made	available	to	the	public	which	will	lay	out	key	information	about	the	state	of	the	
company	and	the	actions	that	the	Treasury	Department	intends	to	take.	
	 Reporting	requirements	can	be	a	good	way	for	congress	members	to	ensure	that	
agencies	do	not	take	actions	that	congress	will	not	approve	of.		These	requirements	allow	
for	oversight	and	can	take	time	away	from	the	agency	and	thus	limit	its	ability	to	tackle	
problems.		They	also	act	as	an	effective	information	gathering	mechanism	for	congress.		This	
is	especially	important	in	areas	that	it	would	be	hard	for	congress	to	gather	much	insight	
about	otherwise	due	to	either	their	complexity	or	their	hidden	nature.		An	example	of	this	is	
the	TARP	program,	which	was	very	important,	but	was	also	very	secretive	and	was	difficult	
to	understand	to	the	average	congressperson.		Thus	congress	created	reporting	
requirements	to	ensure	they	received	the	information	needed	so	that	they	could	assess	the	
program	and	take	any	needed	actions	to	address	any	shortcomings.	
In	addition,	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	requires	the	SEC	and	the	Comptroller	General	to	
submit	annual	reports	to	congress	about	the	SEC’s	internal	controls	and	financial	reporting	
procedures.		By	requiring	both	these	entities	to	submit	separate	reports	it	ensured	different	
perspectives	and	ensured	independent	viewpoints.		The	comptroller	is	also	told	to	look	at	
the	actions	and	structure	of	other	entities	such	as	the	Governmental	Accounting	Standards	
Board	(GASB).		There	are	81	studies	and	93	congressional	reports	mandated	by	the	Dodd-
Frank	Act	alone.375	
	
5.3.4 Public Hearings 
	
There	are	multiple	types	of	public	hearings	including	primary	purpose	oversight	
hearings,	reauthorization	hearings,	and	those	to	amend	existing	statutes.		This	is	another	
instance	in	which	the	Administrative	Procedure	Act	(APA),376	requires	specific	actions	for	
																																																						
375	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce.	2010.	
376	Pub.L.	79-404	
243	
executive	agencies	in	order	to	ensure	that	potential	actions	are	performed	in	accordance	to	
the	will	of	congress.		Public	hearings	are	a	good	way	to	determine	individuals	and	groups	
that	would	be	affected	by	the	regulations	passed	by	and	actions	of	an	executive	agency.		It	
can	help	make	clear	the	relative	intensity	of	interests,	the	strength	of	these	political	
coalitions,	and	the	political	landscape.		This	can	better	help	congress	to	take	positions	that	
meet	their	constituents’	wishes.		These	also	give	members	of	congress	considerable	
leverage	over	the	agency	which	can	allows	for	members	of	congress	to	perform	casework	
on	behalf	of	their	constituents	and	other	constituencies	and	thus	help	their	electoral	
prospect	in	future	elections.	
It	also	allows	congress	to	sanction	agencies	and	their	heads	that	are	not	following	
congress’	wishes.		Congress	can	question	and	fact-find	and	often	publicly	berate	the	head	of	
an	agency	and	thereby	get	them	to	fall	in	line	if	they	have	veered	off	of	congress’	preferred	
course.		This	can	also	serves	as	a	deterrent	to	agency	heads	taking	political	initiative	and	this	
helps	congress	maintain	control	of	the	agency.	
The	transparency	of	public	hearings	can	make	for	good	governance	as	well	and	is	
part	of	a	participatory	democracy	that	brings	disenfranchised	individuals	into	the	political	
system.		This	can	allow	a	back	and	forth	in	which	the	public	comments	on	a	proposed	rule	
and	the	agency	responds	to	the	public.		This	allows	for	a	free	flow	of	information	among	
those	concerned	about	the	issue	and	the	agency	so	that	issues	that	might	have	been	
overlooked	by	the	agency	are	brought	to	light	by	those	that	focus	on	the	issue.		The	agency	
also	makes	a	record	of	public	comment	and	this	is	made	available.	
		Among	other	reporting	requirements,	the	proposed	regulation	is	required	to	be	
posted	in	the	Federal	Register.		Congress	may	keep	to	these	and	other	requirements	that	
form	a	base	level	for	public	hearing,	but	they	may	also	add	additional	requirements	in	
certain	cases	in	order	to	further	constrain	the	actions	of	the	executive	branch.	
	
5.3.5 Rule-Making Requirements 
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Congress	can	mandate	that	an	executive	body	that	is	delegated	power	must	use	a	
specific	process	or	specific	methodology	when	deciding	to	make	an	action.		The	APA	is	one	
example	of	a	rule-making	requirement	in	so	far	as	it	requires	regulatory	agencies	to	
announce	their	decision-making	reasons.		In	the	case	of	the	APA	this	ensures	that	there	is	a	
justifiable	reason	for	an	agency’s	decision	and	helps	keep	them	in	line	with	congress’	desires	
since	they	will	need	to	justify	any	deviations.		By	requiring	an	agency	to	use	a	methodology	
this	makes	agency	heads	easier	to	control	as	they	need	a	justifiable	reason	for	their	actions	
and	it	is	harder	for	them	to	be	a	political	free	agent.		These	constraints	can	also	slow	down	
agency	action	and	help	assure	that	congress	is	apprised	before	any	far	reaching	change	in	
policy	is	enacted.		It	can	also	help	keep	the	agency	confined	to	more	evolutionary	policy	
rather	than	revolutionary	policy,	as	it	is	easier	to	justify	minor	changes.	
	 This	type	of	constraint	can	also	ensure	that	a	certain	methodology	is	used,	that	the	
public	is	listened	to,	and	that	various	interest	and	viewpoints	are	accommodated	or	taken	
into	account.		This	can	in	certain	instances	lead	to	better,	more	inclusive	policy.		These	rule	
making	requirements	are	subject	to	judicial	review	and	this	too	can	help	ensure	compliance	
with	the	mandate	given	by	congress	and	can	limit	the	tendency	of	an	agent	trying	to	
substitute	in	their	own	preferences	for	those	of	congress.			
	 These	rules	can	be	very	constraining	and	intricate	in	detail	or	can	be	more	general	in	
nature.		An	example	of	a	broad	constraint	would	be	the	directive	that	the	agency	should	
work	in	the	public	interest.		These	general	delegations	give	the	agent	more	freedom	of	
action.	
	 The	authority	that	was	delegated	to	the	FDIC	and	the	Securities	Investor	Protection	
Corporation	(SIPC)	to	wind	down	operations	for	banks	and	other	financial	institutions	came	
with	some	limitations	including	that	certain	criteria	must	be	met	for	the	winding	down	
process	to	begin.	
The	act	that	authorized	the	FDIC	to	take	over	a	failing	institution	also	gives	it	a	set	of	
rules	to	follow	during	the	liquidation	phase,	which	limits	its	options	and	also	give	it	goals	
that	it	is	asked	to	prioritize	such	as	performing	actions	that	will	help	ensure	the	financial	
stability	of	the	country	as	opposed	to	actions	done	on	behalf	of	the	company	that	is	in	
receivership.	
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Any	asset	purchases	made	by	TARP	were	mandated	by	congress	to	take	place	in	only	
a	manner	that	would	protect	public	finances	so	that	taxpayers	would	not	be	on	the	hook.		
One	example	of	the	restrictions	that	was	put	in	place	on	purchases	is	that	the	act	only	
allowed	TARP	funds	to	make	purchases	in	return	for	warrants.		Congress	wrote	the	act	in	a	
way	that	would	give	the	agency	wide	discretion	in	certain	areas	while	keeping	agency	
actions	quite	constrained	in	other	areas.		
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	allowed	regulators	to	create	additional	rules	regulating	asset-
based	securities	beyond	those	explicitly	laid	out	in	the	act,	however	it	only	allows	rules	that	
are	limited	in	their	goals	in	that	they	must	either,	“help	ensure	high	quality	underwriting	
standards	for	the	securitizers	and	originators	of	assets	that	are	securitized	or	available	for	
securitization”	or	“encourage	appropriate	risk	management	practices	by	the	securitizers	and	
originators	of	assets,	improve	the	access	of	consumers	and	businesses	to	credit	on	
reasonable	terms,	or	otherwise	be	in	the	public	interest	and	for	the	protection	of	investors.”		
By	stating	a	goal	it	keeps	the	agencies	eyes	fixed	on	the	purpose	of	the	rules	it	enacts	and	
ensure	that	its	reasoning	matches	that	of	congress.		This	can	help	prevent	against	excess	
regulation	or	the	SEC	creating	its	own	ends	and	goals.			
Rulemaking	requirements	were	used	by	congress	to	avoid	negative	symbolism	that	
could	lead	to	political	problems.		For	instance,	in	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	
of	2008,	congress	used	rulemaking	constraints	to	limit	the	Treasury	Department	to	buy	a	
troubled	asset	for	more	than	the	owner	of	the	asset	initially	paid	to	buy	it.		This	could	have	
been	viewed	as	spending	taxpayer	funds	in	order	to	enrich	the	financial	companies	that	
caused	the	financial	crisis.	
	 The	Helping	Families	Save	Their	Home	Act	of	2009	has	several	rulemaking	
requirements	that	act	as	constraints.		The	Secretary	of	HUD	is	given	authority	to	set	up	a	
program	to	help	homeowners	pay	their	mortgages.		However	there	are	several	restrictions	
upon	the	specific	program	and	terms	that	the	Secretary	can	use	to	achieve	this	aim.		For	
instance,	the	act	has	a	requirement	that	requires	the	mortgager	to	agree	in	writing	that	they	
are,	“liable	to	repay	to	the	Secretary	any	direct	financial	benefit	achieved	from	the	
reduction	of	indebtedness	on	the	existing	mortgage”.377		Congress	thus	helped	avoid	
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potential	political	problems	that	might	arise	if	individuals	who	didn’t	pay	their	mortgages	
were	enriched	during	this	program	at	taxpayer	expense.		
The	Bureau	of	Consumer	Financial	Protection	has	rule-making	requirements	in	that	it	
is	required	to,	“take	specified	considerations	into	account	before	prescribing	a	final	
regulation…”378	
	 Section	604	of	The	Dodd-Frank	Act	amends	the	Bank	Holding	Company	Act	of	1956	
such	that	the	board	of	the	FDIC	is	directed,	“to	take	into	consideration	the	extent	to	which	a	
proposed	bank	acquisition,	merger,	or	consolidation	would	result	in	greater	or	more	
concentrated	risks	to	the	stability	of	the	U.S.	banking	or	financial	system.”			
In	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	the	appropriate	regulatory	agencies	are	given	the	ability	to	
set	minimum	capital	requirements	for	bank	holding	companies	and	savings	and	loan	
companies.379		This	authority	came	with	the	rule-making	requirement	that	the	agencies	seek	
to	make	capital	requirements	counter-cyclical	such	that	requirement	are	highest	during	
strong	economic	periods	and	are	less	during	a	financial	downturn.	
	 In	Section	718	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	sets	forth	procedures	for	the	Securities	and	
Exchange	Commission	and	Commodities	Futures	Trading	Commission	for	how	to	evaluate	
new	derivative	products.		Meanwhile	Section	723	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	adds	rule-making	
requirements	that	constrain	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury’s	powers	to	exempt	foreign	
swaps	from	regulation	by	the	United	States	government.		
In	the	Dodd-Frank	act,	the	secretary	of	HUD	is	assigned	the	task	of	establishing	a	
program	to	protect	tenants	of	mid	to	large	size	rental	properties	as	well	as	the	properties	
themselves.		The	criteria	for	the	program	are	optionally	laid	out	by	congress	in	the	law,	but	
left	to	the	discretion	of	the	Secretary.		Meanwhile	this	subtitle	directs	the	Treasury	
Secretary	to	post	information	online	as	part	of	an	emphasis	on	transparency.	
Also	under	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	the	Federal	Reserve	is	empowered	to,	but	not	
required	to,	create	standards	that	regulate	the	contingent	capital	required,	additional	public	
disclosure	requirements,	and	limits	on	short-term	debt.			The	act	constrains	the	Fed’s	ability	
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to	decide	on	rules	for	capital	requirements.		It	mandates	that	the	Fed	must	take	into	
account	off-balance-sheet	activities	and	enumerates	several	such	activities	that	the	Fed	
must	include	as	part	of	their	requirement	rule.	
	
5.3.6 Recommendations 
	
Similar	to	rule-making	requirement	constraints	described	above,	congress	also	made	
recommendations	for	agencies	that	it	delegated	powers	to.		These	did	not	have	the	force	of	
law	that	rule-making	requirements	do,	but	still	could	direct	the	actions	of	the	agency	that	
was	delegated	to	toward	congress’	desired	course	of	action.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Act	recommends	the	SEC	use	its	authority	to	create	general	rules	
governing	conflicts	of	interest	covering	a	much	wider	scope	of	issues.		By	recommending	a	
course	of	action	for	an	agency,	congress	can	guide	the	agency	to	what	it	believes	is	an	
important	issue	to	address	while	leaving	the	experts	at	the	SEC	full	range	of	action.		It	also	
allows	for	inaction	if	the	agency	deems	that	that	is	best	or	that	the	issue	that	it	is	asked	to	
propose	rules	for	is	not	a	priority	and	can	wait	till	a	later	period.	
	 Congress	delegated	authority	to	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	and	entrusted	him	to	
spend	a	significant	amount	of	money	to	improve	the	economy.		In	the	Helping	Families	Save	
Their	Home	Act	of	2009,	congress	included	the	recommendation	that	the	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury	should	use	the	money	authorized	in	the	act	to	purchase	mortgage	revenue	bonds	
for	single-family	housing.		There	were	other	similar	recommendations	in	the	act	such	as	the	
recommendation	that	the	Department	of	Justice	should	set	up	a	Mortgage	Fraud	Task	Force	
and	a	recommendation	that	foreclosures	against	mortgagors	not	occur	until	foreclosure	
mitigation	provisions	are	put	into	place.		Ultimately	these	were	not	explicit	requirements,	
but	merely	the	feelings	or	suggestions	of	congress.		These	suggestions	had	some	weight,	but	
allowed	flexibility	to	the	agencies	that	were	delegated	to.	
	 Section	1124	of	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	includes	a	section	
stating	congress’	belief	that	securitization	of	mortgages	add	liquidity	to	the	market	and	the	
exhortation	that	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	should	securitize	mortgages	acquired	under	
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the	act.		Congress	also	included	the	recommendation	that	mortgage	requirements	and	rules	
should	not	interfere	with	local	rules	that	the	holder	of	a	foreclosed	property	maintain	the	
property.380	
	 With	the	Federal	Insurance	Office	Act	of	2010,	Congress	preempted	some	state	law	
regarding	the	insurance	industry.		However,	congress	still	deferred	to	the	states	on	many	
several	key	points.		It	did	however	include	in	this	act	that	it	intends	states	to	adopt	nation-
wide,	uniform	requirements	and	procedures.381	
In	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	Section	939H,	congress	states	its	desire	that	the,	“SEC	should	
exercise	specified	rulemaking	authority	to	prevent	improper	conflicts	of	interest	arising	
from	employees	of	NRSROs	providing	services	to	issuers	of	securities...”		Congress	did	not	
have	specific	policy	recommendations	to	deal	with	the	fact	that	NRSROs	had	a	conflict	of	
interest	in	that	they	sold	services	to	the	organizations	whose	securities	they	are	rating.		It	
however	let	the	SEC	know	that	it	would	like	the	conflict	of	interest	addressed.	
In	Section	1079A	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	had	the	U.S.	Sentencing	Commission	review	
and	potentially	amend	sentencing	guidelines	for	securities	fraud	under	the	guidance	of	
congress’	recommendation	that	penalties	and	sentences	should	reflect	the	damage	these	
do	to	the	public	and	to	financial	markets	and	that	they	should	ensure	the	appropriate	
amount	of	jail	time.		In	this	act	congress	was	able	to	push	for	tougher	sentences	to	these	
crimes	without	actually	taking	any	action.		It	is	able	to	position	itself	as	being	tough	on	
financial	crime	and	being	with	Main	Street	against	the	abuses	of	Wall	Street.	
Congress	also	included	a	provision	in	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	that	stated	congress’	view	
that	a	fix	to	mortgage	credit	practices	would	not	be	complete	without	an	overhaul	of	Fannie	
Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.		Politically	however	it	was	difficult	for	congress	to	act	directly	as	they	
had	received	substantial	donations	from	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	and	who	were	at	risk	
for	severe	retributions	if	individual	members	of	congress	went	against	Fannie	Mae	and	
Freddie	Mac.		Thu	congress	states	its	view	that	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	require	major	
structural	reforms	to	address	problems	of	the	organizations,	yet	no	action	is	taken	directly	
by	congress	to	restructure	these	agencies.	
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5.3.7 Exemptions 
	
Exemptions	are	when	Congress	specifically	exempts	an	entity	from	regulation	or	
limits	the	facets	in	which	it	can	be	regulated	for	a	certain	amount	of	time.		This	allows	
congress	to	exempt	certain	favored	groups	from	the	adverse	effects	of	regulation.		This	is	a	
powerful	ability	that	can	make	these	groups	becoming	indebted	to	the	members	of	congress	
who	helped	exempt	them	and	thus	can	lead	to	campaign	contributions,	votes,	and	
advocacy.		It	also	allows	for	congress	to	avoid	certain	negative	repercussions	of	regulation	
and	to	ensure	the	agency	limits	its	actions	to	certain	acceptable	channels.		In	addition,	it	can	
be	used	in	special	circumstances	or	special	cases	to	make	allowances	as	specific	
circumstances	demand.		Exemptions	can	also	enable	a	law	to	be	passed	that	otherwise	
would	meet	with	too	much	opposition	from	entrenched	interests.	
By	specifically	exempting	a	company,	industry,	or	other	favored	group,	congress	ties	
the	hand	of	the	agency	that	it	delegated	to	and	limits	its	freedom	of	action.		So	doing	can	
allow	for	distributional	benefits	to	key	constituents,	which	have	positive	electoral	
ramifications	for	members	of	congress	who	ensure	the	exemption	gets	implemented	and	
thereby	ensures	that	the	agency	cannot	threaten	the	protected	interest	group.	
During	the	crisis,	there	were	several	pieces	of	delegation	that	included	exemption	
constraints.	At	example	of	an	exemption	constraint	during	this	period	was	a	provision	in	the	
Dodd-Frank	Act,	in	which	the	ability	to	set	capital	requirements	for	financial	institutions	was	
delegated	to	regulatory	agencies	however	Section	619	of	the	act	exempts	a	number	of	
activities	such	as	the	purchase	of	US	securities	and	certain	hedging	activities.	
The	Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	Section	113	
created	the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council	and	delegated	significant	powers,	but	it	
placed	limitations	on	these	such	as	restricting	the	Board’s	supervision	to	the	company's	
financial	activities	only.382	
Section	763	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	exempts,	“a	security-based	swap	from	clearing	
requirements	if	one	of	its	counterparties	is	not	a	financial	entity”	or	if	the	counterparty	“is	
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using	such	swaps	to	hedge	or	mitigate	commercial	risk”.383			The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	
included	a	section	that	exempts	state-registered	investment	advisers	from	“certain	
restrictions	on	investment	advisory	contracts.”384	
Exemptions	from	regulation	were	also	given	for	loans	that	are	guaranteed	by	the	
Farm	Credit	Administration.		These	loans	did	not	have	the	requirement	that	securitizers	
keep	a	portion	of	the	credit	risk	that	congress	placed	on	securitizers	of	other	residential	
mortgages.			
The	Consumer	Financial	Protection	Bureau	is	given	vast	domain,	but	areas	such	as	
real	estate	brokers,	accountants,	lawyers,	auto	dealers,	and	charities	are	all	expressly	
exempted	from	the	bureau’s	purview.		This	keeps	these	industries	from	being	adversely	
affected	by	new	requirements.		These	industries	had	faced	relatively	little	federal	regulation	
and	this	exemption	attempted	to	maintain	this	status	quo.		These	are	politically	powerful	
constituencies	that	appear	within	most	congressional	district,	which	in	part	may	be	one	of	
the	reasons	they	had	exemptions.	
By	way	of	comparison,	compensation	constraints,	in	which	congress	mandates	that	
agencies	compensate	those	adversely	affected	by	new	rules	and	regulation,	were	used	far	
less	and	had	much	smaller	effects	on	the	final	policy	that	their	exemption	constraints	
despite	their	similarity	and	the	similar	instances	in	which	they	would	typically	be	used.			
	
5.3.8 Oversight 
	
Congress	uses	oversight	of	agencies	and	the	other	parts	of	the	executive	branch	to	
help	avoid	an	agent	from	setting	a	course	that	congress	does	not	approve	of.		It	also	is	used	
to	ensure	good	government	and	avoid	surprises.			During	the	crisis	Congress	formalized	
oversight	of	a	number	of	agencies	by	enshrining	oversight	provisions	in	the	law.		
Included	in	the	section	of	the	Housing	&	Economic	Recovery	Act	of	2008	that	created	
the	FHFA	were	checks	to	ensure	that	the	agency	performed	well	and	in	a	manner	consistent	
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with	congress’	wishes.		Amongst	these	checks	is	that	this	act	created	an	Office	of	the	
Inspector	General	which	is	a	position	appointed	by	the	president	which	must	be	confirmed	
by	the	senate.	
	 Among	other	delegations	of	authority	during	this	period	was	the	increase	in	the	
authority	of	the	Comptroller	General,	who	is	the	head	of	the	Government	Accountability	
Office.		This	helped	constrain	the	actions	of	agencies	that	were	delegated	additional	powers	
during	the	financial	crisis.		In	addition,	there	was	a	Special	Inspector	General	for	TARP	
(SIGTARP)	that	was	created	to	allow	for	increased	scrutiny	of	TARP.		Other	oversight	
included	a	Congressional	Oversight	Panel,	the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Board	(FSOB),	and	
additional	requirements	for	the	Government	Accountability	Office	(GAO)	and	the	
Congressional	Budget	Office	(CBO).		This	series	of	organizations	and	agencies	helped	ensure	
that	the	considerable	funds	used	for	TARP	were	expended	in	a	manner	consistent	with	
congress’	wishes.	These	oversight	agencies	have	a	number	of	different	forms.	
The	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Board	(FSOB)	was	created	to	oversee	the	
Department	of	the	Treasury’s	actions	vis-à-vis	the	TARP	program.		It	was	mostly	charged	
with	looking	for	waste	and	abuse	and	recommending	changes	to	minimize	these.		However	
it	also	has	more	than	just	an	advisory	role;	it	has	the	power	to	ensure	that	its	actions	are	in	
accordance	with	the	needs	of	the	United	States	economy.		It	issues	a	quarterly	report	to	
congress	and	to	the	Congressional	Oversight	Panel.		The	FSOB	is	a	temporary	board	that	was	
set	up	to	deal	with	this	one	specific	task.		The	members	of	the	board	are	prominent	
members	of	the	administration	and	they	head	executive	branch	agencies.		In	particular	they	
are	the	Chairman	of	the	Board	of	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	
Director	of	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency,	Chairman	of	the	Securities	and	Exchange	
Commission,	and	the	Secretary	of	the	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development.		This	
delegation	by	congress	thus	also	helps	assure	that	agencies	are	working	together.	
	The	Congressional	Oversight	Panel	(COP)	was	also	established	by	the	TARP	Act.		It	is	
constituted	of	members	of	congress	and	is	given	a	role	in	ensuring	a	proper	management	of	
TARP	funds,	overseeing	financial	markets,	and	ensuring	the	regulatory	system	for	these	
troubled	assets	and	those	that	participate	in	the	market	contribute	to	the	emergence	of	
healthy,	long	term	market	for	these	securities.		This	panel	was	charged	with	issuing	a	
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monthly	report	to	congress	stating	their	findings.		This	helps	ensure	that	TARP	gets	
continued	attention	and	oversight	from	congress.		The	congress	assigned	five	experts	to	this	
board	in	a	roughly	non-partisan	manner	that	has	representatives	appointed	by	both	the	
Senate	and	the	House	of	Representatives.		In	addition,	this	panel	was	charged	with	creating	
a	one-time	report	regarding	regulation	by	January	20,	2009	detailing	potential	reforms	to	
the	regulatory	scheme	that	was	in	place	that	might	prove	beneficial.	
The	Congressional	Oversight	Panel	was	a	temporary	panel	that	congress	designed	to	
terminate	on	or	before	December	31,	2009.	Some	members	of	this	panel	were	members	of	
congress	and	others	were	outside	experts.		Thus	this	ad	hoc	panel	was	not	completely	
nonpolitical.		On	February	6,	2009	the	COP	issued	a	report	stating	its	finding	that	the	
Treasury	Department	had	paid	far	more	that	market	value	for	the	assets	that	it	purchased.		
This	overpayment	of	$78	billion	for	an	estimated	$176	billion	worth	of	assets	was	opposed	
to	the	Emergency	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	2008	and	the	explicit	mandate	of	TARP	
which	is	required	to	safeguard	public	funds	rather	than	to	subsidize	financial	institutions.		
The	COP	summarized	its	view	on	TARP	by	saying,	"In	particular,	the	Panel	sees	no	evidence	
that	the	U.S.	Treasury	has	used	TARP	funds	to	support	the	housing	market	by	avoiding	
preventable	foreclosures."385		They	also	said,	"Although	half	the	money	has	not	yet	been	
received	by	the	banks,	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	have	been	injected	into	the	
marketplace	with	no	demonstrable	effects	on	lending."386		This	criticism	focuses	on	the	
program’s	value	and	is	a	broader	criticism	than	whether	it	had	lax	control	that	allowed	
fraud.		This	sort	of	oversight	can	be	important	though	little	ultimately	came	from	the	
concerns	that	were	voiced	by	the	COP.	
Another	body	in	the	legislative	branch	tasked	with	overseeing	TARP	funds	was	the	
Governmental	Accountability	Office	(GAO).		The	GAO	oversees	the	actions	of	much	of	the	
executive	branch,	but	they,	and	in	particular	the	head	of	the	GAO,	were	given	specific	
guidance	as	to	the	oversight	of	the	administration	of	the	TARP	program.		The	head	of	the	
GAO,	who	is	the	Comptroller	General,	is	mandated	to	do	an	annual	audit	of	TARP.		This	
legislation	required	the	Treasury	to	make	the	relevant	data	and	documents	related	to	the	
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TARP	program	available	to	the	GAO	to	perform	the	necessary	analysis	and	oversight.		The	
GAO’s	role	is	to	keep	congress	appraised	as	to	TARP’s	activities	and	oversee	them.		In	this	
sense	it	acts	to	gather	and	compile	data,	and	to	act	as	a	source	of	fire	alarms	for	congress	on	
the	issue.		However,	the	ability	of	GAO	to	actually	enact	changes	is	quite	limited.		It	
suggested	a	number	of	changes	to	the	TARP	program	which	could	help	rectify	a	perceived	
lack	of	controls	in	place	on	the	program.		Some	of	these	suggestions	were	accepted	and	
some	were	rejected	by	the	Office	of	Financial	Stability.		Neel	Kashkari,	the	chairman	of	the	
OFS,	rejected	the	GAO’s	key	suggestion	of	adding	additional	reporting	requirements	for	
banks.		This	did	not	allow	congress	to	have	the	level	of	control	and	influence	that	congress	
wanted.		Members	of	congress	such	as	Rep.	Elijah	Cummings	and	Speaker	of	the	House	
Nancy	Pelosi	agreed	with	the	GAO’s	findings	and	wished	additional	auditing	mechanisms	
and	financial	controls	were	put	in	place.		Speaker	of	the	house	Pelosi	went	so	far	as	to	say	
that	the	TARP	program,	"is	not	accountable	to	American	taxpayers."387	
This	act	also	created	a	Special	Inspector	General	for	TARP	(SIGTARP)	to	help	with	
oversight	of	the	TARP	program.		This	position	like	so	many	others	was	designed	so	that	it	
would	be	appointed	by	the	president	and	approved	by	congress.		This	enables	both	the	
president	and	the	congress	to	have	some	influence	on	this	individual	and	to	make	sure	that	
the	individual	selected	generally	has	the	same	general	position	on	key	issues	as	do	the	
president	and	the	congress.		The	Special	Inspector	General	is	charged	with	investigating	and	
monitoring	the	actions	of	the	OFS	in	administering	the	TARP	program.		Similar	to	the	GAO,	
part	of	SIGTARP’s	responsibility	is	to	report	their	findings	to	congress.		In	the	case	of	
SIGTARP	they	are	required	to	report	on	the	TARP	program	once	per	quarter.		This	position	is	
separate	and	distinct	from	the	position	of	the	Inspector	General	of	the	U.S.	Department	of	
the	Treasury.		By	creating	a	new	position	it	helped	keep	constant	focus	on	the	TARP	
program	even	after	some	of	the	media	spotlight	had	lessened.		The	Special	Investigator	
General	for	TARP	was	confirmed	on	December	8,	2008.		The	job	of	overseeing	such	a	large	
program	required	significant	resources	that	were	available	to	the	Special	Investigator	
General	by	using	the	resources	of	the	Office	of	the	Special	Inspector	General	for	the	
Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program.		This	office	has	a	number	of	agents	authorized	to	make	
arrests.		It	thus	serves	as	a	law	enforcement	agency	as	well	as	its	oversight	function.		The	
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SIGTARP	in	some	instances	has	been	able	to	stop	malfeasance,	has	recovered	over	$150	
million	in	assets,	and	has	led	to	the	conviction	of	14	individuals	for	fraud.		Having	numerous	
overseers	led	to	various	viewpoints	being	voiced.		For	instance	Neil	Barofsky,	the	Special	
Investigator	General	of	the	Troubled	Asset	Release	Program,	was	very	critical	of	the	bailout	
of	the	American	Insurance	Group	(AIG)	which	raised	the	prominence	of	that	decision	in	the	
public	discourse.388	
The	SIGTARP	stated	that,	"Inadequate	oversight	and	insufficient	information	about	
what	companies	are	doing	with	the	money	leaves	the	program	open	to	fraud,	including	
conflicts	of	interest	facing	fund	managers,	collusion	between	participants	and	vulnerabilities	
to	money	laundering”.389	
	 Dodd-Frank	Act	creates	an	ombudsman	to	act	as	a	liaison	between	a	retail	investor	
and	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission.		The	ombudsman	acts	as	an	advocate,	but	
also	acts	in	an	oversight	role.		The	Dodd-Frank	Act	also	added	new	whistle-blower	
protections	that	helped	produce	additional	oversight	of	the	industry	and	the	administration	
with	relative	low	cost	in	terms	of	time	of	government	resources.	
	
5.3.9 Spending Limits 
	
Epstein	and	O’Halloran	define	an	act	as	having	spending	limits	if	it	defines,	“a	
maximum	amount	that	the	agency	can	allocate	to	any	activity	or	set	of	activities,	either	
stated	explicitly	or	in	a	formula”390	this	limit	is	important	as	it	can	limit	the	scope	of	an	
agency’s	programs	and	can	also	help	prioritize	actions.		This	can	help	congress	protect	
constituents	or	allow	it	to	be	seen	to	tackle	the	issues	of	the	day	without	giving	too	much	
authority	to	executive	agents.		It	can	keep	executive	agencies	in	check	by	effectively	setting	
their	agenda	and	capabilities.		It	can	also	handicap	agencies	and	make	them	dependent	on	
activist	groups	or	industry.		This	can	lead	to	agency	capture	or	a	weak	ineffectual	agency	
which	may	be	what	congress	wishes	such	as	when	creating	a	regulating	agency	that	is	
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popular,	but	that	congress	does	not	wish	to	have	too	much	ability	to	regulate	an	industry.		
Congress	can	put	a	cap	on	spending	to	ensure	that	the	agency	does	not	change	priorities.		It	
also	limits	the	amount	of	discretion	that	the	agency	has	to	make	case-by-case	decisions	on	
spending	priorities	which	is	one	of	the	main	powers	that	agencies	typically	have.		Spending	
limits	and	budgets	can	be	an	ex	ante	control	device	that	principals	can	use	to	control	agents.	
	 Despite	their	ability	to	constrain	actions	and	set	priorities,	there	was	relatively	little	
use	of	spending	limit	constraints	during	this	period.		The	most	notable	use	of	spending	limit	
constraints	was	Title	XIII	Dodd-Frank	Act,	which	was	also	known	as	the	Pay	It	Back	Act.		This	
act	limited	the	amount	of	TARP	funds	that	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	was	authorized	to	
have	outstanding	at	any	given	time	to	$475	billion.		Similarly,	it	included	a	rescission	of	used	
funds	from	the	American	Recovery	and	Reinvestment	Act	of	2009.		However,	other	than	this	
act,	this	type	of	constraint	was	largely	unused.	
	
5.3.10 Appointment Power Limits 
	
	 Appointment	power	limits	are	constraints	on	who	can	be	appointed	to	positions.		
There	are	some	minor	constraints	on	appointments	that	had	already	been	in	place	such	as	
that	many	positions	require	the	advice	and	consent	of	the	Senate.			The	president	with	the	
advice	and	consent	of	the	senate	appoints	the	heads	of	each	of	the	cabinet	level	agencies	as	
well	as	other	key	positions	such	as	deputy	secretaries	and	undersecretaries.		This	comes	
from	the	Appointments	Clause391	of	the	U.S.	Constitution	that	gives	the	president	the	
authority	to	appoint	all	“Officers	of	the	United	States”.		The	phrase	“consent	of	the	senate”	
as	laid	out	in	the	constitution	in	practice	means	that	when	the	presidential	nominates	his	
nominees	for	these	positions	they	must	be	voted	on	and	approved	by	the	Senate.		While	
this	is	certainly	a	limit	on	the	president	it	is	required	of	many	appointments.		This	paper	is	
focused	primarily	on	new	appointment	power	limits	that	go	beyond	this	low	threshold	to	
constrain	the	agent	even	further	during	this	period.	
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	 Appointment	power	constraints	are	another	type	of	constraint	that	were	used	
sparingly	during	the	crisis	and	in	the	period	following	it.		Some	restrictions	were	laid	out	for	
the	new	offices	and	agencies	created	during	the	crisis,	such	as	that	one	of	the	voting	
members	of	the	Financial	Stability	Oversight	Council	needs	to	have	knowledge	of	the	
insurance	industry.		However,	the	net	effect	of	the	constraints	was	relatively	minimal	and	
did	not	greatly	affect	the	policy	created	during	this	period.	
Other	appointment	power	constraints	were	included	in	The	Housing	and	Economic	
Recovery	Act	of	2008	and	decreased	the	number	of	board	members	on	the	boards	of	Fannie	
Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	from	18	down	to	13	with	the	director	of	the	Federal	Housing	Finance	
Agency	able	to	change	this	number	at	their	discretion.		The	act	also	strips	the	president	of	
appointment	power	for	the	boards	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac.		Which	was	perhaps	
one	of	the	most	significant	of	these	constraints.		But	these	in	practice	were	minor	changes	
as	these	organizations	were	placed	under	the	conservatorship	of	the	Federal	Housing	
Finance	Agency	in	September	2008	which	effectively	stripped	the	board	of	its	authority	and	
in	November	the	FHFA	reconstituted	Fannie	Mae’s	board.		Due	to	the	conservatorship,	the	
boards	of	Fannie	Mae	and	Freddie	Mac	work	at	the	behest	of	the	FHFA.392	
	
5.3.11 Judicial Review 
	
In	the	U.S.	legal	system	a	court	can	look	at	the	statutes	proposed	by	an	agency	and	
determine	if	the	delegation	is	within	the	scope	of	the	authority	granted	to	the	executive	
branch	by	the	initial	law	that	vested	the	agency	with	power.		If	it	is	found	to	exceed	the	
authority	delegated	and	to	be	Ultra	Vires,	then	the	courts	can	overturn	the	legislation.	
The	Judiciary	also	has	taken	steps	to	ensure	the	executive	actions	are	appropriate	
and	it	can	overturn	executive	actions	that	it	judges	are	not	constitutional.		This	sort	of	
judicial	review	started	to	increase	around	the	time	that	there	began	to	be	an	increase	in	
delegation.		This	is	an	understandable	trend	since	a	shift	of	power	to	the	executive	requires	
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some	assurance	for	other	branches	that	there	is	neither	too	great	a	concentration	of	power	
nor	a	misuse	of	power.	
In	many	cases,	congress	wishes	to	limit	judicial	power	and	authority.		Vaguely	
written	laws	give	the	judicial	branch	the	ability	to	interpret	laws	and	place	their	own	stamp	
on	these	laws.		Congress	thus	formulates	laws	in	a	manner	so	that	the	judicial	branch	cannot	
set	itself	up	as	a	competing	power	with	sway	over	the	agency.	
	 Judicial	review	can	be	used	to	ensure	the	decision	making	process	was	fair	and	
followed	established	guidelines.		A	judge	in	this	case	would	have	a	check	on	executive	
action.		It	differs	from	many	other	constraints	in	that	it	can	give	relief	or	recourse	to	an	
individual	person	or	entity.		Many	other	constraints	are	broad-brush	attempts	to	constraint	
agency	action,	but	are	less	focused	on	individual	cases	and	details.	
	 Typically	even	for	a	person	or	group	with	legal	standing,	they	must	have	followed	a	
process	before	asking	for	judicial	review	and	be	consistent	with	the	exhaustion	of	remedies	
doctrine.		Furthermore	the	issue	at	hand	must	be	a	general	controversy	worthy	of	
adjudication	and	meet	the	ripeness	requirements	to	be	heard.		In	practice,	it	is	often	the	
case	that	cases	are	dismissed	due	to	a	ruling	that	the	plaintive	lacked	standing	in	the	case	
and	thus	did	not	have	a	right	to	bring	the	case	before	the	court.	
If	a	court	vacates	an	agency’s	rule	or	regulation,	it	will	typically	grant	the	agency	the	
prerogative	of	reissuing	the	rule	in	a	manner	that	addresses	the	legal	problems	that	the	
court	found	in	the	rule.	
By	judicial	review	constraint,	this	paper	refers	to	something	beyond	this	basic	form	
of	review.		Constraints	of	this	sort	would	be	provisions	created	by	congress	that	specifically	
provided	a	method	of	judicial	review	for	an	agency’s	actions.		In	this	way,	judicial	constraints	
serve	a	role	similar	to	traditional	oversight.		This	serves	as	a	constraint	in	that	it	can	limit	the	
actions	an	agency	takes	and	allow	constituencies	that	are	unhappy	with	agency	actions	to	
seek	remediation.	
One	of	the	key	sections	of	this	act	creates	a	provision	to	allow	for	judicial	review	of	
the	actions	performed	by	the	Treasury	Department	under	the	Emergency	Economic	
Stimulus	Act.		The	liquidation	provisions	under	Title	II	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act	specifically	list	
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judicial	review	provisions	for	the	financial	companies	to	be	liquidated	if	the	company’s	
directors	do	not	agree	to	liquidate.		The	authority	granted	to	the	FDIC	and	the	Securities	
Investor	Protection	Corporation	(SIPC)	by	the	Dodd	Frank	Act	to	wind	down	operations	of	
banks	and	other	financial	institutions	was	specifically	designed	to	be	subject	to	judicial	
review	if	the	board	of	directors	of	the	company	that	is	to	be	liquidated	does	not	agree	to	the	
liquidation.		
A	special	judicial	panel	was	also	created	as	part	of	the	United	States	Bankruptcy	
Court	for	the	District	of	Delaware.		The	panel	must	concur	with	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	
before	a	company	can	be	taken	over	by	the	FDIC	or	SIPC	or	else	the	Treasury	can	appeal	to	
an	appeals	court	that	can	further	be	appealed	to	the	Supreme	Court.		The	panel	that	makes	
the	initial	decision,	the	Orderly	Liquidation	Authority	Panel,	is	designed	so	that	it	ensures	
that	the	members	of	the	panel	have	the	necessary	understanding	of	the	financial	system	to	
evaluate	the	situation.	
By	designing	such	a	judicial	review	methods	congress	was	attempting	to	place	a	
check	on	the	authority	given	to	the	Treasury	Department	and	FDIC	while	still	allowing	a	
case-by-case	decision	which	congress	would	have	trouble	overseeing.		The	use	of	judicial	
review	also	is	useful	in	showing	the	rule	of	law	in	the	liquidation	of	these	companies.		It	
legitimizes	the	process	more	than	if	an	agency	could	just	liquidate	a	company	against	its	
wishes	without	any	recourse.			
Another	instance	of	Judicial	Review	being	specifically	included	in	an	act	of	delegation	
was	the	Dodd-Frank	act.		In	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	state	attorneys	general	are	specifically	
given	authority	to	bring	court	cases	on	behalf	of	their	state	if	they	feel	the	act	is	not	being	
enforced.393		This	was	designed	to	ensure	that	parts	of	the	federal	government	did	not	
neglect	to	write	and	implement	the	rules	and	regulations	necessary	to	implement	the	act.	
	 Like	judicial	review,	appeals	procedures	can	help	keep	an	agency	monitored	and	thus	
in	line	with	congresses	wishes	and	less	likely	to	create	negative	surprises.		Steps	such	as	
giving	standing	to	a	group	in	the	law	can	help	limit	agency	action	and	can	appease	interest	
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groups	hurt	by	the	policy,	as	congress	can	seem	to	be	on	the	side	of	the	constituents	and	
against	the	“rogue”	agency.	
	 The	use	of	judicial	review	constraints	were	comparatively	minor	and	have	had	had	
minor	overt	effect	of	policy	thus	far.		While	it	has	been	employed	in	the	instances	
mentioned	above,	it	was	used	less	consulting	and	reporting	requirements	and	had	less	
affect	than	other	constraints	such	as	time	limits	constraints.	
	
5.3.12 Summary of Constraints Used 
	
	 Due	to	the	vast	amount	of	delegation	that	occurred	in	response	to	the	financial	
crisis,	most	every	type	of	constraint	was	used	multiple	times	during	this	period,	however	
there	were	differences	in	prevalence	and	effect	of	different	types	of	constraints.		Types	of	
constraints	used	during	this	period	included	time	limit	constraints,	consultation	constraints,	
reporting	requirements,	public	hearings,	rule-making	requirements,	exemption	constraints,	
compensation	constraints,	spending	limit	constrains,	appointment	power	limits,	and	judicial	
review	constraints.	
	 The	types	of	constraints	that	were	used	most	during	this	period	were	time	limit	
constraints,	consultation	and	reporting	requirements,	as	well	as	rule-making	requirements	
and	recommendations.		These	seemed	aimed	at	making	sure	that	a	policy	was	created	
quickly,	but	that	the	policy	would	not	outlive	the	need	for	it	and	would	be	phased	out	when	
it	was	no	longer	needed.		These	constraint	types	also	helped	ensure	that	congress	and	the	
public	was	kept	aware	of	proposed	changes	to	public	policy	and	allowed	course	corrections	
by	congress	if	policy	seemed	to	be	moving	in	a	direction	that	congress	did	not	approve	of.	
	 Other	constraint	types	such	as	compensation	constraints,	spending	limits,	
appointment	power	limits,	constraints	requiring	legislative	action,	and	judicial	review	
constraints	were	used	less	frequently	and	to	less	effect.		They	had	less	benefits	with	regard	
to	dealing	with	a	crisis	and	making	sure	that	effective	policy	that	congress	could	approve	of	
was	enacted.	
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5.4	Use	of	Unilateral	Executive	Action	
	 		
	 Surprisingly	little	substantive	unilateral	executive	action	was	taken	by	the	president	
in	response	to	this	crisis.		When	there	are	large	unilateral	policy	shifts,	they	are	typically	
enacted	by	means	of	executive	orders,	which	are	perhaps	the	most	powerful	tool	the	
president	has	to	shift	domestic,	non-defense	policy.		They	can	also	allow	the	president	to	
take	action	even	when	congress	does	not	approve	of	the	proposed	policy	change.		However,	
during	the	crisis	the	use	of	executive	orders	relating	to	the	crisis	was	minor	as	was	their	
results.	
Historically	there	have	been	times	when	presidents	have	taken	unilateral	executive	
action	at	times	where	it	could	be	argued	they	did	not	have	the	authority	based	on	the	
powers	laid	out	in	constitution	or	through	explicit	delegation	of	power	by	congress.		During	
the	depth	of	the	crisis	congress	was	relatively	unlikely	to	try	to	curb	assertion	of	power	by	
the	president,	however	both	President	Bush	and	President	Obama	took	relatively	little	
executive	action.		This	is	somewhat	surprising	juxtaposed	against	some	of	the	executive	
actions	that	took	place	in	other	policy	areas.	
A	rational	president	will	be	more	likely	to	work	with	congress	rather	than	take	
unilateral	action	if	he	is	likely	to	get	the	policy	he	wants	enacted	anyways.		However,	having	
a	hostile	congress	will	lead	the	president	to	attempt	unilateral	action.		A	hostile	congress	
can	be	caused	by	numerous	factors	including	the	result	of	the	president	and	congress	being	
of	opposing	parties,	a	president	that	has	used	unilateral	action	too	often	and	has	neglected	
congress,	or	a	weak	president	plagued	by	failures	or	scandal.		During	a	crisis	or	another	
time-sensitive	situation	many	have	hypothesized	that	there	would	be	more	presidential	
unilateral	action	than	there	would	be	otherwise.		Besides	allowing	for	quick	policy	changes	
and	the	enacting	of	policy	without	much	risk	of	failure,	unilateral	executive	action	can	also	
be	used	to	make	the	president	look	effective	and	decisive.	
The	main	executive	orders	that	were	issued	in	response	to	this	crisis	primarily	
created	boards	and	task	forces,	which	primarily	served	in	advisory	roles	wherein	they	could	
suggest	policy,	but	could	not	create	or	implement	policy.		The	boards	created	by	these	
261	
executive	orders	were	the	President’s	Economic	Recovery	Advisory	Board,394	the	Financial	
Fraud	Enforcement	Task	Force,395	the	National	Commission	on	Fiscal	Responsibility	and	
Reform,396	the	President’s	Council	on	Jobs	and	Competitiveness,397	and	the	President’s	
Advisory	Council	on	Financial	Literacy.398	
Most	of	these	boards	were	limited	in	scope	and	were	also	limited	in	length	in	that	
the	majority	of	these	boards	had	2-year	sunset	provisions.		The	actual	tangible	results	from	
these	boards	were	relatively	minor	with	regard	to	the	sum	of	government	action	that	was	
taken	in	response	to	the	crisis.	
	 In	addition,	almost	no	policy	focused	on	the	financial	crisis	or	financial	regulation	
was	created	by	unilateral	executive	action.		The	president	has	a	number	of	tools	that	he	can	
use	to	unilaterally	create	and	shape	policy	such	as	executive	actions,	executive	agreements,	
presidential	directives,	presidential	proclamations,	and	signing	statements.		Many	of	these	
can	be	quite	powerful	and	can	allow	the	president	to	essentially	create	policy	without	the	
need	to	work	with	congress.		This	can	be	useful	for	creating	effective	and	timely	policy	
especially	during	periods	of	high	polarization	between	the	parties.		During	President	Bush’s	
second	term	and	for	much	of	President	Obama’s	time	in	office	there	was	considerable	
gridlock	with	congress	often	struggling	to	pass	bills	and	not	always	able	or	willing	to	push	
forward	the	president’s	proposals.		With	high	polarization	we	would	expect	executive	
actions	such	as	executive	orders	to	be	a	more	compelling	way	to	create	policy	for	these	
presidents	and	would	consequently	have	expected	several	executive	orders	meant	to	
address	the	system	of	financial	regulation	in	America.		However,	neither	president	
employed	such	executive	actions	and	instead	left	the	responsibility	to	create	the	relevant	
law	to	congress,	which	was	in	turn	delegated	to	governmental	agencies.		This	is	juxtaposed	
against	the	fact	that	both	these	presidents	used	extensive	use	of	unilateral	executive	action	
in	numerous	areas	such	as	terrorism,	foreign	policy,	minimum	wage,	stem	cell	research,	
national	security,	and	immigration.		The	only	major	executive	orders	that	came	about	due	to	
the	financial	crisis	were	those	focused	on	deficit	reduction,	the	debt	limit,	and	spending	
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cuts.		While	these	were	focused	on	fiscal	policy,	they	were	not	related	to	the	financial	
regulatory	system,	but	instead	were	targeted	to	a	separate	issue	that	became	high	profile	in	
the	years	following	the	financial	crisis.	
As	stated	above,	the	steps	that	were	taken	during	the	financial	crisis,	were	minor	
executive	orders	that	presidents	Bush	and	Obama	issued	in	order	to	address	the	economic	
problems	the	nation	was	facing.		The	main	example	of	this	was	Executive	Order	13501	which	
was	issued	by	President	Barack	Obama	on	February	6,	2009.		This	executive	order	
established	President’s	Economic	Recovery	Advisory	Board	as	an	entity	within	the	
Department	of	the	Treasury.		This	board	was	designed	to	be	a	temporary	board	that	would	
advise	the	president	on	how	to	address	the	financial	crisis.		This	ability	to	establish	a	sub-
entity	under	the	treasury	is	usually	a	power	that	congress	would	wield,	but	in	this	case,	the	
president	was	wielding	this	power.		A	similar	body	was	established	by	President	Obama	by	
Executive	Order	13564	on	January	31,	2011.		That	executive	order	established	the	
President's	Council	on	Jobs	and	Competitiveness	in	order	to	advise	the	president	on	
bolstering	the	economy	and	the	prosperity	of	Americans.		Other	executive	orders	during	this	
period	take	steps	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	government	or	national	competitiveness	
established	the	Performance	Improvement	Council,399	National	Commission	on	Fiscal	
Responsibility	and	Reform,400	the	President's	Advisory	Council	on	Financial	Capability,401	
Intellectual	Property	Enforcement	Advisory	Committees,402	the	President's	Advisory	Council	
on	Financial	Literacy,403	and	an	executive	order	to	stop	earmarks.404		Another	attempt	to	
boost	the	USA’s	competitiveness	is	the	SelectUSA	Initiative,	which	seeks	to	have	both	
foreign	and	domestic	business	choose	to	invest	in	America.		This	initiative	was	established	
by	Executive	Order	13577	and	includes	many	provisions	in	which	the	president	utilizes	
powers	that	typically	are	used	by	congress	such	as	assigning	funds	and	staff	from	the	
Commerce	agency	for	this	initiative.		This	executive	order	also	required	giving	new	
responsibilities	to	the	Director	of	the	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	to	help	implement	
the	other	provisions	in	the	order.		Often	these	executive	orders	tie	the	authority	to	issue	
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executive	orders	to	specific	laws.	For	instance	the	National	Export	Initiative	that	Obama	
established	in	Executive	Order	13534	was	authorized	through	the	Export	Enhancement	Act	
of	1992.405		This	Export	Enhancement	Act	explicitly	delegated	authority	to	the	president	to	
take	the	steps	in	this	act	and	gave	him	other	general	powers	to	promote	U.S.	exports.	
Many	of	these	executive	orders	touched	upon	financial	policy,	but	none	had	far	
reaching	consequences	or	was	directly	focused	on	reforming	the	financial	regulatory	
environment	or	on	responding	to	the	crisis.	
	 Thus	though	the	president	could	have	taken	unilateral	action	to	create	new	policy,	
the	bulk	of	the	policy	creation	taken	in	response	to	the	financial	crisis	was	created	directly	
by	congress,	was	formally	delegated	by	congress,	or	was	asserted	by	the	executive	agencies.	
This	lack	of	unilateral	executive	action	appears	in	large	part	due	to	the	fact	that	
there	was	considerable	public	sentiment	for	reform	and	around	the	period	of	Dodd-Frank	
Act,	when	much	of	the	financial	reform	was	being	decided,	Democrats	controlled	the	House,	
the	Senate,	and	the	presidency.		Thus	they	were	able	to	enact	much	or	their	preferred	policy	
changes	in	legislation	rather	than	needing	to	use	executive	orders.		Many	of	the	changes	
that	Dodd-Frank	brought	are	more	popular	with	liberal	rather	than	conservative	groups.		
Many	typically	right-leaning	organizations,	such	as	the	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce,	came	
out	against	many	of	the	new	requirements,	while	many	left-leaning	groups	have	lauded	the	
additional	regulation.	Lawmakers	also	emphasizes	the	political	divide	on	this	issue.		Senator	
Dodd,	who	was	at	the	time	the	Chairman	of	The	Senate	Committee	on	Banking,	Housing,	
and	Urban	Affairs	and	was	one	of	the	namesakes	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act,	said,	"I	could	have	
tried	to	draft	something	that	was,	sort	of,	already	a	compromise	of	ideas	here,	but	I	think	
you	make	a	huge	mistake	by	doing	that.	You're	given	very	few	moments	in	history	to	make	
this	kind	of	a	difference,	and	we're	trying	to	do	that."406		The	bill	passed	in	a	very	partisan	
vote	with	essentially	no	Republican	support.		Furthermore	the	president	put	forward	some	
of	the	provisions	such	as	the	Volker	Rule	that	later	became	law.	
	 Early	in	the	crisis,	when	President	Bush	was	still	in	office,	hesitancy	to	take	executive	
action	seemed	in	part	an	attempt	to	distance	the	policy	responses	from	himself	because	he	
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had	a	realization	that	his	legacy	was	tarnished	and	policy	that	he	created	to	handle	the	crisis	
would	start	out	stigmatized	and	potentially	without	the	adequate	trust	that	was	needed	
during	that	period	to	settle	markets	and	boost	public	sentiment.		Henry	Paulson	in	his	
memoire	of	the	crisis	essentially	ascribed	these	motivations	for	the	reason	much	of	the	
policy	creation	was	delegated	either	explicitly	or	implicitly.407		It	seems	likely	that	
motivations	for	delegating	would	also	be	a	reasonable	explanation	for	forgoing	unilateral	
executive	action.		Timothy	Geithner’s	assessment	of	Bush’s	role	in	the	financial	crisis	seems	
largely	consistent	with	that	of	Henry	Paulson’s	and	thus	it	lends	credibility	to	the	attribution	
of	these	motivations	since	unlike	Paulson,	Geithner	was	far	more	liberal	and	less	likely	to	
paint	President	Bush	in	a	flattering	light.		
	
5.5	Use	of	Implicit	Delegation	
	
	 There	were	numerous	instances	of	delegation	that	took	place	during	this	period.		
These	delegations	did	not	all	take	place	in	the	same	way.		There	were	a	profusion	of	
methods	of	delegation.		There	were	both	acts	of	explicit	delegation	where	congress	passed	
a	law	giving	power	and	authority	to	bureaucrats	and	implicit	delegation	where	the	
administration	asserted	a	power	that	had	not	been	explicitly	delegated	or	which	came	from	
the	constitution	and	the	congress	did	not	take	action	to	question	this	potential	transfer	of	
authority.	
By	implicit	delegation,	this	paper	refers	to	instances	where	the	administration	or	a	
governmental	entity	declares	that	they	have	a	power	and	use	this	power	to	affect	policy	
despite	the	fact	that	the	power	was	not	explicitly	delegated	to	that	political	entity.		This	
paper	will	refer	to	this	as	delegation	because	the	congress	and	the	courts	did	not	challenge	
these	transfers	of	power	from	the	legislative	to	the	executive	branch	and	these	powers	
become	informally	solidified	in	the	new	branch	so	that	even	after	the	crisis,	remnants	of	
these	new	powers	remain	with	their	new	wielders.		In	so	far	as	congress,	which	has	the	
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power	to	forestall	such	transfers	of	power,	takes	no	steps	to	do	so,	they	are	affectively	
letting	power	be	transferred	to	an	agent	to	act	on	their	behalf	or	in	other	words	are	
effectively	delegating	to	the	other	entity.	
	 There	were	several	types	of	implicit	delegation	during	this	period.		An	example	was	
when	the	Fed	and	Treasury	Department	took	extraordinary	actions	to	stop	financial	
companies	from	failing	though	they	had	not	formally	been	given	some	of	the	powers	they	
exercised.		Still	congress	gave	them	slack	and	did	not	question	this	declaration	of	authority	
though	it	certainly	could	have	controlled	the	power	this	way.		In	fact,	the	acceptance	of	
congress’	acceptance	of	the	transfer	of	power	to	the	administration	can	be	seen	in	Barney	
Frank,	Chairman	of	the	House	Committee	on	Financial	Services,	told	Secretary	of	the	
Treasury	that	he	should	stretch	the	authorities	that	he	had	in	his	position	in	order	to	resolve	
the	crisis	and	that	he	would	not	be	questioned.408		This	led	to	a	quick	response	to	the	crisis	
and	allowed	for	a	more	vigorous	government	response	than	if	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury	
stayed	within	more	established	powers.	
When	congress	is	at	odds	with	the	bureaucracy	or	the	president,	congress	holds	the	
final	say.		Almost	all	actions	of	agencies	or	unilateral	actions	of	the	president	can	be	undone	
by	congress.		Congress	has	the	final	word	in	legislative	matters	and	when	a	law	passed	by	
congress	conflicts	with	agency	regulations	or	the	unilateral	actions	of	the	president,	the	
actions	of	congress	have	the	force	of	law	and	the	other	actions	are	effectively	
countermanded.		Thus	assertions	of	power	that	are	not	contained	in	the	constitution	and	
which	had	not	been	previously	delegated	by	the	administration	or	the	bureaucracy	are	
effectively	an	implicit	delegation.	
Once	the	depth	of	the	crises	had	passed	and	government	began	to	focus	on	
regulatory	reform	and	avoiding	future	crises.		The	type	of	delegation	that	was	used	for	the	
bulk	of	the	policy	creation	relating	to	the	overhaul	of	the	financial	regulatory	system	is	
explicit	delegation.		A	common	example	of	this	is	when	congress	passes	a	law	that	transfers	
power	to	the	executive	branch.		Explicit	delegation	was	one	of	the	key	methods	used	during	
the	crisis.	
																																																						
408	Paulson.		2010.		Pg.	XIX.	
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	 In	instances	such	as	TARP	or	the	creation	of	Consumer	Finance	Protection	Bureau	
there	was	an	explicit	delegation	to	an	agency	and	members	of	the	administration	that	was	
written	into	law.		In	other	cases	such	as	the	actions	of	the	Treasury	Secretary	to	prop	up	
banks	or	the	Federal	Reserve	lending	to	organizations	that	had	not	been	approved	of.			
The	Term	Asset-Backed	Securities	Loan	Facility	(TALF)	was	another	program	that	was	
created	to	deal	with	the	crisis.		In	this	case,	the	Federal	Reserve	was	the	agency	behind	the	
program	and	with	it	the	Federal	Reserve	attempted	to	increase	lending.		Because	the	funds	
for	the	program	did	not	come	from	the	Treasury	Department,	congress	did	not	have	to	
approve	the	funding.		However,	congress	did	pass	an	act	forcing	the	Federal	Reserve	to	
show	how	the	money	was	used.		This	program	helped	increase	credit	availability	for	asset	
backed	securities	and	thereby	increase	liquidity	in	these	secondary	securities	markets.		This	
program	was	shut	down	well	before	it	had	spent	the	amount	it	was	initially	designed	to	
spend.		By	having	the	Federal	Reserve	determine	that	it	had	authority	to	implement	this	
program	and	it	was	able	to	self-fund	the	program,	it	was	able	to	take	action	without	getting	
approval	from	congress.		Ultimately	congress	passed	a	law	that	gave	it	oversight	of	this	
program.	
While	this	paper	has	mostly	focused	on	more	formal	methods	that	congress	has	used	
to	control	or	constrain	those	that	were	delegated	to,	Congress	can	also	use	informal	
methods	to	set	the	focus	of	an	agency.		For	instance,	in	June	2008,	the	Speaker	of	the	
House,	Nancy	Pelosi,	wanted	the	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	to	limit	
speculation	in	the	energy	market	and	sent	a	letter	to	the	president	asking	him	to	guide	the	
CFTC	to	use	its	powers	to	enact	this	change.		The	democrats	also	attempted	a	more	formal	
approach	as	well	and	proposed	a	similar	measure	in	the	Energy	Markets	Emergency	Act	of	
2008	though	the	Republicans,	despite	being	in	the	minority	had	enough	votes	to	prevent	
cloture	and	thus	a	vote	on	the	measure.	
	 An	extensive	view	of	its	own	power	can	allow	an	agency	to	expand	its	actions	
beyond	the	limits	of	its	formal	powers.		This	is	particularly	true	where	the	exact	extent	or	
boundaries	of	delegation	were	not	specific.		An	example	of	this	was	FDIC	insuring	foreign	
deposits.		This	was	a	useful	power	that	enabled	it	to	support	Citibank,	which	was	on	the	
verge	of	collapse	and	had	a	high	percentage	of	its	funds	coming	from	foreigners.		Because	of	
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Citibank’s	reliance	on	foreign	deposits,	it	would	be	more	at	risk	of	a	bank	run	if	it	could	not	
insure	these	funds	since	the	money	could	be	taken	out	and	deposited	in	another	country	
where	the	deposits	would	be	insured.	
In	addition,	a	considerable	amount	of	power	had	been	previously	delegated	in	such	a	
way	that	powers	were	realized	once	there	was	a	crisis.		The	definition	of	emergency	was	ill-
defined	so	that	the	administration	and	agencies	could	make	their	own	determination	on	
their	powers.		Many	of	these	powers	were	given	by	prior	laws,	but	had	never	before	been	
used.	These	powers	were	given	in	case	a	need	would	eventually	arise	in	much	the	way	that	
supplies	are	preposition	before	a	storm	to	be	there	when	needed. 
Substantial	powers	had	previously	been	delegated	and	could	be	used	by	members	of	
the	administration	when	an	emergency	called	for	these	powers	to	be	used.		However,	as	the	
president	and	bureaucracy	where	the	main	individuals	that	could	declare	a	state	of	
emergency,	these	powers	were	in	essence	delegated	to	the	administration	as	the	
administration	saw	fit.		In	order	to	give	the	administration	significant	powers	these	
delegations	were	broadly	written	and	gave	considerable	leeway	to	the	administration.		
These	prior	delegated	powers	were	used	extensively	during	the	crisis.	
	 		
6. Conclusion	
	
Congress,	the	president,	and	the	bureaucracy	all	can	craft	and	shape	public	policy	as	
can	other	entities	as	well.		The	method	by	which	policy	is	created	can	explain	some	of	the	
results	of	the	public	policy	such	as	the	political	results	for	those	involved,	the	structure	of	
the	policy	and	what	that	means	for	its	distributive	benefits,	its	adaptability	and	
responsiveness,	as	well	as	to	what	extent	it	meets	the	needs	of	the	nation	in	the	present	
and	moving	forward.	
There	are	many	avenues	of	policy	adoption	open	to	multiple	political	actors.		Each	of	
these	avenues	has	its	own	particular	characteristics	such	as	who	may	utilize	it,	whether	
there	are	checks	on	the	action,	the	timeframe	the	policy	deals	with,	its	flexibility,	its	ability	
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to	leverage	expertise	in	a	field,	the	time	frame	for	its	adoption,	and	its	effect	on	popularity	
and	political	factors.		There	has	been	an	increase	in	the	capabilities	and	responsibilities	of	
the	bureaucracy	and	that	has	led	to	much	policy	making	getting	shifted	to	executive	
agencies	as	well	as	other	entities	such	as	ad	hoc	committees	and	private	entities.		This	paper	
investigated	the	manner	in	which	policy	was	created	to	address	a	severe	financial	crisis	in	
hopes	of	learning	the	consequences	of	these	methods.		
In	a	crisis	there	are	often	many	factors	that	are	not	in	effect	when	enacting	policy	in	
other	periods	where	policy	can	be	created	in	more	deliberative	way.			When	not	in	a	crisis,	
political	actors	make	determinations	about	what	policy	areas	they	want	to	approach	and	
they	can	craft	a	bill	and	gain	support	often	over	years	for	a	specific	course	of	action.		
Likewise,	when	they	are	not	in	the	midst	of	a	crisis,	agencies	can	study	an	issue	until	they	
have	a	full	understanding	and	are	prepared	to	issue	new	policy.		In	a	crisis,	due	both	to	the	
crisis	and	to	higher	scrutiny	by	the	public,	this	is	no	longer	possible	and	action	needs	to	be	
taken	quickly	and	often	without	all	the	facts.		This	is	not	ideal	and	can	lead	to	poor	policy	
being	created.		Thus	by	delegating	to	an	executive	agency,	congress	is	able	to	avoid	a	rushed	
policy	response	to	an	important	issue	area	and	allow	an	agency	with	more	available	
resources	and	expertise	to	determine	policy	in	a	more	deliberate	manner.		Even	when	the	
policy	to	be	created	deals	with	future	crises,	congress	still	feels	a	need	to	act	quickly	to	quell	
the	clamor	of	the	public.		Congress	thus	can	comply	with	the	wishes	of	the	people	for	action	
without	rushing	into	policy	creation	without	the	necessary	grasp	of	the	consequences	of	
that	policy.	
The	president	has	a	number	of	policy-making	tools	such	as	executive	orders	and	
executive	agreements.		However,	as	we	have	seen,	the	president	played	a	relatively	minor	
direct	role	during	the	financial	crisis	in	that	he	neither	took	significant	unilateral	executive	
action	nor	was	the	president	delegated	significant	new	powers	by	congress	to	deal	with	the	
crisis.		Rather,	in	response	to	the	crisis,	the	president	relied	largely	on	his	power	of	
persuasion	to	shape	policy	and	acted	in	a	manner	similar	to	that	described	by	Neustadt.			
We	also	saw	that	there	were	significant	amounts	of	implicit	delegation	early	in	the	
crisis.		In	these	cases,	members	of	the	bureaucracy	asserted	powers	and	made	policy	
decisions	without	explicitly	being	granted	powers	by	the	constitution,	congress,	or	the	
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president.		The	amount	of	implicit	delegation	decreased	as	the	crisis	receded	and	the	focus	
of	government	shifted	from	forestalling	the	deepening	crisis	to	preventing	future	crises.	
Delegation,	both	implicit	and	explicit,	was	used	to	create	a	large	percentage	of	the	
financial	policy	during	this	period.		This	appeared	in	part	to	be	due	to	congress	looking	to	
delegate	away	difficult	decisions	to	executive	agencies.		As	we	saw,	there	was	considerable	
support	during	this	period	for	the	abdication	hypothesis.		Congress	on	multiple	occasions	
made	a	strategic	decision	to	delegate	away	authority	and	responsibility	in	order	to	help	its	
members	politically.	
The	acts	of	delegation	during	this	period	were	also	made	in	a	strategic	way	in	which	
the	agents	of	delegation	and	the	constraints	on	the	agent’s	new	power	were	made	with	
specific	ends	in	mind.		Agents	were	selected	or	created	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	most	
common	of	which	during	this	period	were	to	ensure	agent	independence,	to	leverage	
agency	expertise,	to	ensure	coordination,	and	to	focus	attention	on	a	specific	issue	or	policy	
sphere.	
The	use	of	constraints	varied	quite	widely,	with	different	types	of	constraints	being	
used	for	different	purposes	as	well	as	for	different	circumstances.		Among	the	most	
common	constraints	used	were	time	limits.		These	were	used	both	to	ensure	that	actions	
were	taken	in	a	timely	manner	by	those	that	were	delegated	powers	as	well	as	to	provide	
end	dates	after	which	additional	powers	that	were	delegated	to	deal	with	the	crisis,	but	
which	we	not	needed	beyond	that	period,	would	revert	back	to	congress.	
There	are	often	different	time	horizons	for	policy	in	dealing	with	a	crisis.		There	may	
be	policy	designed	to	deal	with	the	immediate	effects	of	the	crisis,	policy	with	a	slightly	
longer	term	that	seeks	to	deal	with	the	underlying	causes	of	the	crisis	and	stop	the	current	
crisis,	and	a	long	term	time	horizon	that	seeks	to	stop	similar	crises	from	occurring	in	the	
future,	fix	systematic	weaknesses,	or	provided	safety	nets	should	similar	crises	arise.		The	
needs	of	the	moment	are	not	always	the	long	term	needs	and	there	is	always	the	potential	
for	overreaction	in	which	for	political	reasons	or	short	sightedness	policy	is	created	that	
serves	the	current	interests,	but	will	be	unneeded	long	term	or	could	potentially	have	
negative	long	term	ramifications.		These	policies	can	be	created	and	enshrined	in	law	and	
are	hard	to	undo	going	forward.		Congress	seems	to	have	tackled	this	challenge	by	relying	
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heavily	on	time	constraints	and	sunset	provisions	on	the	powers	that	it	delegated	during	the	
crisis.	
Another	common	constraint	type	used	during	this	period	were	consultation	
requirements	that	ensured	that	agencies	were	working	together	to	deal	with	the	crisis	and	
were	not	making	unilateral	decisions	and	that	they	were	informing	counterparts	or	
proposed	policy	changes	in	a	timely	manner.		This	was	designed	to	ensure	that	input	from	
multiple	political	actors	were	taken	into	account	and	a	more	holistic	response	could	be	
crafted	to	deal	with	the	financial	crisis.	
Rule-making	requirements	and	recommendations	were	also	used	extensively	during	
this	period	and	helped	congress	shape	the	direction	of	policy	even	when	much	of	the	
lawmaking	had	been	delegated	to	other	actors.		Rule-making	requirements	allowed	the	
agent	of	delegation	to	use	their	judgment	and	take	action,	but	it	limited	the	scope	of	the	
action	or	prescribed	methods	by	which	policy	should	be	created.	
By	way	of	contrast,	other	types	of	constraints	such	as	spending	limit	constraints,	
appointment	power	limits,	compensation	constraints,	and	judicial	review	constraints	were	
used	relatively	infrequently	during	this	period.		Furthermore	their	use	had	relatively	minor	
effects	on	policy	creation.		In	part	their	disuse	was	because	they	were	less	focused	on	the	
need	to	immediately	create	policy	and	the	requirements	of	having	multiple	actor	work	
together	to	craft	a	cohesive	regulatory	system,	the	way	that	time	limits	and	consultation	
requirements	were.	
The	implications	of	this	study	can	be	used	in	determining	how	best	policy	should	be	
made	during	a	crisis	and	the	structure	and	features	that	would	be	appropriate	to	accomplish	
the	nation’s	goals.		It	also	lays	out	the	often	more	complex	interplay	between	various	
political	actors	which	can	be	investigated	more	generally	in	future	papers.		In	addition,	a	
quantitative	study	of	a	larger	period	may	find	trends	and	tendencies	that	would	be	more	
generalizable	than	in	the	case	study	based	approach	this	paper	put	forward.		In	addition	this	
paper	has	mostly	looked	at	a	recent	timeframe,	but	an	investigation	could	be	done	to	see	
how	policy	making	in	crisis	situations	has	changed	over	time	or	if	indeed	there	are	
similarities	between	other	crises	such	as	the	response	to	World	War	II,	the	Great	
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Depression,	and	the	terrorist	attacks	of	September	11th	and	the	recession	that	begin	in	
2007.	
This	paper	tries	to	answer	some	questions,	but	it	also	leads	to	additional	questions.		
One	area	for	potential	further	study	is	to	investigate	other	types	of	crises	to	see	if	policy	
responses	had	similar	characteristics.		It	could	be	useful	in	determining	the	extent	of	
similarities	between	the	government’s	response	to	various	types	of	crises,	be	they	political,	
economic,	social,	defense,	environmental,	etc.		For	instance	the	governmental	response	to	
this	crisis	seemed	to	have	a	parallel	in	the	government	response	dealing	with	the	aftermath	
of	the	September	11th,	2001	terrorist	attacks.		It	was	vast	and	consisted	of	a	vast	number	of	
governmental	actions	taken	in	several	policy	spaces	and	by	a	large	number	of	political	
actors.		This	in	particular	could	be	a	good	case	study	that	would	allow	for	a	good	
comparison.	
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